AMERICAN  DIPLOMAC 


JOHN    BASSETT  MOORE 


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BENJAMIN    FRANKLIN 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 


ITS    SPIRIT  AND  ACHIEVEMENTS 


BY 

JOHN  BASSETT  MOORE,  LL.D. 

PROFESSOR  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  AND  DIPLOMACY 
COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY 


NEW  YORK  AND  LONDON 

HARPER  &  BROTHERS  PUBLISHERS 
1905 


Copyright,  1905,  by  Harper  &  Brothbrs. 

AU  rights  reserved. 

Published  October,  1905. 


iJbrarj 

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PREFATORY    NOTE  Ml^O^ 

In  the  present  volume  there  is  reproduced,  with 
some  revision  and  amplification,  a  series  of  arti- 
cles that  appeared  in  Harper's  Magazine ;  and  one 
chapter — the  fourth — has  been  added.  The  primary- 
object  of  the  work  is.  to  give,  not  a  chronological 
narrative  of  international  transactions,  but  rather 
an  exposition  of  the  principles  by  which  they  were 
guided,  in  order  that  the  distinctive  purposes  of 
American  diplomacy  may  be  understood  and  its 
meaning  and  influence  appreciated.  Nothing  could 
be  more  erroneous  than  the  supposition  that  the 
United  States  has,  as  the  result  of  certain  changes 
in  its  habits,  suddenly  become,  within  the  past  few 
years,  a  "world-power."  The  United  States  has  in 
reality  always  been,  in  the  fullest  and  highest  sense, 
a  world-power ;  and  the  record  of  its  achievements  in 
the  promulgation  and  spread  of  liberal  and  humane 
doctrines  is  one  in  which  no  American  need  hesitate 
to  own  a  patriotic  pride. 

J.  B.  M. 


1C6G112 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

Prefatory  Note iii 

The  Conduct  of  Foreign  Intercourse      ...  ix 

I.  The  Beginnings i 

II.  The  System  of  Neutrality 33 

III.  Freedom  of  the  Seas 63 

IV.  Fisheries  Questions 87 

V.  The  Contest  with  Commercial  Restrictions     .  105 

VI.  Non-Intervention  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine     .  131 

VII.  The  Doctrine  of  Expatriation 168 

VIII.  International  Arbitration 200 

IX.  The    Territorial    Expansion    of    the    United 

States 223 

X.  Influence  and  Tendencies 248 

Bibliography 267 

Index 271 


ILLUSTRATIONS 


BENJAMIN    FRANKLIN Frontispiece 

JOHN    ADAMS Facing  p.     14 

THOMAS  JEFFERSON "  46 

JOHN    JAY "  56 

JOHN    QUINCY    ADAMS     .      , "  76 

CALEB    GUSHING .  "  122 

MATTHEW    C.    PERRY,   U.  S.  N "  128 

JAMES    MONROE "  134 

HAMILTON    FISH "  I40 

RICHARD    RUSH "  I48 

JOHN    HAY "  158 

WILLIAM    H.    SEWARD "  164 

JAMES    BUCHANAN "  174 

WILLIAM    L.   MARCY "  180 

WILLIAM    PINKNEY "  2o6 

CONTINENTAL   EXPANSION   OF  THE   UNITED  STATES      .  "  223 

ROBERT   R.    LIVINGSTON "  230 


THE  CONDUCT  OF  FOREIGN  IN- 
TERCOURSE 

Prior  to  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  the 
executive  as  well  as  the  legislative  power  of  the 
United  States  resided  in  the  Congress.  For  the 
purpose  of  conducting  foreign  intercourse,  the  Con- 
tinental Congress  established  on  November  29,  1775, 
a  Committee  of  Secret  Correspondence.  This  com- 
mittee was  superseded  on  April  17,  1777,  by  the 
Committee  for  Foreign  Affairs.  The  committee 
plan  having  proved  to  be  utterly  inefficient,  there 
was  created  on  January  10,  1871,  the  Department  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  to  be  presided  over  by  a  Secretary  of 
Foreign  Affairs.  The  first  person  to  fill  this  office 
was  Robert  R.  Livingston,  who  was  elected  August 
10,  1 78 1.  He  entered  upon  his  duties  October  20, 
1 781,  and  served  till  June  4,  1783.  His  successor 
was  John  Jay,  who  assumed  charge  of  the  office  on 
September  21,  1784.  By  the  act  of  July  27,  1789, 
under  the  Constitution,  the  Department  of  Foreign 
Affairs  was  reorganized  and  expanded,  while  by  the 
act  of  September  15,  1789,  its  name  was  changed  to 
the  Department  of  State,  and  the  title  of  the  head 
became  Secretary  of  State.     Jay,   who  had  been 

ix 


CONDUCT   OF  FOREIGN    INTERCOURSE 

appointed  Chief -Justice,  remained  in  charge,  under 
his  commission  as  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs,  till 
March  22,  1790,  when  Jefferson  entered  upon  his 
duties  as  Secretary  of  State.  Below  is  a  list  of 
the  Presidents  and  Secretaries  of  State.  It  will  be 
observed  that  there  are  frequent  gaps  between  the 
terms  of  service  of  the  Secretaries  of  State.  These 
gaps  were  filled  by  ad  interim  designations,  usually 
of  some  member  of  the  cabinet,  or  of  the  chief  clerk 
of  the  Department  of  State,  or  later  of  an  assistant 
secretary,  to  perform  the  duties  of  the  office. 

Presidents  Secretaries  op  State 

George  Washington,  April  30,    Thomas  Jefferson,  commission- 
1789,  to  March  3,  1797.  ed  Sept.  26,  1789;  entered 

on  duties  March  22,  1790; 
served  till  Dec.  31,  1793. 
Edmund    Randolph,    Jan.     2, 

1794,  to  Aug.  20,  1795. 
Timothy    Pickering,    Dec.    10, 

1795,— 
John  Adams,  March  4,  1797,  to   Timothy  Pickering  (continued) 
March  3,  1801.  to  May  12,  1800. 

John  Marshall,  May  13, 1800,  to 
March  4,  1801. 
Thomas    Jefferson,    March    4,   James  Madison,  March  5,  1801, 

1801,  to  March  3,  1809.  to  March  3,  1809. 

James  Madison,  March  4,  1809,    Robert  Smith,  March  6,  1809, 
to  March  3,  1817.  to  April  i,  1811. 

James  Monroe,  April  2,   181 1, 
to  March  3,  1817. 
James  Monroe,  March  4,  181 7,   John  Quincy  Adams,  commis- 
to  March  3,  1825.  sioned  March  5,  1817;  en- 

tered on  duties  Sept.  22, 
181 7;  served  to  March  3, 
1825. 

X 


CONDUCT   OF    FOREIGN    INTERCOURSE 


Presidents  Secretaries  of  State 

John  Quincy  Adams,  March  4,    Henry  Clay,  March  7,  1825,  to 

1825,  to  March  3,  1829.  March  3,  1829. 

Andrew     Jackson,     March     4,    Martin  Van   Buren,   March  6, 
1829,  to  March  3,  1837.  1829,  to  May  23,  1831. 

Edward    Livingston,    May    24, 

1831,  to  May  29,  1833. 
Louis  McLane,  May  29,  1833,  to 

June  30,  1834. 
John  Forsyth,  June  27,  1834, — 
Martin   Van   Buren,   March  4,    John    Forsyth    (continued)    to 

1837,  to  March  3,  1841.  March  3,   1841. 

William  Henry  Harrison,  March    Daniel      Webster,     March      5, 

4,  1841,  to  April  4,  1841.  1841, — 

John  Tyler,  April  6,   1841,  to    Daniel  Webster  (continued)  to 
March  3,  1845.  ^^.y  8,  1843. 

Abel  P.  Upshur,  July  24,  1843, 

to  Feb.  28,  1844. 
John  C.  Calhoun,  March  6, 1844, 
to  March  10,   1845. 
James  K.  Polk,  March  4,  1845,    James  Buchanan,  commission- 
to  March  3,  1849.  ed  March   6,  1845;   enter- 
ed   on    duties   March    10, 
1845;  served  to  March  7, 
1849. 
Zachary  Taylor,  March  5,  1849,    John    M.     Clayton,    March    7, 

to  July  9,  1850.  1849, — ■ 

Millard  Fillmore,  July  10,  1850,    John  M.  Clayton  (continued)  to 
to  March  3,  1853.  July  22,  1850. 

Daniel  Webster,  July  22,  1850, 

to  Oct.  24,  1852. 
Edward  Everett,  Nov.  6,  1852, 
to  March  3,    1853. 
FranklinPierce,  March  4,  1853,    William    L.    Marcy,    March    7, 

to  March  3,   1857.  1853,  to  March  6,  1857. 

James     Buchanan,     March     4,    Lewis  Cass,  March  6,  1857,  to 
1857,  to  March  3,  1861.  Dec.   14,   i860. 

Jeremiah    S.    Black,     Dec.    17, 
i860,  to  March  6,  1861. 
Abraham    Lincoln,    March    4,    William  H.  Seward,  March  5, 
1861,  to  April  15,  1865.  1861, — 

xi 


CONDUCT  OF  FOREIGN  INTERCOURSE 


Presidents 

An  drew  Johnson,  April  15,1865, 

to  March  3,  1869. 
Ulysses    S.    Grant,    March    4, 

1869,  to  March  3,  1877. 


Rutherford  B.  Hayes,  March  5, 
1877,  to  March  3,  1881. 

James  A.  Garfield,  March  4, 
1881,  to  Sept.  19,  1881. 

Chester  A.  Arthur,  Sept.  20, 
1 88 1,  to  March  3,  1885. 


Grover  Cleveland,  March  4, 
1885,  to  March  3,  1889. 

Benjamin  Harrison,  March  4, 
1889,  to  March  3,  1893. 


Grover    Cleveland,    March    4, 
1893,  to  March  3,  1897. 


William    McKinley,    March    4, 
1897,  to  Sept.  14,  1901. 


Theodore  Roosevelt,  Sept.  14, 
1901, 


Secretaries  of  State 

William  H.  Seward  (continued) 

to  March  4,  1869. 
Elihu  B.Washburne,  March  5, 

1869,  to  March  16,  1869. 
Hamilton   Fish,  commissioned 

March    11,    1869;    entered 

on  duties  March  17,  1869; 

served  to  March  12,  1877. 
William  M.  Evarts,  March  12, 

1877,  to  March  7,  1881. 
James  G.  Blaine,  commissioned 

March  5,  1881;  entered  on 

duties  March  7,  1881, — 
James  G.  Blaine  (continued)  to 

Dec.  19,  1881. 
Frederick     T.     Frelinghuysen, 

commissioned      Dec.      12, 

1 881;    entered    on    duties 

Dec.   19,   1881;  served  to 

March  6,  1885. 
Thomas  F.  Bayard,  March  6, 

1885,  to  March  6,  1889. 
James  G.  Blaine,  March  5,  1889, 

to  June  4,  1892. 
John  W.  Foster,  June  29,  1892, 

to  Feb.  23,  1893. 
Walter  Q.  Gresham,  March  6, 

1893,  to  May  28,  1895. 
Richard   Olney,  June  8,   1895, 

to  March  5,  1897. 
John  Sherman,  March  5,  1897, 

to  April  25,  1898. 
William  R.  Day,  April  26, 1898, 

to  Sept.  16,  1898. 
John  Hay,  Sept,  20,  1898, — 
John  Hay  (continued)  to  July 

I,   1905- 
Elihu  Root,  July  7,  1905, — 


AMERICAN   DIPLOMACY 


AMERICAN   DIPLOMACY 

ITS   SPIRIT  AND  ACHIEVEMENTS 


THE   BEGINNINGS 

We  hazard  nothing  in  saying  that  not  only  the 
most  important  event  of  the  past  two  hundred 
years,  but  one  of  the  most  important  events  of  all 
time,  was  the  advent  of  the  United  States  of  Amer- 
ica into  the  family  of  nations.  Its  profound  signifi- 
cance was  not  then  unfelt,  but  in  the  nature  of 
things  its  far-reaching  effects  could  not  be  foreseen. 
Even  now,  as  we  survey  the  momentous  changes  of 
the  last  few  years,  we  seem  to  stand  only  on  the 
threshold  of  American  history,  as  if  its  domain  were 
the  future  rather  than  the  past.  But  the  splendor 
of  the  hour,  while  it  illuminates  the  present,  dark- 
ens by  its  light  what  lies  beyond  the  immediate 
range  of  vision.  The  power  which  we  hold  to-day 
is  no  sudden  and  isolated  possession.  Its  founda- 
tions were  laid  in  the  work  of  the  original  builders; 
and  if  we  would  understand  the  greatness  of  the 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

present  we  must  recur  to  what  has  gone  before. 
Many  nations  have  come  and  gone,  and  have  left 
little  impress  upon  the  life  of  humanity.  The 
Declaration  of  American  Independence,  however, 
bore  upon  its  face  the  marks  of  distinction,  and 
presaged  the  development  of  a  theory  and  a  policy 
which  must  be  worked  out  in  opposition  to  the 
ideas  that  then  dominated  the  civilized  world.  Of 
this  theory  and  policy  the  key-note  was  freedom; 
freedom  of  the  individual,  in  order  that  he  might 
work  out  his  destiny  in  his  own  way;  freedom  in 
government,  in  order  that  the  human  faculties  might 
have  free  course;  freedom  in  commerce,  in  order 
that  the  resources  of  the  earth  might  be  developed 
and  rendered  fruitful  in  the  increase  of  human 
wealth,  contentment,  and  happiness. 

When  our  ancestors  embarked  on  the  sea  of  in- 
dependence, they  were  hemmed  in  by  a  system  of 
monopolies.  It  was  to  the  effects  of  this  system 
that  the  American  revolt  against  British  authority 
was  primarily  due;  and  of  the  monopolies  under 
which  they  chafed,  the  most  galling  was  the  com- 
mercial. It  is  an  inevitable  result  of  the  vital  con- 
nection between  bodily  wants  and  human  happiness 
that  political  evils  should  seem  to  be  more  or  less 
speculative  so  long  as  they  do  not  prevent  the  in- 
dividual from  obtaining  an  abundance  of  the  things 
that  are  essential  to  his  physical  comfort.  This 
truth  the  system  of  commercial  monopoly  brutally 


THE    BEGINNINGS 

disregarded.  From  the  discovery  of  America  and 
of  the  passage  to  the  Eastern  seas,  colonies  were 
held  by  the  European  nations  only  for  purposes  of 
selfish  exploitation.  Originally  handed  over  to  com- 
panies which  possessed  the  exclusive  right  to  trade 
with  them,  the  principle  of  monopoly,  even  after 
the  power  of  the  companies  was  broken,  was  still 
retained.  Although  the  English  colonies  were  some- 
what more  favored  than  those  of  other  nations,  yet 
the  British  system,  like  that  of  the  other  European 
powers,  was  based  upon  the  principle  of  exclusion. 
Foreign  ships  were  forbidden  to  trade  with  the  colo- 
nies, and  many  of  the  most  important  commodities 
could  be  exported  only  to  the  mother  -  country. 
British  merchants  likewise  enjoyed  the  exclusive 
privilege  of  supplying  the  colonies  with  such  goods 
as  they  needed  from  Europe.  This  system  was  ren- 
dered yet  more  insupportable  to  the  American  colo- 
nists by  reason  of  the  substantial  liberty  which  they 
had  been  accustomed  to  exercise  in  matters  of  local 
government.  Under  what  Burke  described  as  a 
policy  of  "wise  and  salutary  neglect,"  they  had  to  a 
great  extent  been  permitted  to  follow  in  such  matters 
their  own  bent.  But  this  habit  of  independence, 
practised  by  men  in  whom  vigor  and  enterprise  had 
been  developed  by  life  in  a  new  world,  far  from 
reconciHng  them  to  their  lot,  served  but  to  accent- 
uate the  incompatibility  of  commercial  slavery  with 
political  freedom.    The  time  was  sure  to  come  when 

3 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

colonies  could  no  longer  be  treated  merely  as  mar- 
kets and  as  prizes  of  war.  The  American  revolt  was 
the  signal  of  its  appearance. 

But  there  was  yet  another  cause.  The  American 
revolt  was  not  inspired  solely  by  opposition  to  the 
system  of  commercial  monopoly.  The  system  of 
colonial  monopoly  may  in  a  sense  be  said  to  have 
been  but  the  emanation  of  the  system  of  monopoly 
in  government.  In  1776  Europe  for  the  most  part 
was  under  the  sway  of  arbitrary  governments. 
To  this  rule  Great  Britain  formed  a  striking  excep- 
tion; but  even  in  Great  Britain  the  struggle  had 
barely  begun  which  was  to  transform  that  nation 
into  the  imperial  democracy  of  the  present  day. 
Great  mutations  were,  however,  impending  in  the 
world's  political  and  moral  order.  The  principles 
of  a  new  philosophy  were  at  work.  With  the  usual 
human  tendency  to  ascribe  prosperity  and  adversity 
alike  to  the  acts  of  government,  the  conviction  had 
come  to  prevail  that  all  the  ills  from  which  society 
suffered  were  ultimately  to  be  traced  to  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  divine  right  of  kings,  on  which  exist- 
ing governments  so  generally  rested.  Therefore,  in 
place  of  the  principle  of  the  divine  right  of  kings, 
there  was  proclaimed  the  principle  of  the  natural 
rights  of  man;  and  in  America  this  principle  found 
a  congenial  and  unpreoccupied  soil  and  an  oppor- 
tunity to  grow.  The  theories  of  philosophers  be- 
came in  America  the  practice  of  statesmen.    The 

4 


THE    BEGINNINGS 

rights  of  man  became  the  rights  of  individual  men. 
Hence,  our  forefathers  in  their  Declaration  of  Inde- 
pendence at  the  outset  declared  "these  truths  to  be 
self-evident:  that  all  men  are  created  equal;  that 
they  are  endowed  by  their  Creator  with  certain  in- 
alienable rights;  that  among  these  are  life,  liberty, 
and  the  pursuit  of  happiness,"  and  that  "to  secure 
these  rights,  governments  are  instituted  among  men, 
deriving  their  just  powers  from  the  consent  of  the 
governed." 

When  the  United  States  declared  their  indepen- 
dence, they  took  stepsto  fulfil  one  of  the  necessary 
conditions  of  national  life  by  endeavoring  to  enter 
into  diplomatic  relations  with  other  powers.  In- 
deed, even  before  that  event,  measures  were  taken 
to  insure  the  proper  conduct  of  foreign  correspond- 
ence. On  November  29,  1775,  the  Continental  Con- 
gress appointed  a  committee  of  five,  which  was 
known  as  the  "Committee  of  Secret  Correspond- 
ence," for  the  purpose  of  communicating  with  the 
friends  of  the  colonies  in  other  parts  of  the  world.* 
On  March  3,  1776,  this  committee  instructed  Silas 
Deane,  of  Connecticut,  to  proceed  to  France  in  the 
character  of  a  secret  agent,  and,  if  possible,  to  as- 

*  This  committee  in  1777  was  denominated  the  "committee 
for  foreign  affairs."  January  lo,  1781,  Congress  estabhshed  a 
"  department  of  foreign  affairs,"  which  was  to  be  in  charge  of  a 
"  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs."  The  first  incumbent  of  this 
office  was  Robert  R.  Livingston,  who  was  appointed  on  August 
10, 1781. 

5 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

certain  whether,  if  the  colonies  should  be  forced  to 
form  themselves  into  an  independent  state,  France 
would  probably  acknowledge  them  as  such  and  en- 
ter into  a  treaty  or  alliance  with  them  for  commerce 
or  defence,  or  both,  and  if  so  on  what  conditions. 
These  instructions  were  signed  by  Benjamin  Frank- 
lin, Benjamin  Harrison,  John  Dickinson,  Robert 
Morris,  and  John  Jay. 

Deane's  mission  was  by  no  means  fruitless;  but, 
after  the  Declaration  of  Independence,  measures  of 
a  more  formal  kind  were  taken.  On  September  17, 
1776,  Congress  took  into  consideration  the  subject 
of  treaties  with  foreign  nations,  and  adopted  a  plan 
of  a  treaty  of  commerce  to  be  proposed  to  the  King 
of  France.  Comprehensive  in  scope  and  far-reach- 
ing in  its  aims,  this  remarkable  state  paper  stands 
as  a  monument  to  the  broad  and  sagacious  views  of 
the  men  who  framed  it  and  gave  it  their  sanction. 
Many  of  its  provisions  have  found  their  way,  often 
in  identical  terms,  into  the  subsequent  treaties  of 
the  United  States;  while,  in  its  proposals  for  the 
abolition  of  discriminating  duties  that  favored  the 
native  in  matters  of  commerce  and  navigation,  it 
levelled  a  blow  at  the  exclusive  system  then  pre- 
vailing, and  anticipated  by  forty  years  the  first 
successful  effort  to  incorporate  into  a  treaty  the 
principle  of  equality  and  freedom  on  which  those 
proposals  were  based.  On  the  other  hand,  as  if 
with  prophetic  instinct,  care  was  taken  that  the 

6 


THE    BEGINNINGS 

expansion  of  the  United  States  in  the  western 
hemisphere  should  not  be  hampered.  The  new  gov- 
ernment, in  turning  to  France  for  aid,  did  not  labor 
under  misconceptions.  It  little  detracts  from  our 
obligations  to  France,  for  support  afforded  us  in  the 
hour  of  peril  and  need,  to  say  that  that  support  was 
not  and  could  not  have  been  given  by  the  French 
monarchy  out  of  sympathy  with  the  principles  an- 
nounced by  the  American  revolutionists.  No  mat- 
ter what  incipient  tendencies  may  have  existed 
among  the  French  people,  there  could  be  on  the  part 
of  the  French  government  no  such  sentiment.  In 
one  point,  however,  the  French  government  and 
the  French  people  were  in  feeling  completely  imited, 
and  that  was  the  determination  if  possible  to  undo 
the  results  of  the  Seven  Years'  War,  as  embodied 
in  the  peace  of  Paris  of  1763.  Under  that  peace 
France  had  given  to  Great  Britain  both  Canada  and 
the  Island  of  Cape  Breton,  and  had  practically  with- 
drawn her  flag  from  the  Western  Hemisphere.  To 
retrieve  these  losses  was  the  passionate  desire  of 
every  patriotic  Frenchman;  and  it  was  believed  by 
the  better  -  informed  among  our  statesmen  that 
France  would  overlook  the  act  of  revolt  and  em- 
brace the  opportunity  to  deal  a  blow  at  her  victo- 
rious rival.  Nevertheless,  in  the  plan  of  a  treaty 
to  be  proposed  to  France  it  was  expressly  declared 
that  the  Most  Christian  King  should  never  invade 
nor  attempt  to  possess  himself  of  any  of  the  coun- 

7 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

tries  on  the  continent  of  North  America,  either  to 
the  north  or  to  the  south  of  the  United  States,  nor 
of  any  islands  lying  near  that  continent,  except  such 
as  he  might  take  from  Great  Britain  in  the  West 
Indies.  With  this  exception,  the  sole  and  perpetual 
possession  of  the  countries  and  islands  belonging  to 
the  British  crown  was  reserved  to  the  United  States. 

When  this  plan  was  adopted,  Franklin,  Deane, 
and  Jefferson  were  chosen  as  commissioners  to  lay 
it  before  the  French  government ;  but  Jefferson  de- 
clined the  post,  and  Arthur  Lee,  who  was  already 
in  Europe,  was  appointed  in  his  stead.  On  Decem- 
ber 4,  1776,  Franklin,  weak  from  the  effects  of  a 
tedious  voyage,  touched  the  coast  of  Brittany,  He 
had  just  reached  the  Psalmist's  first  limit  of  age,  and 
was  no  stranger  to  suffering ;  but,  serene  in  the  faith 
that  sustained  him  in  trials  yet  to  come,  he  entered 
upon  that  career  which  was  to  add  to  his  earlier  re- 
nown and  shed  upon  his  borrowed  years  the  lustre 
of  great  achievements.  As  soon  as  his  health  was 
sufficiently  re-established,  he  hastened  to  Paris,  where 
he  met  his  colleagues  in  the  mission;  and  on  De- 
cember 23  they  jointly  addressed  to  the  Count  Ver- 
gennes,  then  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  France, 
the  first  formal  diplomatic  communication  made  on 
behalf  of  the  United  States  to  a  foreign  power. 

The  plan  of  a  commercial  treaty  which  the  com- 
missioners were  instructed  to  submit  proved  to  be 
unacceptable  to  France ;  nor  was  this  strange.     The 

8 


THE    BEGINNINGS 

French  government,  while  maintaining  a  show  of 
neutrality,  had  indeed  opened  its  treasury  and  its 
military  stores  to  the  Americans,  under  the  guise  of 
commercial  dealings  carried  on  through  the  dram- 
atist, Beaumarchais,  in  the  supposititious  name  of 
a  Spanish  firm.  Nevertheless,  France  was  still  in  a 
state  of  peace,  her  commerce  unvexed  by  war,  while 
America  was  invaded  by  a  hostile  army  and  her  in- 
dependence was  yet  to  be  established.  She  was 
free  at  any  moment  to  become  reconciled  to  Eng- 
land, and  such  a  reconciliation  was  not  deemed  im- 
probable either  in  England  or  in  France,  Even  in 
America  there  were  not  wanting  those  who  expected 
it.  But  the  course  of  events  swept  the  two  coun- 
tries rapidly  along.  The  American  commissioners, 
soon  after  they  met  in  France,  were  authorized  to 
abandon  the  purely  commercial  basis  of  negotiation 
and  to  propose  both  to  France  and  to  Spain  a  po- 
litical connection — to  the  former,  in  return  for  her 
aid,  the  conquest  of  the  West  Indies;  and  to  the 
latter,  the  subjugation  of  Portugal.  These  new  in- 
structions disclosed  on  the  part  of  the  United  States 
a  conviction  of  the  necessity  of  foreign  aid  of  a  more 
direct  and  extensive  kind  than  could  possibly  be 
rendered  within  the  limits  of  neutrality.  While  the 
French  government  was  still  hesitating,  there  came 
the  news  of  the  surrender  of  Burgoyne  at  Saratoga. 
The  report  reached  France  early  in  December,  1777. 
The  signal  success  of  the  American  arms  was  the 

9 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 


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THE    FIRST   FORMAL    DIPLOMATIC    COMMUNICATION     MADE    ON 
lO 


THE    BEGINNINGS 


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i^^C^ 


BEHALF   OF   THE    UNITED    STATES    TO    A    FOREIGN    POWER 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

turning-point  in  the  negotiations.  The  American 
commissioners  at  once  assumed  a  bolder  front.  They 
formally  proposed  a  treaty  of  alliance,  and  insisted 
on  knowing  the  intentions  of  the  French  court. 
The  answer  of  France  came  on  December  17,  On 
that  day  the  American  commissioners  were  informed, 
by  order  of  the  King,  that  his  Majesty  had  deter- 
mined to  acknowledge  the  independence  of  the 
United  States  and  to  make  with  them  a  treaty.  The 
negotiations  then  rapidly  proceeded;  and  on  Feb- 
ruary 6,  1778,  there  were  signed  two  treaties,  one  of 
commerce  and  the  other  of  alliance.  The  commer- 
cial treaty  was  the  one  first  signed,  and  it  thus  be- 
came the  first  treaty  concluded  between  the  United 
States  and  a  foreign  power.  The  treaty  of  alliance 
was  signed  immediately  afterwards.  The  table  on 
which  these  acts  were  performed  is  still  preserved 
in  the  French  Foreign  Office. 

In  the  treaty  of  commerce,  the  original  views  of 
the  United  States  as  to  the  opening  of  the  colonial 
trade  and  the  abolition  of  discriminating  duties 
were  by  no  means  carried  out ;  but  the  terms  actual- 
ly obtained  embodied  the  most-favored-nation  prin- 
ciple, and  were  as  liberal  as  could  reasonably  have 
been  expected.  The  treaty  of  alliance  was,  how- 
ever, of  a  totally  different  nature,  and  established 
between  the  two  countries  an  intimate  association 
in  respect  of  their  foreign  affairs.  No  one  doubted 
that  the  conclusion  of  the  alliance  meant  war  be- 

12 


THE    BEGINNINGS 

tween  France  and  Great  Britain.  France's  recogni- 
tion of  the  independence  of  the  United  States  was 
on  all  sides  understood  to  be  an  act  of  intervention, 
which  the  British  government  would  resent  and 
oppose;  for,  while  the  United  States  had  declared 
their  independence,  they  were  still  in  the  midst  of 
the  struggle  actually  to  secure  it.  This  fact  was  ac- 
knowledged in  the  treaty  itself.  Its  "  essential  and 
direct  end  "  was  avowed  to  be  "to  maintain  effectu- 
ally the  liberty,  sovereignty  and  independence,  abso- 
lute and  unlimited,  of  the  United  States,  as  well  in 
matters  of  government'as  of  commerce  " ;  and  it  was 
agreed  that,  if  war  between  France  and  Great  Brit- 
ain should  ensue,  the  King  of  France  and  the  United 
States  would  make  it  a  common  cause  and  aid  each 
other  mutually  with  their  good  offices,  their  coun- 
sels, and  their  forces.  The  American  idea  as  to  ter- 
ritorial expansion  was,  however,  preserved.  The 
United  States,  in  the  event  of  seizing  the  remaining 
British  possessions  in  North  America  or  the  Bermuda 
Islands,  were  to  be  permitted  to  bring  them  into 
the  confederacy  or  to  hold  them  as  dependencies. 
The  King  of  France  renounced  them  forever,  reserv- 
ing only  the  right  to  capture  and  hold  any  British 
islands  in  or  near  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  In  addition 
to  these  engagements,  the  United  States  guaranteed 
to  France  the  latter's  existing  possessions  in  America 
as  well  as  any  which  she  might  acquire  by  the  future 
treaty  of  peace,  while  France  guaranteed  to  the 

13 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

United  States  their  independence  as  well  as  any 
dominions  which  they  might  obtain  from  Great 
Britain  in  North  America  or  the  Bermuda  Islands 
during  the  war.  In  conclusion,  the  contracting  par- 
ties agreed  to  invite  or  admit  other  powers  who  had 
received  injuries  from  England  to  make  common 
cause  with  them.  This  stipulation  particularly  re- 
ferred to  Spain,  France's  intimate  ally. 

The  French  alliance  was  beyond  all  comparison 
the  most  important  diplomatic  event  of  the  Amer- 
ican Revolution.  It  secured  to  the  United  States, 
at  a  critical  moment,  the  inestimable  support  of  a 
power  which  at  one  time  controlled  the  destinies  of 
Europe  and  which  was  still  the  principal  power  on 
the  Continent.  Only  one  other  treaty  was  obtained 
by  the  United  States  prior  to  the  peace  with  Great 
Britain,  and  that  was  the  convention  of  amity  and 
commerce,  signed  by  John  Adams,  with  representa- 
tives of  their  "  High  Mightinesses,  the  States-General 
of  the  United  Netherlands,"  at  The  Hague,  on  Oc- 
tober 8,  1782;  but  the  Netherlands  were  then  also 
at  war  with  Great  Britain,  and  their  recognition, 
though  most  timely  and  helpful,  was  not  of  vital 
import.  The  failure,  however,  to  make  other  trea- 
ties was  not  due  to  any  lack  of  effort.  Agents  were 
accredited  by  the  Continental  Congress  to  various 
courts  in  Europe.  John  Jay  and  William  Car- 
michael  were  sent  to  Spain;  Ralph  Izard  was  ap- 
pointed to  Tuscany ;  William  Lee  was  directed  to  test 

14 


JOHN    ADAMS 


THE    BEGINNINGS 

the  disposition  of  Vienna ;  Arthur  Lee  was  author- 
ized to  sound  various  courts,  including  that  of  Prus- 
sia ;  Francis  Dana  was  bidden  to  knock  at  the  door 
of  Russia ;  Henry  Laurens  was  commissioned  to  the 
Netherlands.  The  fortunes  and  misfortunes  of  some 
of  these  agents  form  a  curious  chapter. 

There  exists  a  popular  tendency  to  overrate  the 
delights  and  to  underrate  the  hardships  of  the  diplo- 
matic life;  but,  however  much  opinions  may  differ 
on  this  point,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  office 
of  an  American  diplomatist  in  the  days  of  the  Revo- 
lution was  no  holiday-  pastime.  If  he  was  not  al- 
ready in  Europe,  his  journey  to  his  post  was  beset 
with  perils  graver  than  those  .of  the  elements.  In 
the  eyes  of  British  law,  American  revolutionists  were 
simply  "rebels,"  the  reprobation  of  whose  conduct 
was  likely  to  be  proportioned  to  their  prominence 
and  activity;  and  the  seas  were  scoured  by  British 
cruisers,  the  dreaded  embodiment  of  England's  mari- 
time supremacy.  Deane  went  abroad  secretly  before 
independence  was  declared;  but  when  his  presence 
in  France  became  known,  the  British  government 
asked  that  he  be  seized  and  delivered  up  into  its 
custody.  Franklin  sailed  for  France  on  a  small 
vessel  of  war  belonging  to  Congress,  called  the  Re- 
prisal. On  the  way  over  she  took  two  prizes,  and 
more  than  once,  descrying  a  suspicious  sail,  cleared 
for  action.  Had  she  been  captured  by  the  British, 
Franklin  would  have  had  an  opportunity  to  test 

IS 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

the  truth  of  his  remark  to  his  associates  in  Congress, 
that  they  must  "either  hang  together  or  hang 
separately."  Not  long  after  bearing  Franklin  to 
France,  the  Reprisal  went  down  with  her  gallant 
commander,  Captain  Wickes,  off  the  banks  of  New- 
foundland. John  Adams,  on  his  first  journey,  took 
passage  on  an  American  vessel;  on  his  second,  he 
embarked  in  the  French  frigate  Sensible,  and  landed 
at  Ferrol,  in  Spain.  Jay  committed  his  fate  to  the 
American  man-of-war  Confederacy,  and,  like  Adams 
and  Franklin,  reached  his  destination.  Less  fortu- 
nate was  Henry  Laurens. 

Laurens  was  elected  minister  to  the  Netherlands 
in  October,  1779,  but,  owing  to  the  vigilance  of  the 
British  watch  of  the  American  coasts,  did  not  sail 
till  August,  1780,  when  he  took  passage  on  a  small 
packet-boat  called  the  Mercury,  under  the  convoy 
of  the  sloop-of-war  Saratoga.  When  off  the  banks 
of  Newfoundland,  the  Mercury,  then  abandoned  by 
her  convoy,  was  chased  and  seized  by  the  British 
cruiser  Vestal.  During  the  pursuit,  Laurens's  pa- 
pers were  hastily  put  into  a  bag,  with  "  a  reasonable 
weight  of  iron  shot,"  and  thrown  overboard.  The 
weight,  however,  was  not  sufficient  to  sink  them, 
and  they  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  captors,  by  whom 
they  were  "hooked  up"  and  delivered  to  the  Brit- 
ish government.  Laurens  himself  was  imprisoned 
in  the  Tower  of  London.  Never  did  consequences 
more  momentous  flow  from  a  confused  effort  to  sup- 

16 


THE    BEGINNINGS 

ply  the  want  of  previous  precautions.  Among  the 
papers  there  was  a  tentative  plan  of  a  commercial 
treaty  between  the  United  States  and  the  Nether- 
lands, which  William  Lee  had,  on  September  4, 
1778,  agreed  upon  with  Van  Berckel,  Grand  Pension- 
ary of  Amsterdam,  who  had  been  authorized  by  the 
burgomasters  to  treat.  Obviously  this  act  was  in 
no  wise  binding  upon  the  States-General,  and  Van 
Berckel  had  formally  declared  that  the  treaty  was 
not  to  be  concluded  till  the  independence  of  the 
United  States  should  be  recognized  by  the  English. 
But  trouble  had  long  been  brewing  between  the 
English  and  the  Dutch ;  and  the  British  minister  at 
The  Hague  was  instructed  to  demand  the  disavowal 
of  the  treaty,  and  the  punishment  of  Van  Berckel 
and  his  "accomplices"  as  "disturbers  of  the  public 
peace  and  violators  of  the  law  of  nations."  This 
demand  the  Dutch  declined  to  grant;  and  on  De- 
cember 20,  1780,  the  British  government  proclaimed 
general  reprisals. 

While  the  persons  of  our  representatives  were 
safe  from  seizure  upon  the  Continent,  they  obtained 
no  substantial  recognition  outside  of  France  and 
the  Netherlands.  In  1777  Arthur  Lee  was  stopped 
by  the  Spanish  government  when  on  his  way  to 
Madrid.  Jay  and  William  Carmichael  were  after- 
wards allowed  to  reside  there,  but  only  as  private 
individuals.  In  the  early  days  of  the  Revolution, 
Spain  had  given  some  pecuniary  aid  at  the  solicita- 

17 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

tion  of  France.  That  Congress  expected  to  obtain 
from  her  further  assistance  may  be  inferred  from 
the  circumstance  that  Jay  had  scarcely  left  the 
United  States  when  bills  were  drawn  upon  him  to  a 
large  amount.  But,  with  the  exception  of  an  in- 
significant sum,  insufficient  to  enable  him  to  meet 
these  bills,  which  Franklin  had  ultimately  to  take  up, 
Jay  obtained  no  aid  and  made  no  progress.  With 
regard  to  the  Mississippi,  Spain  demanded  an  ex- 
clusive navigation;  but,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
Congress,  against  Jay's  warning  that  such  a  course 
would  render  a  future  war  with  Spain  unavoidable, 
eventually  offered  in  return  for  an  alliance  to 
concede  this  demand  from  31°  of  north  latitude 
southward,  his  mission  failed.  Spain  ultimately 
went  to  war  against  Great  Britain,  but  for  her  own 
purposes.  With  a  presentiment  not  unnatural,  she 
to  the  end  regretted  the  independence  of  the  United 
States.  In  a  prophetic  paper  submitted  to  the 
Spanish  King,  after  peace  was  re-established.  Count 
d'Aranda,  who  was  Spanish  ambassador  at  Paris  dur- 
ing the  American  Revolution,  said:  "The  indepen- 
dence of  the  English  colonies  has  been  recognized. 
It  is  for  me  a  subject  of  grief  and  fear.  France  has 
but  few  possessions  in  America,  but  she  was  bound 
to  consider  that  Spain,  her  most  intimate  aUy,  had 
many,  and  that  she  now  stands  exposed  to  terrible 
reverses.  From  the  beginning,  France  has  acted 
against  her  true  interests  in  encouraging  and  sup- 


THE    BEGINNINGS 

porting  this  independence,  and  so  I  have  often  de- 
clared to  the  ministers  of  that  nation." 

While  the  attitude  of  Spain  towards  the  Revo- 
lution was  affected  by  considerations  of  her  par- 
ticular interests,  it  was  to  a  great  extent  shared  by 
most  of  the  powers  of  Europe.  William  Lee  went 
to  Vienna,  but  was  not  received  there.  Dana  resided 
for  two  years  at  St.  Petersburg  as  a  private  individ- 
ual, and  obtained  nothing  beyond  one  informal  in- 
terview with  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.  Izard 
was  dissuaded  by  the  minister  of  Tuscany,  at  Paris, 
from  attempting  to  visit  that  country,  and  ended 
his  diplomatic  career  in  unhappy  discontent  at  the 
French  capital.  But  the  greatest  misfortune  of  all 
was  that  which  befell  Arthur  Lee  at  the  Prussian 
capital. 

Diplomacy,  in  the  course  of  time,  had  lost  much 
of  its  idle  pomp  and  ceremony,  but  had  gained  little 
in  scrupulousness  and  delicacy.  Bribery  was  still 
one  of  its  most  formidable  weapons ;  but  in  its  treat- 
ment of  Lee  it  also  employed  methods  the  burgla- 
rious grossness  of  which  was  mollified  only  by  the 
histrionic  air  that  pervaded  the  whole  transaction. 
Great  concern  was  felt  by  England  as  to  the  pos- 
sible course  of  Prussia;  and  when,  early  in  May, 
1777,  the  British  government  received,  through  one 
of  its  ubiquitous  agencies,  a  report  that  Lee  and 
Carmichael  were  about  to  proceed  from  Paris  to 
Berlin,  the  Earl  of  Suffolk  directed  Hugh  Elliot,  the 

19 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

British  minister  at  the  latter  capital,  to  "  give  every 
proper  attention  to  their  conduct,  and  the  impression 
which  it  may  make."  His  lordship  added,  with  that 
completeness  and  accuracy  of  information  which 
characterized  all  his  communications,  that  Car- 
michael  had  "the  best  abilities,"  but  that  Lee  was 
more  immediately  in  the  commission  of  Congress. 
At  the  end  of  May,  his  lordship  wrote  that  a  Mr, 
Sayre,  and  not  Carmichael,  would  accompany  Lee  to 
Berlin;  and  Sayre  he  described  as  "a  man  of  des- 
perate private  fortune,  but  with  the  disposition 
rather  than  the  talents  to  be  mischievous."  Sayre 
was  in  fact  one  of  those  adventurers  with  whom 
Lee,  through  bad  judgment,  permitted  himself  often 
to  be  associated,  with  unhappy  results.  Meanwhile, 
before  Elliot  could  have  received  his  lordship's  sec- 
ond letter,  all  diplomatic  Berlin  was  agog  over  the 
arrival  of  Lee  and  a  "Mr.  Stephens,"  such  being 
the  patronymic  under  which  Sayre,  whose  Christian 
name  was  Stephen,  then  travelled,  while  he  assumed 
the  character  of  a  banker,  Elliot,  however,  was  not 
deceived;  and,  with  the  ardent  desire  of  a  young 
man  of  twenty-four  to  show  his  mettle,  he  set  about 
his  task  with  diligence  and  enthusiasm.  His  sus- 
picions were  soon  inflamed  by  learning  that  Lee  had 
had  a  private  interview  with  Count  Schulenburg 
and  was  in  correspondence  with  him,  and  that  Herr 
Zegelin,  formerly  Prussian  minister  at  Constanti- 
nople, who  was  supposed  to  be  much  employed  by 


THE    BEGINNINGS 

Frederick  the  Great  iti  confidential  negotiations,  had 
come  to  Berlin  "unexpectedly,"  and  taken  lodgings 
not  only  in  the  same  inn  with  Lee  and  Sayre,  but 
even  on  the  same  floor.  Nor  was  Elliot  reassured 
when  Count  Schulenburg,  on  a  certain  occasion, 
turned  the  conversation  to  the  "report"  of  the  ar- 
rival of  the  "Americans,"  for  the  purpose  of  saying 
that  he  knew  nothing  of  it ;  nor  when,  still  later,  he 
admitted  that  they  had  proposed  to  sell  some  tobac- 
co at  a  low  price,  but  declared  that  the  King  was 
"entirely  ignorant  of  their  being  at  all  connected 
with  the  rebels  in  America."  Elliot,  however,  had 
determined  to  get  authentic  information  at  first 
hand.  Through  a  German  servant  in  his  employ, 
he  "gained,"  as  he  expressed  it,  the  co-operation 
of  the  servants  at  the  inn  and  of  the  landlord's  wife. 
By  this  means  he  learned  that  Lee  kept  his  papers, 
including  a  journal  of  each  day's  transactions,  in  a 
portfolio  which  was  usually  laid  away  in  a  bureau. 
He  therefore  had  false  keys  made,  both  to  the  door 
of  the  chamber  and  the  bureau ;  and  having  learned 
that  on  a  certain  day  Lee  and  Sayre  were  going  into 
the  country,  where  they  usually  stayed  till  eleven 
at  night,  he  sent  his  German  servant  to  bring  away 
the  papers.  When  the  servant  reached  the  inn, 
some  strangers  had  just  arrived,  and  as  he  could  not 
enter  the  door  without  being  seen,  he  got  into  Lee's 
room  through  a  window.  He  returned  with  the 
portfolio  about  four  o'clock.     Elliot  was  at  dinner, 

21 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

duly  provided  with  four  guests,  "who  were  all  en- 
joined to  the  most  sacred  secrecy,  and  set  to  copy- 
ing instantly,"  while  he  himself  went  about  to  pay 
visits  and  show  himself.  He  was  still  thus  engaged 
when,  calling  about  eight  o'clock  at  the  inn  on  pre- 
tence of  seeing  a  fellow-countryman,  Lord  Russ- 
borough,  he  found  that  Lee  and  Sayre  had  just  ar- 
rived. He  then  assumed  the  most  difficult  part  of 
his  task.  Knowing  that  the  papers  had  not  been 
returned,  he,  in  company  with  Russborough,  joined 
Lee  and  Sayre  and  endeavored  to  amuse  them  with 
conversation,  which  he  did  for  nearly  two  hours, 
without  any  introductions,  or  any  disclosure  of 
names,  but  merely  as  one  who  had  happened  to 
meet  persons  speaking  the  same  language.  At  ten 
o'clock,  however,  Lee  retired,  saying  that  he  must 
go  to  his  room  and  write.  Soon  afterwards  Elliot 
heard  a  "violent  clamor"  in  the  house  of  a  "rob- 
bery" and  "loss  of  papers,"  He  then  drove  home, 
and,  finding  most  of  the  papers  copied,  disguised 
himself  and  took  them  to  the  mistress  of  the  house, 
who,  being  in  the  plot,  told  the  story  that  they 
were  left  at  the  door  by  some  one  who  announced 
their  return  through  the  keyhole  and  then  ran  off. 
Lee  appealed  to  the  police,  and  an  inquiry  was 
promptly  set  on  foot.  It  soon  led  to  the  German 
servant.  Elliot,  who  was  not  unprepared  for  this 
contingency,  immediately  sent  him  out  of  the  coun- 
try, and  made  to  the  Prussian  government,  as  well 

23 


THE    BEGINNINGS 

as  to  his  own,  an  official  explanation  of  the  incident. 
According  to  this  version,  the  affair  was  altogether 
an  accident,  due  to  his  own  imprudence  in  saying 
in  the  presence  of  an  over-officious  servant,  that  he 
would  give  a  large  sum  of  money  to  see  Mr.  Lee's 
papers;  but,  as  soon  as  the  "unwarrantable  action" 
of  the  servant  was  discovered,  the  papers  were  re- 
turned. This  account  naturally  found  little  cre- 
dence, although  diplomatic  opinion  of  the  merits 
of  the  transaction  was  said  to  be  much  "divided." 
But  the  knowledge  of  the  fact  that  the  British  gov- 
ernment had  obtained  copies  of  Lee's  papers  put  an 
end  to  the  attempt  privately  to  negotiate  with  the 
Prussian  government,  and  frustrated  the  plans  for 
obtaining  supplies  from  Prussian  ports. 

In  the  narration  of  the  course  of  our  Revolution- 
ary diplomacy,  there  yet  remains  to  be  mentioned 
one  name,  that  of  Charles  William  Frederick  Dumas. 
To  the  people  of  the  United  States  it  is  to-day  prac- 
tically unknown;  but  I  do  not  hesitate  to  affirm 
that,  with  the  exception  of  Adams,  Franklin,  and 
Jay,  he  rendered  to  the  American  cause  in  Europe 
services  more  important  than  did  any  other  man. 
A  native  of  Switzerland,  though  he  spent  most  of 
his  life  in  the  Netherlands ;  a  man  "  of  deep  learning, 
versed  in  the  ancient  classics,  and  skilled  in  several 
modem  languages";  the  author  and  translator  of  a 
large  nimiber  of  works,  some  of  which  related  to 
America,  and  the  editor  of  an  edition  of  Vattel,  with 

33 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

a  preface  and  copious  notes — he  felt  at  the  very  be- 
ginning the  inspiration  of  the  American  cause,  and 
from  thenceforth  dedicated  his  all  to  its  advance- 
ment. When  the  first  report  of  the  Revolution  was 
heard  in  Europe,  he  began  to  employ  his  pen  in  its 
support.  Besides  publishing  and  circulating  an  ex- 
planation of  its  causes,  he  translated  and  spread 
abroad  the  proceedings  of  the  Continental  Congress. 
Towards  the  end  of  1775,  his  services  were  solicited 
by  Franklin,  in  the  name  of  the  Committee  of  Secret 
Correspondence,  as  an  agent  of  the  American  colo- 
nies in  the  Netherlands.  He  accepted  the  commis- 
sion with  the  promise  of  "a  hearty  good- will  and  an 
untiring  zeal,"  adding:  "This  promise  on  my  part  is 
in  fact  an  oath  of  allegiance,  which  I  spontaneously 
take  to  Congress."  Never  was  oath  more  faithfully 
kept.  His  voluminous  reports  to  Congress,  some  of 
which  have  been  published,  attest  his  constant  ac- 
tivity. He  journeyed  from  city  to  city,  and  from 
state  to  state,  in  the  Low  Countries,  as  the  apostle 
of  American  independence.  He  lent  his  aid  to 
Adams  as  secretary  and  translator,  and  later  acted 
as  charge  d'affaires,  exchanging  in  that  capacity  for 
the  United  States  the  ratifications  of  the  treaty  which 
Adams  had  concluded  with  the  Dutch  government. 
And  if,  when  the  treaty  was  made,  it  represented  not 
merely  a  perception  of  material  interests,  but  the 
sentiment  of  fraternity  commemorated  in  the  medals 
of  the  time,  the  fact  was  in  no  small  measure  due 

24 


THE    BEGINNINGS 

to  the  untiring  devotion  of  this  neglected  advocate 
of  the  American  cause,  to  whom  some  memorial 
should  yet  be  raised  in  recognition  of  his  zeal,  his 
sacrifices,  and  his  deserts. 

We  have  seen  that  in  diplomacy,  in  spite  of  its 
supposed  precautions,  chance  often  plays  an  im- 
portant part.  So  it  happened  in  the  case  of  the 
negotiations  between  England  and  America  for 
peace.  In  the  winter  of  1781-82,  a  friend  and 
neighbor .  of  Franklin's,  Madame  Brillon,  met  at 
Nice  a  number  of  the  English  gentry.  Among  these 
was  Lord  Cholmondeley,  who  promised  while  on  his 
return  to  England  to  call  upon  Franklin  and  drink 
tea  with  him  at  Passy.  On  March  21,  1782,  Frank- 
lin received  a  note  from  his  lordship,  who,  in  the  in- 
terview that  followed,  offered  to  bear  a  note  to  Lord 
Shelbume,  who,  as  he  assured  Franklin,  felt  for  him 
a  high  regard.  Franklin  accepted  the  suggestion 
and  wrote  a  brief  letter,  in  which  he  expressed  a 
wish  that  a  "  general  peace  "  might  be  brought  about, 
though  he  betrayed  no  hope  that  it  would  soon  take 
place.  But  at  this  moment  the  political  situation 
in  England  was  somewhat  tumultuous.  The  Amer- 
ican war  was  becoming  more  and  more  unpopular; 
and  on  March  20th  Lord  North  resigned.  In  this 
emergency  George  III.  sent  for  Lord  Shelbume. 
Shelburne  advised  that  Lord  Rockingham  be  called 
to  the  head  of  the  cabinet,  and  declared  the  recogni- 
tion of  American  independence  to  be  indispensable. 

25 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

Rockingham  was  made  Prime-Minister,  and  Shel- 
bume  became  Secretary  for  Home  and  Colonial  Af- 
fairs. The  Foreign  Office  was  given  to  Charles  James 
Fox.  Franklin's  letter  to  Shelbume  was  written 
without  knowledge  of  the  significant  change  then 
taking  place  in  the  British  ministry.  Soon  after- 
wards news  came  of  Shelbume 's  entrance  into  the 
cabinet ;  but  Franklin  thought  no  more  of  his  letter 
till  the  second  week  in  April,  when  a  neighbor  ap- 
peared and  introduced  a  Mr.  Oswald,  who  after 
some  conversation  handed  Franklin  two  letters,  one 
from  Shelbume  and  the  other  from  Henry  Laurens. 
The  letter  from  Shelbume,  besides  commending  Os- 
wald as  an  honest  and  capable  man,  expressed  his 
lordship's  desire  to  retain  between  himself  and 
Franklin  the  same  simplicity  and  good  faith  which 
had  subsisted  between  them  in  transactions  of  less 
importance. 

Although  Fox  has  always  been  regarded  with 
affection  in  America  as  a  friend  of  the  colonists,  it 
was  fortunate  that  the  negotiations  fell  into  the 
hands  of  Shelbume.  Associated  in  his  earlier  ca- 
reer with  men  of  reactionary  tendencies,  he  after- 
wards became  an  eminent  representative  of  the 
liberal  economic  school  of  which  Adam  Smith  was 
the  founder.  As  often  happens,  this  change  in  his 
position  gave  rise  to  suspicions  as  to  his  sincerity. 
Lacking  the  vehemence  which  characterized  Fox,  and 
which  gives  even  to  the  most  flexible  conduct  the 

26 


THE    BEGINNINGS 

air  of  passionate  sincerity,  Shelbume  was  a  man  of 
high  intellectual  power,  who  followed  the  dictates 
of  reason  rather  than  the  impulses  of  feeling.  No 
better  evidence  could  be  adduced  of  the  sincerity 
of  his  desire  to  treat  on  the  most  liberal  basis  than  his 
choice  of  Richard  Oswald  as  a  negotiator.  Ingen- 
uous and  impulsive,  in  the  end  the  British  cabinet 
was  obliged  to  send  an  assistant  to  withdraw  some 
of  his  concessions.  On  the  part  of  the  United  States, 
authority  to  negotiate  for  peace  had  been  given  to 
Adams,  Franklin,  Jay,  and  Laurens.  Jay  arrived 
in  Paris  late  in  June,  1782,  and  for  a  time  thereafter, 
owing  to  the  illness  of  Franklin,  the  negotiations  fell 
chiefly  into  his  hands.  But  on  July  6th  Franklin 
presented  to  Oswald  certain  propositions,  three  of 
which  were  put  forward  as  necessary,  and  two  as 
advisable.  The  former  were  (i)  the  acknowledg- 
ment of  independence,  (2)  a  settlement  of  the  boun- 
daries, and  (3)  freedom  of  fishing ;  the  advisable  stipu- 
lations were  (i)  free  commercial  intercourse  and  (2) 
the  cession  of  the  province  of  Canada  to  the  United 
States,  partly  in  payment  of  war  claims  and  partly 
to  create  a  fimd  for  the  compensation  of  loyalists 
whose  property  had  been  seized  and  confiscated. 
The  negotiations  continued  substantially  on  these 
lines  till  Adams,  fresh  from  his  triumphs  in  the 
Netherlands,  joined  his  associates  in  the  commission. 
He  arrived  in  Paris,  October  26,  1782.  The  British 
government  had  then  conceded  (i)  independence, 

27 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

(2)  a  settlement  of  the  boundaries,  (3)  the  restric- 
tion of  Canada  to  its  ancient  Hmits,  and  (4)  freedom 
of  fishing  on  the  banks  of  Newfoundland  and  else- 
where. There  still  remained  open  the  questions  (i) 
of  the  right  to  dry  fish  on  the  British  coasts,  (2) 
the  payment  of  debts  due  to  British  subjects  prior 
to  the  war,  and  (3)  the  compensation  of  the  loyalists. 
To  the  last  measure  Franklin  was  unalterably  op- 
posed, and  whenever  it  was  pressed  brought  up  his 
proposition  for  the  cession  of  Canada.  Adams  was 
equally  insistent  upon  the  right  of  drying  and  cur- 
ing fish  on  the  British  coasts.  The  question  as  to 
the  payment  of  debts  grew  out  of  the  acts  of  seques- 
tration passed  by  certain  States  during  the  Revo- 
lution for  the  purpose  of  causing  debts  due  to  Brit- 
ish creditors  to  be  paid  into  the  public  treasuries. 
The  lawfulness  of  this  transaction  became  a  subject 
of  controversy  in  the  peace  negotiations,  especially 
in  connection  with  the  claims  of  the  loyalists  for 
compensation  for  their  confiscated  estates.  Frank- 
lin and  Jay,  though  they  deprecated  the  policy  of 
confiscating  private  debts,  hesitated  on  the  ground 
of  a  want  of  authority  in  the  existing  national  gov- 
ernment to  override  the  acts  of  the  States.  But,  by 
one  of  those  dramatic  strokes  of  which  he  was  a 
master,  John  Adams,  when  he  arrived  on  the  scene, 
ended  the  discussion  by  suddenly  declaring,  in  the 
presence  of  the  British  plenipotentiaries,  that  he 
"had  no  notion  of  cheating  anybody";  and  that, 

28 


THE    BEGINNINGS 

while  he  was  opposed  to  compensating  the  loyalists, 
he  would  agree  to  a  stipulation  to  enable  the  Brit- 
ish creditors  to  sue  for  the  recovery  of  their  debts. 
Such  a  stipulation  was  inserted  in  the  treaty.  It  is 
remarkable  not  only  as  the  embodiment  of  an  en- 
lightened policy,  but  also  as  the  strongest  assertion 
in  the  acts  of  that  time  of  the  power  and  authority 
of  the  national  government.  The  final  concession 
as  to  the  fisheries  was  also  granted  upon  the  demand 
of  Adams,  who  declared  that  he  would  not  sign  a 
treaty  on  any  other  terms.  Before  the  close  of  the 
negotiations,  Henry  Laurens  arrived  in  Paris;  and 
there,  on  November  30th,  he  joined  his  three  col- 
leagues in  signing,  with  Richard  Oswald,  the  pro- 
visional articles  of  peace.  It  has  often  been  said 
that  of  all  the  treaties  Great  Britain  ever  made,  this 
was  the  one  by  which  she  gave  the  most  and  took 
the  least.  It  brought,  however,  upon  Shelbume 
and  his  associates  the  censure  of  the  House  of  Com- 
mons, and  caused  the  downfall  of  his  ministry. 

The  articles  were  signed  by  the  American  com- 
missioners without  consultation  with  the  French 
government.  In  taking  this  course,  the  commis- 
sioners acted  in  opposition  to  their  instructions. 
Their  action  was  due  to  suspicions  first  entertained 
by  Jay,  but  in  which  Adams,  who  besides  was  little 
disposed  to  defer  to  Vergennes,  participated.  Frank- 
lin, although  he  does  not  appear  to  have  shared  the 
feelings  of  his  colleagues,  determined  to  act  with 

29 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

them.  The  question  whether  they  were  justified  has 
given  rise  to  controversies  perhaps  more  volumi- 
nous than  important.  Every  source  of  information 
has  been  diligently  explored  in  order  to  ascertain 
whether  the  suspicions  of  Jay  were,  in  fact,  well  or 
ill  founded.  This  test  does  not,  however,  seem  to 
be  necessarily  conclusive.  In  law,  the  justification 
of  an  act  often  depends  not  so  much  upon  the  actual 
as  upon  the  apparent  reality  of  the  danger.  The 
principal  ground  of  Jay's  distrust  was  a  secret  mis- 
sion to  England  of  Rayneval,  an  attache  of  the 
French  Foreign  Office,  and  an  especial  representative 
of  Vergennes.  Jay  suspected  that  Rayneval  had 
been  sent  to  London  to  learn  from  Shelbume  the 
views  of  the  American  commissioners,  and  to  assure 
him  of  the  support  of  France  if  he  should  reject  their 
claims  to  the  fisheries  and  the  Mississippi.  The  dis- 
closure in  recent  years  of  Rayneval's  reports  to  Ver- 
gennes has  shown  that  his  mission  had  other  ob- 
jects, though  it  is  no  doubt  also  true  that  the 
government  of  France,  mindful  of  its  own  historic 
contentions,  as  well  as  of  the  interests  of  its  other 
ally,  Spain,  regarded  the  claims  of  the  Americans 
as  excessive  and  was  indisposed  to  support  them. 
But  whether  the  conduct  of  the  American  commis- 
sioners was  or  was  not  justifiable,  it  aroused  the  in- 
dignation of  the  French  government.  "You  are 
about  to  hold  out,"  wrote  Vergennes  to  Franklin, 
"  a  certain  hope  of  peace  to  America  without  even 

30 


THE    BEGINNINGS 

informing  yourself  of  the  state  of  negotiations  on 
our  part.  You  are  wise  and  discreet,  sir ;  you  per- 
fectly understand  what  is  due  to  propriety;  you 
have  all  your  life  performed  your  duties.  I  pray 
you  to  consider  how  you  propose  to  fulfil  those 
which  are  due  to  the  King.  I  am  not  desirous  of 
enlarging  these  reflections.  I  recommend  them  to 
your  own  integrity."  No  paper  that  Franklin  ever 
wrote  displays  his  marvellous  skill  to  more  advan- 
tage than  his  reply  to  these  reproaches.  While 
protesting  that  nothing  had  been  agreed  in  the 
preliminaries  contrary'  to  the  interests  of  France, 
he  admitted  that  the  American  commissioners  had 
"been  guilty  of  neglecting  a  point  of  bienseance." 
But  as  this  was  not,  he  declared,  from  want  of 
respect  to  the  King,  whom  they  all  loved  and 
honored,  he  hoped  that  it  would  be  excused,  and 
that  "the  great  work,  which  has  hitherto  been 
so  happily  conducted,  is  so  nearly  brought  to  per- 
fection, and  is  so  glorious  to  his  reign,  will  not  be 
ruined  by  a  single  indiscretion  of  ours."  And  then 
he  adds  this  adroit  suggestion :  "  The  English,  I  just 
now  learn,  flatter  themselves  they  have  already  divided 
us.  I  hope  this  little  misunderstanding  will  there- 
fore be  kept  a  secret,  and  that  they  will  find  them- 
selves totally  mistaken." 

When  the  provisional  articles  of  peace  were  signed, 
the  American  commissioners  hoped  subsequently  to 
be  able  to  conclude  a  commercial  arrangement. 

31 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

This  hope  proved  to  be  delusive.  On  September  3, 
1783,  the  provisional  articles  were  formally  con- 
verted into  a  definitive  peace.  The  old  system,  em- 
bodied in  the  Navigation  Act,  England  even  yet 
was  not  ready  to  abandon.  It  still  dominated 
Europe,  and  confined  the  New  World  outside  of  the 
United  States.  Years  of  strife  were  to  ensue  before 
it  was  to  fall  to  pieces ;  and  in  the  course  of  the  con- 
flict the  United  States  was  to  stand  as  the  exponent 
and  defender  of  neutral  rights  and  commercial  free- 
dom. 


II 

THE   SYSTEM    OF   NEUTRALITY 

Between  1776,  when  independence  was  pro- 
claimed, and  1789,  when  the  government  under  the 
Constitution  was  inaugurated,  the  United  States 
entered  into  fourteen.-  treaties  —  six  with  France, 
three  with  Great  Britain,  two  with  the  Netherlands, 
and  one  each  with  Sweden,  Prussia,  and  Morocco; 
but  a  majority  of  all  were  negotiated  and  signed  in 
France,  at  Paris  or  at  Versailles.  Eight  were  sub- 
scribed, on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  by  two  or 
more  plenipotentiaries;  and  among  their  names  we 
find,  either  alone  or  in  association,  that  of  Franklin, 
ten  times ;  the  name  of  Adams,  seven  times ;  that  of 
Jefferson,  three  times ;  and  that  of  Jay,  twice.  These 
early  treaties  covered  a  wide  range  of  subjects,  em- 
bracing not  only  war  and  peace,  and,  as  did  those 
with  France,  political  alliance,  but  also  commercial 
intercourse  and  the  rights  of  consuls.  Among  their 
various  stipulations,  we  find  provisions  for  liberty 
of  conscience,  and  for  the  removal  of  the  disability  of 
aliens  in  respect  of  their  property  and  their  business. 
Stipulations  for  the  mitigation  of  the  evils  of  war  are 
3  33 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

numerous.  A  fixed  time  is  allowed,  in  the  unfortunate 
event  of  hostilities,  for  the  sale  or  withdrawal  of 
goods;  provision  is  made  for  the  humane  treatment 
of  prisoners  of  war;  the  exercise  of  visit  and  search 
at  sea  is  regulated  and  restrained ;  the  acceptance  by 
a  citizen  of  the  one  country  of  a  privateering  com- 
mission from  the  enemy  of  the  other  is  assimilated 
to  piracy;  and  an  effort  is  made  to  limit  the  scope 
of  belligerent  captures  at  sea.  But,  prior  to  the 
establishment  of  the  Constitution,  it  was  easier  for 
the  United  States  to  make  treaties  than  to  enforce 
them.  In  spite  of  the  engagement  of  the  treaty  of 
peace,  that  his  Britannic  Majesty  should  with  "all 
convenient  speed"  withdraw  his  "armies,  garrisons 
and  fleets"  from  the  United  States,  important  posts 
within  the  northern  frontier  continued  to  be  occu- 
pied by  the  British  forces;  and  when  the  govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  protested,  the  British 
government  pointed  to  the  refusal  of  the  State  courts 
to  respect  the  treaty  pledge  that  British  creditors 
should  meet  with  no  lawful  impediment  to  the  re- 
covery of  their  confiscated  debts.  For  similar  rea- 
sons, the  act  of  the  United  States  in  sending  John 
Adams,  soon  after  the  peace,  as  minister  to  the  court 
of  St.  James,  remained  unreciprocated. 

The  termination  of  the  period  of  divergence  and 
of  incapacity  for  uniform  action  among  the  several 
States  came  none  too  soon.  Perils  were  close  at 
hand,  the  disruptive  impulses  of  which  the  old  con- 

34 


THE    SYSTEM    OF    NEUTRALITY 

federation  could  not  have  withstood.  They  were 
even  to  test  the  efficacy  of  the  new  Constitution. 
In  1789,  when  that  instrument  was  put  into  opera- 
tion, France  was  in  the  first  throes  of  the  great  revo- 
lution which  was  eventually  to  involve  all  Europe 
in  a  struggle  of  unprecedented  magnitude  and 
severity.  What  attitude  was  the  United  States  to 
hold  towards  this  impending  conflict  ?  Even  apart 
from  the  treaties  with  France  of  1778,  the  question 
was  fraught  with  grave  possibilities.  For  genera- 
tions, Europe  had  been  a  vast  battle-ground,  on 
which  had  been  fought  out  the  contests  not  only 
for  political  but  also  for  commercial  supremacy. 
Of  the  end  of  these  contests,  there  appeared  to  be 
no  sign;  nor,  in  spite  of  their  long  continuance,  had 
the  rights  and  duties  of  non-participant  or  neutral 
nations  been  clearly  and  comprehensively  defined. 
Indeed,  so  intricate  were  the  ramifications  of  the 
European  system  that,  when  discords  arose,  it 
seemed  to  afford  little  room  for  neutrality.  The 
situation  of  the  United  States  was  essentially  dif- 
ferent. Physically  remote  from  the  Old  World, 
its  political  interests  also  were  detached  from  those 
of  Europe.  Except  as  it  might  be  drawn  into 
disputes  affecting  the  fate  of  existing  colonies  or 
the  formation  of  new  ones  in  America,  it  was 
not  likely  to  become  embroiled  in  European  wars. 
Not  only,  therefore,  did  it  enjoy  the  opportunity 
to  be  neutral,  but  its  permanent  interest  appeared 

35 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

to  be  that  of  neutrality;  and  the  importance  of 
preserving  this  interest  was  greatly  enhanced  by 
the  necessity  of  commercial  and  industrial  develop- 
ment. The  new  nation,  though  born,  was  yet  to 
demonstrate  to  a  world  somewhat  sceptical  and  not 
altogether  friendly  its  right  and  its  power  to  live 
and  to  grow.  It  was  easy  to  foresee  that  its  enter- 
prise would  penetrate  to  the  farthest  corners  of  the 
globe,  and  that  its  commerce,  overspreading  the 
seas,  would  be  exposed  to  hazards  and  vexations  of 
which  the  most  uncertain  and  potentially  the  most 
disastrous  were  those  arising  from  the  exorbitant 
pretensions  of  belligerents.  To  resist  these  pre- 
tensions would  fall  to  the  lot  of  a  neutral  power; 
and  upon  the  results  of  this  resistance  would  depend 
the  right  to  be  independent  in  reality  as  well  as  in 
name,  and  to  enjoy  the  incidents  of  independence. 
In  circumstances  such  as  these  it  is  not  strange 
that  Washington  and  his  advisers  watched  with 
anxiety  the  progress  of  the  French  Revolution,  as, 
growing  in  intensity  and  in  violence,  it  encountered, 
first,  the  agitated  disapprobation,  and  then  the 
frantic  opposition  of  other  powers.  It  was  not  till 
1793,  when  England  entered  into  the  conflict,  that 
the  war,  by  assuming  a  distinctively  maritime  form, 
raised  a  question  as  to  the  obligations  of  the  United 
States  under  the  treaties  with  France;  but,  long 
prior  to  that  event,  popular  feeling  in  America  was 
deeply  stirred.     Although  the  treaties  of  1778  were 

36 


THE    SYSTEM    OF    NEUTRALITY 

made  with  Louis  XVI.,  yet  in  the  sounds  of  the 
French  Revolution  the  American  people  discerned  a 
reverberation  of  their  own  immortal  declaration. 
From  Boston  to  Savannah,  there  were  manifesta- 
tions of  the  liveliest  sympathy  and  enthusiasm.  To 
set  bounds  to  this  tendency,  obviously  would  require 
the  exercise  of  unusual  prudence  and  firmness  on  the 
part  of  those  intrusted  with  the  affairs  of  govern- 
ment. America  had  fought  for  freedom,  but  her 
statesmen  were  not  mere  doctrinaires.  Their  aims 
were  practical.  They  understood  that  the  peace- 
ful demonstration  of  the  beneficence  of  their  prin- 
ciples, in  producing  order,  prosperity,  and  content- 
ment at  home,  was  likely  to  accomplish  far  more  for 
the  cause  of  liberty  than  an  armed  propagandism, 
which  perchance  might  ultimately  degenerate  into 
military  despotism.  It  was  therefore  important  to 
avoid  premature  commitments.  To  a  perception 
of  this  fact  is  no  doubt  to  be  ascribed  the  appoint- 
ment by  Washington,  on  January  12,  1792,  of 
Gouvemeur  Morris  as  minister  to  France.  In  his 
own  country  Morris  had  been  a  supporter  of  the 
Revolution,  a  member  of  the  Continental  Congress, 
assistant  to  Robert  Morris  in  the  management  of 
the  public  finances,  and  a  member  of  the  Constitu- 
tional Convention  of  1787.  From  the  beginning, 
however,  he  had  exhibited  a  distrust  of  the  revolu- 
tion in  France.  He  instinctively  recoiled  from  the 
excesses  that  were  committed  when  his  forebodings 

37 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

came  to  be  fulfilled.  Before  he  became  minister  of 
the  United  States,  he  offered  his  counsel  to  Louis 
XVL,  in  a  sense  directly  antagonistic  to  the  Revo- 
lution; and  he  afterwards  sought  to  effect  that 
monarch's  escape.  Such  a  man  could  not  be  ac- 
ceptable to  the  revolutionary  leaders ;  but  he  at  any 
rate  possessed  an  intimate  knowledge  of  the  condi- 
tions and  tendencies  of  the  time,  and  was  not  likely 
to  commit  his  government  to  extravagant  policies. 
Early  in  1793  a  new  minister  was  appointed  by 
France  to  the  United  States.  His  name  was  Ed- 
mond  C.  Genet.  Of  Morris  he  was  in  many  respects 
the  precise  antithesis ;  for,  while  by  no  means  desti- 
tute of  experience,  he  was  a  turbulent  champion  of 
the  new  order  of  things.  According  to  his  own  ac- 
count, he  was  placed  at  the  age  of  twelve  years  in 
the  French  Foreign  Office,  where,  under  the  direc- 
tion of  his  father,  he  translated  into  French  a  num- 
ber of  American  political  writings.  After  spending 
seven  years  at  the  head  of  a  bureau  at  Versailles, 
under  the  direction  of  Vergennes,  he  passed  one 
year  at  London,  two  years  at  Vienna,  one  at  Berlin, 
and  five  in  Russia.  At  St.  Petersburg,  however,  he 
fell  into  difficulties.  Because  of  some  of  his  repre- 
sentations, which  were  pitched  too  high  in  the  revo- 
lutionary scale,  the  Empress  Catherine  requested  his 
recall,  and,  when  it  was  refused,  dismissed  him.  In 
reporting  his  departure  for  the  United  States,  Mor- 
ris observed  that  "  the  pompousness  of  this  embassy 

38 


THE    SYSTEM    OF    NEUTRALITY 

could  not  but  excite  the  attention  of  England," 
What  it  was  that  called  forth  this  remark  does  not 
appear ;  but,  whatever  it  may  have  been,  there  can 
be  no  doubt  that  Gen^t  set  out  on  his  mission  gur- 
gling with  the  fermentation  of  the  new  wine  of  the 
Revolution;  and  he  had  scarcely  left  France  when 
Morris  reported  that  the  Executive  Council  had  sent 
out  by  him  three  hundred  blank  commissions  for 
privateers,  to  be  distributed  among  such  persons  as 
might  be  willing  to  fit  out  vessels  in  the  United  States 
to  prey  on  British  commerce. 

On  April  i8,  1793,  before  this  report  was  received, 
Washington  submitted  to  the  various  members  of 
his  cabinet  a  series  of  questions  touching  the  rela- 
tions between  the  United  States  and  France.  These 
questions  were,  first,  whether  a  proclamation  of 
neutrality  should  issue;  second,  whether  a  minister 
from  the  republic  of  France  should  be  received; 
third,  whether,  if  received,  he  should  be  received 
unconditionally  or  with  qualifications ;  fourth, 
whether  the  treaties  previously  made  with  France 
were  to  be  considered  as  still  in  force.  At  a  meet- 
ing of  the  cabinet,  on  April  19th,  it  was  determined, 
with  the  concurrence  of  all  the  members,  that  a 
proclamation  of  neutrality  should  issue,  and  that 
the  minister  from  the  French  Republic  should  be 
received.  On  the  third  question,  Hamilton,  who 
was  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  was  supported  by 
Knox,  the  Secretary  of  War,  in  the  opinion  that  the 

39 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

reception  should  be  qualified,  while  Washington,  Jef- 
ferson, his  Secretary  of  State,  and  Randolph,  the 
Attorney-General,  inclined  to  the  opposite  view; 
but  the  third  and  fourth  questions  were  postponed 
for  further  consideration.  In  a  subsequent  written 
opinion  Hamilton  argued  that  the  reception  of  Genet 
should  be  qualified  by  an  express  reservation  of  the 
question  whether  the  treaties  were  not  to  be  deemed 
temporarily  and  provisionally  suspended  by  reason 
of  the  radical  change  in  conditions  since  they  were 
formed.  He  also  thought  the  war  plainly  offensive 
on  the  part  of  France,  while  the  alliance  was  de- 
fensive. On  the  other  hand,  Jefferson  maintained 
that  the  treaties  were  not  "between  the  United 
States  and  Louis  Capet,  but  between  the  two  na- 
tions of  America  and  France,"  and  that  "  the  nations 
remaining  in  existence,  though  both  of  them  have 
since  changed  their  forms  of  government,  the 
treaties  are  not  annulled  by  these  changes."  He 
also  contended  that  the  reception  of  a  minister  had 
nothing  to  do  with  this  question. 

On  April  22,  1793,  Washington  issued  his  famous 
proclamation  of  neutrality.  On  April  8th,  just  two 
weeks  before,  Gen^t  had  arrived  at  Charleston, 
South  Carolina;  but  the  news  of  his  presence  there 
reached  Philadelphia  through  the  public  press  only 
on  the  day  on  which  the  proclamation  was  pub- 
lished. At  Charleston  he  lost  no  time  in  fitting-out 
and  commissioning  privateers ;  and,  after  having  got 

40 


THE    SYSTEM    OF    NEUTRALITY 


By  the  President  of  the  United  States  of  America. 
A     PROCLAMATION. 

WHEREAS  it  appears  that  a  ftate  of  war  exifts  between  Auftria, 
Pruflia,  Sardinia,  Great-Britain,  and  the  United  Netherlands,  of  the 
one  part,  and  France  on  the  other,  and  the  duty  and  intereft  of  the  United 
States  require,  that  they  (hould  with  fincerity  and  good  faith  adopt  and  pur- 
fue  a  conduft  friendly  and  impartial  toward  the  belligerent  powers: 

I  have  therefore  thought  fit  .by  thefe  prefents  to  declare  the  difpofition  of 
the  United  States  to  obferve  the  conduft  aforefaid  towards  thole  powers 
refpeftivelyj  and  to  exhort  and  warn  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  care- 
fully to  avoid  all  a6ls  and  proceedings  whatfoever,  which  may  in  any  manner 
tend  to  contravene  fuch  difpofition. 

And  I  do  hereby  alfo  make  known  that  whofoever  of  the  citizens  of  the 
United  States  (hall  render  himfelf  liable  to  punilhment  or  forfeiture  under  the 
law  of  nations,  by  committing,  aiding  or  abetting  hoftilities  againft  any  of 
the  faid  powers,  or  by  carrying  to  any  of  them  thofe  articles,  which  are 
deemed  contraband  by  the  modern  ufage  of  nations,  will  not  receive  the  pro- 
teftion  of  the  United  States,  againft  fuch  punifhment  or  forfeiture  :  and  fur- 
ther, that  I  have  given  inftru6lions  to  thofe  officers,  to  whom  it  belongs,  to 
caufe  profecutions  to  be  inftituted  againft  all  perfons,  who  ftiall,  within  the 
cognizance  of  the  courts  of  the  United  States,  violate  the  Law  of  Nations, 
with  refpeft  to  the  powers  at  war,  or  any  of  them. 


In  testimony  whereof  \  have  caufed  the  Seal  of  the  United  States  of 
America  to  he  c^xed  to  thefe  prefents,  andfigned  the  fame  ivith  my  hand. 
Done  at  the  city  of  Philadelphia,  the  tuuenty-fecond  day  of  April,  one  thou- 
fandfenien  hundred  and  ninety-three,  and  of  the  Independence  of  the  United 
States  of  America  the  feventeenth . 


G°.    WASHINGTON 


Th:  Jefferson. 

41 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

a  number  ready  for  sea,  he  proceeded  to  the  seat  of 
the  national  government  by  land.  On  the  way  he 
incited  the  people  to  hostility  against  Great  Britain, 
and  received  such  demonstrations  of  sympathy  as 
to  strengthen  his  confidence  in  the  success  of  the 
course  on  which  he  had  entered. 

The  posture  of  affairs  between  the  United  States 
and  France  was  complicated  and  difficult.  By  the 
treaty  of  commerce  of  1778,  the  ships  of  war  and 
privateers  of  the  one  country  were  entitled  to  enter 
the  ports  of  the  other  with  their  prizes,  without 
being  subjected  to  any  examination  as  to  their  law- 
fulness, while  cruisers  of  the  enemy  were  in  like  cir- 
cumstances to  be  excluded,  unless  in  case  of  stress 
of  weather.  By  the  treaty  of  alliance,  the  United 
States,  as  has  been  seen,  had  guaranteed  to  France 
her  possessions  in  America.  For  the  moment,  how- 
ever, the  situation  was  much  simplified  by  reason 
of  the  fact  that  the  French  Republic  did  not  ask  of 
the  United  States  the  execution  of  the  territorial 
guarantee.  This  may  be  accounted  for  by  either  of 
two  reasons.  The  general  arming  of  the  whole  popu- 
lation and  the  exhaustive  devotion  of  the  resources 
of  the  country  to  military  purposes  had  caused  a 
scarcity  in  France  both  of  money  and  of  provisions. 
The  United  States,  as  a  neutral,  formed  a  source  of 
supply  of  both.  An  intimation  to  this  effect  was 
made  by  the  French  government  to  Morris  not  long 
before  the  issuance  of  Washington's  proclamation  of 

42 


THE    SYSTEM    OF    NEUTRALITY 

neutrality;  and  the  same  idea  was  strongly  ex- 
pressed in  a  report  of  the  French  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  in  June,  1793,  in  which  it  was  said  that  the 
United  States  became  "  more  and  more  the  granary 
of  France  and  her  colonies."  But  there  may  have 
been  yet  another  reason.  It  is  not  improbable  that 
the  National  Assembly,  while  balancing  the  ad- 
vantages of  American  neutrality  against  those  of 
the  treaty  of  alliance,  doubted  whether  the  guaran- 
tee was  precisely  applicable  to  the  conditions  then 
existing.  This  doubt  is  suggested  by  the  original 
instructions  to  Genet-,  which,  although  they  were 
given  before  the  conflict  with  England  began,  were 
written  in  contemplation  of  hostilities  with  that 
country  as  well  as  with  Spain ;  and  in  these  instruc- 
tions, which  looked  to  the  formation  of  a  new  com- 
mercial and  political  connection  with  the  United 
States,  adapted  to  the  conditions  which  the  French 
Revolution  had  produced,  Gen^t  was  directed  to 
bring  about  "a  national  agreement,  in  which  two 
great  peoples  shall  suspend  their  commercial  and 
political  interests,  and  establish  a  mutual  under- 
standing to  defend  the  empire  of  liberty,  wherever 
it  can  be  embraced." 

When  Genet  arrived  in  Philadelphia,  an  unquali- 
fied reception  was  promptly  accorded  him.  In  pre- 
senting his  letters  of  credence,  he  stated  that  his 
government  knew  that  "under  present  circum- 
stances" they  had  a  right  to  call  upon  the  United 

43 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

States  for  the  guarantee  of  their  islands,  but  de- 
clared that  they  did  not  desire  it;  in  a  subsequent 
communication,  he  proposed  that  the  two  peoples 
should,  "by  a  true  family  compact, establish  a  com- 
mercial and  political  system"  on  a  "liberal  and 
fraternal  basis."  The  administration,  however,  was 
indisposed  to  quixotic  enterprises.  On  the  contrary, 
it  was  soon  fully  occupied  with  its  efforts  to  vindi- 
cate its  proclamation  of  neutrality,  which  was  con- 
stantly violated  by  the  fitting-out  of  privateers,  the 
condemnation  of  prizes  by  French  consuls  sitting 
as  courts  of  admiralty,  and  even  by  the  capture  of 
vessels  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States. 
These  proceedings,  in  which  he  was  himself  directly 
implicated.  Genet  defended  as  being  in  conformity 
not  only  with  the  treaties  between  the  two  countries, 
but  also  with  the  principles  of  neutrality.  When 
Jefferson  cited  the  utterances  of  writers  on  the  law 
of  nations,  Genet  repelled  them  as  "diplomatic 
subtleties"  and  as  " aphorisms  of  Vattel  and  others." 
He  especially  insisted  that,  by  the  treaty  of  com- 
merce of  1778,  the  authorities  of  the  United  States 
were  precluded  from  interfering  in  any  manner  with 
the  prizes  brought  into  their  ports  by  the  French 
privateers.  The  United  States,  on  the  other  hand, 
denied  that  the  contracting  parties,  in  agreeing  that 
prizes  should  not  be  subject  to  examination  as  to 
their  lawfulness,  deprived  themselves  of  the  right 
to  prevent  the  capture  and  condemnation  of  vessels 

44 


THE    SYSTEM    OF     NEUTRALITY 

in  violation  of  their  own  neutrality  and  sover- 
eignty. 

In  the  correspondence  to  which  these  differences 
gave  rise,  Jefferson,  always  perspicacious  in  his  de- 
ductions from  fundamental  principles,  expounded 
with  remarkable  clearness  and  power  the  nature 
and  scope  of  neutral  duty.  Its  foundations  he  dis- 
covered in  two  simple  conceptions — the  exclusive 
sovereignty  of  the  nation  within  its  own  territory 
and  the  obligation  of  impartiality  towards  belliger- 
ents. As  it  was  "the  right  of  every  nation  to  pro- 
hibit acts  of  sovereignty  from  being  exercised  by 
any  other  within  its  limits,"  so  it  was,  he  declared, 
"the  duty  of  a  neutral  nation  to  prohibit  such  as 
would  injure  one  of  the  warring  powers."  Hence, 
"no  succor  should  be  given  to  either,  unless  stipu- 
lated by  treaty,  in  men,  arms,  or  anything  else, 
directly  serving  for  war."  The  raising  of  troops 
and  the  granting  of  military  commissions  were,  be- 
sides, sovereign  rights,  which,  as  they  pertained  ex- 
clusively to  the  nation  itself,  could  not  be  exercised 
within  its  territory  by  a  foreign  power,  without  its 
consent;  and  if  the  United  States  had  "a  right  to 
refuse  permission  to  arm  vessels  and  raise  men" 
within  its  ports  and  territories,  it  was  "bound  by 
the  laws  of  neutrality  to  exercise  that  right,  and  to 
prohibit  such  armaments  and  enlistments." 

Such,  briefly  summarized,  was  the  theory  of  neu- 
tral duty  formulated  by  Jefferson.     But  the  admin- 

45 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

istration  did  not  stop  with  the  enunciation  of  doc- 
trines. It  endowed  them  with  vitality.  Acknowl- 
edging the  obligation  of  the  government  to  make 
indemnity  for  any  losses  resulting  from  its  previous 
failure  to  cause  its  neutrahty  to  be  respected,  it 
adopted  efficacious  measures  to  prevent  the  future 
fitting-out  of  privateers  in  the  ports  of  the  United 
States,  to  exclude  from  asylum  therein  any  that  had 
been  so  equipped,  and  to  cause  the  restitution  of  any 
prizes  brought  by  them  within  the  national  juris- 
diction. To  insure  the  enforcement  of  these  rules, 
instructions  were  issued  by  Hamilton  to  the  col- 
lectors of  customs;  and  on  June  5,  1794,  there  was 
passed  the  first  Neutrality  Act,  which  forbade  within 
the  United  States  the  acceptance  and  exercise  of 
commissions,  the  enlistment  of  men,  the  fitting-out 
and  arming  of  vessels,  and  the  setting  on  foot  of 
military  expeditions,  in  the  service  of  any  prince  or 
state  with  which  the  government  was  at  peace.  In 
due  season  compensation  was  made  to  British  sub- 
jects for  the  injuries  inflicted  by  French  privateers 
in  violation  of  American  neutrality.  "The  policy 
of  the  United  States  in  1793,"  says  the  late  W.  E. 
Hall,  one  of  the  most  eminent  of  English  publicists, 
"constitutes  an  epoch  in  the  development  of  the 
usages  of  neutrality.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that 
it  was  intended  and  believed  to  give  effect  to  the 
obligations  then  incumbent  on  neutrals.  But  it 
represented  by  far  the  most  advanced  existing  opin- 

46 


THOMAS    JEFFERSON 


THE    SYSTEM    OF    NEUTRALITY 

ions  as  to  what  those  obligations  were ;  and  in  some 
points  it  even  went  further  than  authoritative  cus- 
tom has  up  to  the  present  day  advanced.  In  the 
main,  however,  it  is  identical  with  the  standard  of 
conduct  which  is  now  adopted  by  the  community  of 
nations." 

Against  the  course  of  the  administration  Genet 
did  not  cease  to  protest;  and,  while  he  was  himself 
its  first  victim,  his  misfortunes  may  serve  as  a 
warning  to  foreign  ministers  who  may  be  disposed 
to  reckon  upon  popular  support  in  opposing  the  gov- 
ernment to  which  they 'are  accredited.  There  was 
indeed  in  his  case  much  to  mislead  a  judgment 
which,  no  matter  how  honest  it  may  have  been,  was 
not  well  balanced.  To  the  superficial  observer  it 
might  have  seemed  that  there  were  in  the  United 
States  few  Americans;  that  the  population  was  al- 
most wholly  composed  of  partisans  of  France  and 
partisans  of  Great  Britain,  the  former  constituting 
a  vast  majority ;  and  that  the  administration,  which 
was  daily  assailed  with  a  virulence  that  knew 
neither  restraint  nor  decency,  might  safely  be 
flouted  and  defied.  But  when,  convinced  that 
the  proclamation  of  neutrality  would  be  faithfully 
enforced.  Genet  denounced  the  government  for 
the  "cowardly  abandonment"  of  its  friends,  and, 
besides  expressing  contempt  for  the  opinions  of  the 
President,  persisted  in  questioning  his  authority, 
Morris  was  instructed  to  ask  for  his  recall.    The 

47 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

French  government  not  only  granted  the  request, 
but  expressed  disapprobation  of  Genet's  "criminal 
proceedings";  and  his  successor,  M.  Fauchet,  de- 
manded his  delivery-up  for  punishment.  This  the 
United  States  refused  "upon  reasons  of  law  and 
magnanimity."  Genet  maintained,  and  with  much 
reason,  that  he  had  acted  in  conformity  with  his 
instructions,  which  in  reality  contemplated  the  or- 
ganization of  hostile  enterprises  in  the  United  States 
against  Spain  as  well  as  Great  Britain.  Neverthe- 
less, he  did  not  return  to  France,  but  settled  in  the 
United  States,  where  he  married  the  daughter  of  an 
eminent  American  statesman  and  spent  the  re- 
mainder of  his  days.  It  is  only  just  to  say  that  he 
has  been  the  subject  of  much  unmerited  obloquy. 
In  circumstances  exceptionally  trying,  his  conduct 
was  ill-advised,  but  not  malevolent.  William  Cullen 
Bryant,  speaking  in  1870,  said  that  he  remembered 
Gen^t  very  vividly,  as  he  appeared  forty-five  years 
before,  when  he  came  occasionally  to  the  city  of  New 
York.  "He  was,"  said  Bryant,  "a  tall  man,  with  a 
reddish  wig  and  a  full,  round  voice,  speaking  English 
in  a  sort  of  oratorical  manner,  like  a  man  making  a 
speech,  but  very  well  for  a  Frenchman.  He  was  a 
dreamer  in  some  respects,  and,  I  remember,  had  a 
plan  for  navigating  the  air  in  balloons.  A  pamphlet 
of  his  was  published  a  little  before  the  time  I  knew 
him,  entitled  'Aerial  Navigation,'  illustrated  by 
an  engraving  of  a  balloon  shaped  like  a  fish,  pro- 

48 


THE    SYSTEM    OF    NEUTRALITY 

pelled  by  sails  and  guided  by  a  rudder,  in  which  he 
maintained  that  man  could  navigate  the  air  as  well 
as  he  could  navigate  the  ocean  in  a  ship." 

The  authorities  of  the  French  Republic  took  ad- 
vantage of  the  request  for  Genet's  recall  to  ask 
for  Morris's  withdrawal.  Under  the  circumstances, 
this  act  of  reciprocity  was  ungrudgingly  conceded. 
Morris  was  succeeded  in  France  by  James  Monroe. 

The  Neutrality  Act  of  1794,  though  originally 
limited  in  duration,  was  afterwards  extended,  and 
was  then  continued  in  force  indefinitely.  In  order 
to  meet  conditions  arising  out  of  the  war  of  the 
Spanish  colonies  in  America  for  independence,  an 
additional  act  was  passed  in  181 7 ;  but  this,  together 
with  all  prior  legislation  on  the  subject,  was  super- 
seded by  the  comprehensive  statute  of  April  20, 
18 1 8,  the  provisions  of  which  are  now  embodied  in 
the  Revised  Statutes  of  the  United  States.  A  simi- 
lar act  was  passed  by  the  British  Parliament  in  the 
following  year ;  laws  and  regulations  were  from  time 
to  time  adopted  by  other  governments;  and  the 
duties  of  neutrality  became  a  fixed  and  determinate 
part  of  international  law.  The  severest  test  of  the 
system,  as  the  ultimate  standard  of  national  obliga- 
tion and  responsibility,  was  made  in  the  case  of  the 
claims  of  the  United  States  against  Great  Britain 
generically  known  as  the  "Alabama  Claims,"  grow- 
ing out  of  the  depredations  of  the  Alabama  and 
other  Confederate  cruisers  fitted  out  in  British  ports 
4  49 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

during  the  American  civil  war.  The  government  of 
the  United  States,  in  demanding  indemnities  for 
these  depredations,  could  point  to  the  precedent  of 
1793;  but  in  the  case  of  the  Alabama  claims  the 
amounts  involved  were  enormous,  and  the  British 
government  besides  denied  that  it  had  been  guilty 
of  any  neglect.  By  the  treaty  of  Washington,  of 
May  8,  187 1,  the  question  was  submitted  to  arbitra- 
tion at  Geneva.  The  treaty  declared  that  a  neutral 
government  was  bound  to  use  "due  diligence"  in 
the  performance  of  its  duties.  The  tribunal  found 
that  there  had  been  negligence  on  the  part  of  the 
British  authorities  in  respect  of  three  of  the  cruisers 
— the  Alabama,  the  Florida,  and  the  Shenandoah  after 
she  left  Melbourne — and  awarded  the  United  States 
$15,500,000.  For  the  depredations  of  the  French 
privateers  in  1793  the  United  States  paid  to  the 
subjects  of  Great  Britain  $143,428.11.  The  amount 
was  relatively  small,  but  its  payment,  on  considera- 
tions of  international  obligation  and  good  faith,  es- 
tablished a  principle  incalculably  important,  and, 
like  the  seed  received  into  good  ground,  brought 
forth  a  hundredfold,  and  even  more. 

It  is  perhaps  not  generally  known  that  the  Ala- 
bama, in  spite  of  the  omission  of  the  English  customs 
authorities  to  seize  her,  might  in  the  end  have  been 
detained  but  for  an  act  of  wifely  devotion.  On  the 
2 2d  and  24th  of  July,  1862,  evidence  directly  incul- 
pating the  vessel  was  communicated  by  the  Amer- 

50 


THE    SYSTEM    OF    NEUTRALITY 


SI 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

ican  legation  in  London  to  the  British  Foreign  Office. 
On  the  23d  and  26th  of  July  the  papers  were  referred 
to  the  law  officers  of  the  crown,  and,  as  the  law 
officers  had  no  permanent  office,  were  sent  as  usual 
to  the  senior  officer,  who  was  then  Sir  John  Domey 
Harding,  Queen's  Advocate,  his  associates  being  Sir 
William  Atherton,  Attorney-General,  and  Sir  Roun- 
dell  Palmer,  afterwards  Lord  Selbome,  Solicitor-Gen- 
eral. Unfortunately,  Sir  John  Harding  had  just  then 
fallen  a  victim  to  an  acute  mental  disorder,  which 
proved  to  be  fatal,  but  which  his  wife,  in  the  hope 
that  it  would  soon  pass  away,  had  kept  a  secret. 
Upon  the  decision  to  be  rendered  by  the  law  officers 
there  hung,  perchance,  the  issues  of  peace  and  war 
and  the  fate  of  nations;  but  the  papers  lay  unex- 
amined at  Sir  John's  residence  apparently  till  the 
28th  of  July,  when  the  Foreign  Office,  growing  anxious 
at  the  delay,  but  ignorant  of  its  cause,  took  steps  to 
recover  them  and  placed  them  in  the  hands  of  Sir 
William  Atherton.  On  the  evening  of  the  same  day, 
Sir  William,  perceiving  the  gravity  of  the  situation, 
which  the  papers  disclosed,  called  Sir  Roundell  Palm- 
er into  consultation  upon  them  in  the  Earl  Marshal's 
room  in  the  House  of  Lords.  They  at  once  agreed 
that  the  vessel  must  be  seized.  An  opinion  to  that 
effect  was  delivered  to  Earl  Russell  on  the  morning  of 
the  29th  of  July ;  but  during  the  night  of  the  28th, 
the  Alabama,  as  if  conscious  of  what  was  impending, 
left  the  docks  in  which  she  had  been  lying.     At  ten 

52 


THE    SYSTEM    OF    NEUTRALITY 

o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  29th  she  put  to  sea. 
The  order  of  the  Foreign  Office  to  detain  her  reached 
Liverpool  in  the  afternoon. 

The  government  of  the  United  States,  in  1793, 
had  barely  entered  upon  the  performance  of  the 
duties  of  neutrality  when  it  was  swept  into  the 
vortex  of  the  great  struggle,  which  was  to  last  al- 
most unbroken  for  more  than  twenty  years,  for  the 
maintenance  of  neutral  rights.  In  this  momentous 
contest  there  was  involved  the  ever-recurrent  ques- 
tion, which  will  continue  in  some  form  to  arise  as 
long  as  wars  are  waged,  as  to  how  far  neutral  powers 
are  required  to  subordinate  the  interests  of  their 
commerce  to  the  hostile  interests  of  belligerents. 
That  powers  at  peace  were  entitled  to  trade  with 
powers  at  war  was  not  denied,  but  the  rule  was  sub- 
ject to  exceptions.  It  was  admitted  that  a  belliger- 
ent might  cut  off  all  trade  with  the  enemy's  ports 
by  blockading  them,  and  might  also  prohibit  the 
carriage  of  contraband  to  the  enemy.  For  entering 
or  attempting  to  enter  a  blockaded  port,  the  penalty 
was  confiscation  of  vessel  and  cargo,  while  the  car- 
riage of  contraband  entailed  the  loss  of  the  pro- 
hibited articles  and  the  freight,  if  nothing  more. 
There  was,  however,  no  precise  and  general  agree- 
ment either  as  to  what  constituted  a  blockade,  or 
as  to  what  articles  were  to  be  considered  as  contra- 
band. If  blockades  could  be  legally  established 
merely  by  decrees  on  paper,  without  the  application 

53 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

of  force,  or  if  the  list  of  contraband  could  be  suffi- 
ciently extended,  it  is  obvious  that  the  right  of 
neutrals  to  trade  with  belligerents  could  be  reduced 
to  the  shadow  of  a  tantalizing  supposition.  Grotius, 
often  called  the  father  of  international  law,  had 
divided  articles,  with  reference  to  the  question  of 
contraband,  into  three  classes:  First,  articles  that 
were  directly  useful  in  war,  as  arms;  second,  those 
that  were  useless  in  war ;  and  third,  those  that  could 
be  "used  both  in  war  and  in  peace,  as  money,  pro- 
visions, ships,  and  articles  of  naval  equipment." 
Concerning  the  first  and  second  classes  there  was 
no  dispute,  except  as  to  the  possible  inclusion  or 
exclusion  of  some  particular  article;  but  as  to  the 
third  class  there  had  been  a  long  and  heated  con- 
troversy, especially  respecting  provisions. 

There  was  also  a  question  as  to  whether  the  goods 
of  an  enemy  might  be  seized  on  board  a  neutral 
ship.  It  was  conceded  that  a  belligerent  power 
might  capture  vessels  belonging  to  subjects  of  the 
enemy,  as  well  as  other  private  property  of  the 
enemy  at  sea;  but  for  many  years  an  effort  had 
been  in  progress  to  introduce  the  rule,  denoted  by 
the  phrase  "free  ships  free  goods,"  that  the  mer- 
chandise of  an  enemy  should,  unless  contraband  of 
war,  be  exempt  from  seizure  when  transported  by 
a  neutral  vessel.  In  1780,  the  Empress  Catherine 
of  Russia  issued  a  famous  declaration  concerning 
neutral   rights.     Since   the   days  when   Peter   the 

54 


THE    SYSTEM    OF    NEUTRALITY 

Great,  barbarian,  statesman,  and  seer,  diversified 
his  studies  in  shipbuilding  by  riding  through  Eve- 
lyn's hedges  in  a  wheelbarrow  and  pulling  the  teeth 
of  his  own  retinue,  Russia  had  aspired  to  become 
a  maritime  power.  The  declaration  of  the  Em- 
press Catherine  afforded  a  striking  manifestation  of 
that  ambition.  Affirming  the  right  of  neutrals  to 
trade  with  the  powers  at  war,  it  sought  to  limit  the 
scope  of  contraband,  declared  that  blockades  must 
be  maintained  by  a  force  sufficient  to  render  access 
to  the  blockaded  port  dangerous,  and  adopted  the 
rule  of  free  ships  free  goods.  On  this  manifesto 
there  was  based  an  alliance  of  neutral  powers,  called 
the  Armed  Neutrality,  the  formation  of  which  was 
one  of  the  most  notable  events  of  the  wars  growing 
out  of  the  American  Revolution ;  and  although  the 
alliance  was  not  effectively  maintained,  the  princi- 
ples which  it  consecrated  possessed  vitality,  and 
were  destined  to  survive  an  ordeal  yet  more  severe 
than  any  to  which  they  had  ever  been  subjected. 

By  a  decree  of  the  National  Convention  of  France, 
of  May  9,  1793,  the  commanders  of  French  ships  of 
war  and  privateers  were  authorized  to  seize  mer- 
chant vessels  laden  with  provisions  bound  to  an 
enemy's  port,  or  with  merchandise  belonging  to  an 
enemy.  This  decree  was  defended  on  the  ground 
of  a  scarcity  of  provisions  in  France,  but  it  ran 
counter  to  the  views  of  the  United  States  concern- 
ing the  freedom  of  trade  as  well  as  to  treaty  stipula- 

55 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

tions.  Morris  remonstrated  against  it,  and  inti- 
mated that  it  would  be  followed  with  eagerness  by 
France's  maritime  enemies.  His  prognostication 
proved  to  be  correct.  By  an  order  in  council  of 
June  8,  1793,  the  commanders  of  British  cruisers 
were  authorized  to  seize  all  vessels  laden  with  grain, 
flour,  or  meal,  bound  either  to  a  port  in  France  or 
to  a  port  occupied  by  the  French  arms.  It  is  true 
that,  by  the  terms  of  both  these  measures,  the  pro- 
visions, if  neutral-owned,  were  to  be  paid  for;  but 
the  compensation  promised  was  far  less  than  the 
cargo  would  have  brought  at  the  port  of  destination. 
Moreover,  the  order  in  council  was  followed,  as  was 
also  the  decree,  by  other  measures  yet  more  vexa- 
tious. 

Out  of  these  perilous  complications  Washington 
sought  to  find  a  way  by  negotiation.  John  Jay, 
then  Chief -Justice  of  the  United  States,  was  sent  to 
London,  where,  on  November  19,  1794,  he  concluded 
a  treaty  under  which  an  aggregate  amount  of  per- 
haps more  than  eleven  million  dollars  was  eventual- 
ly obtained  from  the  British  government  on  account 
of  maritime  captures.  The  treaty,  however,  gave 
great  umbrage  to  France,  not  only  because  it  granted 
privileges  of  asylum  to  British  ships  of  war  and  rec- 
ognized the  right  to  capture  enemies'  goods  in  neu- 
tral vessels,  but  also  because  it  definitely  fixed  the 
position  of  the  United  States  as  a  neutral.  The  re- 
sentment of  the  French  government  was  soon  made 

56 


JOHN    JAY 


THE    SYSTEM    OF    NEUTRALITY 

manifest  by  measures  which  prefigured  the  Berlin 
and  Milan  decrees  of  Napoleon.  By  a  decree  of  the 
Executive  Directory  of  July  2,  1796,  which  laid  the 
foundation  of  a  new  series,  it  was  announced  that 
the  cruisers  of  France  would  treat  neutral  vessels, 
as  to  searches,  captures,  and  confiscation,  in  the 
same  manner  as  their  governments  should  suffer 
the  English  to  treat  them.  The  French  government 
also  recalled  its  minister  from  the  United  States  and 
reduced  the  grade  of  the  mission.  Monroe,  too,  was 
recalled,  and  in  his  place  was  sent  Charles  Cotes- 
worth  Pinckney. 

When,  in  December,  1796,  Pinckney  arrived  in 
Paris,  the  Directory  refused  either  to  receive  him 
or  to  permit  him  to  stay  at  the  capital  as  a  private 
alien ;  and  he  retired  to  Amsterdam  to  await  develop- 
ments. Desirous,  however,  of  trying  all  possible 
means  of  conciliation.  President  John  Adams,  while 
recommending  to  Congress  the  consideration  of  ef- 
fectual measures  of  defence,  joined  Elbridge  Gerry 
and  John  Marshall  with  Pinckney  in  a  special  mis- 
sion. The  three  envoys  arrived  in  Paris  October 
4,  1797.  Four  days  later  they  were  unofficially  re- 
ceived by  Talleyrand,  who  was  then  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs ;  but  he  subsequently  intimated  that 
they  could  not  have  a  public  audience  of  the  Direc- 
tory till  their  negotiations  were  concluded.  Mean- 
while, they  were  waited  upon  by  three  men  who 
came  sometimes  singly  and  sometimes  together,  and 

57 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

who  professed  to  represent  Talleyrand  and  the 
Directory.  These  persons  are  known  in  the  corre- 
spondence as  X,  Y,  and  Z.  Their  approach  was  pre- 
pared by  W,  who  called  on  Pinckney  and  vouched 
for  X  as  a  gentleman  of  credit  and  reputation,  in 
whom  great  reliance  might  be  placed.  On  the 
evening  of  the  same  day  X  called,  and,  professing 
to  speak  for  Talleyrand,  suggested  confidentially  a 
plan  of  conciliation.  He  represented  that  certain 
passages  in  President  Adams's  recent  speech  to  Con- 
gress, at  which  two  members  of  the  Directory  were 
exceedingly  irritated,  would  need  to  be  softened; 
that  a  sum  of  money,  to  be  at  the  disposal  of  Talley- 
rand, would  be  required  as  a  douceur  for  the  ministry, 
except  Merlin,  the  Minister  of  Justice,  who  was  already 
making  enough  from  the  condemnation  of  vessels; 
and  that  a  loan  to  the  government  would  also  be 
insisted  on.  X  stated,  however,  that  he  communi- 
cated with  Talleyrand  not  directly,  but  through 
another  gentleman,  in  whom  Talleyrand  had  great 
confidence.  This  gentleman  proved  to  be  Y,  who 
afterwards  called  with  X  upon  the  American  pleni- 
potentiaries and  presented  the  propositions  in  writ- 
ing. Y  also  dilated  upon  the  resentment  produced 
by  the  President's  speech,  but  declared  that,  after 
the  plenipotentiaries  had  afforded  satisfaction  on 
that  point,  they  must  pay  money,  "  a  great  deal  of 
money."  In  so  saying  he  referred  to  the  subject 
of  a  loan.     Concerning  the  douceur  little  was  said,  it 

58 


THE    SYSTEM    OF    NEUTRALITY 

being  understood  that  it  was  required  for  the  offi- 
cers of  government,  and  therefore  needed  no  further 
explanation.  An  impression  perhaps  widely  pre- 
vails that  at  this  point  Pinckney  exclaimed,  "Mill- 
ions for  defence,  but  not  a  cent  for  tribute,"  and 
'broke  off  the  negotiations.  The  story  is  a  pretty 
one,  but  is  inaccurate.  The  sentiment  in  question, 
which  resembles  a  phrase  used  by  Jefferson,  when 
Secretary  of  State,  in  his  correspondence  with  the 
Barbary  powers,  was  pronounced  as  a  toast  at  a 
public  dinner  given  to  Marshall,  at  Philadelphia,  on 
his  return  from  France:  In  reality,  the  American 
plenipotentiaries,  although  they  repulsed  the  solicita- 
tions of  personal  venality  with  the  reply,  "No,  no, 
not  a  sixpence,"  offered  to  consult  their  govern- 
ment with  regard  to  a  loan,  if  the  Directory  would 
suspend  its  measures  against  American  commerce. 
This  the  Directory  refused  to  do.  Negotiations 
were  ended;  the  treaties  between  the  two  countries 
were  abrogated  by  the  United  States;  and  there 
succeeded  the  state  of  limited  war  wliich  prevailed 
from  1798  till  1800. 

The  respite  which  commerce  enjoyed  from  bel- 
ligerent depredations  after  the  Peace  of  Amiens  was 
of  brief  duration,  and  the  renewal  of  war,  in  1803, 
was  ere  long  followed  by  measures  which  retain  in 
the  history  of  belligerent  pretensions  an  unhappy 
pre-eminence.  The  "rule  of  the  War  of  1756,"  by 
which  Great  Britain  had  assumed  to  forbid  neutrals 

59 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

to  engage  during  war  in  a  trade  from  which  they 
were  excluded  in  time  of  peace,  was  enforced  by  the 
British  admiralty  courts  with  new  stringency  under 
cover  of  the  doctrine  of  continuous  voyages.  More- 
over, the  British  government  in  1806,  in  retaliation 
for  a  decree  of  Prussia,  which  was  issued  under  Napo- 
leonic compulsion,  excluding  British  trade  from  that 
country,  declared  the  mouths  of  the  Ems,  the  Weser, 
the  Elbe,  and  the  Trave  to  be  in  a  state  of  blockade. 
On  November  21,  1806,  Napoleon  fulminated  from 
the  imperial  camp  at  Berlin  a  decree  declaring  the 
British  Islands  to  be  in  a  state  of  blockade  and  pro- 
hibiting all  commerce  and  correspondence  with  them. 
Great  Britain  replied  by  an  order  in  council  of 
January  6,  1807,  forbidding  neutral  vessels  to  trade 
between  ports  in  the  control  of  France  or  her  allies ; 
and  by  still  another  order,  November  11,  1807,  she 
forbade  such  vessels  to  trade  with  the  ports  of 
France  and  her  allies,  or  even  with  any  port  in 
Europe  from  which  the  British  flag  was  excluded, 
without  a  clearance  obtained  in  a  British  port. 
Napoleon's  answer  was  the  Milan  decree  of  Decem- 
ber 17,  1807,  by  which  it  was  declared  that  every 
vessel  that  had  submitted  to  search  by  an  English 
ship,  or  consented  to  a  voyage  to  England,  or  paid 
any  tax  to  the  English  government,  as  well  as  every 
vessel  that  should  sail  to  or  from  a  port  in  Great 
Britain  or  her  possessions,  or  in  any  country  occu- 
pied by  British  troops,  should  be  deemed  good  prize. 

60 


THE    SYSTEM    OF    NEUTRALITY 

These  measures,  with  their  bald  assertions  of  paper 
blockades  and  sweeping  denials  of  the  rights  of 
neutrality,  the  United  States,  as  practically  the 
only  remaining  neutral,  met  with  protests,  with 
embargoes,  with  non-intercourse,  and  finally,  in  the 
case  of  Great  Britain,  which  was  aggravated  by  the 
question  of  impressment,  to  which  President  Madi- 
son gave  so  much  prominence  in  his  war  message, 
with  hostile  resistance,  while  from  France  a  con- 
siderable indemnity  was  afterwards  obtained  by 
treaty.  The  pretensions  against  which  the  United 
States  contended  are  no  longer  justified  on  legal 
grounds.  Since  the  Declaration  of  Paris  of  1856; 
it  has  been  universally  admitted  that  a  blockade, 
in  order  to  be  valid,  must  be  effective.  The  right 
of  neutrals  to  trade  with  belligerents  is  acknowl- 
edged, subject  only  to  the  law  of  contraband  and 
of  blockade. 

There  is  one  radical  limitation  to  belligerent  ac- 
tivities, which,  although  often  urged,  has  not  yet 
been  adopted.  This  is  the  inhibition  of  the  capt- 
ure of  private  property  at  sea.  Strongly  advocated 
by  Franklin,  it  was  introduced  into  the  first  treaty 
between  the  United  States  and  Prussia,  in  the  signa- 
ture of  which  he  was  associated  with  Adams  and  Jef- 
ferson. John  Quincy  Adams,  Henry  Clay,  William 
L.  Marcy,  and  Hamilton  Fish  are  among  the  great 
Secretaries  of  State  who  have  given  the  principle  their 
support.     President  McKinley,  in  his  annual  mes- 

61 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

sage  of  December  5,  1898,  suggested  to  Congress 
that  the  Executive  be  authorized  to  correspond  with 
the  governments  of  the  principal  maritime  powers 
of  the  world  with  a  view  to  incorporate  it  into  the 
permanent  law  of  civilized  nations.  This  recom- 
mendation is  cordially  renewed  by  President  Roose- 
velt in  his  annual  message  of  December  7,  1903,  in 
which  the  exemption,  except  as  to  contraband  of 
war,  is  advocated  not  only  as  a  matter  of  "  human- 
ity and  morals,"  but  also  as  a  measure  altogether 
compatible  with  the  practical  conduct  of  war  at  sea. 


Ill 

FREEDOM   OF   THE   SEAS 

In  maintaining  the  right  of  neutrals  freely  to 
navigate  the  ocean  in  pursuit  of  innocent  commerce, 
the  early  statesmen  of  America,  while  sustaining  a 
predominant  national  interest,  gave  their  support 
to  a  cause  from  the  eventual  triumph  of  which  the 
whole  world  was  to  derive  an  incalculable  benefit. 
But  it  was  not  in  time  of  war  alone  that  commerce 
was  exposed  to  attacks  at  sea.  Although  the  ex- 
orbitant pretensions  of  the  sixteenth  century,  by 
which  the  navigation  even  of  the  Atlantic  and  the 
Pacific  was  assumed  to  be  susceptible  of  engross- 
ment, had,  before  the  end  of  the  eighteenth,  fallen 
into  desuetude,  much  remained  to  be  accomplished 
before  the  exhibition  of  an  acknowledged  national 
flag  would  assure  to  the  peaceful  mariner  an  un- 
molested passage.  Ere  this  great  end  could  be  at- 
tained, it  was  necessary  that  various  exaggerated 
claims  of  dominion  over  adjacent  seas  should  be 
denied  and  overcome,  that  the  "right  of  search" 
should  be  resisted  and  abandoned,  and  that  piracy 
should  be  extirpated. 

63 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

In  placing  the  danger  from  "water  thieves"  be- 
fore the  peril  of  "waters,  winds,  and  rocks,"  Shy- 
lock  described  a  condition  of  things  that  long  sur- 
vived his  own  times.  At  the  close  of  the  eighteenth 
century,  a  merchantman  built  for  long  voyages  still 
differed  little  in  armament  from  a  man-of-war. 
Whether  it  rounded  the  Horn  or  the  Cape  of  Good 
Hope,  it  was  exposed  to  the  depredations  of  fero- 
cious and  well-armed  marauders,  and  if  it  passed 
through  the  Straits  of  Gibraltar  it  was  forced  to  en- 
counter maritime  blackmail  in  its  most  systematic 
and  most  authoritative  form.  On  the  African  coast 
of  the  Mediterranean  lay  the  Barbary  powers — the 
empire  of  Morocco,  and  the  regencies  of  Tunis, 
Tripoli,  and  Algiers — ^which  had  for  generations  sub- 
sisted by  depredations  on  commerce.  In  this  way 
they  had  won  the  opprobrious  title  of  "piratical 
states,"  but  they  wore  it  with  a  pampered  and  super- 
cilious dignity.  Even  in  the  exchange  of  courtesies 
they  exhibited  a  haughty  parsimony,  exacting  from 
the  foreign  man-of-war  the  generous  requital  of  a 
barrel  of  powder  for  every  gun  with  which  they  re- 
turned its  salute.  They  had  every  reason  to  know 
that  their  power  was  understood  and  dreaded.  In 
their  navies  might  be  found  the  products  of  the 
ship-building  skill  of  England,  France,  Spain,  and 
Venice.  In  war,  civilized  powers  did  not  always 
scruple  to  make  use  of  their  aid.  Their  mode  of 
life  was  diplomatically  recognized,  and  to  some  ex- 

64 


FREEDOM    OF    THE    SEAS 

tent  connived  at.  It  was  regulated  by  a  simple 
formula.  While  disdaining  the  part  of  common 
pirates,  such  as  plundered  vessels  indiscriminately, 
they  professed  themselves  at  war  with  all  who  re- 
fused to  pay  them  tribute ;  and  they  took  good  care 
to  make  their  friendship  expensive.  Peace  with 
Algiers,  in  1786,  was  reported  to  have  cost  Spain 
upward  of  three  millions  of  dollars,  while  the  an- 
nual presents  of  Great  Britain  to  the  four  states 
were  valued  at  nearly  three  hundred  thousand. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  Revolution  it  was  esti- 
mated that  one-sixth  of  the  wheat  and  flour  ex- 
ported from  the  United  States,  and  one-fourth  of 
their  dried  and  pickled  fish,  and  a  quantity  of  rice, 
found  their  best  market  in  the  ports  of  the  Mediter- 
ranean. In  this  commerce,  which  had  grown  up 
under  the  protection  of  the  British  flag,  there  were 
employed  from  eighty  to  a  hundred  ships,  manned 
by  twelve  hundred  seamen.  Early  in  the  war  it  was 
entirely  abandoned,  and  its  loss  was  severely  felt.  In 
the  plan  of  a  treaty  furnished  to  Franklin  and  his 
colleagues,  the  Continental  Congress,  accommodating 
its  demands  to  its  wishes,  proposed  that  France 
should  take  the  place  of  Great  Britain  as  the  pro- 
tector of  American  vessels ;  but  the  King  of  France 
went  no  further  than  to  agree  to  lend  his  good 
offices.  During  the  Revolution  the  Mediterranean 
commerce  therefore  remained  in  abeyance;  but  on 
May  12,  1784,  Adams,  Franklin,  and  Jefferson  were 
5  65 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

commissioned  to  treat  with  the  Barbary  powers; 
and  on  the  nth  of  the  ensuing  March  they  were 
authorized  to  send  agents  to  those  countries  to 
negotiate.  The  government  acted  none  too  soon. 
Before  an  agent  was  appointed  to  Morocco,  an 
American  vessel  was  captured  by  a  cruiser  of  that 
state.  The  Emperor,  however,  exhibited  much  mild- 
ness. On  the  friendly  interposition  of  Spain,  he 
restored  the  vessel  and  cargo  and  released  the  crew ; 
and  in  January,  1787,  he  concluded  a  liberal  treaty, 
at  a  cost  to  the  United  States  of  less  than  ten  thou- 
sand dollars. 

The  other  powers  proved  to  be  less  tractable,  and 
especially  troublesome  was  the  Dey  of  Algiers,  by 
whose  activities  the  revival  of  American  commerce 
with  the  Mediterranean  was  for  a  time  effectually 
prevented.  On  July  25,  1785,  the  schooner  Maria, 
of  Boston,  was  captured  off  Cape  St.  Vincent  by  an 
Algerine  cruiser,  and  five  days  later  the  ship  Dau- 
phin, of  Philadelphia,  was  taken.  The  vessels  and 
their  cargoes  were  carried  to  Algiers,  and  all  on 
board,  embracing  twenty-one  persons,  were,  accord- 
ing to  custom,  consigned  to  slavery  till  they  should 
be  ransomed.  A  new  difficulty  was  thus  created. 
When  Congress  issued  its  commission  to  Adams 
and  his  associates,  there  were  thousands  of  captives 
in  Barbary ;  but,  as  there  were  no  Americans  among 
them,  the  question  of  ransom  was  not  considered, 
and  the  whole   expense   of  the  negotiations  was 

66 


FREEDOM    OF    THE    SEAS 

limited  to  eighty  thousand  dollars.     For  the  libera- 
tion of  the  twenty -one  Americans  subsequently 
captured,   Algiers    demanded    two  -  thirds   of  that 
simi.     For  this  emergency  no  provision  had  been 
made.     When  the  new  government  under  the  Con- 
stitution  was   formed,   Jefferson,   as   Secretary   of 
State,  declared  the  determination  of  the  United 
States  "  to  prefer  war,  in  all  cases,  to  tribute  under 
any   form,"    but   a   navy   was    wanting   to   make 
this    declaration    effective.     By    December,    1793, 
the  number  of  American  vessels  captured  by  Al- 
gerine  corsairs  had  risen  to  thirteen,  and  the  num- 
ber of  captives  to  a  hundred  and  nineteen.     From 
Boston  to  Norfolk  almost  every  seaport  had  fur- 
nished its  victim.     Nor  was  the  Dey  anxious  to 
make  peace  with  America.     So  successful  had  he 
been  in  bringing  other  governments  to  terms,  that 
he  remained  at  war  only  with  the  United  States  and 
the  Hanse  Towns,  and  he  began  to  grow  apprehen- 
sive at  the  prospect  of  inactivity.     "If,"  he   ex- 
claimed, "I  were  to  make  peace  with  everybody, 
what  should  I  do  with  my  corsairs?     What  should 
I  do  with  my  soldiers?     They  would  take  off  my 
head  for  the  want  of  other  prizes,  not  being  able  to 
live  upon  their  miserable  allowance."     Reasoning 
thus,  he  was  not  disposed  to  compromise;  but  the 
government  of  the  United  States,  urged  on  by  the 
cry  of  the  captives,  whom  it  was  then  unable  to 
rescue  by  force,  accepted  his  conditions,  and,  by 

67 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

the  expenditure  of  nearly  eight  hundred  thousand 
dollars,  obtained  the  release  of  its  citizens  and  pur- 
chased a  peace,  which  was  signed  on  September  5, 
1795.  A  treaty  with  Tripoli  followed  on  November 
4,  1796,  and  with  Tunis  in  August,  1797. 

The  respite  thus  secured  was  of  brief  duration. 
The  Dey  of  Algiers  received,  under  his  treaty  with 
the  United  States,  an  annual  payment  of  twelve 
thousand  sequins  (equivalent  to  nearly  twenty-two 
thousand  dollars)  in  naval  stores,  but,  besides  this 
stipulated  tribute,  there  were  customary  payments 
that  were  rigorously  counted  as  regalian  rights. 
Among  these  were  included  a  present  of  twenty 
thousand  dollars  on  the  sending  out  of  a  new  consul, 
biennial  presents  to  officers  of  government  esti- 
mated at  seventeen  thousand  dollars,  and  incidental 
and  contingent  presents  of  which  no  forecast  could 
be  made.  Tribute  was  likewise  paid  to  Tripoli  and 
to  Tunis ;  but  the  potentates  of  the  regencies,  though 
they  pursued  a  common  interest,  were  jealous  of 
one  another's  prosperity  in  peace  as  well  as  in  war, 
and  were  hard  to  content.  Early  in  1800  the  Ba- 
shaw of  Tripoli,  Jusuf  Caramanly,  a  bold  usurper  who 
seems  to  have  understood  both  the  principles  and 
the  cant  of  thrifty  politics,  complained  to  Mr.  Cath- 
cart,  the  American  consul,  that  the  presents  of  the 
United  States  to  Algiers  and  Tunis  were  more  liberal 
than  those  to  himself;  and  he  significantly  added 
that  compliments,  although  acceptable,  were  of  lit- 

68 


FREEDOM    OF    THE    SEAS 

tie  account,  and  that  the  heads  of  the  Barbary 
states  knew  their  friends  by  the  value  of  the  pres- 
ents they  received  from  them.  Not  long  afterwards 
he  intimated  that  he  would  like  to  have  some  Ameri- 
can captives  to  teach  him  English,  and  that,  if  the 
United  States  flag  once  came  down,  it  would  take 
a  great  deal  of  "grease"  to  raise  it  again.  Finally, 
lest  the  seriousness  of  his  grievances  might  not  be 
appreciated,  he  addressed  himself  directly  to  the 
President,  to  whom  he  pointedly  declared  that  any 
delay  in  complying  with  his  demands  would  be  prej- 
udicial to  American  interests.  No  response  came, 
and  the  Bashaw  grew  impatient.  "  In  Tripoli,  con- 
sul," said  he,  to  Cathcart,  "we  are  all  htmgry,  and 
if  we  are  not  provided  for  we  soon  get  sick  and 
peevish."  Cathcart,  seeing  that  the  Bashaw  spoke 
in  metaphors,  replied  that,  when  the  chief  physician 
prescribed  the  medicine,  he  should  not  object  to 
administering  it,  but  that  meanwhile  he  could  prom- 
ise nothing.  "Take  care,"  answered  the  Bashaw, 
"that  the  medicine  does  not  come  too  late,  and,  if 
it  comes  in  time,  that  it  is  strong  enough."  On 
May  14,  1 80 1,  he  caused  the  American  flag-staff  to 
be  chopped  down  six  feet  from  the  ground,  in  token 
of  war.  The  answer  of  the  United  States  had  al- 
ready been  decided  upon.  Symptoms  of  unrest  had 
appeared  in  Tunis  and  Algiers  as  well  as  in  Tripoli ; 
and  a  squadron  was  sent  to  the  Mediterranean  with 
orders,  if  any  of  the  Barbary  powers  should  declare 

69 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

war  or  commit  hostilities,  to  protect  American  com- 
merce and  chastise  their  insolence.  The  govern- 
ment had,  as  President  Jefferson  declared,  deter- 
mined "to  owe  to  our  own  energies,  and  not  to 
dishonorable  condescensions,  the  protection  of  our 
right  to  navigate  the  ocean  freely."  For  two  years 
the  contest  with  Tripoli  dragged  wearily  along,  but 
its  vigorous  prosecution  with  augmented  forces, 
after  the  summer  of  1803,  brought  it  at  length  to 
a  triumphant  close.  The  midnight  destruction  by 
Decatur  of  the  frigate  Philadelphia,  under  the  fire 
of  the  Bashaw's  gunboats  and  batteries;  the  fierce 
and  incessant  bombardments  by  Preble  of  the 
Tripolitan  stronghold;  the  mysterious  fate  of  the 
heroic  Somers  and  his  fire-ship;  and  the  intrepid 
march  of  Eaton  across  the  desert  to  the  capture  of 
Deme,  were  incidents  which  taught  the  rulers  of 
the  Barbary  coast  that  a  new  spirit  must  be  reck- 
oned with.  On  June  3,  1805,  peace  was  agreed  to 
by  a  representative  of  the  Bashaw  on  board  the 
frigate  Constitution,  and  next  day  a  treaty  was  con- 
cluded on  shore. 

During  the  seven  years  that  followed  the  second 
peace  with  Tripoli,  the  relations  of  the  United  States 
with  the  Barbary  powers  were  comparatively  un- 
eventful; but  their  tranquillity  was  now  and  then 
disturbed  by  incidents  which,  although  they  did 
not  produce  a  rupture,  bespoke  a  sullen  dissatisfac- 
tion with  existing  conditions.     This  feeling  prompt- 

70 


FREEDOM    OF    THE    SEAS 

ly  flamed  out  when  in  1812  the  report  was  received 
of  war  between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain. 
The  Dey  of  Algiers,  encouraged  to  believe  that  the 
maritime  power  of  America  would  be  annihilated, 
discovered  that  the  United  States  had  always  fallen 
short  in  the  payment  of  tribute,  and  expelled  the 
American  consul-general  and  all  American  citizens 
from  his  dominions.  An  American  brig  was  capt- 
ured by  an  Algerine  corsair,  and  the  crew  reduced 
to  captivity,  while  an  American  passenger  was  taken 
out  of  a  Spanish  ship  and  held  in  bondage.  Tripoli 
and  Tunis  allowed  the  prizes  of  an  American  priva- 
teer to  be  recaptured  by  the  British  in  their  ports. 
As  the  war  with  England  had  practically  shut  the 
Mediterranean  against  American  vessels,  measures 
of  defence  were  deferred;  but  on  February  23,  181 5, 
five  days  after  peace  with  Great  Britain  was  pro- 
claimed. President  Madison  recommended  a  decla- 
ration of  war  against  Algiers.  The  response  of 
Congress  was  at  once  made  in  an  act,  approved  on 
March  3d,  "for  the  protection  of  the  commerce  of 
the  United  States  against  the  Algerine  cruisers." 
Two  squadrons  were  ordered  to  the  Mediterranean, 
under  Bainbridge  and  Decatur.  Decatur,  arriving 
first  on  the  scene,  compelled  the  Dey  on  June  30th 
to  agree  to  a  treaty  by  which  it  was  declared  that 
no  tribute,  under  any  name  or  form  whatsoever, 
should  again  be  required  from  the  United  States. 
No  other  nation  had  ever  obtained  such  terms. 

71 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

Tripoli  and  Tunis  were  also  duly  admonished;  and 
the  passage  of  the  Straits  of  Gibraltar  was  relieved 
of  its  burdens  and  its  terrors. 

With  the  suppression  of  the  Barbary  exactions, 
tolerated  piracy  disappeared;  but  the  depredations 
of  lawless  freebooters  in  various  parts  of  the  world 
long  continued  to  furnish  occasion  for  naval  and 
to  some  extent  for  diplomatic  activity.  As  late  as 
1870  the  naval  forces  of  the  United  States  were  di- 
rected, upon  the  invitation  of  Prussia,  to  co-operate 
with  those  of  the  other  powers  for  the  suppres- 
sion of  piracy  in  Chinese  waters.  Such  incidents, 
however,  possess  no  special  significance.  No  one 
undertakes  to  defend  confessed  lawlessness.  At- 
tempts to  abridge  the  freedom  of  the  seas  assume 
a  dangerous  form,  and  become  important  when 
they  are  made  or  sanctioned  by  governments,  on 
pleas  of  pretended  right  or  interest.  Within  this 
category  fell  the  claim  long  strenuously  asserted 
that  the  cniisers  of  one  nation  might  lawfully  visit 
and  search  the  merchant  vessels  of  another  nation 
on  the  high  seas,  in  peace  as  well  as  in  war.  To  the 
people  of  the  United  States  this  claim  was  rendered 
especially  hateful  by  the  practice  of  impressment, 
with  which  it  came  to  be  peculiarly  identified.  From 
time  immemorial  the  commanders  of  men-of-war 
had  been  in  the  habit,  when  searching  neutral  ves- 
sels for  contraband  or  enemy's  property,  of  taking 
out  and  pressing  into  service  any  seamen  whom 

72 


FREEDOM    OF    THE    SEAS 

they  conceived  to  be  their  fellow-subjects.  The 
practice  was  essentially  irregular,  arbitrary,  and  op- 
pressive, but  its  most  mischievous  possibilities 
were  yet  to  be  developed  in  the  conditions  resulting 
from  American  independence.  After  Great  Britain, 
in  1793,  became  involved  in  the  wars  growing  out 
of  the  French  Revolution,  the  nature  and  extent  of 
those  possibilities  were  soon  disclosed.  Not  only 
were  the  native  sailors  of  England  and  America 
generally  indistinguishable  by  the  obvious  test  of 
language,  but  the  crews  of  American  vessels  often 
contained  a  large  proportion  of  men  of  British  birth, 
who,  even  when  naturalized  in  the  United  States, 
were,  under  the  doctrine  of  indelible  allegiance 
then  almost  universally  prevalent,  still  claimed  by 
Great  Britain  as  her  subjects.  Native  Americans, 
if  mistakenly  impressed,  ran  the  risk  of  being  killed 
in  action  before  an  order  could  be  obtained  for  their 
release;  all  others  were  firmly  held  to  service.  Nor 
was  it  a  slight  inconvenience  that  in  this  way  Ameri- 
can crews  were  sometimes  so  far  depleted  as  to  be 
unable  to  navigate  their  ships.  The  United  States, 
while  freely  admitting  the  belligerent  right  of  search, 
denied  that  it  might  be  employed  for  any  but  the 
acknowledged  purposes  of  enforcing  blockades, 
seizing  prize  goods,  and  perhaps  capturing  officers 
and  soldiers  in  the  actual  service  of  the  enemy. 
"The  simplest  rule,"  declared  Jefferson,  when  Sec- 
retary of  State,  "  will  be  that  the  vessel  being  Amer- 

73 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

ican  shall  be  evidence  that  the  seamen  on  board 
are  such."  Efforts  were  repeatedly  made  by  the 
United  States  to  adjust  the  controversy,  but  in  vain. 
President  Madison  gave  it  the  chief  place  in  his  mes- 
sage of  June  I,  1812,  recommending  war  against 
Great  Britain ;  but  in  the  treaty  of  peace  concluded 
at  Ghent,  December  24,  1814,  it  was  not  mentioned. 
Nearly  thirty  years  later,  Webster,  when  Secretary 
of  State,  recurring  to  Jefferson's  rule,  declared :  "  In 
every  regularly  documented  American  merchant- 
vessel  the  crew  who  navigate  it  will  find  their  pro- 
tection in  the  flag  which  is  over  them. ' '  These  words 
were  addressed  to  Lord  Ashburton  on  August  8, 
1842.  The  principle  of  protection  and  immimity 
which  they  announced  was  asserted  in  even  broader 
terms,  and  was  thus  impliedly  accepted  by  the 
British  government  in  1861.  On  November  8th  in 
that  year  the  British  mail-steamer  Trent,  while  on 
a  voyage  from  Havana  to  St.  Thomas,  was  over- 
hauled by  the  American  man-of-war  San  Jacinto, 
Captain  Wilkes,  and  was  compelled  to  surrender 
the  Confederate  commissioners  Messrs.  Mason  and 
Slidell,  and  their  secretaries,  Messrs.  McFarland  and 
Eustis,  all  of  whom  were  on  their  way  to  England. 
The  sole  reason  given  by  Earl  Russell  for  demand- 
ing their  release  was  that  "certain  individuals" 
had  "been  forcibly  taken  from  on  board  a  British 
vessel,  the  ship  of  a  neutral  power,  while  such  ves- 
sel was  pursuing  a  lawful  and  innocent  voyage — an 

74 


FREEDOM    OF    THE    SEAS 

act  of  violence  which  was  an  ajffront  to  the  British 
flag  and  a  violation  of  international  law."  No 
wonder  that  Mr.  Seward,  in  assuring  Lord  Lyons 
that  the  demand  would  be  granted,  congratulated 
himself  on  defending  and  maintaining  "an  old, 
honored,  and  cherished  American  cause." 

The  controversy  as  to  impressment  involved  no 
question  as  to  search  on  the  high  seas  in  time  of 
peace.  Such  a  right  had  been  asserted  by  Spain 
and  other  powers  for  the  purpose  of  enforcing  their 
colonial  restrictions.  The  United  States  refused  to 
admit  it,  and  conceded'  a  right  of  search  in  time  of 
peace  only  in  respect  of  pirates,  who,  as  enemies  of 
the  human  race,  were  held  to  be  outside  the  pale 
of  national  protection.  Beyond  this  the  govern- 
ment refused  to  go.  As  the  war-right  of  search 
had  been  perverted  to  the  purpose  of  impress- 
ment, so  it  was  apprehended  that  the  peace-right, 
if  any  were  admitted  to  exist,  might  be  perverted 
to  the  same  purpose  or  to  purposes  equally  odious. 

To  this  position  the  United  States  tenaciously 
adhered,  even  when  strongly  solicited  to  depart  from 
it  by  the  promptings  of  philanthropy.  The  move- 
ment so  energetically  led  by  Great  Britain  during 
the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  for  the  sup- 
pression of  the  African  slave  -  trade,  found  in  all 
civilized  lands  strong  support  in  public  opinion. 
To  its  success,  however,  the  voluntary  co-operation 
of  nations  was  discovered  to  be  indispensable.   Soon 

75 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

after  the  close  of  the  Napoleonic  wars,  Lord  Stowell, 
the  greatest  judge  that  ever  sat  in  the  English  Court 
of  Admiralty,  declared  in  the  case  of  a  French  ves- 
sel, which  had  been  seized  by  a  British  cruiser  on  a 
charge  of  engaging  in  the  slave-trade,  that  no  nation 
could  exercise  a  right  of  visitation  and  search  upon 
the  common  and  unappropriated  part  of  the  ocean 
except  from  belligerent  claim.  The  vessel  was  dis- 
charged. As  if  to  anticipate  such  an  obstacle,  the 
British  government  had  already  entered  into  treaties 
with  Denmark,  Portugal,  and  Spain,  by  which  a 
qualified  right  of  search  was  conceded ;  and  it  sought 
to  make  the  measure  universal.  So  steadfastly  was 
the  object  pursued  that  by  1850  the  nimiber  of  such 
treaties  in  force  between  Great  Britain  and  other 
powers  was  twenty -four.  Among  the  assenting 
governments,  however,  the  two  most  important 
powers  were  not  found  —  the  United  States  and 
France.  When  the  proposal  was  submitted  to  the 
United  States,  the  government  at  once  repulsed  it. 
No  man  condemned  the  slave-trade  more  strongly 
than  did  John  Quincy  Adams;  on  the  other  hand, 
no  one  more  profoundly  appreciated  the  funda- 
mental principles  of  American  policy  and  the  im- 
portance of  maintaining  them.  In  1818,  when 
Secretary  of  State,  he  declared  that  the  admission 
of  the  right  of  search  in  time  of  peace,  under  any 
circumstances  whatever,  would  meet  with  universal 
repugnance  in  the  United  States.     He  steadily  re- 

76 


JOHN    QUINCY    ADAMS 


FREEDOM    OF    THE    SEAS 

sisted  in  Monroe's  cabinet,  even  in  opposition  to  the 
yielding  inclinations  of  Calhoun  and  other  members 
from  slave  States,  any  abatement  of  this  position. 
The  subject  was,  however,  taken  up  in  Congress, 
and  by  an  act  of  May  15,  1820,  the  slave-trade  was 
branded  as  piracy.  This  act  seemed  to  constitute 
the  first  step  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  tow- 
ards the  assimilation  of  the  traffic,  by  the  consent 
of  the  civilized  world,  to  piracy  by  law  of  nations, 
thus  bringing  it  within  the  operation  of  the  only 
acknowledged  right  of  search  in  time  of  peace ;  and 
by  a  resolution  of  the  House  of  Representatives, 
passed  on  February  28,  1823,  by  a  vote  of  131  to  9, 
the  President  was  requested  to  open  negotiations 
to  that  end.  Instructions  in  conformity  with  this 
resolution  were  given  to  the  diplomatic  representa- 
tives of  the  United  States;  and  on  March  13,  1824, 
a  convention  was  signed  at  London  which  conceded 
a  reciprocal  right  of  search  on  the  coasts  of  Africa, 
America,  and  the  West  Indies.  The  Senate  of  the 
United  States,  however,  on  May  21,  1824,  by  a  vote 
of  36  to  2,  struck  out  the  word  "America,"  and,  the 
British  government  declining  to  accept  the  amend- 
ment, the  treaty  failed.  On  December  10,  1824, 
the  Senate  rejected  a  similar  convention  with  Co- 
lombia, although  it  did  not  apply  to  the  American 
coasts.  Negotiations  on  the  subject  were  there- 
fore discontinued,  and  the  decision  not  to  concede 
even  a  qualified  right  of  search  was  adhered  to. 

77 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

The  government  of  the  United  States  was  not  in- 
sensible to  the  crying  evils  of  the  traffic  in  slaves. 
In  the  treaty  of  Ghent,  it  had  concurred  in  reprobat- 
ing the  traffic  as  "  irreconcilable  with  the  principles 
of  humanity  and  justice,"  and  had  pledged  its  best 
endeavors  to  accomplish  its  entire  abolition.  But, 
while  always  acknowledging,  as  it  did  in  the  Webster- 
Asburton  treaty,  the  duty  to  employ  its  naval  forces 
for  the  redemption  of  that  pledge,  it  insisted  that 
American  vessels  on  the  high  seas  should  be  liable 
to  search  only  by  American  cruisers;  and  it  con- 
ceded a  similar  exemption  to  the  vessels  of  other 
nations.  In  1858  this  principle  was  at  length 
formally  accepted  by  the  British  government;  and 
in  the  same  year  the  Senate  of  the  United  States 
unanimously  reaffirmed  it.  Since  that  time,  the 
United  States  has  in  three  instances  consented  to  a 
qualified  departure  from  its  observance:  in  the 
treaties  with  Great  Britain,  concluded  April  7,  1862, 
and  February  17,  1863,  during  the  civil  war,  ad- 
mitting a  reciprocal  search  for  slavers  within  two 
hundred  miles  from  the  African  coast  southward  of 
the  thirty-second  parallel  of  north  latitude,  and 
within  thirty  leagues  of  the  islands  of  Cuba,  Puerto 
Rico,  Santo  Domingo,  and  Madagascar;  in  the  gen- 
eral act  of  Brussels  of  July  2,  1890,  permitting,  for 
the  purpose  of  repressing  the  slave-trade,  a  mutual 
search  within  a  defined  zone  on  the  eastern  coast  of 
Africa  of  vessels  of  less  than  five  hundred  tons  bur- 

78 


FREEDOM    OF    THE    vSEAS 

den;  and  in  the  agreements  for  the  protection  of 
the  fur  seals  in  Bering  Sea.  By  the  abolition  of 
slavery  in  the  Spanish  Antilles,  the  most  doubtful 
concession  made  in  the  treaties  with  Great  Britain 
soon  ceased  practically  to  cause  anxiety;  nor  was 
the  integrity  of  the  general  principle  impaired  by 
the  exceptional  and  temporary  relaxation  of  its 
observance  by  mutual  agreement.  It  may  indeed 
be  said  that  the  making  of  such  agreements  by  the 
United  States  was  rendered  possible  by  the  previous 
unqualified  acceptance  of  the  principle  of  the  free- 
dom of  the  seas  by  Great  Britain  and  other  mari- 
time powers. 

The  disposition  of  the  United  States  to  maintain 
its  general  and  time-honored  rule  was  signally  ex- 
emplified in  the  case  of  the  steamer  Virginius.  On 
October  31,  1873,  the  Virginius,  while  sailing  under 
an  American  register  and  flying  the  American  flag, 
was  chased  and  seized  on  the  high  seas  off  the 
coast  of  Cuba  by  the  Spanish  man-of-war  Tornado. 
The  captive  vessel  was  taken  to  Santiago  de  Cuba, 
where,  after  a  summary  trial  by  court  -  martial, 
ostensibly  on  a  charge  of  piracy,  fifty-three  of  her 
officers,  crew,  and  passengers,  embracing  Americans, 
British  subjects,  and  Cubans,  were  condemned  and 
shot.  The  rest  were  held  as  prisoners.  No  founda- 
tion was  shown  for  the  charge  of  piracy  beyond  the 
fact  that  the  vessel  was  employed  by  Cuban  insur- 
gents in  conveying  arms,  ammunition,  and  men  to 

79 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

Cuba,  an  employment  which  obviously  did  not  con- 
stitute piracy  by  law  of  nations.  The  government 
of  the  United  States  therefore  demanded  the  restora- 
tion of  the  vessel,  the  surrender  of  the  captives,  a 
salute  to  the  American  flag,  and  the  condign  punish- 
ment of  the  Spanish  officials.  On  proof  that  the 
register  of  the  Virginius  was  fraudulent,  and  that 
she  had  no  right  to  American  colors,  the  salute  to 
the  flag  was  afterwards  dispensed  with;  but  the 
vessel  and  the  survivors  of  her  passengers  and  crew 
were  duly  delivered  up;  and  an  indemnity  was 
eventually  obtained  by  the  United  States  for  the 
relief  of  the  sufferers  and  of  the  families  of  those 
who  were  put  to  death,  with  the  exception  of  the 
British  subjects,  for  whom  compensation  was  ob- 
tained from  Spain  by  their  own  government.  It  is 
often  stated  that  the  United  States  in  this  case 
maintained  that  the  Virginius  was  exempt  from 
search  merely  because  she  bore  the  American  flag, 
even  though  her  papers  were  false  and  she  had  no 
right  to  fly  it.  This  supposition  is  contradicted 
by  the  fact  that  the  salute  to  the  flag  was  dispensed 
with.  The  demands  of  the  United  States  in  their 
last  analysis  rested  chiefly  upon  the  ground  that 
the  vessel  was  unlawfully  seized  on  a  spurious  charge 
of  piracy,  and  that  the  proceedings  at  Santiago  de 
Cuba  were  conducted  in  flagrant  disregard  of  law 
and  of  the  treaties  between  the  two  countries.  In 
March,  1895,  the  American  steamer,  Allianga,  bound 

80 


FREEDOM    OF    THE    SEAS 

from  Colon  to  New  York,  was  fired  on  by  a  Spanish 
gunboat  off  the  coast  of  Cuba  outside  the  three- 
mile  limit.  The  Spanish  government  promptly  dis- 
avowed the  act  and  expressed  regret,  and,  by  way  of 
assurance  that  such  an  event  would  not  again  occur, 
relieved  the  offending  officer  of  his  command.  In- 
cidents such  as  these  serve  to  show  that  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  freedom  of  the  seas  has  lost  neither  its 
vitality  nor  its  importance.  It  may  indeed  be  said 
that  the  exemption  of  vessels  from  visitation  and 
search  on  the  high  seas  in  time  of  peace  is  a  prin- 
ciple which  rather  grows  than  diminishes  in  the  es- 
timation of  mankind ;  for  in  the  light  of  history,  its 
establishment  is  seen  to  mark  the  progress  of  com- 
merce from  a  semi-barbarous  condition,  in  which  it 
was  exposed  to  constant  violence,  to  its  present  state 
of  freedom  and  security.  Nor  is  there  any  page  in 
American  diplomacy  more  glorious  than  that  on 
which  the  successful  advocacy  of  this  great  principle 
is  recorded. 

While  maintaining  the  freedom  of  the  seas,  the 
United  States  has  also  contended  for  the  free  nav- 
igation of  the  natural  channels  by  which  they  are 
connected.  On  this  principle,  it  led  in  the  move- 
ment that  brought  about  the  abolition,  in  1857,  of 
the  dues  levied  by  Denmark  on  vessels  and  cargoes 
passing  through  the  sound  and  belts  which  form 
a  passage  from  the  North  Sea  into  the  Baltic.  These 
dues,  which  were  justified  by  the  Danish  govem- 

6  81 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

merit  on  the  ground  of  immemorial  usage,  sanc- 
tioned by  a  long  succession  of  treaties,  and  of  the 
benefit  conferred  on  shipping  by  the  policing  and 
lighting  of  the  waters,  bore  heavily  on  commerce, 
and  the  United  States,  after  repeatedly  remonstrat- 
ing, at  length  gave  notice  that  it  would  no  longer 
submit  to  them.  This  action  led  to  the  calling  of  a 
conference  in  Europe.  The  United  States  declined 
to  take  part  in  it,  but  afterwards  co-operated,  by  a 
treaty  with  Denmark,  in  giving  effect  to  the  plan 
under  which  the  dues  were  capitalized  and  removed. 
An  artificial  channel  necessarily  involves  special 
consideration;  but,  reasoning  by  analogy,  Mr.  Clay, 
as  Secretary  of  State,  declared  that  if  a  canal  to 
unite  the  Pacific  and  Atlantic  oceans  should  ever 
be  constructed,  "the  benefits  of  it  ought  not  to  be 
exclusively  appropriated  to  any  one  nation,  but 
should  be  extended  to  all  parts  of  the  globe  upon 
the  payment  of  a  just  compensation  or  reasonable 
tolls."  This  principle  was  approved  by  the  Senate 
in  1835,  and  by  the  House  of  Representatives  in 
1839,  and  was  incorporated  in  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty  in  1850.  It  is  now  embodied  in  the  Hay- 
Pauncefote  treaty  for  the  neutralization  of  the 
interoceanic  canal. 

Nor  should  we  omit  to  mention,  in  connection 
with  the  freedom  of  the  seas,  the  subject  of  the  free 
navigation  of  international  rivers.  It  is  not  doubted 
that  rivers  such  as  the  Hudson  and  the  Mississippi, 

82 


FREEDOM    OF    THE    SEAS 

which  are  navigable  only  within  the  territory  of  one 
country,  are  subject  to  that  country's  exclusive 
control.  But  with  regard  to  rivers  which  are  navi- 
gable within  two  or  more  countries,  the  principle 
of  free  navigation,  consecrated  in  the  acts  of  the 
Congress  of  Vienna,  has  been  consistently  advocated 
by  the  United  States,  and  has  been  embodied  in 
various  forms  in  several  of  its  treaties.  When  the 
British  government  sought  to  deny  to  the  inhabi- 
tants of  the  United  States  the  commercial  use  of 
the  river  St.  Lawrence,  Henry  Clay,  as  Secretary  of 
State,  appealed  to  the  regulations  of  the  Congress  of 
Vienna,  which  should,  he  declared,  "be  regarded 
only  as  the  spontaneous  homage  of  man  to  the 
superior  wisdom  of  the  paramount  Lawgiver  of  the 
Universe,  by  delivering  His  great  works  from  the 
artificial  shackles  and  selfish  contrivances  to  which 
they  have  been  arbitrarily  and  unjustly  subjected." 
The  free  navigation  of  the  St.  Lawrence  was  secured 
temporarily  by  the  reciprocity  treaty  of  1854,  and 
in  perpetuity  by  the  treaty  of  Washington  of  1871, 
which  also  declared  the  rivers,  Yukon,  Porcupine, 
and  Stikine  to  be  "forever  free  and  open  for  pur- 
poses of  commerce"  to  the  citizens  of  both  countries. 
For  many  years  the  government  of  the  United  States 
actively  endeavored  to  secure  the  free  navigation 
of  the  Amazon,  which  was  at  length  voluntarily  con- 
ceded by  the  Emperor  of  Brazil  to  all  nations  in 
1866.     By  a  treaty  between  the  United  States  and 

83 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

Bolivia  of  1858,  the  Amazon  and  La  Plata,  with 
their  tributaries,  were  declared  to  be,  "in  accord- 
ance with  fixed  principles  of  international  law,  .  .  . 
channels  open  by  nature  for  the  commerce  of  all 
nations."  In  1852,  General  Urquiza,  provisional  di- 
rector of  the  Argentine  Confederation,  decreed  that 
the  navigation  of  the  rivers  Parana  and  Uruguay 
should  be  open  to  the  vessels  of  all  nations.  In  the 
next  year  the  United  States,  acting  concurrently 
with  France  and  Great  Britain,  secured  the  con- 
firmation of  this  privilege  by  treaty.  The  State  of 
Buenos  Ay  res,  which  had  sought  to  control  the 
commercial  possibilities  which  the  rivers  afforded, 
protested  against  the  treaties  and  withdrew  from 
the  confederation ;  but  the  treaty  powers  decided  to 
bestow  the  moral  weight  and  influence  of  diplomatic 
relations  upon  the  government  which  had  been 
prompt  to  recognize  the  liberal  commercial  prin- 
ciples of  the  age,  and  the  policy  of  free  navigation 
prevailed. 

From  Paraguay,  which  had  sought  to  lead  the 
life  of  a  hermit  state,  a  similar  concession  was  ob- 
tained under  peculiar  circumstances.  In  1853  the 
government  of  the  United  States  sent  out  a  naval 
vessel,  called  the  Water  Witch,  under  the  command 
of  Lieutenant  Thomas  J.  Page,  to  survey  the  trib- 
utaries of  the  river  Plate  and  report  on  the  com- 
mercial condition  of  the  countries  bordering  on  their 
waters.     Permission  was  obtained  from  the  gov- 

84 


FREEDOM    OF    THE    SEAS 

emment  of  Brazil  to  explore  all  the  waters  of  the 
Paraguay  that  were  under  Brazilian  jurisdiction, 
and  from  the  provisional  director  of  the  Argentine 
Confederation  to  explore  all  rivers  within  the  juris- 
diction of  his  government.  The  surveys  of  the 
Plate,  and  of  the  Paraguay  and  the  Parana,  had 
been  in  progress  about  a  year  and  a  half,  when,  on 
January  31,  1855,  Lieutenant  Page  started  from 
Corrientes  with  a  small  steamer  and  two  boats  to 
ascend  the  river  Salado,  leaving  Lieutenant  William 
N.  Jeffers  in  charge  of  the  Water  Witch,  with  in- 
structions to  ascend  the  Parana  as  far  as  her  draught 
would  allow.  Lieutenant  Jeffers  sailed  from  Cor- 
rientes on  the  ist  of  February,  and  had  proceeded 
only  a  few  miles  above  the  point  where  the  Parana 
forms  the  common  boundary  between  Paraguay  and 
the  Argentine  province  of  Corrientes,  when  he  ran 
aground  near  the  Paraguayan  fort  of  Itapiru.  An 
hour  later  the  Water  Witch  was  hauled  off  and 
anchored ;  but  while  the  crew  were  at  dinner  it  was 
observed  that  the  Paraguayans  were  getting  their 
guns  ready.  Lieutenant  Jeffers,  though  not  expect- 
ing serious  trouble,  had  the  Water  Witch  cleared  for 
action  and  gave  directions  to  proceed  up  the  river 
at  all  hazards.  While  he  was  weighing  anchor,  a 
Paraguayan  canoe  came  alongside  and  a  man  on 
board  handed  him  a  paper  in  Spanish.  This  paper 
Jeffers  declined  to  receive,  since  he  did  not  under- 
stand the  language  in  which  it  was  printed,  and  as 

85 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

soon  as  the  anchor  was  raised  he  stood  up  the  river, 
the  crew  at  quarters.  The  pilot  informed  him  that 
the  only  practicable  channel  lay  close  to  the  fort, 
on  the  Paraguayan  side  of  the  river,  and  this  he 
directed  the  pilot  to  take.  When  within  three 
hundred  yards  from  the  fort  he  was  hailed,  presum- 
ably in  Spanish,  by  a  person  who  was  said  to  be 
the  Paraguayan  admiral,  but  not  understanding  the 
import  of  the  hail  he  did  not  regard  it.  Two  blank 
cartridges  were  then  fired  by  the  fort  in  quick  suc- 
cession, and  these  were  followed  by  a  shot  which 
carried  away  the  wheel  of  the  Water  Witch,  cut  the 
ropes,  and  mortally  wounded  the  helmsman.  Lieu- 
tenant Jeffers  directed  a  general  fire  in  return,  and 
the  action  continued  for  some  minutes.  In  1858, 
the  government  of  the  United  States  sent  an  ex- 
pedition to  Paraguay  to  obtain  reparation  for  this 
and  other  incidents.  The  American  minister,  who 
accompanied  the  fleet,  obtained  "ample  apologies," 
as  well  as  an  indemnity  of  $10,000  for  the  family  of 
the  seaman  who  was  killed  at  the  wheel;  and  on 
February  4,  1859,  a  treaty  of  amity  and  commerce 
was  concluded  at  Asuncion,  by  which  Paraguay 
conceded  "to  the  merchant  flag  of  the  citizens  of 
the  United  States"  the  free  navigation  of  the  rivers 
Paraguay  and  Parana,  so  far  as  they  lay  within  her 
dominions. 


IV 

FISHERIES    QUESTIONS 

As  the  cause  of  the  freedom  of  the  seas  advanced, 
inordinate  claims  of  dominion  over  adjacent  waters 
naturally  shrank  and  dwindled  away.  This  ten- 
dency towards  humaner  opinions  and  practices  may 
be  traced  in  the  history  of  fisheries  questions.  For 
more  than  three  centuries,  Denmark  claimed  the 
right,  on  grounds  of  sovereignty  and  dominion,  to 
monopolize  the  fisheries  in  all  the  seas  lying  between 
Norway  and  Iceland.  This  claim,  though  eventually 
resisted  by  other  powers,  was  acquiesced  in  by  Eng- 
land by  treaties  made  in  1400  and  1523,  under  which 
her  merchants  and  fishermen  plying  their  trade  in 
those  seas  were  required  to  take  out  licenses  from 
the  Danish  King.  At  a  later  day  the  Dutch  obtained 
licenses  from  the  British  government  for  the  purpose 
of  fishing  in  the  North  Sea.  These  examples  serve 
to  illustrate  the  practices  that  prevailed  in  times 
when  exclusive  rights  were  asserted  not  only  as  to 
fishing  in  gulfs  and  bays  and  in  vast  reaches  of  the 
open  sea,  but  also  as  to  particular  fisheries,  such  as 
those  on  the  Grand  Banks  of  Newfoundland. 

87 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

We  have  seen  that  among  the  subjects  discussed 
by  the  peace  commissioners  of  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States  at  Paris  in  1782,  the  two  that  were 
the  most  strongly  contested  and  the  last  disposed  of 
were  those  of  the  fisheries  and  the  compensation  of 
the  loyalists.  The  provisional  articles  of  peace  were 
concluded  November  30,  1782.  On  the  25th  of 
that  month  the  British  commissioners  delivered  to 
the  American  commissioners  a  set  of  articles,  con- 
taining fresh  proposals  from  the  British  ministry, 
and  representing  the  results  of  many  weeks  of 
negotiation.  By  these  articles,  the  third  of  which 
related  to  the  fisheries,  the  citizens  of  the  United 
States  were  forbidden  not  only  to  dry  fish  on  the 
shores  of  Nova  Scotia,  but  also  to  take  fish  within 
three  leagues  of  the  coasts  in  the  Gulf  of  St.  Law- 
rence, and  within  fifteen  leagues  of  the  coasts  of  Cape 
Breton  outside  of  that  gulf.  This  proposal  was 
unacceptable  to  the  American  commissioners;  and 
on  the  28th  of  November,  John  Adams  drew  up  a 
counter-project,  which  was  submitted  in  a  conference 
of  the  commissioners  on  the  following  day.  It  pro- 
vided that  the  subjects  of  his  Britannic  Majesty  and 
the  people  of  the  United  States  should  "  continue  to 
enjoy,  unmolested,  the  right  to  take  fish  of  every 
kind,  on  the  Grand  Bank,  and  on  all  the  other  banks 
of  Newfoimdland ;  also  in  the  Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence, 
and  in  all  other  places,  where  the  inhabitants  of  both 
countries  used  at  any  time  heretofore  to  fish";  and 

88 


FISHERIES    QUESTIONS 

that  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  should  "  have 
liberty  to  cure  and  dry  their  fish  on  the  shores  of  Cape 
Sables,  and  any  of  the  unsettled  bays,  harbors,  or 
creeks  of  Nova  Scotia,  or  any  of  the  shores  of  the 
Magdalen  Islands,  and  of  the  Labrador  coast";  and 
that  they  should  be  "permitted,  in  time  of  peace,  to 
hire  pieces  of  land,  for  terms  of  years,  of  the  legal 
proprietors,  in  any  of  the  dominions  of  his  Majesty, 
whereon  to  erect  the  necessary  stages  and  buildings, 
and  to  cure  and  dry  their  fish."  One  of  the  British 
commissioners  objected  to  the  use  of  the  word  right, 
in  respect  of  the  taking  of  fish  on  the  Grand  Bank 
and  other  banks  of  Newfoundland,  in  the  Gulf  of 
St.  Lawrence,  "and  in  all  other  places,  where  the 
inhabitants  of  both  countries  used  at  any  time  here- 
tofore to  fish."  Another  said  that  "the  word  right 
was  an  obnoxious  expression."  Adams  vehemently 
contended  for  the  right  of  the  people  of  America  to 
fish  on  the  banks  of  Newfoundland.  "Can  there 
be  a  clearer  right?"  he  exclaimed.  "In  former 
treaties,  that  of  Utrecht,  and  that  of  Paris,  France 
and  England  claimed  the  right  and  have  used  the 
word."  Finally,  when  he  declared  that  he  would 
not  sign  any  articles  without  satisfaction  in  respect 
of  the  fishery,  the  British  commissioners  conceded 
the  point,  and  after  many  suggestions  and  amend- 
ments a  stipulation  was  agreed  on  which  formed 
the  third  article  of  the  provisional  peace.  By  this 
article,  which  was  based  on  the  proposal  submitted 

89 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

by  Adams,  it  was  agreed  that  the  people  of  the  United 
States  should  continue  to  enjoy  the  "right"  to  take 
fish  on  all  the  banks  of  Newfoundland  and  in  the 
Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence,  and  "at  all  other  places  in  the 
sea"  where  the  inhabitants  of  both  countries  had 
been  accustomed  to  fish ;  and  that  the  inhabitants  of 
the  United  States  should  have  the  " liberty"  to  take 
fish  on  the  coast  of  Newfoundland  and  on  the  coasts, 
bays,  and  creeks  of  all  other  of  his  Britannic  Majesty's 
dominions  in  America,  and  also  the  " liberty"  to  dry 
and  cure  fish,  subject  to  an  agreement  with  the  pro- 
prietors of  the  ground,  so  soon  as  any  of  the  coasts 
should  become  settled. 

When  the  representatives  of  the  two  countries  met 
at  Ghent,  on  August  8,  1814,  to  negotiate  a  new 
treaty  of  peace,  the  British  plenipotentiaries  at  once 
took  the  ground  that  the  fishery  arrangement  of 
1782-83  had  been  terminated  by  the  war  of  18 12,  and 
declared  that,  while  they  "  did  not  deny  the  right  of 
the  Americans  to  fish  generally,  or  in  the  open  seas," 
they  could  not  renew  the  privilege  of  fishing  within 
British  jurisdiction  and  of  drying  fish  on  the  Brit- 
ish shores  without  an  equivalent.  In  the  discussions 
that  ensued,  the  question  of  the  free  navigation  of 
the  Mississippi,  which  had  been  secured  to  British 
subjects  by  the  treaty  of  1782-83,  became  coupled 
with  that  of  the  fisheries.  The  American  plenipoten- 
tiaries were  unwilling  to  renew  the  stipulation  as  to 
the  Mississippi ;  the  British  plenipotentiaries  refused 

90 


FISHERIES    QUESTIONS 

to  yield  the  fisheries  without  it ;  and  in  the  end,  on 
motion  of  the  Americans,  a  treaty  of  peace  was  con- 
cluded which  contained  no  mention  either  of  the 
fisheries  or  of  the  Mississippi,  Both  subjects  were 
left  for  future  negotiation. 

On  June  19,  181 5,  an  American  fishing- vessel,  en- 
gaged in  the  cod-fishery,  was,  when  about  forty-five 
miles  from  Cape  Sable,  warned  by  the  commander  of 
the  British  sloop  Jaseur  not  to  come  within  sixty 
miles  of  the  coast.  This  act  the  British  govern- 
ment disavowed;  but  Lord  Bathurst  is  reported  at 
the  same  time  to  have  declared  that,  while  it  was  not 
the  government's  intention  to  interrupt  American 
fishermen  "in  fishing  anywhere  in  the  open  sea,  or 
without  the  territorial  jurisdiction,  a  marine  league 
from  the  shore,"  it  "could  not  permit  the  vessels  of 
the  United  States  to  fish  within  the  creeks  and  close 
upon  the  shores  of  the  British  territories."  John 
Quincy  Adams,  who  was  then  minister  of  the  United 
States  in  London,  maintained  that  the  treaty  of 
peace  of  1783  "was  not,  in  its  general  provisions,  one 
of  those  which,  by  the  common  understanding  and 
usage  of  civilized  nations,  is  or  can  be  considered 
as  annulled  by  a  subsequent  war  between  the  same 
parties."  This  position  Lord  Bathurst  denied.  He 
contended  that  the  treaty  of  1782-83,  like  many 
others,  contained  provisions  of  different  characters — 
some  irrevocable,  and  others  of  a  temporary  nature, 
terminable  by  war;  and  that  the  two  governments 

91 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

had,  in  respect  of  the  fisheries,  recognized  this  dis- 
tinction by  describing  as  a  "right"  the  open  sea 
fishery,  which  the  United  States  could  enjoy  merely 
by  virtue  of  its  independence,  and  as  a  "liberty," 
dependent  on  the  treaty  itself,  what  was  to  be  done 
within  British  jurisdiction.  This  position  the  British 
government  continued  to  maintain.  From  1815  to 
1818  many  American  vessels  foimd  fishing  in  British 
waters  were  seized,  and  much  ill  feeling  was  en- 
gendered. 

Such  was  the  condition  of  things  when,  on 
October  20,  181 8,  Albert  Gallatin  and  Richard  Rush 
concluded  with  plenipotentiaries  on  the  part  of 
Great  Britain  a  convention,  the  first  article  of  which 
related  to  the  fisheries.  By  this  article  the  United 
States  "renounce  forever,  any  liberty  heretofore  en- 
joyed or  claimed  by  the  inhabitants  thereof  to  take, 
dry,  or  cure  fish  on  or  within  three  marine  miles"  of 
any  of  the  "  coasts,  bays,  creeks,  or  harbours  "  of  the 
British  dominions  in  America,  not  included  within 
certain  limits,  within  which  the  right  to  fish  or  to 
dry  and  cure  fish  was  expressly  reserved.  It  was 
provided,  however,  that  the  American  fishermen 
might  "enter  such  bays  or  harbours"  for  the  pur- 
poses "of  shelter  and  of  repairing  damages  there- 
in, of  purchasing  wood,  and  of  obtaining  water,  and 
for  no  other  purpose  whatever,"  subject  to  such 
restrictions  as  might  be  necessary  to  prevent  them 
from  abusing  the  privileges  thus  reserved  to  them. 

92 


FISHERIES    QUESTIONS 

On  June  14,  1819,  an  act,  closely  following  the  lan- 
guage of  the  article,  was  passed  by  the  imperial 
parliament  to  carry  it  into  effect ;  and  from  that  time 
down  to  1836,  little  trouble  seems  to  have  occurred. 
But  in  that  year  the  legislature  of  Nova  Scotia  passed 
an  act,  by  which  the  "hovering"  of  vessels  within 
three  miles  of  the  coasts  and  harbors  was  sought  to  be 
prevented  by  various  regulations  and  penalties ;  and 
claims  were  subsequently  asserted  to  exclude  Amer- 
ican fishermen  from  all  bays  and  even  from  all  waters 
within  lines  drawn  from  headland  to  headland,  to 
forbid  them  to  navigate  the  Gut  of  Canso,  and  to 
deny  them  all  privileges  of  traffic,  including  the 
purchase  of  bait  and  supplies  in  the  British  colonial 
ports.  From  1839  down  to  1854  there  were  numer- 
ous seizures,  and  in  1852  the  home  government  sent 
over  a  force  of  war  steamers  and  sailing  vessels  to 
assist  in  patrolling  the  coast. 

With  a  view  to  adjust  the  various  questions  that 
had  arisen,  the  British  government  in  1854  sent  Lord 
Elgin  to  the  United  States  on  a  special  mission,  and 
on  June  5,  1854,  he  concluded  with  Mr.  Marcy,  who 
was  then  Secretary  of  State,  a  treaty  in  relation  to 
the  fisheries  and  to  commerce  and  navigation.  By 
this  treaty  the  United  States  fishermen  temporarily 
reacquired  the  greater  part  of  the  inshore  privileges 
renounced  by  the  convention  of  18 18,  On  the  other 
hand,  a  reciprocal  concession  was  granted  to  Brit- 
ish fishermen  on  the  eastern  coasts  of  the  United 

93 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

States  down  to  the  thirty -sixth  parallel  of  north 
latitude,  and  provision  was  made  for  reciprocal  free 
trade  between  the  United  States  and  the  British 
colonies  in  North  America  in  various  articles  of 
commerce.  This  treaty  came  into  operation  on 
March  i6,  1855.  It  was  terminated  on  March  17, 
1866,  on  notice  given  by  the  United  States  in  con- 
formity with  its  provisions.  All  the  old  questions 
were  thus  revived;  but  a  new  arrangement  was  ef- 
fected by  Articles  xviii.-xxv.  of  the  comprehensive 
treaty  of  Washington  of  May  8,  1871.  The  Ameri- 
can fishermen  were  again  temporarily  readmitted 
to  the  privileges  renounced  by  the  convention 
of  18 1 8,  while  the  United  States  agreed  to  admit 
Canadian  fish  and  fish-oil  free  of  duty,  and  to  refer 
to  a  tribunal  of  arbitration,  which  was  to  meet  at 
Halifax,  the  question  of  the  amount  of  any  additional 
compensation  which  should  be  paid  by  the  United 
States  for  the  inshore  privileges.  On  November  23, 
1877,  an  award  was  made  in  favor  of  Great  Britain 
of  the  sum  of  five  million  five  hundred  thousand  dol- 
lars, or  nearly  half  a  million  dollars  for  each  of  the 
years  during  which  the  arrangement  was  necessarily 
to  continue  in  force.  The  United  States  protested 
against  the  award,  but  paid  it  in  due  course.  Lest, 
however,  the  same  rate  of  compensation  should 
subsequently  be  demanded,  the  United  States  in 
1883  availed  itself  of  the  right  to  give  notice  of 
termination  of  the  fishery  articles,  and  they  came  to 

94 


FISHERIES    QUESTIONS 

an  end  in  1885.  A  temporary  arrangement  was 
entered  into  for  that  year,  under  which  the  Amer- 
ican fishermen  continued  to  enjoy  the  privileges 
accorded  them  by  the  terminated  articles,  in  consid- 
eration of  President  Cleveland's  undertaking  to  rec- 
ommend to  Congress,  when  it  should  again  assemble, 
the  appointment  of  a  joint  commission  to  consider 
both  the  question  of  the  fisheries  and  that  of  trade 
relations.  The  recommendation  was  submitted  to 
Congress,  but  it  was  not  adopted ;  and  on  the  opening 
of  the  fishing  season  of  1886,  seizures  of  American 
vessels  began  to  be  made.  A  sharp  controversy 
followed,  reviving  questions  not  only  as  to  the 
construction  of  the  convention  of  18 18,  but  also 
as  to  the  right  of  fishing  vessels  to  participate  in 
enlarged  privileges  of  intercourse  established  since 
that  time.  What  were  the  "bays"  intended  by  the 
convention  ?  Did  they  include  only  bodies  of  water 
not  more  than  six  marine  miles  wide  at  the  mouth, 
or  all  bodies  of  water  bearing  the  name  of  bays? 
Were  the  three  marine  miles  to  be  measured  from  a 
line  following  the  sinuosities  of  the  coast,  or  from 
a  line  drawn  from  headland  to  headland,  even  where 
there  might  be  no  body  of  water  bearing  the  name 
of  a  bay  ?  Were  American  fishing  vessels  forbidden 
to  traffic  or  to  obtain  supplies,  even  when  they  en- 
tered the  colonial  ports  for  one  of  the  four  purposes 
specified  in  the  convention?  All  these  questions 
were  raised  and  elaborately  argued.     By  an  act  of 

95 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

March  3,  1887,  Congress  authorized  the  President  in 
his  discretion  to  adopt  measures  of  retaliation.  A 
negotiation  was,  however,  subsequently  undertaken, 
which  resulted  in  the  Bayard-Chamberlain  treaty  of 
February  15,  1888.  Provision  was  made  for  delimit- 
ing the  waters  in  which  American  fishermen  were  to 
be  forbidden  to  fish.  To  this  end,  certain  definite 
lines  were  expressly  drawn;  and,  apart  from  these, 
the  rule,  followed  in  the  North  Sea  and  other  fishery 
arrangements,  was  adopted,  of  treating  as  territorial 
waters  all  bays  not  more  than  ten  miles  wide  at  the 
mouth,  the  theory  being  that  fishing  could  not  be 
carried  on  in  a  free  space  of  less  than  four  miles, 
without  constant  danger  of  entering  exclusive  waters. 
Fishing  vessels,  when  entering  bays  or  harbors  for 
any  of  the  four  purposes  specified  in  the  convention 
of  18 1 8,  were  not  to  be  required  to  enter  or  clear, 
unless  remaining  more  than  twenty-four  hours  or 
communicating  with  the  shore,  or  to  pay  port  dues  or 
charges ;  and  they  were  to  be  allowed  to  transship  or 
sell  their  cargoes  in  case  of  distress  or  casualty,  and 
to  obtain  on  all  occasions  "casual  or  needful  provi- 
sions and  supplies,"  as  distinguished  from  original 
outfits.  Each  vessel  was  to  be  duly  nimibered ;  but 
the  penalty  of  forfeiture  was  to  be  imposed  only  for 
fishing  in  exclusive  British  waters,  or  for  preparing  in 
such  waters  to  fish  therein ;  and  for  any  other  viola- 
tion of  the  fishery  laws  the  penalty  was  not  to  exceed 
three  dollars  for  every  ton  of  the  implicated  vessel. 

96 


FISHERIES    QUESTIONS 

It  was  further  stipulated  that  all  restrictions  should 
be  removed  from  the  purchase  of  bait,  supplies,  and 
outfits,  the  transshipment  of  catch,  and  the  shipping 
of  crews,  whenever  the  United  States  should  remove 
the  duty  from  the  fishery  products  of  Canada  and 
Newfoundland.  This  treaty  enjoys  the  distinction 
of  being  the  only  one  that  was  ever,  by  formal  resolu- 
tion of  the  Senate,  discussed  in  open  session,  so  that 
the  speeches  upon  it  may  be  found  in  the  daily 
record  of  the  Congressional  debates.  Late  in  August, 
1888,  after  a  long  and  animated  debate,  it  was  re- 
jected. President  Cleveland  then  recommended  to 
Congress  a  definite  course  of  retaliation,  looking  im- 
mediately to  the  suspension  of  the  bonded-transit 
system.  This  recommendation  failed;  and  a  mo- 
dus vivendt,  which  was  arranged  by  the  negotiators 
of  the  defeated  treaty  at  the  time  of  its  signature, 
and  under  which  a  system  of  licenses  was  established, 
continued  for  the  time  being  to  operate  by  virtue  of 
Canadian  orders  in  council.  The  fisheries  question 
was  one  of  the  subjects  considered  by  the  Quebec 
commission  of  1898,  but  no  conclusive  results  on  any 
matter  were  reached  by  that  body. 

In  its  later  phases,  the  discussion  of  the  north- 
eastern fisheries  came  to  involve  only  to  a  com- 
paratively slight  extent  any  question  as  to  the  use  of 
the  open  sea.  Very  different  in  that  respect  was  the 
Bering  Sea  controversy,  which  arose  in  regard  to  the 
fur-seals  in  1886.  By  an  imperial  ukase  or  edict  of 
7  97 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

July  8,  1799,  Paul  I.  of  Russia  granted  to  the  Rus- 
sian-American Company  various  important  rights 
on  the  Russian  coasts  in  America,  including  that  of 
fishing.  Twenty-two  years  later — on  September  7, 
182 1 — there  was  issued  by  the  Emperor  Alexander 
another  ukase,  the  apparent  effect  of  which  was 
much  more  far-reaching,  since  it  purported  to  ex- 
clude foreigners  from  carrying  on  commerce  and 
from  whaling  and  fishing  on  the  northwest  coast  of 
America,  from  Bering  Strait  down  to  the  fifty-first 
parallel  of  north  latitude,  and  forbade  them  even  to 
approach  within  a  hundred  Italian  miles  of  the  coast. 
Against  this  ukase  both  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain  protested,  and  it  was  never  enforced.  On  the 
other  hand,  a  convention  was  concluded  between  the 
United  States  and  Russia  on  April  17,  1824,  by  which 
it  was  agreed  that  "in  any  part  of  the  great  ocean, 
commonly  called  the  Pacific  Ocean,  or  South  Sea," 
the  citizens  or  subjects  of  the  high  contracting 
parties  should  be  "neither  disturbed  nor  restrained, 
either  in  navigation  or  in  fishing."  A  treaty  in 
similar  terms  was  made  by  Great  Britain  in  the 
following  year.  By  a  convention  signed  at  Washing- 
ton on  March  30,  1867,  the  Russian  Emperor,  in  con- 
sideration of  the  sum  of  seven  million  two  hundred 
thousand  dollars  in  gold,  ceded  "  all  the  territory  and 
dominion"  which  he  possessed  "on  the  continent  of 
America  and  in  the  adjacent  islands"  to  the  United 
States.    Of  this  cession,  the  eastern  limit  was  that 

98 


FISHERIES    QUESTIONS 

defined  in  the  treaty  between  Great  Britain  and 
Russia  of  1825.  The  western  limit  was  defined  by  a 
water  line,  which  was  drawn  so  as  to  include  in  the 
territory  conveyed  numerous  islands. 

In  1886  certain  Canadian  sealers  were  seized  by 
United  States  revenue  -  cutters  in  Bering  Sea,  at  a 
distance  of  upwards  of  sixty  miles  from  the  nearest 
land.  The  United  States  Court  at  Sitka  pronounced 
a  sentence  of  condemnation,  but  the  President  sub- 
sequently ordered  the  vessels  to  be  released ;  and  on 
August  17,  1887,  Mr.  Bayard,  as  Secretary  of  State, 
instructed  the  American  ministers  at  London,  Paris, 
and  certain  other  capitals,  to  invite  the  governments 
to  which  they  were  accredited  to  co-operate  with  the 
United  States  in  measures  for  the  better  protection 
of  the  fur-seals.  It  was  represented  that,  as  the 
result  of  indiscriminate  killing,  the  seals  were  in 
danger  of  extermination,  and  that  the  nations  had  a 
common  interest  in  preventing  this  from  being  done. 
The  responses  to  this  overture  were  generally  favor- 
able, and  negotiations  with  Great  Britain  had 
practically  reached  a  favorable  conclusion,  when,  on 
May  16,  1888,  nine  days  after  the  adverse  report  of 
the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 
States  Senate  on  the  Bayard-Chamberlain  treaty, 
they  were  arrested  on  an  objection  from  the  Canadian 
government.  On  the  12th  of  the  following  Septem- 
ber, Mr.  E.  J.  Phelps,  then  American  minister  in  Lon- 
don, in  a  despatch  to  Mr.  Bayard,  suggested  that  the 

99 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

United  States  might  of  its  own  motion  take  measures 
to  prevent  the  destruction  of  the  fur-seals  by  captur- 
ing on  the  high  seas  the  vessels  employed  in  it.  This 
suggestion  was  not  then  adopted;  but,  after  the 
change  of  administration  in  1889,  seizures  were 
renewed.  A  warm  dispute  followed,  in  which  Mr. 
Blaine  sought  to  defend  the  seizures  on  the  ground 
that  the  killing  of  seals  in  the  open  sea  was  contra 
bonos  mores,  as  well  as  on  the  supposition  that  Russia 
had  asserted  and  exercised  exclusive  rights  in  Bering 
Sea,  and  that  the  treaties  of  1824  and  1825  did  not 
apply  to  that  body  of  water.  On  February  29,  1892, 
however,  a  treaty  was  signed,  by  which  a  tribunal 
of  arbitration,*  to  sit  at  Paris,  was  invested  with 
power  to  decide:  (i)  what  exclusive  jurisdiction,  or 
exclusive  rights  in  the  seal-fisheries,  in  Bering  Sea, 
Russia  asserted  prior  to  the  cession  of  Alaska  to  the 
United  States;  (2)  how  far  those  claims  were  rec- 
ognized by  Great  Britain;  (3)  whether  Bering  Sea 
was  included  in  the  phrase  "  Pacific  Ocean,"  as  used 
in  the  treaties  of  1824  and  1825;  (4)  whether  all 
Russia's  rights  passed  to  the  United  States;  and  (5) 
whether  the  United  States  had  any  right  of  pro- 
tection or  property  in  the  fur-seals  in  Bering  Sea 
outside  the  ordinary  three-mile  limit.  If  the  arbi- 
trators found  that  the  exclusive  rights  of  the  United 
States  were  insufficient,  they  were  to  determine  what 

*  For  the  personnel  of  this  tribunal  see  infra,  p.  212. 
100 


FISHERIES    QUESTIONS 

concurrent  regulations  the  two  governments  should 
jointly  enforce  outside  territorial  waters. 

Before  the  tribunal  of  arbitration,  the  representa- 
tives of  the  United  States  relied  much  upon  a  theory 
of  property  in  fur-seals ;  but  on  the  various  questions 
of  right  submitted,  the  decision  of  the  arbitrators 
was  adverse  to  the  United  States.  This  result  was 
due,  however,  not  to  any  lack  of  ability  or  of  effort 
on  the  part  of  the  accomplished  American  agent  and 
counsel,  who  exhausted  every  resource  of  argument, 
but  to  certain  historical  and  legal  antecedents,  among 
which  we  may  mention  the  following : 

1.  That,  when  the  first  seizures  were  reported  in 
1886,  the  Department  of  State  not  only  possessed  no 
information  concerning  them,  but  was  unable  to 
give  any  explanation  of  them,  and  that,  when  the 
circumstances  of  the  seizures  were  ascertained,  even 
though  the  full  judicial  record  had  not  then  been 
received,  the  vessels  were  ordered  to  be  released. 

2.  That  the  court  in  Alaska,  in  condemning  the 
vessels  and  punishing  their  masters  and  crews,  pro- 
ceeded on  a  doctrine  of  mare  clausum,  which  the 
United  States  had  never  legally  asserted  and  which 
the  government  afterwards  disavowed.  It  is  indeed 
generally  supposed,  and  the  supposition  apparently  is 
shared  by  the  Supreme  Court,  that  Mr.  Blaine  in  his 
correspondence  claimed  that  the  United  States  had 
derived  from  Russia  exclusive  dominion  over  Ber- 
ing Sea.     It  is,  however,  a  fact  that  in  a  note  to  Sir 

lOI 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

Julian  Pauncefote,  December  17,  1890,  Mr.  Blaine 
said:  "The  government  has  never  claimed  it  and 
never  desired  it ;  it  expressly  disavows  it."  Whether 
this  sweeping  denial  is  or  is  not  altogether  justified 
by  the  record,  is  a  question  that  need  not  be  here 
considered, 

3.  That  the  treaty  ceding  Alaska  to  the  United 
States  did  not  purport  to  convey  the  waters  of 
Bering  Sea,  but  in  terms  conveyed  only  "the 
territory  and  dominion"  of  Russia  "on  the  con- 
tinent of  America  and  in  the  adjacent  islands,"  and 
drew  a  water  botmdary  so  as  to  effect  a  transfer  of 
the  islands,  many  of  them  nameless,  which  lay  in  the 
intervening  seas. 

4.  That  the  ukase  of  1821,  which  contained  the 
only  distinctive  claim  of  mare  clausum  ever  put 
forward  by  Russia,  did  not  assume  to  treat  the  whole 
of  Bering  Sea  as  a  close  sea,  but  only  to  exclude 
foreign  vessels  from  coming  within  one  hundred 
Italian  miles  of  the  coast,  from  the  fifty-first  parallel 
of  north  latitude  to  Bering  Strait,  without  discrimi- 
nation as  to  localities. 

5.  That  against  this  ukase  both  the  United  States 
and  Great  Britain  protested ;  and  that  by  the  treaties 
of  1824  and  1825  Russia  agreed  not  to  interfere  with 
their  citizens  or  subjects  either  in  navigating  or  in 
fishing  in  "any  part  of  the  Pacific  Ocean,"  thus 
abandoning  the  exclusive  jurisdictional  claim  an- 
nounced in  the  ukase. 

102 


FISHERIES    QUESTIONS 

6.  That  it  was  declared  by  Mr,  Blaine  in  the 
diplomatic  correspondence  that  if  the  phrase  "  Pacific 
Ocean,"  as  used  in  those  treaties,  included  Bering 
Sea,  the  United  States  had  "no  well-grounded  com- 
plaint "  against  Great  Britain ;  and  that  it  was  iman- 
imously  found  by  the  arbitrators  that  the  phrase 
Pacific  Ocean  did  include  Bering  Sea. 

7.  That  while  the  tribunal,  by  six  voices  to  one, 
found  that  there  was  no  evidence  to  substantiate 
the  supposition  that  Russia  had  asserted  exception- 
al claims  as  to  the  fur-seals,  there  was  affirmative 
evidence  that  she  had  not  done  so  in  recent  years. 
In  reality,  most  of  the  specific  passages  from  early 
Russian  documents,  given  in  the  case  of  the  United 
States  to  substantiate  Russia's  supposed  exclusive 
claims,  proved  to  be  the  interpolations  of  a  dishon- 
est translator,  and  were  spontaneously  withdrawn 
by  the  agent  of  the  United  States  on  his  discovery 
of  the  circumstances,  soon  after  the  cases  were 
exchanged.  These  interpolations,  however,  did  not 
figure  in  the  diplomatic  correspondence,  but  were 
made  after  its  close. 

8.  That  it  was  admitted  that  no  municipal  law  of 
the  United  States  had  ever  treated  the  fur-seals, 
either  individually  or  collectively,  as  the  subject  of 
property  and  protection  on  the  high  seas. 

9.  That  it  was  also  admitted  by  the  representa- 
tives of  the  United  States  that,  for  the  claim  of 
property  and  protection  on  the  high  seas,  there  was 

103 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

no  precise  precedent  in  international  law,  though  it 
was  strongly  maintained  that  the  claim  was  justified 
by  analogies. 

ID.  That  the  effort  to  support  this  claim  was  em- 
barrassed by  its  relation  to  the  subject  of  visitation 
and  search  on  the  high  seas,  and  especially  by  the 
precedents  which  the  United  States  itself  had  made 
on  that  subject. 

The  question  of  regulations  stood  on  different 
grounds — that  of  international  co-operation,  proposed 
in  1887.  The  arbitrators,  after  deciding  against  the 
United  States  on  questions  of  right,  proceeded  to 
prescribe  regulations,  which  were  afterwards  duly 
put  into  operation  by  the  two  governments.  Under 
a  treaty  of  arbitration  signed  at  Washington  on 
February  8,  1896,  the  sum  of  $473,151.26  was  award- 
ed as  compensation  to  be  paid  by  the  United  States 
for  interference  with  the  Canadian-sealers. 


V 

THE   CONTEST  WITH   COMMERCIAL  RESTRICTIONS 

When  viewed  in  their  wider  relations,  the  early- 
efforts  of  the  United  States  to  establish  the  rights 
of  neutrals  and  the  freedom  of  the  seas  are  seen  to 
form  a  part  of  the  great  struggle  for  the  liberation  of 
commerce  from  the  restrictions  with  which  the  spirit 
of  national  monopoly  had  fettered  and  confined  it. 
When  the  United  States  declared  their  indepen- 
dence, exclusive  restrictions,  both  in  the  exchange  of 
commodities  and  in  their  transportation,  existed  on 
every  side.  The  system  of  colonial  monopoly  was 
but  the  emanation  of  the  general  principle,  on  which 
nations  then  consistently  acted,  of  regarding  every- 
thing "bestowed  on  others  as  so  much  withholden 
from  themselves."  Prohibitions  and  discrimina- 
tions were  universal. 

Such  was  the  prospect  on  which  the  United  States 
looked  when  they  achieved  their  independence. 
With  exceptions  comparatively  unimportant,  there 
was  not  a  single  port  in  the  Western  Hemisphere 
with  which  an  American  vessel  could  lawfully  trade, 
outside  of  its   own   country.      But  the  exclusion 

105 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

most  seriously  felt  was  that  from  the  British  West 
Indies.  Prior  to  the  Revolution  the  burdens  of  the 
restrictive  system  were  essentially  mitigated  by  the 
intercolonial  trade,  the  British  colonists  on  the  con- 
tinent finding  their  best  markets  in  the  British 
islands;  but  when  the  United  States,  by  establish- 
ing their  independence,  became  to  Great  Britain  a 
foreign  nation,  they  at  once  collided  with  her  colo- 
nial system.  American  statesmen  foresaw  these 
things  and  endeavored  to  guard  against  them,  but 
in  vain.  When  the  provisional  articles  of  peace 
with  Great  Britain  were  later  converted  into  a  defin- 
itive treaty,  without  the  addition  of  any  commercial 
clauses,  the  hope  of  establishing  the  relations  be- 
tween the  two  countries  at  the  outset  on  the  broad 
basis  of  mutual  freedom  of  intercourse  disappeared. 
In  the  contest  with  commercial  restrictions,  the 
government  of  the  United  States  adopted  as  the 
basis  of  its  policy  the  principle  of  reciprocity.  In 
its  later  diplomacy  the  term  "reciprocity"  is  much 
used  to  denote  agreements  designed  to  increase  the 
interchange  of  commodities  by  mutual  or  equivalent 
reductions  of  duty.  Tested  by  recent  experience, 
the  later  "reciprocity"  might  not  inaptly  be  de- 
scribed as  a  policy  recommended  by  free-traders 
as  an  escape  from  protection,  and  by  protectionists 
as  an  escape  from  free  trade,  but  distrusted  by  both 
and  supported  by  neither.  It  is,  however,  impos- 
sible to  doubt  that,  in  the  efforts  of  the  United  States 

1 06 


COMMERCIAL    RESTRICTIONS 

to  bring  about  the  abolition  of  the  cumbersome  and 
obstructive  contrivances  of  the  old  navigation  laws, 
the  policy  of  reciprocity  proved  to  be  an  efficient 
instrument  in  furthering  the  tendency  towards 
greater  commercial  freedom.  It  was  announced  by 
the  government  at  the  very  threshold  of  its  existence. 
In  the  preamble  to  the  treaty  of  commerce  with 
France  of  1778,  it  was  declared  that  the  contracting 
parties,  wishing  to  "fix  in  an  equitable  and  perma- 
nent manner"  the  rules  that  should  govern  their 
commerce,  had  judged  that  this  end  "could  not  be 
better  obtained  than  by  taking  for  the  basis  of  their 
agreement  the  most  perfect  equality  and  reciproc- 
ity, and  by  carefully  avoiding  all  those  burthen- 
some  preferences  which  are  usually  sources  of  de- 
bate, embarrassment,  and  discontent;  by  leaving, 
also,  each  party  at  liberty  to  make,  respecting  com- 
merce and  navigation,  those  interior  regulations 
which  it  shall  find  most  convenient  to  itself;  and  by 
founding  the  advantage  of  commerce  solely  upon 
reciprocal  utility  and  the  just  rules  of  free  inter- 
course; reserving  withal  to  each  party  the  liberty 
of  admitting  at  its  pleasure  other  nations  to  a  par- 
ticipation of  the  same  advantages."  John  Quincy 
Adams,  in  1823,  while  avowing  the  belief  that  this 
preamble  was  "  the  first  instance  on  the  diplomatic 
record  of  nations,  upon  which  the  true  principles 
of  all  fair  commercial  negotiation  between  indepen- 
dent states  were  laid  down  and  proclaimed  to  the 

107 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

world,"  at  the  same  time  declared  that  it  "was,  to 
the  foundation  of  our  commercial  intercourse  with 
the  rest  of  mankind,  what  the  Declaration  of  Inde- 
pendence was  to  that  of  our  internal  government. 
The  two  instnmients,"  he  added,  "were  parts  of 
one  and  the  same  system  matured  by  long  and 
anxious  deliberation  of  the  founders  of  this  Union 
in  the  ever  memorable  Congress  of  1776;  and  as  the 
Declaration  of  Independence  was  the  foundation  of 
all  our  mimicipal  institutions,  the  preamble  to  the 
treaty  with  France  laid  the  comer-stone  for  all  our 
subsequent  transactions  of  intercourse  with  foreign 
nations." 

The  progress  of  the  United  States,  in  the  contest 
thus  early  begun  with  commercial  restrictions,  was 
painful  and  slow.  Soon  after  the  establishment  of 
independence,  Congress  took  into  consideration  the 
entire  subject  of  commercial  relations,  and  on  May 
7,  1784,  adopted  a  series  of  resolutions  in  which  the 
principles  by  which  American  negotiators  should  be 
guided  were  set  forth.  By  the  first  of  these  reso- 
lutions it  was  declared  that,  in  any  arrangements 
that  might  be  effected,  each  party  should  have  the 
right  to  carry  its  own  produce,  manufactures,  and 
merchandise  in  its  own  vessels  to  the  ports  of  the 
other,  and  to  bring  thence  the  produce  and  mer- 
chandise of  the  other,  paying  in  each  case  only  such 
duties  as  were  paid  by  the  most -favored  nation. 
The  second  resolution,   which  related  to  colonial 

108 


COMMERCIAL    RESTRICTIONS 

trade,  embodied  the  proposal  that  a  direct  and  simi- 
lar intercourse  should  be  permitted  between  the 
United  States  and  the  possessions  of  European  pow- 
ers in  America,  or  at  any  rate  between  the  United 
States  and  certain  free  ports  in  such  possessions; 
and  that,  if  neither  of  these  alternatives  could  be  ob- 
tained, then  each  side  should  at  least  be  permitted 
to  carry  its  own  produce  and  merchandise  in  its  own 
vessels  directly  to  the  other.  When  the  wars  grow- 
ing out  of  the  French  Revolution  began,  no  progress 
had  been  made  by  the  United  States  towards  the 
attainment  of  the  objects  of  the  second  resolution, 
American  vessels  laden  with  the  produce  of  their  own 
country,  and  in  some  cases  when  laden  with  the 
produce  of  other  countries,  were  admitted  into  most 
of  the  European  ports,  including  those  of  Great 
Britain,  on  condition  of  paying  the  customary  alien 
dues ;  but  the  ports  of  the  colonies  continued  to  be 
closed  against  them,  while  some  of  the  most  im- 
portant American  products  were  specifically  ex- 
cluded from  the  trade  which  vessels  of  the  domi- 
nant country  were  permitted  to  carry  on  between 
its  colonies  and  the  United  States.  When  author- 
izing Gouvemeur  Morris,  as  an  informal  agent,  in 
1789,  to  sound  the  views  of  the  British  ministry 
concerning  relations  with  the  United  States,  Wash- 
ington said:  "Let  it  be  strongly  impressed  on  your 
mind  that  the  privilege  of  carrying  our  productions 
in  our  vessels  to  their  islands,  and  bringing  in  return 

log 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

the  productions  of  those  islands  to  our  own  ports 
and  markets,  is  regarded  here  as  of  the  highest  im- 
portance ;  and  you  will  be  careful  not  to  countenance 
any  idea  of  our  dispensing  with  it  in  a  treaty."  In 
the  following  year  Morris  reported  that  no  arrange- 
ment on  the  subject  could  be  made.  The  question 
was,  however,  revived  in  the  instructions  given  to 
Jay,  as  special  plenipotentiary  to  England,  on  May 
6,  1794.  He  was  directed  to  secure  for  American 
vessels  the  privilege  of  carrying  between  the  United 
States  and  the  British  West  Indies  the  same  arti- 
cles as  might  be  transported  between  the  two  places 
in  British  bottoms,  and,  unless  he  could  obtain  this, 
he  was  to  do  no  more  than  refer  to  his  government 
such  concessions  as  might  be  offered.  He  sub- 
mitted to  Lord  Grenville  a  proposal  in  this  sense, 
but,  although  it  was  limited  to  American  vessels 
of  not  more  than  a  hundred  tons  burden,  it  was  re- 
jected. So  important,  however,  did  Jay  conceive 
it  to  be  to  obtain  some  relief  from  the  colonial  re- 
strictions that,  in  spite  of  his  instructions,  he  as- 
sented to  the  incorporation  into  the  treaty,  which 
was  signed  by  him  and  Lord  Grenville  on  Novem- 
ber 19,  1794,  of  an  article  by  which  the  privilege  of 
trading  between  the  United  States  and  the  British 
West  Indies  was  for  a  term  of  years  extended  to 
American  vessels  of  a  burden  of  not  more  than 
seventy  tons,  but  only  on  condition  that,  during 
the  continuance  of  the  privilege,  the  United  States 

110 


COMMERCIAL    RESTRICTIONS 

should  prohibit  and  restrain  the  carrying  of  any 
molasses,  sugar,  coffee,  cocoa,  or  cotton  in  American 
vessels,  either  from  the  British  islands  or  from  the 
United  States  itself,  to  any  port  not  in  the  United 
States.  It  was  argued  that  this  condition,  by  which 
American  vessels  were  to  be  forbidden  to  transport 
from  their  own  country  any  of  the  specified  com- 
modities, even  though  produced  there  or  in  a  third 
country,  was  essential  as  a  safeguard  against  abuse 
of  the  treaty  privilege.  American  vessels,  it  was 
said,  might,  after  importing  a  cargo  from  the 
British  islands,  carry  it  on  to  Europe,  under  the 
guise  of  a  feigned  American  product,  and  thus  de- 
stroy the  exclusive  advantages  which  were  to  con- 
tinue to  belong  to  British  shipping.  But  the  price 
was  deemed  by  the  United  States  to  be  too  high  for 
the  limited  privilege  that  was  gained.  The  Senate, 
in  assenting  to  the  ratification  of  the  treaty,  struck 
out  the  obnoxious  article.  The  treaty,  however, 
provided  that  the  citizens  of  the  two  countries  might 
freely  pass  and  repass  by  land,  or  by  inland  naviga- 
tion, into  the  territories  of  the  one  and  the  other  on 
the  continent  of  America  (the  country  within  the 
limits  of  the  Hudson's  Bay  Company  only  except- 
ed), and  carry  on  trade  and  commerce  with  each 
other  in  that  way.  American  vessels  were  ex- 
pressly excluded  from  any  seaports  in  such  ter- 
ritories ;  but,  by  another  article  of  the  treaty,  they 
were  admitted  on  certain  conditions  to  a  direct 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

trade  with  the  British  dominions  in  the  East  In- 
dies. 

During  the  long  wars  that  grew  out  of  the  French 
Revolution,  colonial  restrictions  in  America  were 
from  time  to  time  suspended  imder  military  neces- 
sity. The  home  governments,  when  unable  to 
carry  on  the  trade  under  their  own  flag,  were  at 
times  reluctantly  obliged  to  open  it  to  neutral  ships 
in  order  that  it  might  not  perish  altogether.  As 
early  as  March  26,  1793,  the  ports  of  the  French 
colonies  in  America  were  opened  on  certain  terms 
to  the  vessels  of  neutral  countries.  On  June  9, 
1793,  Spain  opened  the  ports  of  New  Orleans,  Pen- 
sacola,  and  St.  Augustine  to  friendly  commerce,  but 
foreign  vessels  were  required  to  touch  at  Corcubion, 
in  Galicia,  or  at  Alicant,  and  obtain  a  permit,  with- 
out which  no  entry  into  the  specified  ports  was 
allowed.  Seventeen  years  later  there  began,  in  a 
conservative  revolt  against  the  Napoleonic  domina- 
tion in  Spain,  the  movement  in  the  Spanish  colonies 
in  America  that  was  gradually  to  be  transformed 
into  a  genuine  struggle  for  independence,  a  strug- 
gle that  was  to  end  in  the  liberation  of  Spain's  vast 
continental  domain  in  the  Western  Hemisphere 
from  the  bonds  of  colonial  monopoly.  With  the 
concurrent  independence  of  Portugal's  great  colony, 
Brazil,  the  system  for  the  most  part  disappeared 
from  the  American  continents,  below  the  northern 
boimdary  of  the  United  States.     But,   emerging 

112 


COMMERCIAL    RESTRICTIONS 

from  the  long  Napoleonic  struggle  triumphant, 
Great  Britain  retained  her  authority  over  her  colo- 
nies, and  had  even  added  to  their  number.  With 
her  the  question  of  colonial  restrictions  therefore  still 
remained.  It  had  never  ceased,  except  during  the 
war  of  1812,  to  be  a  subject  of  consideration.  Mon- 
roe and  Pinkney  had  vainly  endeavored  to  settle  it 
in  1806.  After  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  of  Ghent, 
the  discussion  was  resumed.  John  Quincy  Adams, 
with  his  accustomed  energy  and  dialectic  force; 
Richard  Rush,  with  his  wonted  tact  and  wise  judg- 
ment, and  Albert  Gallatin,  with  all  his  penetrating 
and  persuasive  reasonableness,  had  all  essayed  to 
arrange  it,  but  without  avail.  In  181 7,  Lord  Castle- 
reagh  proposed  to  extend  to  the  United  States  the 
provisions  of  the  "free  port"  acts,  the  effect  of 
which  would  have  been  to  admit  to  a  limited  trade 
American  vessels  of  one  deck ;  but  this  proposal  was 
rejected,  and  by  the  act  of  Congress  of  April  18, 
1 818,  the  ports  of  the  United  States  were  closed 
against  British  vessels  coming  from  any  British 
colony  which  was,  by  the  ordinary  laws  of  naviga- 
tion and  trade,  closed  against  American  vessels; 
and  British  vessels  sailing  from  the  United  States 
were  put  under  bond  to  land  their  cargoes  elsewhere 
than  in  such  a  colony.  By  an  act  of  May  15,  1820, 
these  restrictions  were  specifically  made  applicable 
to  any  British  colonial  port  in  the  West  Indies  or 
America.  In  1822  these  restrictions  were  partially 
8  113 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

suspended,  in  reciprocal  recognition  of  the  opening 
of  certain  colonial  ports  to  American  vessels  un- 
der certain  conditions.  By  the  act  of  Congress  of 
March  i,  1823,  this  suspension  was  continued,  but 
a  claim  was  also  put  forth,  which  had  previously 
been  advanced  by  the  United  States  in  negotiation 
but  had  always  been  resisted  by  Great  Britain,  that 
no  higher  duties  should  be  imposed  in  the  colonial 
ports  on  articles  imported  from  the  United  States 
in  American  vessels,  than  on  similar  articles  when 
imported  in  British  ships  from  any  country  whatso- 
ever, including  Great  Britain  herself  and  her  colo- 
nies. This  claim  had  been  a  favorite  one  with  Mr. 
Adams,  on  the  supposition  that  its  acceptance  was 
necessary  to  assure  to  American  vessels  their  full 
share  of  the  carrying-trade;  and  it  was  now  pro- 
posed to  enforce  it  by  means  of  discriminating  du- 
ties. Its  attempted  enforcement  immediately  led 
to  the  imposition  of  countervailing  duties  by  Great 
Britain,  Such  was  the  condition  of  things  when,  by 
the  act  of  July  5,  1825,  Parliament  opened  the  trade 
with  the  British  colonies  in  North  America  and  the 
West  Indies  to  the  vessels  of  all  nations,  on  speci- 
fied conditions.  The  government  of  the  United 
States  failed  to  accept  these  conditions,  with  the 
result  that  on  December  i,  1826,  direct  intercourse 
between  the  United  States  and  the  British- American 
colonies,  in  British  as  well  as  in  American  vessels, 
was  almost  wholly  suspended. 

114 


COMMERCIAL    RESTRICTIONS 

In  learning  how  an  escape  was  fotind  from  this 
dilemma,  we  shall  see  how  the  unmaking  of  a  min- 
ister contributed  to  the  raaking  of  a  President. 
When  Andrew  Jackson  was  inaugurated  as  Presi- 
dent, in  1829,  Martin  Van  Buren  became  his  Sec- 
retary of  State,  and  Louis  McLane  was  sent  as 
minister  to  the  court  of  St.  James.  In  a  speech  in 
the  Senate  in  February,  1827,  Van  Buren  had  crit- 
icised the  administration  then  in  power  for  its 
omission  to  a,ccept  the  conditions  prescribed  in  the 
act  of  Parliament  of  1825.  The  views  which  he 
then  expressed  he  embodied  on  July  20,  1829,  in  an 
instruction  to  McLane.  In  concluding  a  long  and 
able  review  of  the  controversy  with  Great  Britain, 
Van  Buren  declared  that  there  were  three  grounds 
on  which  the  United  States  was  assailable.  The 
first  was  "in  our  too  long  and  too  tenaciously  re- 
sisting the  right  of  Great  Britain  to  impose  pro- 
tecting duties  in  her  colonies";  the  second,  "in  not 
relieving  her  vessels  from  the  restriction  of  return- 
ing direct  from  the  United  States  to  the  colonies, 
after  permission  had  been  given  by  Great  Britain 
to  our  vessels  to  clear  out  from  the  colonies  to  any 
other  than  a  British  port " ;  and  the  third,  "in  omit- 
ting to  accept  the  terms  offered  by  the  act  of  Par- 
liament of  July,  1825."  McLane  was  authorized 
to  say  that  the  United  States  would  open  its  ports 
to  British  vessels  coming  from  the  British  colonies 
laden  with  such  colonial  products  as  might  be  im- 

115 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

ported  in  iVmerican  vessels,  on  condition  that  Great 
Britain  would  extend  to  American  vessels  the  privi- 
leges offered  by  that  act.  In  these  instructions  Van 
Buren  only  re-echoed  the  views  which  Gallatin  had 
strongly  expressed  to  the  Department  of  State  in  his 
despatches  in  1826.  But  Van  Buren  did  not  stop 
here.  He  directed  McLane  not  to  "harass"  the 
British  cabinet  by  the  repetition  of  prior  discussions, 
but,  if  the  course  of  the  late  administration  should 
be  brought  up,  to  say  that  its  views  had  been  sub- 
mitted to  the  people  of  the  United  States,  that  the 
counsels  by  which  his  own  conduct  was  directed 
represented  the  judgment  expressed  by  the  only 
earthly  tribunal  to  which  the  late  administration 
was  amenable  for  its  acts,  and  that  to  set  up  those 
acts  as  the  cause  of  withholding  from  the  people 
of  the  United  States  privileges,  which  would  other- 
wise be  extended  to  them,  would  be  unjust  in  itself 
and  could  not  fail  to  excite  their  deepest  sensibility, 
McLane  duly  communicated  to  the  British  govern- 
ment the  entire  purport  of  his  instructions.  His 
negotiations  were  altogether  successful.  By  a  proc- 
lamation issued  by  President  Jackson  on  October 
5,  1830,  under  the  authority  of  an  act  of  Congress 
of  the  29th  of  the  preceding  May,  the  ports  of  the 
United  States  were  declared  to  be  open  to  British 
vessels  and  their  cargoes  coming  from  the  colonies, 
on  payment  of  the  same  charges  as  American  ves- 
sels coming  from  the  same  quarter.     An  order  in 

116 


COMMERCIAL    RESTRICTIONS 

council  issued  November  5,  1830,  extended  to  Amer- 
ican vessels  reciprocal  privileges.  The  last  rem- 
nants of  the  vicious  system  that  was  thus  broken 
down  were  removed  in  1849. 

In  1 83 1  McLane  resigned  his  post  in  London,  and 
Van  Buren  was  appointed  by  the  President  to  fill 
the  vacancy.  He  arrived  in  England  in  September, 
and  entered  upon  the  discharge  of  the  duties  of  his 
office.  On  January  25,  1832,  the  Senate,  of  which 
he  had  so  recently  been  a  member,  refused  to  con- 
firm him.  In  the  memorable  debate  that  preceded 
his  rejection,  his  pointed  and  censorious  disavowal, 
in  the  instructions  to  McLane,  of  responsibility  for 
the  acts  of  the  preceding  administration,  formed  a 
principal  ground  of  objection.  It  was  eloquently 
declared  by  his  Whig  opponents  that  party  dif- 
ferences should  not  be  injected  into  international 
discussions.  The  criticism  was  essentially  sound; 
but,  in  the  popular  estimation,  the  punishment  was 
altogether  disproportionate  to  the  offence.  A  wide- 
spread impression  that  its  infliction  was  inspired  by 
resentment,  occasioned  by  party  defeat,  greatly 
enhanced  Van  Buren's  political  strength. 

While  the  contest  with  colonial  restrictions  was 
going  on,  steady  progress  was  made  towards  the 
accomplishment  of  the  design,  propounded  by  the 
Continental  Congress  in  1776,  of  placing  the  for- 
eigner, in  respect  of  commerce  and  navigation,  on 
an  equal  footing  with  the  native,  and  to  this  end 

117 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

of  abolishing  all  discriminating  charges  whatsoever. 
"  This  principle,"  once  declared  John  Quincy  Adams, 
"is  altogether  congenial  to  our  institutions,  and 
the  main  obstacle  to  its  adoption  consists  in  this: 
that  the  fairness  of  its  operation  depends  upon  its 
being  admitted  universally,"  Before  the  formation 
of  the  Constitution,  the  several  States  were  driven 
for  purposes  of  retaliation  to  impose  discriminating 
duties  on  foreign  vessels  and  their  cargoes.  The 
system  was  continued  by  the  government  of  the 
United  States,  for  the  same  reason.  By  an  act  of 
March  3,  181 5,  however.  Congress  offered  to  abolish 
all  discriminating  duties,  both  of  tonnage  and  of 
impost,  on  foreign  vessels  laden  with  the  produce 
or  manufactures  of  their  own  country,  on  condition 
of  the  concession  of  a  reciprocal  privilege  to  Amer- 
ican vessels.  By  "  discriminating  duties  "  are  meant 
all  duties  in  excess  of  what  would  be  charged,  in  the 
particular  country,  one  of  its  own  vessels  and  the 
cargo  imported  in  it.  This  principle  first  found  con- 
ventional expression  in  the  treaty  of  commerce  and 
navigation  with  Great  Britain  of  July  3,  181 5;  but 
its  operation  was  therein  confined,  on  the  part  of 
that  power,  to  the  British  territories  in  Europe.  By 
the  act  of  Congress  of  March  i,  181 7,  the  offer  made 
in  the  act  of  181 5  was  enlarged,  by  including  vessels 
belonging  to  citizens  either  of  the  country  by  which 
the  goods  were  produced  or  manufactured,  or  of  the 
country  from  which  they  could  only  be,  or  most 

118 


COMMERCIAL    RESTRICTIONS 

usually  were,  first  shipped  for  transportation.  The 
final  step  was  taken  in  the  act  of  March  24,  1828, 
which  is  still  in  force,  and  by  which  a  standing  offer 
was  made  for  the  reciprocal  abolition  of  all  dis- 
criminating duties,  without  regard  to  the  origin  of 
the  cargo  or  the  port  from  which  the  vessel  came. 
The  provisions  of  this  statute  have  been  extended 
to  many  countries  by  proclamation,  and  the  prin- 
ciple on  which  they  are  founded  is  confirmed  by 
numerous  treaties. 

With  the  passing  away  of  the  old  system  of  ex- 
clusions and  discriminations  in  the  West,  the  ac- 
tivities of  American  diplomacy  were  directed  more 
and  more  to  the  East,  where  the  expansion  of  com- 
merce was  hindered  by  various  conditions,  present- 
ing every  phase  of  obstruction  from  general  insecu- 
rity to  positive  non-intercourse.  In  1830  a  treaty 
of  commerce  and  navigation  was  concluded  with 
the  Ottoman  Empire,  with  which  a  trade  had  been 
carried  on  under  the  somewhat  costly  shelter  of  the 
English  Levant  Company.  But  a  wider  field  await- 
ed the  spirit  of  enterprise  in  the  Far  East.  In  Au- 
gust, 1784,  less  than  a  year  after  the  definitive  peace 
with  Great  Britain,  a  New  York  ship,  the  Empress 
of  China,  bore  the  American  flag  into  Canton.  Be- 
fore the  close  of  the  century,  American  vessels  had 
prosecuted  their  adventures  in  trading  and  in  fish- 
ing into  all  parts  of  the  Pacific.  It  was  an  Ameri- 
can ship,  fitted  out  at  Boston  for  the  fur-trade,  that 

119 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

entered  and  explored  in  1792  the  "River  of  the 
West"  and  gave  to  it  its  name,  Columbia.  Even 
the  stem  barriers  of  Spanish  colonial  exclusion 
failed  to  withstand  the  assaults  of  American  energy 
in  the  trade  carried  on  between  the  shores  of  Amer- 
ica and  the  shores  of  Asia.  In  time,  private  in- 
itiative was  powerfully  reinforced  by  the  action  of 
government.  In  1832  Edmund  Roberts,  a  sea- 
captain  of  Portsmouth,  New  Hampshire,  was  ap- 
pointed by  President  Jackson  as  "  agent  for  the  pur- 
pose of  examining  in  the  Indian  Ocean  the  means 
of  extending  the  commerce  of  the  United  States  by 
commercial  arrangements  with  the  powers  whose 
dominions  border  on  those  seas."  Taking  with  him 
blank  letters  of  credence,  he  embarked  in  March, 
1832,  on  the  sloop-of-war.  Peacock,  for  his  long  voy- 
age of  inquiry''  and  negotiation.  If  we  were  to  judge 
by  the  provision  made  for  his  comfort  and  remu- 
neration, we  should  infer  that  little  importance  was 
attached  to  his  mission.  Rated  on  the  Peacock  as 
"captain's  clerk,"  his  pay  was  barely  sufficient  to 
defray  the  cost  of  an  insurance  on  his  life  for  the 
benefit  of  his  numerous  children;  and  for  three 
months  he  was  obliged  to  lie  on  the  sea -washed 
gun-deck  with  the  crew,  all  the  available  space  in 
the  cabin  being  occupied  by  a  charg6  d'a-fj aires  to 
Buenos  Ayres  whose  name  is  now  forgotten.  He 
touched  at  all  the  important  countries  eastward  of 
the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  except  those  on  the  Bay 

120 


COMMERCIAL    RESTRICTIONS 

of  Bengal,  He  visited  Java  three  times,  on  one 
occasion  remaining  at  Batavia  nearly  two  months. 
At  Manila,  where  the  crew  were  attacked  by  cholera, 
the  Peacock  was  compelled  to  put  to  sea  with  her 
deck  converted  into  a  hospital.  In  Siam,  and  in 
the  countries  bordering  on  the  Persian  Gulf  and  the 
Red  Sea,  Roberts  endured  many  hardships  and  en- 
countered many  perils.  But  his  sacrifices  were  not 
in  vain.  On  March  30,  1833,  he  concluded  a  treaty 
of  amity  and  commerce  with  Siam,  and  on  Septem- 
ber 2ist  signed  a  similar  treaty  with  the  Sultan  of 
Muscat.  He  returned  to  the  United  States,  in  1834, 
on  the  U.  S.  S.  Lexington.  His  treaties  were  prompt- 
ly approved  by  the  Senate.  He  then  returned  to 
the  East,  sailing  again  in  a  man-of-war.  His  diplo- 
matic career  ended  in  1836,  at  Macao,  where  he 
fell  a  victim  to  the  plague.  In  1839  Congress,  recog- 
nizing the  gross  inadequacy  of  the  recompense  that 
had  been  made  for  his  exceptional  services,  granted 
to  his  legal  representatives  a  belated  requital.  If 
the  successful  performance  of  important  public 
duties,  unhampered  by  any  thought  of  personal 
aggrandizement,  forms  a  just  title  to  remembrance, 
there  can  be  no  doubt  that  an  abiding  place  in  our 
history  belongs  to  this  pioneer  of  American  diplo- 
macy in  Asia. 

Roberts  was  empowered  to  negotiate  a  treaty 
with  Cochin  China,  but  in  this  task  he  made  no  prog- 
ress.    In  all  the  vast  Chinese  Empire  only  one  port 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

— that  of  Canton — was  accessible  to  foreign  mer- 
chants. The  first  permanent  breach  in  the  wall  of 
seclusion  was  made  by  the  treaty  between  Great 
Britain  and  China,  signed  at  Nanking,  August  29, 
1842,  at  the  close  of  the  opium  war.  By  this  treaty 
the  ports  of  Canton,  Amoy,  Foochow,  Ningpo,  and 
Shanghai  were  opened  to  British  subjects  and  their 
commerce,  and  the  island  of  Hongkong  was  ceded 
to  Great  Britain  as  an  entrepot.  A  supplementary 
treaty  of  commerce  and  navigation  was  concluded 
in  the  following  year.  The  United  States  soon  ap- 
peared in  the  breach.  By  the  act  of  Congress  of 
March  3,  1843,  the  sum  of  forty  thousand  dollars 
was  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  President  to  en- 
able him  to  establish  commercial  relations  with 
China  on  terms  of  "national  equal  reciprocity." 
On  May  8th,  Caleb  Cushing,  of  Massachusetts,  was 
appointed  to  the  mission  with  the  title  of  minister 
plenipotentiary  and  commissioner.  The  choice  was 
fortunate.  No  public  character  in  America  has 
possessed  a  mind  more  versatile  or  talents  more 
varied  than  Cushing.  Lawyer,  jurist,  politician, 
soldier,  and  diplomatist,  a  student  of  literature  and 
of  science,  and  an  accomplished  linguist,  he  respond- 
ed to  the  demands  of  every  situation,  promptly 
and  without  embarrassment.  So  prodigious  and 
insatiable  was  his  acquisitiveness  that,  as  the  tradi- 
tion runs  in  the  Department  of  State,  when  deprived 
of  other  mental  pabulum  he  would  memorize  the 

123 


CALEB    GUSHING. 


COMMERCIAL    RESTRICTIONS 

groups  of  figures  in  the  cipher  code.  When  he  set 
out  for  China,  a  squadron  of  three  vessels  was  placed 
at  his  disposal.  On  February  27,  1844,  writing  from 
the  flag-ship  Brandywine,  in  Macao  Roads,  he  an- 
nounced to  the  governor-general  of  the  two  Kwang 
provinces  his  arrival  with  full  powers  to  make  a 
treaty.  He  encountered  the  usual  evasions;  but, 
after  an  exchange  of  correspondence,  he  learned 
early  in  May  that  Tsiyeng,  the  negotiator  of  the 
treaties  with  Great  Britain,  had  been  appointed  as 
imperial  commissioner  to  treat  with  him.  Tsiyeng 
arrived  outside  Macao  on  June  i6th,  and  next  day 
entered  the  village  of  Wang  Hiya,  where  with  his 
suite  he  lodged  in  a  temple  that  had  been  prepared 
for  him.  On  June  21st,  after  an  exchange  of  offi- 
cial visits.  Gushing  submitted  a  project  of  a  treaty. 
In  communicating  it  he  stated  that  his  government 
desired  to  treat  on  the  basis  of  "cordial  friendship 
and  firm  peace,"  that  it  did  not  desire  any  part  of 
the  territory  of  China,  and  that,  while  it  would  be 
happy  to  treat  on  the  basis  of  opening  all  ports,  yet, 
if  China  so  desired,  it  would  be  content  with  a  free 
and  secure  commerce  with  the  five  ports  opened  by 
the  British  treaty.  The  negotiations  proceeded 
steadily,  and  on  July  3,  1844,  a  treaty  was  signed. 
The  point  of  diplomatic  representation  at  Peking 
was  yielded  with  the  express  understanding  that, 
in  case  it  should  be  conceded  to  other  Western 
powers,  the  envoy  of  the  United  States  should  like- 

123 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

wise  be  received.  All  the  commercial  privileges 
obtained  by  Great  Britain  for  her  subjects  were, 
with  some  variations,  extended  to  citizens  of  the 
United  States;  and  American  citizens  were,  like 
British  subjects,  exempted  from  Chinese  jurisdiction, 
A  curious  light  is  thrown  on  American  enterprise  by 
a  correspondence  wliich  Gushing,  before  his  return 
to  the  United  States,  had  with  two  American  citi- 
zens who  had  established  a  ship- yard  on  the  Chinese 
coast,  opposite  Hongkong,  and  who  had  been  or- 
dered away.  Cushing  advised  them  to  acquiesce 
in  the  action  of  the  Chinese  authorities,  in  view  of 
the  stipulations  of  the  treaty  which  he  had  just 
concluded. 

A  new  treaty  was  made  in  1858;  and  ten  years 
later  a  special  Chinese  embassy,  headed  by  Anson 
Burlingame,  signed  at  Washington  the  treaty  that 
is  known  by  his  name.  In  entering  the  service  of 
China,  after  a  notable  career  of  six  years  as  Ameri- 
can minister  at  Peking,  Burlingame  declared  that 
he  was  governed  by  the  interests  of  his  country  and 
of  civilization;  and  his  course  was  approved  by 
his  government.  The  rule  that  the  United  States 
will  not  receive  as  a  diplomatic  representative  of  a 
foreign  power  one  of  its  own  citizens  was  in  his  case 
gladly  waived.  As  American  minister  at  Peking, 
he  sought  "to  substitute  fair  diplomatic  action  in 
China  for  force,"  a  policy  which  Mr.  Seward  "ap- 
proved with  much  commendation."    Through  the 

124 


COMMERCIAL    RESTRICTIONS 

vicissitudes  of  the  years  that  have  since  elapsed  it 
may  be  said  that  the  United  States  has,  in  its  com- 
mercial dealings  with  China,  uniformly  adhered  to 
that  principle.  In  his  celebrated  circular  of  July 
3,  1900,  during  the  military  advance  of  the  powers 
for  the  relief  of  their  beleagured  legations  in  Peking, 
Mr.  Hay  declared  it  to  be  the  policy  of  the  United 
States  "to  seek  a  solution  which  may  bring  about 
permanent  safety  and  peace  to  China,  preserve 
China's  territorial  and  administrative  entity, .  pro- 
tect all  rights  guaranteed  to  friendly  powers  by 
treaties  and  international  law,  and  safeguard  for 
the  world  the  principle  of  equal  and  impartial  trade 
with  all  parts  of  the  Chinese  Empire. ' '  This  declara- 
tion admirably  sums  up  what  have  been  conceived 
to  be  the  cardinal  principles  of  American  policy  in 
the  Far  East.  In  the  acquisition  of  the  Philip- 
pines, the  United  States  declared  its  purpose  to 
maintain  in  those  islands  "an  open  door  to  the 
world's  commerce."  The  phrase  "open  door"  is 
but  a  condensed  expression  of  "the  principle  of 
equal  and  impartial  trade"  for  all  nations.  Its 
meaning  was  well  illustrated  by  the  stipulation  in 
the  treaty  of  peace  with  Spain  that  the  United 
States  would,  for  the  term  of  ten  years,  "admit 
Spanish  ships  and  merchandise  to  the  ports  of  the 
Philippine  Islands  on  the  same  terms  as  ships  and 
merchandise  of  the  United  States." 

When  Edmund  Roberts  was  despatched  to  the 
125 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

East,  he  was  directed  to  obtain  information  respect- 
ing Japan  and  the  value  of  its  trade  with  the  Dutch 
and  the  Chinese.  Japan,  like  China,  had  been 
closed  to  intercourse  with  the  Western  powers  in 
the  seventeenth  century,  chiefly  on  account  of 
foreign  aggressions.  The  seclusion  of  Japan  was, 
however,  even  more  complete  than  that  of  China, 
since  the  only  privilege  of  trade  conceded  to  any 
Western  power  was  that  granted  to  the  Dutch,  who 
maintained  a  factory  on  the  island  of  Deshima,  at 
Nagasaki,  and  who  were  allowed  to  fit  out  two  ships 
a  year  from  Batavia  to  that  port.  In  1845  Alex- 
ander Everett,  when  he  went  as  commissioner  to 
China,  took  with  him  a  full  power  to  negotiate  a 
treaty  with  Japan.  This  power  he  afterwards  trans- 
ferred to  Commodore  James  Biddle,  who  in  1846 
paid  an  ill-fated  visit  to  the  bay  of  Yedo.  In  1849 
Commander  Glynn,  of  the  United  States  navy,  while 
stationed  in  the  western  Pacific,  made  a  voyage  in 
the  Preble  to  Nagasaki  to  inquire  as  to  the  fate  of 
certain  American  whalers,  said  to  have  been  ship- 
wrecked, who  were  reported  to  be  held  as  prisoners 
by  the  Japanese.  Commander  Glynn  found  that 
the  men  were  in  reality  deserters,  but  he  obtained 
their  release ;  and  on  his  return  to  the  United  States 
he  urged  that  another  effort  be  made  to  open  an 
intercourse  between  the  two  countries,  especially 
with  a  view  to  the  use  of  a  Japanese  port  for  the  ac- 
commodation of  a  line  of  steamers  which  was  then 

126 


COMMERCIAL    RESTRICTtONS 

expected  to  be  established  between  California  and 
China.  On  June  lo,  1851,  Commodore  Aulick  was 
instructed  to  proceed  to  Yedo  in  his  flag-ship,  ac- 
companied by  as  many  vessels  of  his  squadron  as 
might  be  conveniently  employed.  His  health,  how- 
ever, soon  afterwards  became  impaired,  and  he  was 
relieved  of  the  mission.  His  powers  were  then 
transferred  to  Commodore  Matthew  C.  Perry,  by 
whom  elaborate  preparations  were  made  for  the 
expedition. 

On  the  afternoon  of  Friday,  July  8,  1853,  Perry, 
in  command  of  a  squadron  of  four  vessels,  anchored 
in  the  bay  of  Yedo.  His  proceedings  were  char- 
acterized by  energy  and  decision.  He  had,  as  he 
said,  determined  to  demand  as  a  right  and  not  to 
solicit  as  a  favor  those  acts  of  courtesy  which  are 
due  from  one  civilized  nation  to  another,  and  to 
allow  none  of  the  petty  annoyances  that  had  been 
unspairingly  visited  on  those  who  had  preceded 
him.  He  declined  to  deliver  his  credentials  to  any 
but  an  officer  of  the  highest  rank.  When  he  was 
asked  to  go  to  Nagasaki,  he  refused;  when  ordered 
to  leave  the  bay,  he  moved  higher  up ;  and  he  found 
that  the  nearer  he  approached  the  imperial  city 
"the  more  polite  and  friendly  they  became."  After 
delivering  his  letters  to  two  princes  designated  by 
the  Emperor  to  receive  them,  he  went  away,  an- 
nouncing that  he  would  return  in  the  following 
spring  to  receive  a  reply  to  his  propositions.     He 

127 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

returned  with  redoubled  forces  in  February,  1854, 
and,  passing  by  the  city  of  Uraga,  anchored  not 
far  below  Yedo.  The  Emperor  had  appointed  com- 
missioners to  treat  with  him,  four  of  whom  were 
princes  of  the  empire.  They  desired  him  to  return  to 
Uraga,  but  he  declined  to  do  so.  The  commissioners 
then  consented  to  treat  at  a  place  opposite  the  ships. 
Here  the  Japanese  erected  a  pavilion,  and  on  March 
8th  Perry  landed  in  state,  with  an  escort  of  five 
hundred  officers,  seamen,  and  marines,  embarked 
in  twenty-seven  barges.  "With  people  of  forms," 
said  Perry,  "it  is  necessary  either  to  set  all  cere- 
mony aside,  or  to  out-Herod  Herod  in  assumed  per- 
sonal consequence  and  ostentation.  I  have  adopted 
the  two  extremes."  Perry  submitted  a  draught  of 
a  treaty;  and,  pending  the  negotiations,  he  estab- 
lished a  telegraph-line  on  shore,  and  laid  down  and 
put  in  operation  a  railway  with  a  loconiotive  and 
cars,  "  carrying  around  the  circle  many  of  the  aston- 
ished natives."  A  treaty  was  signed  on  March  31, 
1854.  American  ships  were  allowed  to  obtain  pro- 
visions and  coal  and  other  necessary  supplies  at 
Simoda  and  Hakodate,  and  aid  and  protection  in 
case  of  shipwreck  were  promised.  No  provision  for 
commercial  intercourse  was  secured,  but  the  privi- 
lege was  obtained  of  appointing  a  consul  to  reside  at 
Simoda.  Such  was  the  first  opening  of  Japan,  after 
two  centuries  of  seclusion.  On  July  17,  1901,  there 
was  unveiled  at  Kurihama,  a  monument  in  com- 

128 


MATTHEW   C.    PERRY,    U.  S.  N. 


COMMERCIAL    RESTRICTIONS 

memoration  of  Perry's  advent.  In  Japan  his  name 
is  to-day  a  household  word,  and  is  better  known 
than  that  of  any  other  foreigner. 

On  September  8,  1855,  the  government  of  the 
United  States,  availing  itself  of  the  privilege  secured 
by  the  Perry  treaty,  appointed  Townsend  Harris  as 
consul-general  to  reside  at  Simoda.  He  was  chosen 
in  the  hope  that  by  reason  of  his  knowledge  of  East- 
em  character  and  his  general  intelligence  and  ex- 
perience in  business,  he  might  be  able  to  induce  the 
Japanese  to  enter  into  a  treaty  of  commerce.  On 
July  29,  1858,  his  efforts  were  crowned  with  success. 
A  provision  for  diplomatic  representation  at  Yedo 
was  obtained;  rights  of  residence  and  of  trade  at 
certain  ports  were  secured;  duties  were  regulated; 
the  privilege  of  extraterritoriality  was  granted  to 
Americans  in  Japan;  and  religious  freedom  in  that 
country  was  promised.  Harris's  triumph  was  won 
by  a  firm,  tactful,  honest  diplomacy,  and  without 
the  aid  of  a  fleet,  though  it  was  no  doubt  true  that 
he  invoked  the  then  recent  humiliation  of  China  by 
the  European  allies  as  an  argument  in  favor  of  a 
voluntary  intercourse.  Before  the  end  of  the  year, 
the  fleets  of  the  allies  appeared  in  Japanese  waters, 
and  treaties  similar  to  that  of  the  United  States  were 
obtained  by  France  and  Great  Britain.  Treaties  be- 
tween Japan  and  other  powers  followed  in  due  time. 
Harris's  treaty  provided  for  the  exchange  of  ratifica- 
tions at  Washington.  For  this  purpose  the  Japanese 
9  129 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

government  sent  a  special  embassy  to  the  United 
States.  Including  servants,  it  comprised  seventy- 
one  persons.  They  were  conveyed  to  America  in  a 
United  States  man-of-war,  and  Congress  provided  for 
their  expenses.  The  ratifications  of  the  treaty  were 
exchanged  at  Washington  on  May  22,  i860,  and  the 
members  of  the  embassy  were  afterwards  conducted 
to  some  of  the  principal  American  cities.  They  were 
sent  back  to  Japan  on  the  man-of-war  Niagara. 
To  the  shallow  and  sectarian  reasoner,  the  Japan 
of  to-day,  once  more  possessed  of  full  judicial  and 
economic  autonomy,  and  in  the  potent  exercise  of  all 
the  rights  of  sovereignty,  presents  an  astounding  spec- 
tacle of  sudden,  if  not  miraculous  development ;  but 
in  reality  Japan  is  an  ancient  and  polished  nation, 
the  roots  of  whose  civilization,  though  its  outward 
forms  may  have  changed,  strike  deep  into  the  past. 
Corea,  the  Land  of  the  Morning  Calm,  continued, 
long  after  the  opening  of  China  and  Japan,  to  ob- 
serve a  rigorous  seclusion.  Efforts  to  secure  access 
had  invariably  ended  in  disaster.  On  May  20,  1882, 
however.  Commodore  Shufeldt,  U.  S.  N.,  invested 
with  diplomatic  powers,  succeeded,  with  the  friendly 
good  offices  of  Li  Hung-Chang,  in  concluding  with 
the  Hermit  Kingdom  the  first  treaty  made  by  it 
with  a  Western  power.  The  last  great  barrier  of 
national  non-intercourse  was  broken  down,  and,  no 
matter  what  may  be  Corea's  ultimate  fate,  is  not 
likely  to  be  restored. 

130 


VI 

NON-INTERVENTION    AND    THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

Among  the  rules  of  conduct  prescribed  for  the 
United  States  by  the  statesmen  who  formulated  its 
foreign  policy,  none  was  conceived  to  be  more  fun- 
damental or  more  distinctively  American  than  that 
which  forbade  intervention  in  the  political  affairs 
of  other  nations.  The  right  of  the  government  to 
intervene  for  the  protection  of  its  citizens  in  foreign 
lands  and  on  the  high  seas  never  was  doubted;  nor 
was  such  action  withheld  in  proper  cases.  But, 
warned  by  the  spectacle  of  the  great  European 
struggles  that  had  marked  the  attempts  of  nations 
to  control  one  another's  political  destiny,  the  states- 
men of  America,  believing  that  they  had  a  different 
mission  to  perform,  planted  themselves  upon  the 
principle  of  the  equality  of  nations  as  expoimded 
by  Grotius  and  other  masters  of  international  law. 
This  principle  was  expressed  with  peculiar  felicity 
and  force  by  Vattel,  who  declared  that  nations  in- 
herited from  nature  "the  same  obligations  and 
rights,"  that  power  or  weakness  could  not  in  this 
respect  produce  any  difference,  and  that  a  "small 

131 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

republic'*  was  "no  less  a  sovereign  state  than  the 
most  powerful  kingdom."  The  same  thought  was 
tersely  phrased  by  Chief -Justice  Marshall,  in  his 
celebrated  affirmation:  "No  principle  is  more  uni- 
versally acknowledged  than  the  perfect  equality 
of  nations.  Russia  and  Geneva  have  equal  rights." 
And  as  the  Declaration  of  Independence  pro- 
claimed life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness 
to  be  "inalienable  rights"  of  individual  men,  so 
the  founders  of  the  American  republic  ascribed  the 
same  rights  to  men  in  their  aggregate  political  ca- 
pacity as  independent  nations. 

While  the  principle  of  non-intervention  formed 
an  integral  part  of  the  political  philosophy  of  Amer- 
ican statesmen,  its  practical  importance  was  pro- 
foundly impressed  upon  them  by  the  narrowness 
of  their  escape  from  being  drawn,  by  the  alliance 
with  France,  into  the  vortex  of  the  European  con- 
flicts that  grew  out  of  the  French  Revolution.  Even 
before  American  independence  was  acknowledged 
by  Great  Britain,  American  statesmen  scented  the 
dangers  that  lurked  in  a  possible  implication  in 
European  broils.  "You  are  afraid,"  said  Richard 
Oswald  to  John  Adams,  "  of  being  made  the  tool  of 
the  powers  of  Europe."  "Indeed,  I  am,"  said 
Adams.  "What  powers?"  inquired  Oswald.  "All 
of  them,"  replied  Adams;  "it  is  obvious  that  all  the 
powers  of  Europe  will  be  continually  manoeuvring 
with  us  to  work  us  into  their  real  or  imaginary  bal- 

132 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

ances  of  power.  .  .  .  But  I  think  that  it  ought  to  be 
our  rule  not  to  meddle."  In  1793,  the  revolution- 
ary government  of  France,  apparently  doubting  the 
applicability  of  the  existing  alliance  with  the  United 
States  to  the  situation  in  Europe,  submitted  a  pro- 
posal for  "  a  national  agreement,  in  which  two  great 
peoples  shall  suspend  their  commercial  and  political 
interests  and  establish  a  mutual  understanding  to 
defend  the  empire  of  liberty,  wherever  it  can  be 
embraced."  This  proposal  the  American  govern- 
ment declined;  and  its  response  found  practical 
embodiment  in  its  acts.  The  reasons  for  the  policy 
of  non-intervention  and  neutrality,  to  which  the 
administration  of  the  time  so  sedulously  adhered, 
were  eloquently  stmimed  up  by  Washington  in  that 
immortal  political  legacy,  his  Farewell  Address. 
"The  great  rule  of  conduct  for  us,  in  regard  to  for- 
eign nations,"  said  Washington,  "is,  in  extending 
our  commercial  relations,  to  have  with  them  as  lit- 
tle political  connection  as  possible.  So  far  as  we 
have  already  formed  engagements,  let  them  be  ful- 
filled with  perfect  good  faith.  Here  let  us  stop." 
The  same  thought  was  conveyed  by  Jefferson,  in 
his  first  inaugural  address,  in  the  apothegm — 
"Peace,  commerce,  and  honest  friendship  with  all 
nations,  entangling  alliances  with  none." 

The  policy  of  non-intervention  embraced  matters 
of  religion  as  well  as  of  politics.  By  the  first  amend- 
ment to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  Con- 

^33 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

gress  was  expressly  forbidden  to  make  any  law  "  re- 
specting an  establishment  of  religion,  or  prohibiting 
the  free  exercise  thereof."  This  inhibition  against 
governmental  interference  with  religious  opinions 
and  practices  was  in  its  spirit  extended  to  the  inter- 
course of  the  United  States  with  foreign  nations. 
In  Article  ix.  of  the  treaty  between  the  United 
States  and  Tripoli,  which  was  concluded  on  Novem- 
ber 4,  1796,  during  the  administration  of  Washing- 
ton, we  find  this  significant  declaration:  "As  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  of  America  is  not 
in  any  sense  foimded  on  the  Christian  Religion;  as 
it  has  in  itself  no  character  of  enmity  against  the 
laws,  religion,  or  tranquillity  of  Mussulmen,  ...  it 
is  declared  by  the  parties,  that  no  pretext  arising 
from  religious  opinions  shall  ever  produce  an  inter- 
ruption of  the  harmony  existing  between  the  two 
coimtries."  With  the  omission  of  the  introductory 
phrase,  a  similar  declaration  was  inserted  in  the 
treaty  with  Tripoli  of  1805,  and  in  the  treaties  with 
Algiers  of  181 5  and  18 16.  A  stipulation  less  broad 
in  its  tolerance  appears  in  Article  xxix.  of  the 
treaty  between  the  United  States  and  China,  signed 
at  Tientsin,  June  18,  1858.  This  article,  after  re- 
citing that  the  principles  of  the  Christian  religion 
are  "recognized  as  teaching  men  to  do  good,  and 
to  do  to  others  as  they  would  have  others  do  to 
them,"  provides  that  "any  person,  whether  citizen 
of  the  United  States  or  Chinese  convert,  who,  ac- 

134 


JAMES    MONROE 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

cording  to  these  tenets,  peaceably  teach  and  prac- 
tice the  principles  of  Christianity,  shall  in  no  case 
be  interfered  with  or  molested."  By  Article  iv., 
however,  of  the  Burlingame  treaty  of  1868,  this 
stipulation  is  mentioned  as  an  introduction  to  the 
declaration  that  it  is  "further  agreed  that  citizens 
of  the  United  States  in  China  of  every  religious  per- 
suasion, and  Chinese  subjects  in  the  United  States, 
shall  enjoy  entire  liberty  of  conscience,  and  shall  be 
exempt  from  all  disability  or  persecution  on  ac- 
count of  their  religious  faith  or  worship  in  either 
country."  In  harmony  with  this  principle  was  the 
simple  declaration  in  the  treaty  with  Siam  of  1856, 
and  in  the  treaty  with  Japan  of  1858,  that  Americans 
in  those  countries  should  "be  allowed  the  free  ex- 
ercise of  their  religion."  They  were  to  be  protected, 
not  as  the  adherents  or  the  propagandists  of  any 
particular  faith,  but  as  American  citizens.  As  was 
well  said  by  Mr.  Cass,  it  was  the  object  of  the  United 
States  "  not  merely  to  protect  a  Catholic  in  a  Protes- 
tant country,  a  Protestant  in  a  Catholic  country,  a 
Jew  in  a  Christian  country,  but  an  American  in  all 
countries." 

The  policy  of  non-intervention,  which  guided  the 
United  States  during  the  wars  growing  out  of  the 
French  Revolution,  was  severely  tested  in  the  strug- 
gle of  the  Spanish  colonies  in  America  for  indepen- 
dence ;  but,  under  the  guardian  care  of  Monroe  and 
John  Quincy  Adams,  it  was  scrupulously  adhered 

135 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

to.  In  view  of  this  circumstance,  it  is  strange  that 
one  of  the  gravest  perils  by  which,  after  the  days 
of  the  alliance  with  France,  the  maintenance  of  the 
policy  was  ever  apparently  threatened  should  have 
grown  out  of  a  political  contest  in  Europe.  The 
struggle  of  the  Greeks  for  independence  evoked 
much  sympathy  in  America  as  well  as  in  England; 
but  the  struggle  of  the  Hungarians,  under  the  leader- 
ship of  Kossuth,  for  emancipation  from  Austrian 
rule,  gave  rise  in  the  United  States  to  manifesta- 
tions of  feeling  that  were  unprecedented.  The  Hun- 
garian revolution  came  at  a  time  when  the  spirit 
of  democracy,  which  distinguishes  the  political  and 
social  development  of  the  nineteenth  century,  was 
especially  active;  but  the  wide-spread  interest  felt 
in  the  United  States  in  the  Hungarian  movement 
was  greatly  intensified  by  reason  of  the  popular  as- 
sumption that  the  declaration  of  Hungary's  inde- 
pendence, although  it  in  reality  left  the  question  of 
a  permanent  form  of  government  wholly  in  abey- 
ance, was  the  forerunner  of  a  republic.  It  was,  how- 
ever, only  after  the  arrival  of  Kossuth  in  the  United 
States  that  the  excitement  reached  its  greatest 
height.  In  June,  1849,  Mr.  A.  Dudley  Mann  was 
appointed  by  the  President  as  a  "special  and  con- 
fidential agent  of  the  United  States  to  Hungary"; 
but,  before  he  reached  his  destination,  Russia  had 
intervened  in  aid  of  Austria,  and  the  revolution  had 
practically  come  to  an  end.     When  the  revolution 

136 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

was  crushed,  Kossuth  and  many  of  his  associates 
sought  refuge  in  Turkey.  By  a  joint  resolution  of 
Congress  of  March  3,  185 1,  the  President  was  re- 
quested, if  it  should  be  the  wish  of  these  exiles  to 
"emigrate"  to  the  United  States,  to  authorize  the 
employment  of  a  public  vessel  to  convey  them  to 
America.  In  conformity  with  this  request  the 
U.  S.  S.  Mississippi  was  sent  to  the  Dardanelles ;  but 
the  exiles  had  scarcely  embarked,  when  it  was  found 
that  Kossuth  had  other  views  than  that  of  coming 
to  America  as  an  emigrant.  At  Gibraltar  he  left 
the  Mississippi  and  proceeded  to  London,  for  the 
purpose  of  conferring  with  revolutionary  exiles  in 
that  city;  and  he  afterwards  sailed  for  America  in 
the  steamer  Humboldt,  from  Southampton.  He  ar- 
rived at  New  York  on  the  night  of  December  14, 
185 1,  after  a  stormy  passage.  He  soon  dissipated 
all  doubts  as  to  the  objects  of  his  mission.  In  his 
public  addresses  he  cast  off  all  reserve,  and  in  his 
"official  capacity"  as  the  representative  of  Hun- 
gary made  an  appeal  for  aid.  He  affirmed  that  the 
consideration  of  distance  should  not  deter  the  United 
States  in  the  case  of  Hungary  any  more  than  in  that 
of  Cuba  from  interfering  against  European  invasion. 
Cuba  was  six  da^'-s'  distant  from  New  York;  Hun- 
gary was  eighteen.  Was  this,  he  asked,  a  circum- 
stance to  regulate  the  conduct  and  policy  of  a  great 
people?  The  people,  wherever  he  went,  seemed 
enthusiastically  to   give   a  negative  answer.     His 

137 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

journey  to  Washington  was  in  the  nature  of  a 
triumphal  progress.  When  presented  to  the  Presi- 
dent, he  made  a  direct  appeal  for  intervention. 
President  Fillmore,  with  courtesy  and  dignity,  but 
with  equal  candor,  repelled  the  solicitation.  But, 
for  his  disappointment  at  the  White  House,  Kos- 
suth found  consolation  in  his  reception  by  Congress, 
though  it  in  the  end  proved  to  be  wholly  illusory. 
He  was  received  both  by  the  Senate  and  by  the 
House,  and  was  banqueted  by  Congress.  The  first 
effective  check  to  the  popular  excitement  was  given 
by  Henry  Clay,  who  refused  to  countenance  the  pre- 
vailing agitation.  Kossuth  more  than  once  ex- 
pressed a  desire  to  meet  him,  and  Clay,  though  in 
feeble  health,  at  length  granted  him  an  interview. 
"  For  the  sake  of  my  country,"  said  Clay,  addressing 
Kossuth,  "  you  must  allow  me  to  protest  against  the 
policy  you  propose  to  her."  "Waiving  the  grave 
and  momentous  question  of  the  right  of  one  nation 
to  assume  the  executive  power  among  nations,  for 
the  enforcement  of  international  law,"  Clay  pointed 
out  the  practical  difficulties  that  stood  in  the  way 
of  affording  to  Hungary  effective  aid  against  Austria 
and  Russia.  He  also  enlarged  upon  the  evil  ex- 
ample that  would  be  afforded  by  the  United  States 
to  other  powers  in  departing  from  its  "ancient 
policy  of  amity  and  non-intervention";  and,  after 
declaring  that  the  United  States  had,  by  adhering 
to  that  policy,  "done  more  for  the  cause  of  liberty 

138 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

in  the  world  than  arms  could  effect,"  he  concluded: 
"  Far  better  is  it  for  ourselves,  for  Hungary,  and  for 
the  cause  of  liberty,  that,  adhering  to  our  wise 
pacific  system  and  avoiding  the  distant  wars  of 
Europe,  we  should  keep  our  lamp  burning  brightly 
on  this  Western  shore,  as  a  light  to  all  nations,  than 
to  hazard  its  utter  extinction,  amid  the  ruins  of 
fallen  or  falling  republics  in  Europe."  The  Kossuth 
danger  passed  away  even  more  suddenly  than  it 
had  arisen.  After  he  left  Washington,  he  addressed 
a  letter  to  the  presiding  officers  of  the  two  houses 
of  Congress,  in  which  he  expressed  the  hope  that  the 
United  States  would  pronounce  in  favor  of  the  law 
of  nations  and  of  international  rights  and  duties. 
A  motion  to  print  this  letter  was  carried  in  the 
Senate  by  only  one  vote,  and  the  arguments  in  sup- 
port of  the  motion  were  almost  exclusively  confined 
to  considerations  of  courtesy.  Indeed,  the  sudden 
collapse  of  Kossuth  enthusiasm  in  high  places,  after 
his  departure  from  the  capital,  would  have  been  in- 
explicable if  the  open  opponents  of  his  policy  of  in- 
tervention had  found  any  one  to  meet  them  on  that 
ground. 

It  may  be  said  that  the  most  pronounced  excep- 
tion ever  made  by  the  United  States,  apart  from 
cases  arising  under  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  to  its  pol- 
icy of  non-intervention,  is  that  which  was  made 
in  the  case  of  Cuba.  At  various  times,  since  the 
United  States  became  an  independent  nation,  con- 

139 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

ditions  in  Cuba  had  been  such  as  to  invite  inter- 
ference either  for  the  purpose  of  correcting  dis- 
orders which  existed  there,  or  for  the  purpose  of 
preventing  Cuba  from  falling  a  prey  to  some  of 
Spain's  European  enemies.  During  the  Ten  Years* 
War  in  Cuba,  from  1868  till  1878,  intervention  by 
the  United  States  was  prevented  on  several  occa- 
sions only  by  the  powerful  influence  of  President 
Grant,  counselled  and  supported  by  his  Secretary 
of  State,  Hamilton  Fish.  In  its  abstention,  the 
administration  was  aided  by  the  situation  at  home, 
which  afforded  daily  admonition  of  the  difficulties 
that  might  attend  the  re  -  establishment  of  order 
in  a  large  and  populous  island  where  the  process 
of  emancipation  was  still  going  on.  In  1895  the 
situation  was  changed  in  the  United  States  as 
well  as  in  Cuba.  American  interests  in  the  island 
had  also  increased.  The  second  insurrection  was, 
besides,  more  active  than  the  first,  and  spread  over 
a  wider  area.  If  the  conflict  were  left  to  take  its 
course,  the  ruin  of  the  island  was  apparently  as- 
sured. The  United  States  tendered  its  good  offices ; 
but  the  offer  was  not  productive  of  any  tangible  re- 
sult. In  his  annual  message  of  December  7,  1896, 
President  Cleveland  declared  that,  when  Spain's 
inability  to  suppress  the  insurrection  had  become 
manifest,  and  the  struggle  had  degenerated  into  a 
hopeless  strife  involving  useless  sacrifice  of  life  and 
the  destruction  of  the  very  subject-matter  of  the 

140 


IIAMILTOX    FISH 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

conflict,  a  situation  would  be  presented  in  which 
the  obligation  to  recognize  the  sovereignty  of  Spain 
would  be  "superseded  by  higher  obligations." 
Conditions  continued  to  grow  worse.  The  distress 
produced  by  the  measures  of  concentration,  under 
the  rule  of  General  Weyler,  excited  strong  feeling  in 
the  United  States,  and  prompted  President  McKin- 
ley  to  request  Spain  to  put  an  end  to  existing  con- 
ditions and  restore  order.  General  Weyler  was 
afterwards  succeeded  by  General  Blanco,  and  it 
was  announced  that  an  autonomous  regime  would 
be  instituted.  But  neither  the  offer  of  autonomy 
nor  the  actual  institution  of  an  autonomous  govern- 
ment produced  peace.  The  insurgents,  embittered 
by  the  three  years'  conflict,  rejected  the  programme 
of  autonomy  with  substantial  unanimity,  while  the 
distinctively  Spanish  element  of  the  population 
viewed  it  with  disapprobation  and  withdrew  from 
politics.  In  this  delicate  situation  the  intervention 
of  the  United  States  was  precipitated  by  certain 
startling  events.  The  incident  created  by  the  sur- 
reptitious publication  of  the  letter  of  Sefior  Dupuy 
de  Lome,  Spanish  minister  at  Washington,  to  Senor 
Canalejas,  in  which  President  McKinley  was  aspersed 
and  the  reciprocity  negotiations  between  the  two 
countries  were  exhibited  as  a  sham,  had  just  been 
officially  declared  to  be  closed,  when  the  U.  S.  S. 
Maine  was  blown  up  at  Havana,  and  two  hun- 
dred and  sixty-six  of  her  crew  perished.    Superficial 

141 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

reasoners  have  wished  to  treat  the  destruction  of 
the  Maine  as  the  justification  and  the  cause  of 
the  intervention  of  the  United  States.  The  gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States,  however,  did  not  it- 
self take  that  ground.  It  is  true  that  the  case  of 
the  Maine  is  mentioned  in  the  preamble  to  the 
joint  resolution  of  Congress,  by  which  the  inter- 
vention of  the  United  States  was  authorized;  but 
it  is  recited  merely  as  the  culmination  of  "abhor- 
rent conditions,"  which  had  existed  for  more  than 
three  years.  The  destruction  of  the  Maine  doubt- 
less kindled  the  intense  popular  feeling  without 
which  wars  are  seldom  entered  upon;  but  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  never  charged — on  the 
contrary,  it  refrained  from  charging — that  the  catas- 
trophe was  to  be  attributed  to  "the  direct  act  of  a 
Spanish  official."  Its  intervention  rested  upon  the 
ground  that  there  existed  in  Cuba  conditions  so  in- 
jurious to  the  United  States,  as  a  neighboring  nation, 
that  they  could  no  longer  be  endured.  Its  action 
was  analogous  to  what  is  known  in  private  law  as 
the  abatement  of  a  nuisance.  On  this  ground  the 
intervention  was  justified  by  the  late  Alphonse 
Rivier,  one  of  the  most  eminent  publicists  in  Europe, 
and  on  this  ground  its  justification  must  continue 
to  rest. 

Any  exposition  of  the  American  doctrine  of  non- 
intervention would  be  incomplete  that  failed  spe- 
cially to  notice  the  rule  of  the  United  States  with 

142 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

regard  to  the  recognition  of  new  governments — a 
rule  which  is  indeed  a  corollary  of  that  doctrine. 
In  Europe,  governments  had  been  treated  as  legiti- 
mate or  illegitimate,  according  to  what  was  con- 
ceived to  be  the  regularity  or  the  irregularity  of  the 
succession  of  their  rulers.  The  attitude  of  the 
United  States  on  this  question  was  early  defined, 
when  the  National  Convention  in  France  proclaimed 
a  republic.  On  that  occasion  Jefferson,  as  Secre- 
tary of  State,  in  a  letter  to  Gouverneur  Morris,  of 
March  12,  1793,  which  has  become  a  classic,  said: 
"We  surely  cannot  deny  to  any  nation  that  right 
whereon  our  own  government  is  founded,  that  every- 
one may  govern  itself  according  to  whatever  form 
it  pleases,  and  change  these  forms  at  its  own  will; 
and  that  it  may  transact  its  business  with  foreign 
nations  through  whatever  organ  it  thinks  proper, 
whether  king,  convention,  assembly,  committee, 
president,  or  anything  else  it  may  choose.  The 
will  of  the  nation  is  the  only  thing  essential  to  be 
regarded."  In  a  word,  the  United  States  main- 
tained that  the  true  test  of  a  government's  title  to 
recognition  is  not  the  theoretical  legitimacy  of  its 
origin,  but  the  fact  of  its  existence  as  the  apparent 
exponent  of  the  popular  will.  And  from  this  prin- 
ciple, which  is  now  universally  accepted,  it  nec- 
essarily follows  that  recognition  can  regularly  be 
accorded  only  when  the  new  government  has  demon- 
strated its  ability  to  exist.     Recognition  extended 

143 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

at  an  earlier  stage  of  the  revolution  savors  of  an 
act  of  intervention,  and  as  such  must  be  defended 
on  its  merits,  as  is  clearly  set  forth  in  President 
Roosevelt's  message  of  January  4,  1904,  in  relation 
to  the  recognition  of  the  Republic  of  Panama. 

In  connection  with  the  principle  of  non-inter- 
vention, a  prominent  place  must  be  given  to  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  the  object  of  which  was  to  render 
intervention  unnecessary  by  precluding  the  oc- 
casions for  it.  On  September  26,  181 5,  the  Em- 
perors of  Austria  and  Russia,  and  the  King  of  Prus- 
sia, signed  at  Paris  a  personal  league  commonly 
called  the  Holy  Alliance,  the  design  of  which  was 
declared  to  be  the  administration  of  government, 
in  matters  both  internal  and  external,  according  to 
the  precepts  of  justice,  charity  and  peace.  To  this 
end  the  allied  monarchs,  "  looking  upon  themselves 
as  delegated  by  Providence"  to  rule  over  their  re- 
spective countries,  engaged  to  "lend  one  another, 
on  every  occasion  and  in  every  place,  assistance, 
aid,  and  support,"  In  the  course  of  time,  as  revolt 
against  the  arrangements  of  the  Congress  of  Vienna 
spread  and  grew  more  pronounced,  the  alliance  came 
more  and  more  to  assume  the  form  of  a  league  for 
the  protection  of  the  principle  of  legitimacy — the 
principle  of  the  divine  right  of  kings  as  opposed  to 
the  rights  of  the  people — against  the  encroach- 
ments of  liberal  ideas.  Congresses  were  held  at 
Aix-la-Chapelle,  Troppau  and  Laybach,  for  the  pur- 

144 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

pose  of  maturing  a  programme  to  that  end.  The 
league  was  joined  by  the  King  of  France ;  but  Eng- 
land, whose  Prince  Regent  had  originally  given  it 
his  informal  adhesion,  began  to  grow  hostile.  Her 
own  government,  with  its  free  and  parliamentary 
institutions,  was  founded  on  a  revolution ;  and  the  ■ 
allies,  in  the  circular  issued  at  Troppau,  had  as- 
sociated "revolt  and  crime,"  and  had  declared  that 
the  European  powers  "had  an  undoubted  right  to 
take  a  hostile  attitude  in  regard  to  those  states  in 
which  the  overthrow  of  the  government  might 
operate  as  an  example."  In  a  circular  issued  at 
Laybach  they  denounced  "as  equally  null,  and 
disallowed  by  the  public  law  of  Europe,  any  pre- 
tended reform  effected  by  revolt  and  open  force." 
In  October,  1822,  they  held  a  congress  at  Verona 
for  the  purpose  of  concerting  measures  against  the 
revolutionary  government  in  Spain;  and  in  yet 
another  circular  announced  their  determination  "  to 
repel  the  maxim  of  rebellion,  in  whatever  place  and 
under  whatever  form  it  might  show  itself."  Their 
ultimate  object  was  more  explicitly  stated  in  a 
secret  treaty  in  which  they  engaged  mutually  "to 
put  an  end  to  the  system  of  representative  govern- 
ments" in  Europe,  and  to  adopt  measures  to  de- 
stroy "the  liberty  of  the  press."  Popular  move- 
ments were  forcibly  suppressed  in  Piedmont  and 
Naples;  and  in  April,  1823,  France,  acting  for  the 
allies,  invaded  Spain,  for  the  purpose  of  restoring 
xo  145 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

the  absolute  monarch  Ferdinand  VII.  Before  the 
close  of  the  summer  such  progress  had  been  made 
in  this  direction  that  notice  was  given  to  the  Brit- 
ish government  of  the  intention  of  the  allies  to  call 
a  congress  with  a  view  to  the  termination  of  the 
revolutionary  governments  in  Spanish  America. 
At  this  time  Lord  Castlereagh,  who  had  always  been 
favorably  disposed  towards  the  alliance,  had  been 
succeeded  in  the  conduct  of  the  foreign  affairs  of 
England  by  George  Canning,  who  reflected  the 
popular  sentiment  as  to  the  policy  of  the  allied 
powers.  The  independence  of  the  Spanish- Amer- 
ican governments,  which  had  now  been  acknowl- 
edged by  the  United  States,  had '  not  as  yet  been 
recognized  by  Great  Britain.  But  English  mer- 
chants, like  those  of  the  United  States,  had  devel- 
oped a  large  trade  with  the  Spanish  -  American 
countries,  a  trade  which  the  restoration  of  those 
regions  to  a  ci^lonial  condition  would,  under  the 
commercial  systemtKen  in  vogue,  have  cut  off  and 
destroyed. 

In  view  of  this  common  interest.  Canning,  in  the 
summer  of  1823,  began  to  sound  Richard  Rush, 
the  American  minister  at  London,  as  to  the  pos- 
sibility of  a  joint  declaration  by  the  two  govern- 
ments against  the  intervention  of  the  allies  in  Span- 
ish America.  Canning  once  boasted  that  he  had 
called  into  being  the  New  World  to  redress  the 
balance  of  the  Old.     The  meaning  of  this  boast 

146 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

can  be  understood  only  in  the  light  of  his  proposals. 
In  a  "private  and  confidential"  note  to  Rush,  of 
August  23,  1823,  he  declared:  "  i.  We  conceive  the 
recovery  of  the  colonies  by  Spain  to  be  hopeless. 
2.  We  conceive  the  question  of  the  recognition  of 
them,  as  independent  states,  to  be  one  of  time  and 
circumstances.  3.  We  are,  however,  by  no  means 
disposed  to  throw  any  impediment  in  the  way  of 
an  arrangement  between  them  and  the  mother- 
country  by  amicable  negotiation.  4.  We  aim  not 
at  the  possession  of  any  portion  of  them  ourselves. 
5.  We  could  not  see  any  portion  of  them  transferred 
to  any  other  power  with  indifference."  If  these 
opinions  and  feelings  were  shared  by  the  United 
States,  Canning  thought  that  the  two  governments 
should  declare  them  in  the  face  of  the  world,  as  the 
best  means  of  defeating  the  project,  if  any  Euro- 
pean power  should  cherish  it,  of  subjugating  the 
colonies  in  the  name  of  Spain,  or  of  acquiring  any 
part  of  them  itself  by  cession  or  by  conquest.  He 
therefore  desired  Rush  to  act  upon  his  proposals 
at  once,  if  he  possessed  the  power  to  do  so.  It  was 
said  of  Richard  Rush  by  an  eminent  Senator  that, 
in  the  course  of  an  unusually  long  and  important 
diplomatic  career,  he  "never  said  a  word  that  was 
improper,  nor  betrayed  a  thought  that  might  peril 
his  country's  fortunes."  On  the  present  occasion, 
he  acted  with  his  usual  good  judgment.  His  pow- 
ers did  not  embrace  the  making  of  such  a  declara- 

147 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

tion  as  Canning  desired ;  but,  while  he  expressed  the 
opinion  that  Canning's  sentiments,  except  as  to  in- 
dependence, which  the  United  States  had  already 
acknowledged,  were  shared  by  his  government,  he 
lost  no  time  in  reporting  the  matter  to  the  Presi- 
dent. Monroe,  on  receiving  the  correspondence, 
hastened  to  take  counsel  upon  it.  Jefferson,  whose 
opinion  was  solicited,  replied:  "Our  first  and  fun- 
damental maxim  should  be  never  to  entangle  our- 
selves in  the  broils  of  Europe ;  our  second,  never  to 
suffer  Europe  to  intermeddle  with  cis-Atlantic 
affairs."  He  was  disposed  to  look  with  favor  upon 
co-operation  with  England  in  the  direction  sug- 
gested. Madison  shared  his  opinion.  In  the  cabi- 
net of  Monroe,  Calhoun  inclined  to  invest  Rush 
with  power  to  join  England  in  a  declaration,  even 
if  it  should  pledge  the  United ""  States  not  to  take 
either  Cuba  or  Texas.  The  President  at  first  in- 
clined to  Calhoun's  idea  of  giving  Rush  discretion- 
ary powers,  but  this  was  opposed  by  John  Quincy 
Adams,  who  maintained  that  we  could  act  with 
England  only  on  the  basis  of  the  acknowledged  in- 
dependence of  the  Spanish-American  states.  The 
views  of  Adams  prevailed.  His  basal  thought  was 
the  right  of  self-government,  which  he  believed  it 
to  be  the  duty  and  the  interest  of  the  United  States 
to  cherish  and  support.  He  thought  that  the 
United  States  should  let  England  make  her  own 
declaration.    This   England   did,   without   waiting 

148 


RICHARD    RUSH 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

for  the  decision  of  the  United  States.  On  October 
9,  1823,  Canning,  in  an  interview  with  Prince  de 
Polignac,  French  ambassador,  declared  that  while 
Great  Britain  would  remain  "neutral"  in  any  war 
between  Spain  and  her  colonies,  the  "junction"  of 
any  foreign  power  with  Spain  against  the  colonies 
would  be  viewed  as  constituting  "entirely  a  new 
question,"  upon  which  Great  Britain  "must  take 
such  decision"  as  her  interests   "might  require." 

In  his  annual  message  to  Congress  of  December 
2,  1823,  President  Monroe  devoted  to  the  subject  a 
long  passage.  The  substance  of  it  is,  however,  con- 
veyed in  a  few  sentences.  After  adverting  to  the 
abstention  of  the  United  States  from  European 
wars  and  to  the  dangers  to  be  apprehended  from 
the  system  of  the  allied  powers,  he  declared:  "We 
owe  it,  therefore,  to  candor  and  to  the  amicable 
relations  existing  between  the  United  States  and 
those  powers,  to  declare  that  we  should  consider 
any  attempt  on  their  part  to  extend  their  system 
to  any  portion  of  this  hemisphere  as  dangerous  to 
our  peace  and  safety.  With  the  existing  colonies 
or  dependencies  of  any  European  power,  we  have 
not  interfered  and  shall  not  interfere.  But  with 
the  governments  who  have  declared  their  indepen- 
dence and  maintained  it,  and  whose  independence  we 
have,  on  great  consideration  and  on  just  principles, 
acknowledged,  we  could  not  view  any  interposition 
for  the  purpose  of  oppressing  them,  or  controlling 

149 


AMERICAN   DIPLOMACY 

in  any  other  manner  their  destiny,  by  any  Euro- 
pean power,  in  any  other  light  than  a  manifestation 
of  an  unfriendly  disposition  towards  the  United 
States." 

The  sentences  just  quoted  specially  relate  to  the 
aims  of  the  Holy  Alliance ;  but  there  is  another  pas- 
sage in  the  message  which  is  also  often  cited  as 
embodying  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  In  182 1  the 
Emperor  of  Russia,  as  we  have  seen,  issued  a  ukase, 
by  which  he  assumed,  as  owner  of  the  shore,  to 
exclude  foreigners  from  carrying  on  commerce  and 
from  navigating  and  fishing  within  a  hundred  Italian 
miles  of  the  northwest  coast  of  America,  from  Bering 
Straits  down  to  the  fifty-first  parallel  of  north  lati- 
tude. As  this  assertion  of  title  embraced  territory 
which  was  claimed  by  the  United  States  as  well  as 
by  Great  Britain,  both  those  governments  protested 
against  it,  as  well  as  against  the  exorbitant  juris- 
dictional pretension  with  which  it  was  associated. 
In  consequence  the  Russian  government  proposed 
to  adjust  the  matter  by  amicable  negotiation ;  and 
instructions  to  that  end  were  prepared  by  John 
Quincy  Adams  for  the  American  ministers  at  Lon- 
don and  St.  Petersburg.  At  a  meeting  of  the 
cabinet  on  June  28,  1823,  while  the  subject  was 
under  discussion,  Adams  expressed  the  opinion 
that  the  claim  of  the  Russians  could  not  be  ad- 
mitted, because  they  appeared  to  have  no  "set- 
tlement" upon  the  territory  in  dispute;    and  on 

150 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

July  17  he  informed  Baron  Tuyl,  then  Russian 
minister  at  Washington,  "that  we  [the  United 
States]  should  contest  the  right  of  Russia  to  any 
territorial  establishment  on  this  continent,  and  that 
we  should  assume  distinctly  the  principle  that  the 
American  continents  are  no  longer  subjects  for  any 
new  European  colonial  establishments."  With  ref- 
erence to  this  subject,  President  Monroe,  in  the 
message  above  quoted,  said:  "In  the  discussions  to 
which  this  interest  has  given  rise,  and  in  the  ar- 
rangements by  which  they  may  terminate,  the  oc- 
casion has  been  judged  proper  for  asserting  as  a 
principle  in  which  the  rights  and  interests  of  the 
United  States  are  involved,  that  the  American 
continents,  by  the  free  and  independent  condition 
which  they  have  assumed  and  maintain,  are  hence- 
forth not  to  be  considered  as  subjects  for  future 
colonization  by  any  European  powers." 

By  the  term  "future  colonization,"  President 
Monroe  evidently  intended  to  convey  the  same 
meaning  as  was  expressed  by  the  terms  "settle- 
ment" and  "colonial  establishments"  previously 
employed  by  Adams.  They  were  used  to  denote, 
what  they  were  then  commonly  understood  to  mean, 
the  acquisition  of  title  to  territory  by  original  occu- 
pation and  settlement.  But  in  the  course  of  time 
the  phrase  "future  colonization"  came  to  receive 
a  broader  interpretation.  President  Polk,  in  his 
annual  message  of  December  2,  1845,  declared  that, 

151 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

while  existing  rights  of  every  European  nation 
should  be  respected,  it  should  be  "distinctly  an- 
nounced to  the  world  as  our  settled  policy,  that  no 
future  European  colony  or  dominion  shall,  with  our 
consent,  be  planted  or  established  on  any  part  of 
the  North  American  continent."  By  pronouncing 
against  the  establishment  by  a  European  power  of 
any  "dominion" — a  term  which  included  even  the 
voluntary  transfer  of  territory  already  occupied — 
President  Polk  expressed  a  conception  which  has 
come  generally  to  prevail,  and  which  is  embodied 
in  the  popular  phrase :  "  No  more  European  colonies 
on  these  continents."  The  same  meaning  is  con- 
veyed in  the  phrase — "America  for  the  Americans," 
which  signifies  that  no  European  power  shall  be 
permitted  to  acquire  new  territory  or  to  extend  its 
dominions  in  the  Western  Hemisphere. 

In  this  sense,  but  apparently  with  the  qualifica- 
tion in  the  particular  case  that  only  a  forcible  ac- 
quisition of  territory  was  forbidden,  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  was  invoked  by  President  Cleveland  in 
respect  of  the  Venezuelan  boundary  question.  This 
incident,  as  is  well  known,  grew  out  of  a  long-stand- 
ing dispute  between  Great  Britain  and  Venezuela, 
which  was  the  continuation  of  a  dispute  two  cen- 
turies old  between  the  Netherlands  and  Spain  as 
to  the  limits  of  the  Dutch  and  Spanish  settlements 
in  Guiana.  In  1844  Lord  Aberdeen  proposed  to 
Venezuela  a  conventional  line,   beginning  at  the 

152 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

river  Moroco.  This  proposal  was  declined;  and, 
chiefly  in  consequence  of  civil  commotions  in  Vene- 
zuela, negotiations  remained  practically  in  abey- 
ance till  1876.  Venezuela  then  offered  to  accept 
the  Aberdeen  line;  but  Lord  Granville  suggested  a 
boundary  farther  west;  and  in  subsequent  negotia- 
tions the  British  demand  was  extended  still  farther 
in  that  direction,  Venezuela,  representing  that  this 
apparent  enlargement  of  British  dominion  consti- 
tuted a  pure  aggression  on  her  territorial  rights,  in- 
voked the  aid  of  the  United  States  on  the  ground 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Venezuela  asked  for  arbi- 
tration, and  in  so  doing  included  in  her  claim  a 
large  portion  of  British  Guiana.  Great  Britain  at 
length  declined  to  arbitrate  unless  Venezuela  would 
first  yield  all  territory  within  a  line  westward  of 
that  offered  by  Lord  Aberdeen.  In  these  circum- 
stances, Mr.  Olney,  as  Secretary  of  State,  in  instruc- 
tions to  Mr.  Bayard,  American  ambassador  at  Lon- 
don, of  July  20,  1895,  categorically  inquired  whether 
the  British  government  would  submit  the  whole 
controversy  to  arbitration.  In  these  instructions 
Mr.  Olney  declared  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  did 
not  establish  a  "protectorate"  over  other  American 
states ;  that  it  did  not  relieve  any  of  them  "  from  its 
obligations  as  fixed  by  international  law  nor  pre- 
vent any  European  power  directly  interested  from 
enforcing  such  obligations  or  from  inflicting  merited 
punishment  for  the  breach  of  them";  but  that  its 

153 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

"single  purpose  and  object"  was  that  "no  European 
power  or  combination  of  European  powers"  should 
"forcibly  deprive  an  American  state  of  the  right 
and  power  of  self-government  and  of  shaping  for 
itself  its  own  political  fortunes  and  destinies."  This 
principle  he  conceived  to  be  at  stake  in  the  dispute 
between  Great  Britain  and  Venezuela,  because,  as 
the  dispute  related  to  territory,  it  necessarily  im- 
ported "political  control  to  be  lost  by  one  party 
and  gained  by  the  other."  "To-day,"  declared  Mr. 
Olney,  "the  United  States  is  practically  sovereign 
on  this  continent,  and  its  fiat  is  law  upon  the  sub- 
jects to  which  it  confines  its  interposition."  All  the 
advantages  of  this  superiority  were,  he  affirmed,  at 
once  imperilled  if  the  principle  should  be  admitted 
that  European  powers  might  convert  American 
states  into  colonies  or  provinces  of  their  own.  Lord 
Salisbury  declined  unrestricted  arbitration;  and, 
when  his  answer  was  received.  President  Cleveland, 
on  December  17,  1895,  laid  the  correspondence  be- 
fore Congress.  "If  a  European  power,  by  an  ex- 
tension of  its  boundaries,  takes  possession  of  the 
territory  of  one  of  our  neighboring  republics  against 
its  will  and  in  derogation  of  its  rights,"  it  was,  said 
President  Cleveland,  the  precise  thing  which  Presi- 
dent Monroe  had  declared  to  be  "  dangerous  to  our 
peace  and  safety";  but  he  added  that  "any  adjust- 
ment of  the  boundary  which  that  country  [Vene- 
zuela] may  deem  for  her  advantage  and  may  enter 

154 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

into  of  her  own  free  will  cannot  of  course  be  ob- 
jected to  by  the  United  States."  He  then  recom- 
mended the  appointment  by  the  United  States  of 
a  commission  to  investigate  the  merits  of  the  con- 
troversy, and  declared  that,  if  the  title  to  the  dis- 
puted territory  should  be  found  to  belong  to  Vene- 
zuela, it  would  be  the  duty  of  the  United  States  "  to 
resist  by  every  means  in  its  power,  as  a  wilful  ag- 
gression upon  its  rights  and  interests,  the  appro- 
priation by  Great  Britain  of  any  lands  or  the  exer- 
cise of  governmental  jurisdiction  over  any  territory 
which,  after  investigation,  we  have  determined  of 
right  belongs  to  Venezuela."  This  declaration  pro- 
duced great  excitement,  in  the  United  States  as  well 
as  in  England.  So  far  as  it  seemed  to  imply,  as  the 
language  has  often  been  construed  to  do,  that  the 
United  States  possessed  the  right,  by  means  of  an 
ex  parte  commission,  appointed  by  itself  and  com- 
posed of  its  own  citizens,  authoritatively  to  fix  the 
boimdary  between  two  other  independent  nations,  it 
went  beyond  the  immediate  necessities  of  the  case. 
If  the  commission  had  ever  reported,  it  is  probable 
that  its  conclusions,  which  conceivably  might  not 
have  been  entirely  acceptable  either  to  Great  Britain 
or  to  Venezuela,  would  have  been  treated  as  advisory 
rather  than  definitive,  and  would  have  been  made 
the  basis  of  further  correspondence  with  both  those 
governments.  The  actual  position  intended  to  be 
insisted  upon,  as  appears  by  Mr.  Olney's  instruc- 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

tions  to  Mr.  Bayard,  as  well  as  the  rest  of  President 
Cleveland's  message,  was  that  the  United  States 
would  resist  the  palpable  and  substantial  encroach- 
ment upon  and  appropriation  by  Great  Britain  of 
Venezuelan  territory.  This  position  was  quite  in 
harmony  with  the  spirit  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
Congress  unanimously  provided  for  the  appointment 
of  a  commission  of  investigation ;  but  the  commission, 
immediately  after  its  organization,  addressed  to 
Mr.  Olney,  through  its  president,  Mr.  Justice  Brewer, 
a  letter  setting  forth  its  peaceful  and  non-partisan 
character  and  the  desirability  of  securing  the  co- 
operation of  Great  Britain  and  Venezuela  in  obtain- 
ing evidence.  At  the  close  of  his  letter,  Mr.  Justice 
Brewer  observed:  "The  purposes  of  the  pending 
investigation  are  certainly  hostile  to  none,  nor  can 
it  be  of  advantage  to  any  that  the  machinery  de- 
vised by  the  government  of  the  United  States  to 
secure  the  desired  information  should  fail  of  its 
purpose."  This  statement  was  communicated  to 
Great  Britain  as  well  as  to  Venezuela,  and  both  gov- 
ernments promptly  responded  to  the  appeal.  The 
labors  of  the  commission  were,  however,  brought 
to  a  close  by  the  conclusion  of  a  treaty  of  arbitra- 
tion, signed  by  Great  Britain  and  Venezuela,  but 
negotiated  between  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States,  the  predominant  feature  of  which  was  the 
application  of  the  principle  of  prescription,  under 
the  definite  rule  that  fifty  years'  adverse  holding 

156 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

of  a  district,  either  by  exclusive  political  control  or 
by  actual  settlement,  should  suffice  to  constitute 
national  title.  The  adoption  of  the  principle  of 
prescription,  on  which  the  arbitrators  would  neces- 
sarily have  acted,  even  if  it  had  not  been  incorpo- 
rated into  the  treaty,  at  once  rendered  nugatory  the 
greater  part  of  the  Venezuelan  claim.  Although  the 
extreme  British  claim  was  not  allowed,  the  territorial 
results  of  the  arbitration  were  decidedly  favorable  to 
that  government.  It  must,  however,  be  conceded 
that  the  most  important  political  result  of  the 
Venezuelan  incident  was  not  the  decision  upon  the 
territorial  question,  but  the  official  adoption  of  the 
Monroe  Doctpne  by  the  Congress  of  the  United 
States,  and  its  explicit  acceptance  by  the  principal 
maritime  power  of  Europe. 

An  official  exposition  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
was  given  by  President  Roosevelt  in  his  annual 
message  of  December  3,  1901,  in  which  he  said: 
"The  Monroe  Doctrine  is  a  declaration  that  there 
must  be  no  territorial  aggrandizement  by  any  non- 
American  power  at  the  expense  of  any  American 
power  on  American  soil.  It  is  in  no  wise  intended 
as  hostile  to  any  nation  in  the  Old  World.  .  .  .  This 
doctrine  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  commercial 
relations  of  any  American  power,  save  that  it  in 
truth  allows  each  of  them  to  form  such  as  it  desires. 
.  .  .  We  do  not  guarantee  any  state  against  punish- 
ment if  it  misconducts  itself,  provided  that  punish- 

157 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

ment  does  not  take  the  form  of  the  acquisition  of 
territory  by  any  non-American  power,"  An  oc- 
casion for  the  practical  application  of  this  definition 
soon  arose.  On  December  ii,  1901,  the  German 
ambassador  at  Washington  left  at  the  Department 
of  State  a  memorandum  in  which  it  was  stated  that 
the  German  government  proposed  to  take  certain 
coercive  measures  against  Venezuela  for  the  satis- 
faction of  claims,  based  partly  on  breaches  of  con- 
tract and  partly  on  violent  wrongs,  which  it  had 
been  found  to  be  impracticable  otherwise  to  bring 
to  a  settlement.  At  the  same  time  the  memoran- 
dum declared  that  "under  no  circumstances"  would 
the  German  governmv  .it  consider  in  i,ts  proceedings 
"the  acquisition  or  the  permanent  occupation  of 
Venezuelan  territory."  In  acknowledging  the  re- 
ceipt of  this  memorandum,  on  December  i6th,  Mr. 
Hay  adverted  to  the  fact  that  the  German  ambas- 
sador, on  his  then  recent  return  from  Berlin,  had 
conveyed  personally  to  the  President,  and  had  after- 
wards repeated  to  himself,  the  assurance  of  the  Ger- 
man Emperor  that  the  imperial  government  had 
no  purpose  or  intention  to  make  even  the  smallest 
acquisition  of  territory  on  the  South  American  con- 
tinent or  the  adjacent  islands;  and  in  view  of  this 
circumstance,  and  of  the  further  assurance  given  in 
the  memorandtmi,  Mr.  Hay  declared  that  the  Presi- 
dent, while  "appreciating  the  courtesy  of  the  Ger- 
man government  in  making  him  acquainted  with 

158 


JOHN    HAY 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

the  state  of  affairs  referred  to,"  did  not  regard  him- 
self "as  called  upon  to  enter  into  the  consideration 
of  the  claims  in  question."  The  coercive  measures 
contemplated  by  the  German  government  were 
postponed  for  a  year,  and  were  then  taken  in  con- 
junction with  the  British  government,  which  also 
made  to  the  United  States,  on  November  13,  1902, 
a  frank  communication  of  its  purposes.  To  this 
communication  Mr.  Hay  replied  that  the  govern- 
ment of  the  United  States,  although  it  "regretted 
that  European  powers  should  use  force  against  Cen- 
tral and  South  American  governments,  could  not 
object  to  their  taking  steps  to  obtain  redress  for 
injuries  suffered  by  their  subjects,  provided  that  no 
acquisition  of  territory  was  contemplated."  In  the 
hostilities  with  Venezuela  that  ensued,  the  assur- 
ances of  the  powers  were  honorably  kept,  but  peace- 
ful relations  were  eventually  restored  through  the 
frank  exercise  of  the  friendly  offices  of  the  United 
States. 

In  popular  discussions  the  position  has  sometimes 
been  urged  that  it  is  a  violation  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine for  a  European  power  to  employ  force  against 
an  American  republic  for  the  purpose  of  collecting 
a  debt  or  satisfying  a  pecuniary  demand,  no  matter 
what  may  have  been  its  origin.  For  this  supposi- 
tion, which  is  discredited  by  the  declarations  and  acts 
of  President  Roosevelt  and  Mr.  Hay,  there  appears  to 
be  no  official  sanction.     It  is  true  that  in  Wharton's 

159 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

International  Law  Digest,  under  the  head  of  the 
"Monroe  Doctrine,"  two  alleged  manuscript  in- 
structions of  Mr.  Blaine  to  the  American  minister 
at  Paris,  of  July  23  and  December  16,  1881,  are 
cited  as  authority  for  the  statement  that  "  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  would  regard  with 
grave  anxiety  an  attempt  on  the  part  of  France  to 
force  by  hostile  pressure  the  payment  by  Venezuela 
of  her  debt  to  French  citizens."  The  citation,  how- 
ever, is  wholly  inadvertent.  Both  instructions  are 
published  in  the  volume  of  Foreign  Relations  for 
1881 ;  and  they  refer,  not  to  "hostile  pressure,"  but 
to  a  rumored  design  on  the  part  of  France  of  "  tak- 
ing forcible  possession  of  some  of  the  harbors  and 
a  portion  of  the  territory  of  Venezuela  in  compensa- 
tion for  debts  due  to  citizens  of  the  French  Repub- 
lic." Even  in  regard  to  this  they  nowhere  express 
"grave  anxiety,"  but  merely  argue  that  such  a  pro- 
ceeding would  be  unjust  to  other  creditors,  includ- 
ing the  United  States,  since  it  would  deprive  them 
of  a  part  of  their  security;  while  they  avow  the 
"solicitude"  of  the  government  of  the  United  States 
"for  the  higher  object  of  averting  hostilities  between 
two  republics  for  each  of  which  it  feels  the  most 
sincere  and  enduring  friendship."  In  1861  the 
government  of  the  United  States  admitted  the  right 
of  France,  Spain,  and  Great  Britain  to  proceed 
jointly  against  Mexico  for  the  satisfaction  of  claims. 
"France,"  said  Mr.  Seward  on   that   occasion,  in 

160 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

an  instruction  to  the  American  minister  at  Paris,  of 
June  26,  1862,  "has  a  right  to  make  war  against 
Mexico,  and  to  determine  for  herself  the  cause. 
We  have  the  right  and  interest  to  insist  that  France 
shall  not  improve  the  war  she  makes  to  raise  up  an 
anti-republican  or  anti-American  government,  or  to 
maintain  such  a  government  there."  In  a  similar 
vein,  Mr.  Seward,  writing  to  the  American  minister 
in  Chile,  on  June  2,  1866,  with  reference  to  the  hos- 
tilities then  in  progress  between  Spain  and  the  re- 
publics on  the  west  coast  of  South  America,  and  par- 
ticularly to  the  bombardment  of  Valparaiso  by  the 
Spanish  fleet,  declared  that  the  United  States  did 
not  intervene  in  wars  between  European  and  Amer- 
ican states  "  if  they  are  not  pushed,  like  the  French 
war  in  Mexico,  to  the  political  point";  that  the 
United  States  had  "no  armies  for  the  purpose  of 
aggressive  war;  no  ambition  for  the  character  of  a 
regulator." 

A  tendency  is  often  exhibited  to  attach  decisive 
importance  to  particular  phrases  in  President  Mon- 
roe's message  of  1823,  or  to  the  special  circum- 
stances in  which  it  originated,  as  if  they  furnished 
a  definitive  test  of  what  should  be  done  and  what 
should  be  omitted  under  all  contingencies.  The 
verbal  literalist  would,  on  the  one  hand,  make  the 
United  States  an  involuntary  party  to  all  controver- 
sies between  European  and  American  governments, 
in  order  that  the  latter  may  not  be  "oppressed"; 
II  161 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

while  the  historical  literalist  would,  on  the  other 
hand,  treat  Monroe's  declarations  as  obsolete,  since 
the  conditions  to  which  they  specially  referred  no 
longer  exist.  But,  when  we  consider  the  muta- 
tions in  the  world's  affairs,  these  modes  of  reasoning 
must  be  confessed  to  be  highly  unsatisfactory.  The 
"Monroe  Doctrine"  has  in  reality  become  a  con- 
venient title  by  which  is  denoted  a  principle  that 
doubtless  would  have  been  wrought  out  if  the 
message  of  1823  had  never  been  written — the  prin- 
ciple of  the  limitation  of  European  power  and  in- 
fluence in  the  Western  Hemisphere.  We  have  seen, 
in  the  first  paper  in  this  series,  that,  as  early  as 
1778,  the  Continental  Congress,  in  the  treaty  of 
alliance  with  France,  obtained  from  its  ally  the  re- 
nimciation  of  any  claim  to  the  British  possessions 
in  North  America.  When  Washington,  in  his  Fare- 
well Address,  observed  that  Europe  had  "a,  set  of 
primary  interests,  which  to  us  have  none,  or  a  very 
remote  relation,"  he  lent  emphasis  to  the  thought 
that  it  was  desirable  so  far  as  possible  to  dissociate 
America  from  the  vicissitudes  of  European  politics. 
Giving  to  this  thought  a  further  reach,  Jefferson, 
while  President,  in  1808,  declared:  "We  shall  be 
satisfied  to  see  Cuba  and  Mexico  remain  in  their 
present  dependence ;  but  very  unwilling  to  see  them 
in  that  of  either  France  or  England,  politically  or 
commercially.  We  consider  their  interests  and 
ours  as  the  same,  and  the  object  of  both  must  be 

162 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

to  exclude  European  influence  from  this  hemi- 
sphere," On  January  15, 181 1,  twelve  years  before 
Monroe's  message  was  published,  Congress,  in  secret 
session,  "taking  into  view  the  peculiar  situation  of 
Spain  and  her  American  provinces,"  and  "the  in- 
fluence which  the  destiny  of  the  territory  adjoining 
the  southern  border  of  the  United  States  might  have 
upon  their  security,  tranquillity,  and  commerce," 
resolved  that  the  United  States  could  not  "with- 
out serious  inquietude,  see  any  part  of  said  terri- 
tory pass  into  the  hands  of  any  foreign  power"; 
and  the  President  was  authorized  to  occupy  all  or 
any  part  of  the  Floridas,  "in  the  event  of  an  at- 
tempt to  occupy  the  same,  or  any  part  thereof,  by 
any  foreign  government."  These  incidents  and 
avowals,  although  they  detract  nothing  from  the 
force  of  Monroe's  declarations,  with  which  they  are 
indeed  in  entire  harmony,  point  to  the  rational  con- 
clusion that  those  declarations  are  to  be  considered 
rather  as  an  important  expression  than  as  the  ex- 
clusive and  final  test  of  American  policy.  In  the 
long  struggle,  which  was  eventually  crowned  with 
success,  to  exclude  European  domination  from  the 
interoceanic  canal  routes,  and  to  secure  the  con- 
struction of  a  neutralized  canal  under  American 
auspices,  American  statesmen  no  doubt  were  aided 
by  the  authority  of  Monroe's  declarations,  but  were 
by  no  means  dependent  upon  them.  It  is  a  remark- 
able fact  that  Seward,  neither  in  the  formal  demand 

163 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

upon  France  in  1865  to  desist  from  armed  inter- 
vention in  Mexico  for  the  purpose  of  overthrowing 
the  domestic  republican  government  under  Juarez 
and  establishing  on  its  ruins  the  foreign  imperial 
government  under  Maximilian,  nor  in  any  of  the 
official  correspondence  relating  to  the  subject, 
mentioned  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  although  his 
action  came  within  the  letter  as  well  as  the  spirit 
of  the  message  of  1823.  President  Polk,  on  the 
other  hand,  in  pronouncing  against  the  acquisition 
of  new  dominion  in  North  America  by  a  Euro- 
pean power,  although  he  was  well  within  the  limits 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  it  is  now  understood, 
invoked  a  passage  that  fell  far  short  of  sustaining 
his  position.  It  would  be  easy  to  cite  many  similar 
examples. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine,  as  a  limitation  upon  the 
extension  of  European  power  and  influence  on  the 
American  continents,  is  now  generally  recognized 
as  a  principle  of  American  policy.  To  its  explicit 
acceptance  by  Great  Britain  and  Germany,  there 
may  be  added  the  declaration  which  was  spread  by 
unanimous  consent  upon  the  minutes  of  The  Hague 
Conference,  and  which  was  permitted  to  be  annexed 
to  the  signature  of  the  American  delegates  to  the 
convention  for  the  peaceful  adjustment  of  inter- 
national disputes,  that  nothing  therein  contained 
should  be  so  construed  as  to  require  the  United 
States  "  to  depart  from  its  traditional  policy  of  not 

164 


WILLIAM    H.    SEWARD 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

entering  upon,  interfering  with,  or  entangling  itself 
in  the  political  questions  or  internal  administration 
of  any  foreign  state,"  or  to  relinquish  "  its  traditional 
attitude  toward  purely  American  questions." 

The  latest  application  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is 
that  which  President  Roosevelt  has  made  in  the  case 
of  Santo  Domingo.  In  a  letter  read  in  New  York, 
in  May,  1904,  at  a  dinner  held  to  celebrate  the 
anniversary  of  Cuban  independence,  he  said :  "  Any 
cotmtry  whose  people  conduct  themselves  well  can 
count  upon  our  hearty  friendliness.  If  a  nation 
shows  that  it  knows  how  to  act  with  decency  in  in- 
dustrial and  political  matters ;  if  it  keeps  order  and 
pays  its  obligations,  then  it  need  fear  no  interference 
from  the  United  States.  Brutal  wrong-doing,  or 
impotence  which  results  in  the  general  loosening  of 
the  ties  of  civilized  society,  may  finally  require  in- 
tervention by  some  civilized  nation,  and  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere  the  United  States  cannot 
ignore  its  duty."  These  declarations  President 
Roosevelt  repeated,  with  only  slight  changes  in 
phraseology,  in  his  annual  message  to  Congress  in 
the  following  December.  On  February  15,  1905,  he 
transmitted  to  the  Senate,  for  its  advice  and  con- 
sent, a  treaty  concluded  at  Santo  Domingo  City 
on  the  7th  of  the  same  month,  under  which  the 
United  States  agreed  to  undertake  the  adjustment 
of  all  Dominican  debts,  foreign  and  domestic,  and 
to  that  end  to  take  charge  of  and  administer  the 

165 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

custom-houses.  In  the  message  accompanying  the 
treaty,  President  Roosevelt  stated  that  conditions 
in  Santo  Domingo  had  for  many  years  been  growing 
steadily  worse,  that  there  had  been  many  disturb- 
ances and  revolutions,  and  that  debts  had  been 
contracted  beyond  the  power  of  the  republic  to  pay. 
Those  who  profited  by  the  Monroe  Doctrine  must,  he 
ajffirmed,  accept  certain  responsibilities  along  with  the 
rights  which  it  conferred;  and  the  justification  for 
assuming  the  responsibility  proposed  in  the  present 
instance  was  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  it  was  in- 
compatible with  international  equity  for  the  United 
States  to  refuse  to  allow  other  powers  to  take  the 
only  means  at  their  disposal  of  satisfying  the  claims 
of  their  citizens  and  yet  to  refuse  itself  to  take  any 
such  steps.  Under  the  Monroe  Doctrine  the  United 
States  could  not,  said  President  Roosevelt,  see  any 
European  power  "seize  and  permanently  occupy" 
the  territory  of  an  American  republic,  and  yet  such 
seizure  might  eventually  offer  the  only  way  in  which 
such  a  power  could  collect  any  debts,  unless  the 
United  States  should  interfere.  Under  such  cir- 
cumstances the  United  States  should  take  charge  of 
the  custom-houses.  In  the  course  of  his  message  he 
further  said:  "Either  we  must  abandon  our  duty 
imder  our  traditional  policy  towards  the  Dominican 
people,  who  aspire  to  a  republican  form  of  govern- 
ment while  they  are  actually  drifting  into  a  condition 
of  permanent  anarchy,  in  which  case  we  must  permit 

i66 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

some  other  government  to  adopt  its  own  measures  in 
order  to  safeguard  its  own  interests,  or  else  we  must 
ourselves  take  seasonable  and  appropriate  action." 
And  in  conclusion  he  avowed  the  belief  that  the 
proposed  treaty  afforded  a  "  practical  test  of  the  ef- 
ficiency of  the  United  States  government  in  main- 
taining the  Monroe  Doctrine,"  The  Senate  adjourn- 
ed without  taking  a  vote  on  the  treaty,  final  action 
on  which  was  thus  deferred.  Meanwhile,  under  a 
modus  vivendi  concluded  by  President  Roosevelt,  an 
American  citizen  designated  by  him  has  been  placed 
by  the  Dominican  government  in  charge  of  the 
collection  of  the  revenues,  a  certain  proportion  of 
which  is  to  be  deposited  in  a  bank  in  New  York,  on 
account  of  the  claims  of  creditors,  till  the  question 
of  ratification  of  the  treaty  shall  be  definitely  de- 
termined. 


VII 

THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EXPATRIATION 

The  Declaration  of  Independence  enumerates  as 
among  the  "inalienable  rights"  with  which  "all 
men"  are  "endowed  by  their  Creator,"  "life,  liberty, 
and  the  pursuit  of  happiness."  It  has  often  been 
remarked  that  this  dogma,  like  the  associated  af- 
firmation that  "all  men  are  created  equal,"  was 
evidently  considered  as  an  abstraction,  since  its 
announcement  was  not  conceived  to  render  inad- 
missible the  continued  holding  in  bondage  of  a  large 
servile  population.  This  criticism,  however,  cannot, 
certainly  in  its  more  sinister  sense,  be  accepted  as 
just.  All  general  declarations  of  human  rights  to  a 
large  extent  represent  aspirations,  for  the  perfect  ful- 
filment of  which  conditions  altogether  ideal  would 
be  requisite.  So  long  as  human  conditions  are  im- 
perfect, the  realization  of  the  highest  human  aspi- 
rations will  be  imperfect.  Even  admitting,  there- 
fore, that  the  enumerated  rights  belonged  to  "all 
men"  and  were  "inalienable,"  there  yet  remained 
the  task  of  determining  what  they  actually  included 
and   what   were    their    practical    limitations.     No 

i68 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EXPATRIATION 

argument,  beyond  the  common  experience  of  daily 
life,  was  needed  to  demonstrate  that  the  unregu- 
lated pursuit  by  each  individual  of  his  own  will 
was  incompatible  with  the  existence  of  social  order ; 
and  it  was  therefore  freely  conceded,  even  by  the 
most  extreme  proponents  of  the  theory  of  natural 
rights,  that  men,  when  living  in  society,  must  be 
considered  as  having  yielded  up  a  part  of  those 
rights  for  the  sake  of  the  common  welfare.  But 
the  question  still  remained,  to  what  extent  had  this 
been  done? 

We  are  now  concerned  with  the  answer  to  this 
question  in  only  one  particular.  Does  the  right  to 
"liberty"  and  the  "pursuit  of  happiness,"  in  the 
sense  in  which  they  may  be  called  "inalienable," 
embrace,  incidentally,  a  right  on  the  part  of  the  in- 
dividual to  expatriate  himself  at  will?  This  was  a 
question  that  was  destined,  in  the  growth  and  de- 
velopment of  American  policy,  to  give  rise  to  im- 
portant international  controversies,  some  of  which 
yet  remain  unadjusted.  In  order  to  grasp  the 
meaning  of  these  controversies,  it  is  necessary  at 
the  outset  clearly  to  understand  just  what  was 
the  point  at  issue.  The  word  expatriation  is  often 
employed  to  denote  merely  the  giving  up  of  one's 
country,  and  more  particularly  one's  native  coim- 
try,  by  a  permanent  change  of  abode;  but,  as 
used  in  diplomatic  discussions,  it  signifies  the 
change    both    of    home    and    of    allegiance,   and 

169 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

more  especially  of  allegiance.  By  the  laws  of  all 
civilized  countries,  provision  is  made  for  the  ad- 
mission of  aliens  to  citizenship.  The  process  by 
which  this  is  done  is  called  naturalization.  What 
is  the  effect  of  this  process?  Does  it  confer  upon 
the  individual  a  new  political  character,  without 
divesting  him  of  that  which  he  previously  had, 
thus  exposing  him,  unless  his  original  sovereign  con- 
sent to  the  change,  to  the  conflicting  claims  of  a 
dual  allegiance  ?  or  does  it  of  its  own  force  not  only 
invest  him  with  a  new  allegiance,  but  also  free  him 
from  the  obligations  of  the  old?  By  the  laws  of 
the  United  States  the  alien  was  required,  at  the 
time  of  his  admission  to  citizenship,  to  forswear  all 
allegiance  to  his  former  sovereign;  and  no  inquiry 
was  made  as  to  whether  that  sovereign  had,  either 
by  general  or  by  specific  permission,  consented  to 
the  act.  It  might  therefore  be  inferred  that  they 
were  framed  upon  the  theory  that  the  individual 
possessed  an  absolute  and  unrestricted  right  to 
change  his  allegiance,  without  regard  to  the  claims 
which  his  country  of  origin  might  assert,  even  within 
its  own  jurisdiction.  This  would,  however,  be  a 
hasty  inference,  so  far,  at  any  rate,  as  the  omission 
to  inquire  concerning  the  claims  of  prior  allegiance 
is  concerned.  Other  countries  had  naturalization 
statutes,  by  which  no  such  inquiry  was  authorized ; 
and  yet  those  countries  conceded  to  their  own  sub- 
jects the  right  of  expatriation  only  with  substantial 

170 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EXPATRIATION 

qualifications  or  not  at  all.  While  they  granted 
naturalization,  they  did  not  claim  that  it  dissolved 
the  ties  of  prior  allegiance  and  made  its  recipient 
an  alien  to  his  native  country,  without  regard  to 
the  latter's  laws  on  the  subject.  And  we  shall  see 
that  a  long  time  elapsed  before  the  United  States 
advanced  to  the  full  assertion  of  this  position  in  its 
diplomatic  correspondence,  and  a  still  longer  time 
before  it  embodied  the  claim  in  its  legislation. 

Nor  is  this  surprising.  The  courts,  and  the  most 
authoritative  jurists,  repeatedly  expressed  the  opin- 
ion that  the  United  States  had  inherited,  as  part  of 
the  common  law,  the  English  doctrine  with  regard 
to  the  change  of  allegiance.  Chancellor  Kent,  re- 
viewing in  his  Commentaries  the  decisions  of  the 
American  courts,  said  that  "  the  better  opinion  would 
seem  to  be,  that  a  citizen  cannot  renounce  his  al- 
legiance to  the  United  States  without  the  permission 
of  government,  to  be  declared  by  law,"  and  that, 
as  there  was  "no  existing  legislative  regulation"  on 
the  subject,  "the  rule  of  the  English  common  law" 
remained  "unaltered."  Mr.  Justice  Story,  deliver- 
ing in  a  certain  case  the  judgment  of  the  Supreme 
Court,  laid  down  the  general  rule  that  individuals 
could  not,  "by  any  act  of  their  own,  without  the 
consent  of  the  government,  put  off  their  allegiance 
and  become  aliens";  while,  in  his  work  on  the  Con- 
flict of  Laws,  he  declared  that  every  nation  had  "  an 
exclusive    right    to    regulate    persons    and    things 

171 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

within  its  own  territory,  according  to  its  own  sov- 
ereign will  and  public  policy."  To  this  general  cur- 
rent of  legal  authority  there  was  just  one  exception, 
and  that  was  a  decision  rendered  by  the  court  of 
appeals  of  Kentucky,  in  1839,  a  decision  in  which 
there  seemed  to  breathe  the  free  and  untrammelled 
spirit  of  the  West.  In  this  case  it  was  declared 
that  expatriation  might  be  "considered  a  practical 
and  fundamental  doctrine  of  America";  but  the 
qualification  was  immediately  added  that  "  the  po- 
litical obligations  of  the  citizen,  and  the  interests 
of  the  Republic,"  might  "forbid  a  renunciation  of 
allegiance  by  his  mere  volition  or  declaration  at 
any  time,  and  under  all  circumstances,"  and  that 
for  this  reason  "the  government,  for  the  purpose 
of  preventing  abuse  and  securing  public  welfare," 
might  "regulate  the  mode  of  expatriation."  Even 
as  thus  qualified,  Chancellor  Kent  expressed  disap- 
proval of  the  decision,  and  maintained  not  only 
that  "the  weight  of  American  authority"  was  "in 
favor  of  the  opposite  doctrine,"  but  also  that  the 
opposite  doctrine  was  "  founded  .  .  .  upon  the  most 
safe  and  reliable  principles." 

In  the  earlier  diplomatic  correspondence  of  the 
United  States,  we  find  no  radical  dissent  from  the 
views  generally  expressed  by  the  courts.  It  is  true 
that  Jefferson,  as  Secretary  of  State,  in  a  letter  to 
Gouvemeur  Morris,  minister  to  France,  of  August 
16,   1793,  said  that  citizens  of  the  United  States 

172 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EXPATRIATION 

were  "certainly  free  to  divest  themselves  of  that 
character  by  emigration  and  other  acts  manifesting 
their  intention,"  and  might  "then  become  the  sub- 
jects of  another  power"  and  be  "free  to  do  what- 
ever the  subject  of  that  power  may  do";  but  this 
was  far  from  saying  that  other  countries  were 
obliged  to  act  upon  the  same  doctrine.  John  Mar- 
shall, as  Secretary  of  State,  a  few  years  later,  in  com- 
menting upon  the  effects  of  naturalization,  observed 
that  no  nation  had  a  right  to  question  its  validity, 
"  unless  it  be  one  which  may  have  a  conflicting  title 
to  the  person  adopted." 

It  is  constantly  stated  that  the  United  States 
maintained  the  right  of  expatriation  in  its  con- 
troversies with  Great  Britain  concerning  the  im- 
pressment of  seamen.  This  is  true,  but  only  in  a 
very  limited  sense.  Taking  the  dispute  over  im- 
pressment as  a  whole,  it  did  not  involve  the  crucial 
point  of  the  later  controversies  as  to  expatriation. 
The  burden  of  the  complaint  in  regard  to  impress- 
ment, as  defined  in  Madison's  war  message  of  June 
I,  1812,  was  that  Great  Britain  sought,  under  cover 
of  belligerent  right,  to  execute  her  municipal  law  of 
allegiance  on  board  the  ships  of  other  countries  on 
the  high  seas,  where  no  laws  could  operate  "  but  the 
law  of  nations,  and  the  laws  of  the  country  to  which 
the  vessels  belong."  Precisely  the  same  position 
was  maintained  by  Webster  in  his  correspondence 
with  Lord  Ashburton  in  1842.     Ships  on  the  high 

173 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

seas  are  treated,  for  purposes  of  jurisdiction,  as  if 
they  were  part  of  the  territory  of  the  nation  to 
which  they  belong.  The  complaint  that  the  Brit- 
ish government  enforced  the  English  law  of  alle- 
giance on  board  American  vessels  on  the  high  seas 
was  manifestly  a  different  thing  from  objecting  to 
her  enforcement  of  the  same  law  within  British 
jurisdiction. 

A  comprehensive  examination  of  our  unpublished 
diplomatic  records  enables  me  to  say  that  the  first 
Secretary  of  State  to  announce  the  doctrine  of  ex- 
patriation in  its  fullest  extent — the  doctrine  that 
naturalization  in  the  United  States  not  only  clothes 
the  individual  with  a  new  allegiance  but  also  ab- 
solves him  from  the  obligations  of  the  old — was 
James  Buchanan.  In  an  instruction  to  George 
Bancroft,  then  American  minister  in  London,  of 
December  i8,  1848,  Buchanan,  referring  to  the  duty 
of  protecting  American  citizens,  naturalized  as  well 
as  native,  said :  "  We  can  recognize  no  difference  be- 
tween the  one  and  the  other,  nor  can  we  permit  this 
to  be  done  by  any  foreign  government,  without  pro- 
testing and  remonstrating  against  it  in  the  strongest 
terms.  The  subjects  of  other  countries  who  from 
choice  have  abandoned  their  native  land,  and,  ac- 
cepting the  invitation  which  our  laws  present,  have 
emigrated  to  the  United  States  and  become  Ameri- 
can citizens,  are  entitled  to  the  very  same  rights  and 
privileges  as  if  they  had  been  bom  in  the  country. 

174 


JAMES    BUCHANAN 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  EXPATRIATION 

To  treat  them  in  a  different  manner  would  be  a 
violation  of  our  plighted  faith  as  well  as  our  solemn 
duty."  The  same  doctrine  was  asserted  by  Buchan- 
an, in  terms  equally  uneqtdvocal,  on  prior  occasions. 
As  early  as  November  25,  1845,  he  informed  an  in- 
quirer that  the  fact  of  his  having  become  a  citizen 
of  the  United  States  by  naturalization  entitled  him 
"  to  the  same  protection  from  this  government  that 
a  native  citizen  would  receive." 

Buchanan's  innovation  was  not,  however,  ac- 
cepted by  any  of  his  successors  as  Secretary  of  State 
till  he  himself  became  President.  Webster,  as  Sec- 
retary of  State  under  Fillmore,  fully  adopted  the 
view  expressed  by  the  eminent  American  publicist, 
Wheaton,  when  minister  to  Prussia,  that  naturaliza- 
tion would  entitle  its  recipient  to  protection  every- 
where but  in  his  native  country.  Edward  Everett, 
Webster's  successor  under  Fillmore,  held  to  the 
same  opinion.  Nor  did  any  reversal  of  it  take  place 
when  Pierce  succeeded  Fillmore,  and  that  Democrat 
of  Democrats,  William  L.  Marcy,  became  Secretary 
of  State.  In  an  instruction  to  the  American  minis- 
ter to  Sardinia,  of  November  10,  1855,  Marcy,  while 
declaring  that  a  naturalized  citizen  of  the  United 
States  had  all  the  rights  of  a  native,  went  on  to  ob- 
serve that  the  vindication  of  those  rights  could  not 
require  or  authorize  "an  interference  in  his  behalf 
with  the  fair  application  to  him  of  the  municipal 
laws  of  his  native  country  when  he  voluntarily  sub- 

17s 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

jects  himself  to  their  control  in  the  same  manner 
and  to  the  same  extent  as  they  would  apply  if  he 
had  never  left  that  country.  A  different  view  of 
the  duties  of  this  government  would,"  added  Marcy, 
"be  an  invasion  of  the  independence  of  nations, 
and  could  not  fail  to  be  productive  of  discord;  it 
might,  moreover,  prove  detrimental  to  the  interests 
of  the  States  of  this  Union." 

Views  similar  to  these  were  expressed  by  Caleb 
Gushing,  Attorney-General  under  Pierce,  in  1856,  in 
an  opinion  which  he  gave  upon  a  question  pro- 
pounded by  the  Bavarian  minister  at  Berlin  as  to 
the  law  in  the  United  States. "  The  results  of  an  ex- 
amination of  judicial  decisions,  both  Federal  and 
State,  Gushing  summarized  thus:  "Expatriation  a 
general  right,  subject  to  regulation  of  time  and  cir- 
cumstances according  to  public  interests;  and  the 
requisite  consent  of  the  state  presumed  where  not 
negatived  by  standing  prohibitions."  Subject  to 
"the  conditions  thus  indicated,"  and  to  "such  oth- 
ers as  the  public  interest  might  seem  to  Congress  to 
require  to  be  imposed,"  he  thought  that  the  right 
of  expatriation  existed  and  might  be  freely  exer- 
cised by  citizens  of  the  United  States.  He  took 
occasion,  however,  to  observe  that  opinion  on  the 
subject  in  the  United  States  had  always  been  "a 
little  colored  ...  by  necessary  opposition  to  the 
assumption  of  Great  Britain  to  uphold  the  doctrine 
of  indefeasible  allegiance,  and  in  terms  to  prohibit 

176 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EXPATRIATION 

expatriation.  Hence,"  he  continued,  "we  have 
been  prone  to  regard  it  hastily  as  a  question  between 
kings  and  their  subjects.  It  is  not  so.  The  true 
question  is  of  the  relation  between  the  political  so- 
ciety and  its  members,  upon  whatever  hypothesis  of 
right  and  in  whatever  form  of  organization  that 
society  may  be  constituted.  The  assumption  of  a 
natural  right  of  emigration,  without  possible  re- 
striction in  law,  can  be  defended  only  by  maintain- 
ing that  each  individual  has  all  possible  rights 
against  the  society  and  the  society  none  with  re- 
spect to  the  individual;  that  there  is  no  social  or- 
ganization, but  a  mere  anarchy  of  elements,  each 
wholly  independent  of  the  other,  and  not  otherwise 
consociated  save  than  by  their  casual  coexistence  in 
the  same  territory." 

A  pronounced  change  in  the  tone  and  language 
of  the  government  was  now  impending,  and  for 
reasons  altogether  intelligible.  In  March,  1857, 
Buchanan  became  President,  and  conditions  were 
ripe  for  the  further  development  of  the  position 
which  he  had  taken  as  Secretary  of  State  ten  years 
before.  For  several  decades  after  the  formation  of 
the  government  of  the  United  States,  the  immigrant 
element  of  the  population  was  comparatively  un- 
important. It  is  estimated  that  the  whole  num- 
ber of  immigrants  from  1790  to  1820  was  only  about 
250,000.  During  the  twenties  it  continued  to  be 
small;  but  in  the  next  decade  it  grew  rapidly.  In 
la  177 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

the  year  1842  the  number  reached  100,000.  In 
1846  there  began  the  movement  due  to  the  Irish 
famine;  and  this  movement,  combined  with  bad 
times  in  Germany,  produced  in  1854  the  enormous 
maximum  of  427,833,  which  was  not  again  reached 
till  after  the  Civil  War.  In  i860  the  foreign-born 
population  of  the  United  States  was  4,138,697.  In 
1870  it  was  5,567,229.  Immigrants  and  the  chil- 
dren of  immigrants  had  come  to  form  a  large  per- 
centage of  the  country's  citizenship.  Such  a  con- 
dition of  things  inevitably  produced  an  effect  on 
the  policy  of  the  United  States,  just  as  it  must 
have  done  on  the  policy  of  any  other  government 
founded  on  popular  suffrage.  The  foreign -bom 
citizen  who  desired  to  revisit  the  country  of  his 
origin,  represented  an  interest  so  wide-spread  and 
so  powerful  that  its  wishes  could  not  be  disregarded, 
no  matter  what  the  courts  and  publicists,  or  even 
what  Secretaries  of  State,  had  said. 

As  the  largest  immigration  prior  to  1857  was  from 
Ireland  and  the  German  states,  controversies  as  to 
allegiance  most  frequently  arose  in  those  quarters. 
By  the  law  of  England,  a  British  subject  could  not 
put  off  his  natural  allegiance  except  by  act  of  Par- 
liament, and  of  such  an  act  there  was  no  record. 
The  law  in  Germany  was  more  liberal.  A  Prussian 
subject,  for  example,  might  lose  his  allegiance  in 
various  ways,  one  of  which  was  by  living  ten  years 
in  a  foreign  land.     But  this  did  not  suffice  to  pre- 

178 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EXPATRIATION 

vent  a  collision,  since  the  laws  of  the  United  States 
required  for  naturalization  only  a  five  years'  resi- 
dence, and  sometimes  less;  and  since,  above  all,  in 
Prussia  as  well  as  in  other  European  states,  the  dis- 
charge from  allegiance  was  always  subject  to  the 
performance  of  military  duties,  whether  the  in- 
dividual had  at  the  time  of  his  emigration  reached 
the  age  of  actual  service  or  not. 

In  1859  the  issue  was  broadly  made.  In  Feb- 
ruary of  that  year  a  native  of  Hanover,  named 
Christian  Ernst,  who  had  emigrated  to  the  United 
States  eight  years  before,  at  the  age  of  nineteen,  was 
admitted  to  citizenship ;  and  in  the  following  month 
he  procured  a  passport  and  returned  to  Hanover 
on  a  visit.  On  arriving  in  his  native  village  he  was 
arrested  and  forced  into  the  army.  President  Bu- 
chanan gave  to  the  case  his  immediate  personal 
attention,  and  submitted  it  to  Judge  Jeremiah  S. 
Black,  his  Attorney -General,  for  an  opinion.  Judge 
Black's  opinion  bore  the  significant  date  of  the  4th  of 
July.  He  advised  that  it  was  the  "natural  right  of 
every  free  person,  who  owes  no  debts  and  is  not  guilty 
of  crime,  to  leave  the  country  of  his  birth  in  good 
faith  and  for  an  honest  purpose,"  and  to  throw  off 
his  natural  allegiance  and  substitute  another  for  it ; 
that,  although  the  common  law  of  England  denied 
this  right,  and  "  some  of  our  own  courts,  misled  by 
British  authority,  have  expressed,  though  not  very 
decisively,  the  same  opinion,"  this  was  not  to  be 

179 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

taken  as  settling  the  question ;  that  "  natural  reason 
and  justice,  writers  of  known  wisdom,"  and  "the 
practice  of  civilized  nations"  were  "all  opposed  to 
the  doctrine  of  perpetual  allegiance,"  and  that  the 
United  States  was  pledged  to  the  right  of  expatria- 
tion and  could  not  without  perfidy  repudiate  it; 
that  expatriation  "  includes  not  only  emigration  out 
of  one's  native  country,  but  naturalization  in  the 
country  adopted  as  a  future  residence";  that  "nat- 
uralization does  ipso  facto  place  the  native  and  the 
adopted  citizen  in  precisely  the  same  relations  with 
the  government  under  which  they  live,  except  in  so 
far  as  the  express  and  positive  law  of  the  country  has 
made  a  distinction  in  favor  of  one  or  the  other  " ;  that 
there  was  no  law  in  the  United  States  that  made  any 
difference  between  native  and  naturalized  citizens 
with  regard  to  protection  abroad;  that  the  opinion 
held  by  "persons  of  very  high  reputation,"  that  a 
naturalized  citizen  ought  to  be  protected  every- 
where except  in  the  country  of  his  birth,  had  "no 
foundation  to  rest  upon  .  .  .  except  the  dogma  which 
denies  altogether  the  right  of  expatriation  without 
the  consent  of  his  native  country";  that,  even  as- 
suming that  Hanover  had  a  municipal  regulation 
by  which  the  right  of  expatriation  was  denied  to 
those  of  her  subjects  who  failed  to  comply  with  cer- 
tain conditions,  and  that  this  regulation  was  violated 
by  Ernst  when  he  came  away,  the  unlawfulness  of 
his  emigration  would  not  make  his  naturalization 

180 


WILLIAM    L.    MARCY 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EXPATRIATION 

void  as  against  the  King  of  Hanover;  that,  if  the 
laws  of  the  two  countries  were  in  conflict,  the  law  of 
nations  must  decide  the  question  upon  principles 
and  rules  of  its  own;  and  that,  "by  the  public  law 
of  the  worid  we  have  the  undoubted  right  to  natural- 
ize a  foreigner,  whether  his  natural  sovereign  con- 
sented to  his  emigration  or  not";  and,  finally,  that 
the  government  of  Hanover  could  justify  Ernst's 
arrest  only  by  proving  that  the  original  right  of 
expatriation  depended  upon  the  consent  of  the 
natural  sovereign — a  proposition  which,  said  Judge 
Black,  "I  am  sure  no  man  can  establish." 

On  July  8,  1859,  the  views  of  the  President  in 
relation  to  the  case  of  Christian  Ernst  and  analogous 
cases  were  communicated  to  Mr,  Wright,  American 
minister  at  Berlin,  in  a  paper  that  at  once  acquired 
great  celebrity.  In  this  paper  the  views  annotmced 
by  Judge  Black,  which  in  reality  were  but  a  reitera- 
tion of  those  held  by  Buchanan  as  Secretary  of  State, 
were  fully  adopted.  What  right,  it  was  asked,  did 
the  laws  of  the  United  States  confer  upon  a  foreigner 
by  granting  him  naturalization?  The  answer  was, 
all  the  rights,  privileges,  and  immunities  which  be- 
longed to  a  native  citizen,  except  that  of  eligibility 
to  the  office  of  President.  "With  this  exception," 
it  was  affirmed,  "the  naturalized  citizen,  from  and 
after  the  date  of  his  naturalization,  both  at  home 
and  abroad,  is  placed  upon  the  very  same  footing 
with  the  native  citizen.     He  is  neither  in  a  better 

181 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

nor  a  worse  condition  .  .  .  The  moment  a  foreigner 
becomes  naturalized,  his  allegiance  to  his  native 
country  is  severed  forever.  He  experiences  a  new 
political  birth.  A  broad  and  impassable  line  sep- 
arates him  from  his  native  country.  He  is  no  more 
responsible  for  anything  he  may  say  or  do,  or  omit 
to  say  or  do,  after  assuming  his  new  character  than 
if  he  had  been  born  in  the  United  States.  Should 
he  return  to  his  native  country,  he  returns  as  an 
American  citizen,  and  in  no  other  character.  In 
order  to  entitle  his  original  government  to  punish 
him  for  an  offence,  this  must  have  been  committed 
while  he  was  a  subject  and  owed  allegiance  to  that 
government."  This  instruction  was  signed  by  Mr. 
Cass,  but  in  its  citations  of  the  law  of  Pennsylvania, 
as  well  as  in  its  sentiments  and  style,  it  bears  Presi- 
dential ear-marks.  On  August  20,  1859,  the  Han- 
overian government  stated  that  a  "  full  pardon"  had 
been  granted  to  Ernst,  and  that  he  had  been  "dis- 
missed" from  the  military  service,  but  added  that 
similar  conflicts  could  be  prevented  in  the  future 
only  by  the  United  States  "  renouncing  its  own  views 
on  the  subject,  which  did  not  agree  with  inter- 
national relations,"  or  by  concluding  a  special  ar- 
rangement. President  Buchanan,  however,  in  his 
annual  message  of  December  3,  i860,  declared: 
"  Our  government  is  bound  to  protect  the  rights  of 
our  naturalized  citizens  everywhere  to  the  same  ex- 
tent as  though  they  had  drawn  their  first  breath  in 

182 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EXPATRIATION 

this  country.  We  recognize  no  distinction  between 
our  native  and  naturalized  citizens." 

The  instruction  to  Mr.  Wright  was  printed  and 
issued  by  the  Department  of  State  in  circular  form, 
for  the  purpose  of  defining  the  positioi;i  which  the 
United  States  would  in  future  maintain.  It  was 
so  used  by  Seward,  as  Secretary  of  State,  after  Lin- 
coln had  succeeded  Buchanan  as  President.  But, 
as  the  Civil  War  grew  more  serious  and  the  United 
States  was  forced  to  adopt  a  policy  of  conscription, 
Seward  permitted  the  controversy  to  rest.  Writing 
to  Motley,  who  was  then  minister  to  Austria,  on 
April  21,  1863,  he  adverted  to  the  perplexities  in 
which  the  United  States  had  become  involved  by 
refusing,  on  the  one  hand,  to  exerppt  from  its  mili- 
tary service  persons  whom  foreign  powers  claimed 
the  right  to  protect,  while  demanding,  on  the  other, 
the  exemption  of  a  like  class  from  military  service 
in  the  country  of  their  origin  on  the  ground  of  their 
having  become  citizens  of  the  United  States.  The 
President  had,  he  said,  decided  that  it  was  not  ex- 
pedient in  the  crisis  then  existing  to  urge  questions 
of  the  latter  sort  beyond  the  limits  of  an  appeal  to 
the  good -will  and  friendly  disposition  of  foreign 
powers.  It  was,  besides,  deemed  necessary  to  dis- 
courage rather  than  encourage  the  return  of  natural- 
ized foreigners  to  their  native  country,  as  well  as 
the  emigration  of  American  citizens  to  Europe. 

But,  soon  after  the  close  of  the  war,  Seward  was 
183 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

somewhat  violently  torn  away  from  this  position 
by  the  outbreak,  in  1866,  of  the  Fenian  agitation, 
and  the  arrest  in  British  jurisdiction  of  naturalized 
American  citizens,  natives  of  Ireland,  for  acts  done 
in  furtherance  of  that  movement.  Among  the 
numerous  cases  of  this  kind,  the  most  notable  one, 
historically,  was  that  of  Warren  and  Costello,  who 
were  members  of  the  discordant  and  ill-starred  ex- 
pedition on  the  brigantine  Jacmel  to  the  coast  of 
Ireland,  and  who  were  afterwards  tried  and  con- 
victed at  Dublin  on  a  charge  of  treason-felony.  At 
that  time  an  alien  charged  with  crime  in  British 
jurisdiction  was  by  law  entitled  to  be  tried  by  what 
was  technically  called  a  jury  de  medietate  Ungues — 
a  jury  composed  half  of  British  subjects  and  half  of 
foreigners.  Warren  and  Costello  applied  for  such 
a  jury,  on  the  ground  that  they  were  American  citi- 
zens. Had  they  been  native  citizens  of  the  United 
States,  their  request  would  have  been  granted,  but, 
as  they  were  British  subjects  by  birth,  it  was  re- 
fused, the  court  citing  Blackstone,  Kent,  and  Story 
to  show  that  their  original  allegiance  still  survived. 
The  trial  and  conviction  of  Warren  and  Costello, 
as  well  as  of  other  prisoners,  under  these  circum- 
stances produced  an  excitement  that,  to  borrow 
Seward's  picturesque  phrase,  extended  "through- 
out the  whole  country,  from  Portland  to  San  Fran- 
cisco and  from  St.  Paul  to  Pensacola."  Public 
meetings  attended  by  immense  crowds  were  held  in 

184 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EXPATRIATION 

many  cities,  and  resolutions  were  adopted  calling 
upon  the  government  for  vigorous  measures.  In  this 
agitation  the  leading  spirit  was  William  E.  Robin- 
son, then  a  member  of  Congress  from  Brooklyn, 
popularly  known  as  "Richelieu"  Robinson,  "Riche- 
lieu" being  the  name  under  which  he  practised 
journalism.  Robinson  was  a  native  of  Ireland  and 
an  advocate  of  her  independence,  or,  as  he  once 
declared  in  Congress,  of  her  purchase  and  annexa- 
tion by  the  United  States.  When  in  the  latter  part 
of  1867  Congress  assembled,  he  at  once  brought  up 
the  subject  of  the  Irish-American  prisoners.  He 
offered  resolutions  of  inquiry  looking  to  the  im- 
peachment of  the  American  minister  at  London, 
and  of  the  American  consul  at  Dublin,  for  neglect 
of  duty;  and  declared  that  unless  every  American 
citizen  then  confined  in  a  British  jail,  against  whom 
a  charge  of  crime  had  not  already  been  filed,  should 
not  on  demand  be  instantly  released,  the  American 
minister  should  "  come  home  and  breathe  his  native 
air,  and  be  prepared  to  stand  up  like  a  man,  and  not 
be  trembling  all  over  like  a  jelly."  As  the  minister 
thus  described  was  no  other  than  Charles  Francis 
Adams,  who,  in  the  dark  hours  of  the  great  Ameri- 
can conflict,  could  quietly  say  to  Earl  Russell,  with 
reference  to  the  apprehended  escape  of  "Lairds' 
Ironclads,"  "It  would  be  superfluous  in  me  to 
point  out  to  your  lordship  that  this  is  war,"  it  is 
obvious  that  Mr.  Robinson  was  a  man  of  fancy, 

185 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

though  tastes  will  necessarily  differ  as  to  the  quality 
of  his  wit.  On  a  subsequent  occasion  he  proposed 
a  resolution,  which  was  at  once  voted  by  the  House 
of  Representatives,  requesting  the  President  to  ob- 
tain the  release  of  Warren  and  Costello  and  "  their 
return  to  our  flag,  with  such  ceremonies  as  are  ap- 
propriate to  the  occasion,"  Warren  and  Costello 
were  eventually  released,  but  without  special  cere- 
monial incidents. 

Meanwhile,  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs, 
spurred  on  by  ninety -six  resolutions  and  memorials 
that  had  been  adopted  at  public  meetings  in  differ- 
ent sections  of  the  country,  all  demanding  that 
action  be  taken  to  secure  to  citizens  of  the  United 
States  protection  abroad,  had  been  wrestling  with 
various  proposals  designed  to  accomplish  that  end; 
and  on  January  27,  1868,  the  chairman.  General 
Banks,  brought  in  a  bill,  accompanied  by  an  elabo- 
rate report.  The  report  was  both  able  and  tem- 
perate. It  pertinently  declared  that  the  claim  of 
"indefeasible  allegiance  and  perpetual  service"  was 
the  symbol  of  "feudalism  and  force,"  but  it  also 
affirmed  that  "the  law  of  allegiance  and  of  service" 
was  "as  essential  to  a  republic  at  it  is  to  a  mon- 
archy," and  that  the  "extinction  of  the  mutual  ob- 
ligations between  a  government  and  its  subject" 
should  depend  upon  "the  express  or  implied  con- 
sent of  both  parties,"  under  proper  regulations. 
The  bill  was  less  carefully  reasoned,  and,  after  some 

186 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EXPATRIATION 

discussion,  was  recommitted.  It  was  reported 
again,  in  a  form  much  altered,  on  March  loth.  In 
its  new  form  it  declared  that  the  "right  of  ex- 
patriation" was  "a  natural  and  inherent  right  of 
all  people,  indispensable  to  the  enjoyment  of  the 
rights  of  life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness," 
and  that  "any  declaration,  instruction,  opinion, 
order,  or  decision,"  of  any  officer  of  the  govern- 
ment, which  denied,  restricted,  impaired,  or  ques- 
tioned that  right,  was  "  inconsistent  with  the  funda- 
mental principles"  of  the  government.  It  further 
provided  that  naturalized  citizens  of  the  United 
States  should  while  abroad  receive  the  same  pro- 
tection as  native  citizens  in  like  circumstances;  and 
empowered  the  President,  whenever  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States  should  be  arrested  and  detained  by 
a  foreign  government  upon  the  allegation  that 
naturalization  in  the  United  States  did  not  operate 
to  dissolve  his  original  allegiance,  to  retaliate  by 
arresting  and  detaining  any  subject  of  that  govern- 
ment found  within  the  national  jurisdiction. 

The  bill,  after  discussion  and  amendment,  passed 
the  House  on  April  20,  1868,  by  a  vote  of  104  to  4, 
81  members  not  voting.  In  the  Senate  it  was  re- 
ferred to  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  from 
which  it  was  reported  by  the  chairman,  Mr.  Sumner, 
on  June  23d,  with  two  amendments,  one  of  which 
struck  out  the  provision  for  reprisals  and  made  it 
the  duty  of  the  President,  in  cases  of  improper  ar- 

187 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

rest  and  detention,  merely  to  report  the  facts  to 
Congress.  In  the  debate  that  ensued,  Mr.  Williams, 
of  Oregon,  moved  to  substitute  for  this  amendment 
a  clause  making  it  the  duty  of  the  President,  before 
reporting  the  facts  to  Congress,  to  use  all  means, 
not  amounting  to  acts  of  war,  to  obtain  the  pris- 
oner's release.  This  amendment  was  eventually 
adopted.  The  bill,  as  amended,  passed  the  Senate 
on  July  25,  1868,  by  a  vote  of  39  to  5,  20  Senators 
not  voting.  On  the  same  day  the  amendments  of 
the  Senate  were  concurred  in  by  the  House,  and  on 
July  27th  the  bill,  with  the  approval  of  the  Presi- 
dent, became  a  law. 

An  examination  of  the  debates  shows  that  the 
passage  of  the  bill  was  greatly  facilitated  by  two 
circumstances,  which  were  repeatedly  mentioned. 
One  was  that,  while  the  bill  was  pending,  both  the 
great  political  parties  held  their  national  conven- 
tions and  adopted  declarations  in  favor  of  the  equal 
protection  of  all  citizens,  both  native  and  natural- 
ized, at  all  times  and  in  all  places.  The  other  was 
that  George  Bancroft  had,  with  the  kindly  and 
powerful  CO  -  operation  of  Bismarck,  concluded  on 
February  22,  1868,  with  the  North  German  Union 
his  epoch-making  naturalization  treaty,  which  was 
soon  followed  by  similar  treaties  with  Baden  and 
Bavaria,  and  by  the  promise  or  well-founded  ex- 
pectation of  treaties  with  yet  other  powers,  includ- 
ing  Great    Britain.     Indeed,    the    principles    of    a 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EXPATRIATION 

naturalization  treaty  with  Great  Britain  were  set- 
tled in  a  protocol  signed  in  London  as  early  as 
October  9,  1868,  though  they  were  not  embodied 
in  a  formal  convention  till  May  13,  1870,  when  Par- 
liament had  by  an  act  of  the  preceding  day  adopted 
the  necessary  legislation.  Before  the  close  of  1872, 
naturalization  treaties  were  made  with  Hesse  (1868), 
Belgium  (1868),  Sweden  and  Norway  (1869),  Aus- 
tria-Hungary (1870),  Ecuador  (1872),  and  Den- 
mark (1872),  Of  all  these  treaties,  however,  that 
with  Great  Britain  is  the  most  liberal,  since  it  recog- 
nizes the  fullest  possible  effects  of  naturalization, 
whether  American  or  British,  whenever  acquired, 
while  all  the  rest  make  a  five  years'  residence  in  the 
country  of  adoption  a  necessary  condition  of  ex- 
patriation, even  though  naturalization  should,  as 
in  some  cases  it  may,  be  sooner  obtained.  The 
treaty  with  Great  Britain  is  therefore  the  only  one 
that  meets  the  full  exactions  of  the  act  of  July  27, 
1868;  but  they  were  all  promptly  ratified. 

Since  1872  the  government  of  the  United  States 
has  earnestly  and  constantly  striven  to  secure 
naturalization  treaties  with  other  powers,  but  its 
efforts  have  been  rewarded  only  in  the  single  and 
unimportant  case  of  Hayti.  For  this  failure  there 
are  several  reasons,  first  among  which  we  may  men- 
tion the  controversies  that  have  arisen  under  the 
existing  treaties,  in  consequence  of  the  return  to 
their  native  country,  immediately  after  their  nat- 

189 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

uralization  in  the  United  States,  of  young  men  who 
emigrated  just  before  arriving  at  the  age  when  they 
were  subject  to  military  duty.  While  the  number 
of  such  persons  from  year  to  year  has  been  com- 
paratively small,  yet  it  has,  as  the  volumes  of  dip- 
lomatic correspondence  amply  testify,  been  large 
enough  to  produce  incalculable  mischief.  This  un- 
fortunate complication,  which  has  in  some  instances 
put  in  jeopardy  subsisting  arrangements,  has  nat- 
urally served  as  an  obstacle  to  the  formation  of  new 
ones.  Besides,  the  increasing  pressure  of  the  mili- 
tary system  in  Europe  has  made  the  non-treaty 
powers  more  and  more  reluctant  to  recognize  the 
expatriation  of  any  citizen  or  subject  who  has  not 
performed  the  entire  military  service  which  the  law 
prescribes.  This  tendency  is  clearly  seen  in  the 
case  of  France,  who,  abandoning  a  less  stringent  rule 
formerly  applied,  now  enforces  her  military  laws 
upon  Frenchmen  naturalized  abroad  who  were  at 
the  time  of  their  naturalization  subject  to  military 
service  in  the  active  army  or  in  the  reserve  of  that 
army.  By  the  Italian  civil  code  of  1866,  citizenship 
of  that  country  is  lost  by  naturalization  abroad,  but 
it  is  expressly  declared  by  the  same  code  that  this 
does  not  carry  with  it  exemption  from  the  obligation 
of  military  service  or  from  the  penalties  inflicted  on 
those  who  bear  arms  against  their  native  country. 
Other  countries,  including  Switzerland,  have  laws 
of  similar  purport;  but  the  Swiss  laws  contain  a 

190 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EXPATRIATION 

provision  under  which  a  native  of  that  country  may, 
if  he  sees  fit  to  do  so,  renounce  his  natural  allegiance. 
The  most  difficult  case,  however,  to  deal  with  is  that 
of  Russia,  by  whose  laws  any  native  of  that  country 
who  enters  a  foreign  service  without  the  permission 
of  his  government,  or  takes  the  oath  of  allegiance 
to  a  foreign  power,  is  exposed  to  the  loss  of  all  civil 
rights  and  perpetual  banishment  from  the  empire, 
or,  in  case  of  his  unauthorized  return  to  Russia,  to 
deportation  to  Siberia.  In  addition  to  this,  he  is 
required  to  perform  his  term  of  military  service. 
Turkey,  prior  to  1869,  recognized  the  right  of  ex- 
patriation, but  has  since  refused  to  do  so.  Referring 
to  the  situation  thus  created.  President  McKinley, 
in  his  annual  message  of  December  5,  1899,  said: 
"  Our  statutes  do  not  allow  this  government  to  admit 
any  distinction  between  the  treatment  of  native  and 
naturalized  Americans  abroad,  so  that  ceaseless  con- 
troversy arises  in  cases  where  persons,  owing  in  the 
eye  of  international  law  a  dual  allegiance,  are  pre- 
vented from  entering  Turkey  or  are  expelled  after 
entrance.  Our  law  in  this  regard  contrasts  with 
that  of  the  European  states.  The  British  act,  for 
instance,  does  not  claim  effect  for  the  naturalization 
of  an  alien  in  the  event  of  his  return  to  his  native 
country,  unless  the  change  be  recognized  by  the  law 
of  that  country  or  stipulated  by  treaty  between  it 
and  the  naturalizing  state."  It  may  be  doubted 
whether  this  statement,  so  far  as  it  relates  to  a 

191 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

"dual  allegiance,"  was  made  with  full  appreciation 
of  its  significance ;  for  if  it  be  admitted  that  an  alien 
naturalized  in  the  United  States,  as  a  result  owes, 
under  international  law,  a  dual  allegiance,  it  neces- 
sarily follows  that  the  doctrine  of  voluntary  ex- 
patriation has  no  foimdation  in  international  law. 
No  one  has  ever  contended  that  the  naturalization 
of  an  alien  is  ineffective  in  the  country  in  which  it  is 
granted.  The  only  question  that  has  existed  is  as  to 
its  effect  in  other  countries,  and  especially  in  the 
country  of  origin.  The  doctrine  embodied  in  the 
act  of  1868  is  that  naturalization  invests  the  in- 
dividual with  a  new  and  single  allegiance,  and  by 
consequence  absolves  him  from  the  obhgations  of  the 
old.  The  position  of  governments  and  of  publicists 
who  deny  the  American  contention  is  that  naturaliza- 
tion merely  adds  a  new  allegiance  to  the  old,  so  that 
the  individual  becomes  subject  to  a  dual  allegiance, 
and  may  be  held  to  all  the  obligations  of  his  original 
citizenship  if  he  returns  to  his  native  country.  The 
doctrine  of  dual  allegiance  is,  in  a  word,  the  precise 
test  the  acceptance  of  which  distinguishes  those  who 
reject  the  doctrine  of  voluntary  expatriation  from 
those  who  support  it. 

But,  quite  apart  from  conditions  existing  in  other 
coimtries,  it  would  be  uncandid  not  to  admit  that  the 
failure  of  the  United  States  since  1872  to  extend 
the  operation  of  the  doctrine  of  expatriation  may 
in  a  measure  be  ascribed  to  certain  acts  that  have 

192 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EXPATRIATION 

seemed  to  discredit  the  declarations  made  in  the  act 
of  1868.  By  the  naturalization  laws  of  the  United 
States  prior  to  1870,  admission  to  citizenship 
was  restricted  to  "free  white"  persons.  By  the 
act  of  July  14,  1870,  Congress,  after  the  adoption  of 
the  Thirteenth  and  Fourteenth  Amendments  to  the 
Constitution,  changed  the  laws  so  as  to  embrace 
persons  of  "African"  nativity  or  descent.  While 
this  act  was  under  discussion  in  Congress,  Senator 
Sumner  made  repeated  efforts  to  strike  from  the 
laws  the  word  "white,"  but  in  this  he  was  unsuc- 
cessful. In  the  preparation  of  the  Revised  Statutes 
of  the  United  States,  the  word  "white"  was  omitted, 
but  by  the  act  of  February  18,  1875,  Congress  cor- 
rected this  omission  by  expressly  restricting  the 
right  of  naturalization  to  "white"  persons  and  to 
persons  of  "African"  nativity  or  descent.  This 
legislation,  under  which  Chinese,  Japanese,  and  per- 
sons of  various  other  races,  being  neither  "white" 
nor  "African,"  have  been  held  to  be  incapable  of 
naturalization  in  the  United  States,  necessarily  im- 
paired the  moral  if  not  the  legal  authority  of  the 
act  of  1868.  The  act  of  1868  declared  expatriation 
to  be  "a  natural  and  inherent  right  of  all  people," 
and  the  right  of  expatriation,  as  correctly  held  by 
Judge  Black,  includes  both  emigration  and  natural- 
ization. It  is  obvious  therefore  that  the  right  of 
expatriation  is  only  imperfectly  recognized  where 
people,  not  individually  because  of  misconduct,  but 
13  193 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

in  the  mass  because  of  their  race,  are  excluded  from 
naturalization.  Some  of  the  very  words  of  the  act 
of  July  27,  1868,  declaratory  of  the  right  of  expa- 
triation, were  embodied  on  the  following  day  in  the 
treaty  with  China,  commonly  called  the  Burlingame 
treaty. 

Any  discussion  of  the  subject  of  expatriation 
would  be  incomplete  which  omitted  to  take  notice 
of  the  impression  that  has  heretofore  prevailed,  and 
may  still  widely  prevail,  that  the  United  States  has 
on  some  occasions  contended  that  a  declaration  of 
intention  to  become  a  citizen  clothed  the  individual 
with  American  nationality  and  gave  him  the  same 
right  to  protection  abroad  as  if  he  had  been  natural- 
ized. This  impression  is  altogether  erroneous,  and 
is  directly  opposed  to  the  positive  declarations  of  a 
long  line  of  Secretaries  of  State,  including  Buchanan, 
Marcy,  Cass,  Fish,  Evarts,  Frelinghuysen,  Bayard, 
Blaine,  Olney,  and  Hay.  In  reality  the  statutes  of 
the  United  States  forbid  the  issuance  of  passports 
to  persons  who  are  not  actual  citizens.  The  erron- 
eous impression  with  regard  to  the  effect  of  a  decla- 
ration of  intention  seems  to  be  connected  with  the 
particular  case  of  Marcin  Koszta,  in  which  William 
L.  Marcy  is  supposed  to  have  maintained  that  by 
such  a  declaration  an  alien  acquired  American  na- 
tionality. Marcy,  however,  took  no  such  ground. 
The  only  purpose  for  which  he  referred  to  Koszta's 
declaration  of  intention  was  that  of  showing  that 

194 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EXPATRIATION 

Koszta  was  domiciled  in  the  United  States.  He  did 
maintain  that  a  person's  domicil,  by  which  is  meant 
his  permanent  home,  may  in  certain  relations  invest 
him  with  a  nationality.  But  even  in  this  regard  the 
position  of  Marcy  has  been  much  misapprehended. 
A  brief  explanation  of  the  case  will  conduce  to  a 
clearer  understanding  of  it. 

Martin  Koszta,  a  Hungarian  by  birth  and  an  Aus- 
trian subject,  was  an  active  participant  in  the  Hun- 
garian revolution  of  1848-49.  At  its  close  he,  with 
many  others,  took  refuge  in  Turkey.  Their  extra- 
dition was  demanded  by  Austria  but  was  resisted  by 
Turkey,  backed  up  by  England  and  France ;  and  they 
were  at  length  released  on  the  understanding  that 
they  would  go  into  foreign  parts.  Many  of  them 
emigrated  to  the  United  States.  Among  these  was 
Koszta,  who,  on  July  31,  1852,  declared  his  intention 
to  become  a  citizen.  Nearly  two  years  later  he  tem- 
porarily returned,  on  private  business,  to  Turkey, 
and  placed  himself  under  the  protection  of  the 
American  consul  at  Smyrna,  by  whom  he  was  fur- 
nished with  a  tezkereh,  a  kind  of  passport  or  safe- 
conduct  given  by  foreign  consuls  in  Turkey  to  per- 
sons whom  they  asstmie  to  protect.  While  waiting 
for  an  opportunity  to  return  to  the  United  States, 
Koszta  was  seized  and  thrown  into  the  sea,  where 
he  was  picked  up  by  a  boat's  crew,  lying  in  wait 
for  him,  and  taken  on  board  the  Austrian  man-of- 
war  Huszar,  where  he  was  confined  in  irons.     It 

195 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

afterwards  transpired  that  his  seizure  was  insti- 
gated by  the  Austrian  consul-general  at  Smyrna, 
and  that  the  Turkish  officials  had  refused  to  grant 
any  authority  for  the  purpose.  The  American  con- 
sul at  Smyrna  and  the  American  charge  d'affaires 
at  Constantinople  sought  to  effect  his  liberation, 
but  in  vain.  Just  then,  however,  the  American 
sloop-of-war  St.  Louis  arrived  at  Smyrna,  and  her 
commander.  Captain  Ingraham,  after  inquiring  into 
the  circumstances  of  the  case,  demanded  Koszta's 
release,  and  intimated  that  he  would  resort  to  force 
if  the  demand  was  not  complied  with  by  a  certain 
hour.  An  arrangement  was  then  made  by  which 
Koszta  was  delivered  into  the  custody  of  the  French 
consul-general,  until  the  United  States  and  Austria 
should  agree  as  to  the  manner  of  disposing  of  him. 

When  a  report  of  the  transaction  was  received  at 
Washington,  Marcy  justified  Captain  Ingraham 's 
conduct,  chiefly  on  the  ground  that  Koszta,  while 
at  Smyrna,  had,  according  to  the  local  custom, 
which  was  recognized  by  international  law,  the  right, 
as  a  Frank  or  sojourner,  to  place  himself  under  any 
foreign  protection  that  he  might  select;  that  he  did 
in  fact  place  himself  under  the  protection  of  the 
American  consul  at  Smyrna;  and  that,  having  thus 
been  clothed  with  the  nationality  of  the  protecting 
power,  he  became  entitled  to  be  regarded  while  in 
that  situation  as  a  citizen  of  the  United  States. 
These  views  Marcy  afterwards  elaborated  in  his  an- 

196 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EXPATRIATION 

swer  to  the  protest  lodged  by  Austria  against  Cap- 
tain Ingraham's  action.  The  links  in  Marcy's  chain 
of  reasoning,  in  this  celebrated  paper,  were  that,  as 
the  seizure  and  rescue  of  Koszta  took  place  within 
the  jurisdiction  of  a  third  power,  the  respective 
rights  of  the  United  States  and  of  Austria,  as  par- 
ties to  the  controversy  that  had  arisen  concerning 
that  transaction,  could  not  be  xietermined  by  the 
municipal  law  of  either  country,  but  must  be  de- 
termined by  international  law ;  that,  as  the  previous 
political  connection  between  Koszta  and  the  Aus- 
trian government  had,  by  reason  of  the  circum- 
stances of  his  emigration  and  banishment,  been, 
even  under  the  laws  of  Austria,  dissolved,  he  could 
not  at  the  time  of  his  seizure  be  claimed  as  an  Aus- 
trian subject,  nor  could  his  seizure  as  such  be  justi- 
fied by  Austria,  either  under  international  law  or 
her  treaties  with  Turkey;  that  the  seizure  in  its 
method  and  circumstances  constituted  an  outrage 
so  palpable  that  any  by-stander  would  have  been 
justified,  on  elementary  principles  of  justice  and 
humanity,  in  interposing  to  prevent  its  consimima- 
tion;  that  there  were,  however,  special  grounds  on 
which  the  United  States  might,  under  international 
law — that  being  under  the  circumstances  the  only 
criterion  —  assert  a  right  to  protect  Koszta;  that, 
although  he  had  ceased  to  be  a  subject  of  Austria, 
and  had  not  become  a  citizen  of  the  United  States, 
and  therefore  could  not  claim  the  rights  of  a  citizen 

197 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

under  the  municipal  laws  of  either  country,  he  might 
under  international  law  derive  a  national  character 
from  domicil;  that  even  if  Koszta  was  not  by  rea- 
son of  his  domicil  invested  with  the  nationality  of 
the  United  States,  he  undoubtedly  possessed,  under 
the  usage  prevailing  in  Turkey,  which  was  recog- 
nized and  sanctioned  by  international  law,  the 
nationality  of  the  United  States  from  the  moment 
when  he  was  placed  under  the  protection  of  the 
American  diplomatic  and  consular  agents  and  re- 
ceived from  them  his  tezkereh;  that,  as  he  was 
clothed  with  the  nationality  of  the  United  States, 
and  as  the  first  aggressive  act  was  committed  by 
the  procurement  of  the  Austrian  functionaries,  Aus- 
tria, if  she  upheld  what  was  done,  became  in  fact 
the  first  aggressor,  and  was  not  entitled  to  an  apol- 
ogy for  the  measures  adopted  by  Captain  Ingraham 
to  secure  his  release ;  that  Captain  Ingraham 's  action 
was  further  justified  by  the  information  which  he 
received  of  a  plot  to  remove  Koszta  clandestinely, 
in  violation  of  the  amicable  arrangement  under 
which  he  was  to  be  retained  at  Smyrna  while  the 
question  of  his  nationality  was  pending ;  and  finally, 
that,  as  the  seizure  of  Koszta  was  illegal  and  un- 
justifiable, the  President  could  not  consent  to  his 
delivery  to  the  Austrian  consul-general  at  Smyrna, 
but  expected  that  measures  would  be  taken  to  cause 
him  to  be  restored  to  the  condition  he  was  in  be- 
fore he  was  seized. 

198 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EXPATRIATION 

On  October  14,  1853,  the  American  consul  and 
the  Austrian  consul-general  at  Smyrna,  acting  un- 
der instructions  from  the  American  and  Austrian 
ministers  at  Constantinople,  requested  the  French 
consul-general  to  deliver  Koszta  over  into  the  cus- 
tody of  the  United  States;  and  on  the  same  day 
Koszta  took  passage  on  the  bark  Sultana  for  Boston. 


VIII 

INTERNATIONAL   ARBITRATION 

Although  the  independence  of  the  United  States 
was  won  by  the  sword,  the  founders  of  the  American 
Republic  were  accustomed  to  look  upon  war  as  a 
measure  that  could  be  justified  only  as  a  choice  of 
evils.  Standing  armies  and  elaborate  preparations 
for  war  they  deprecated  as  a  menace  to  liberty. 
Having  proclaimed  as  the  basis  of  their  political 
system  the  consent  of  the  governed,  they  cherished 
as  their  ideal  a  peaceful  nation,  always  guided  by 
reason  and  justice.  In  order  that  this  ideal  might 
be  attained,  they  perceived  the  necessity  of  estab- 
lishing international  relations  on  definite  and  sure 
foundations.  To  that  end  they  became  ardent  ex- 
pounders of  the  law  of  nations ;  and  their  predilec- 
tion for  legal  methods  naturally  found  expression  in 
the  employment  of  arbitration  for  the  settlement  of 
international  differences. 

By  arbitration  we  mean  the  determination  of 
controversies  by  international  tribunals  judicial  in 
their  constitution  and  powers.  Arbitration  is  not 
to  be  confounded  with  mediation.     Mediation  is  an 

200 


INTERNATIONAL   ARBITRATION 

advisory,  arbitration  a  judicial,  process.  Mediation 
recommends,  arbitration  decides.  And  while  it  may 
be  true  that  nations  have  for  this  reason  sometimes 
accepted  mediation  when  they  were  unwilling  or 
reluctant  to  arbitrate,  yet  it  is  also  true  that  they 
have  settled  by  arbitration  questions  which  media- 
tion could  not  have  adjusted.  It  is,  for  instance, 
hardly  conceivable  that  the  question  of  the  Ala- 
bama claims  could  have  been  settled  by  mediation. 
The  same  thing  may  be  said  of  many  boundary  dis- 
putes. The  importance  of  mediation,  as  one  of  the 
forms  of  amicable  negotiation,  should  not,  indeed,  be 
minimized.  A  plan  of  mediation  even  may,  as  in 
the  case  of  The  Hague  convention  for  the  peaceful 
settlement  of  international  disputes,  form  a  useful 
auxiliary  to  a  system  of  arbitration;  but  the  fact 
should  nevertheless  be  understood  that  the  two 
processes  are  fundamentally  different,  and  that, 
while  mediation  is  only  a  form  of  diplomacy,  arbi- 
tration consists  in  the  application  of  law  and  of 
judicial  methods  to  the  determination  of  inter- 
national disputes. 

The  government  of  the  United  States  had  been  in 
existence  only  five  years,  when  it  found  occasion  to 
employ  arbitration  for  the  settlement  of  serious  dif- 
ferences with  the  mother-country.  Important  pro- 
visions of  the  treaty  of  peace  remained  unexecuted. 
Various  posts  along  the  northern  frontier  were  still 
held  by  the  British  forces,  and  the  British  govern- 

20I 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

merit  refused  to  evacuate  them  because  of  the  fail- 
ure of  the  United  States  to  render  effectual  the  en- 
gagement that  British  creditors  should  meet  with 
no  lawful  impediment  to  the  recovery  of  their  con- 
fiscated debts.  Moreover,  almost  immediately  after 
the  ratification  of  the  treaty  of  peace,  a  question 
arose  as  to  what  was  the  "River  St.  Croix,"  which 
was  to  form  the  eastern  boundary  of  the  United 
States  in  its  course  northward  from  the  Bay  of 
Fundy.  Such  a  river  appeared  on  the  map  used  by 
the  negotiators  of  the  treaty,  but  no  stream  answer- 
ing to  the  name  was  afterwards  found.  The  un- 
certainty as  to  the  boundary  was  embarrassing, 
while  the  controversy  as  to  the  surrender  of  the 
posts  and  the  recovery  of  debts  formed  a  prolific 
source  of  irritation.  But  a  still  more  acute  cause 
of  quarrel  arose  when,  in  1793,  the  governments  of 
France  and  Great  Britain  began  to  fulminate  and 
enforce  measures  invasive  of  the  rights  of  neutral 
trade.  The  situation  then  became  so  tense  that, 
apparently  as  the  only  alternative  to  measures  of 
force,  Washington  decided  to  send  a  special  mission 
to  England.  John  Jay,  who  was  chosen  for  that 
delicate  task,  submitted  his  first  formal  representa- 
tions to  Lord  Grenville  on  July  30,  1794.  In  the 
treaty  concluded  on  the  19th  of  the  following  No- 
vember, provision  was  made  for  three  arbitrations. 
The  first  of  these  related  to  the  boundary  question ; 
the  second,  to  the  claims  on  account  of  confiscated 

202 


INTERNATIONAL  ARBITRATION 

debts ;  the  third,  to  the  subject  of  neutral  rights  and 
duties. 

The  boundary  question  was  referred  to  a  mixed 
commission  of  three  persons,  which  met  at  Halifax, 
Nova  Scotia,  on  August  30,  1796,  and  rendered  its 
award  at  Providence,  Rhode  Island,  on  October  25, 
1798,  holding  that  the  Schoodiac,  or  Schoodic,  was 
the  river  intended  under  the  name  of  the  St.  Croix. 

The  claims  of  British  subjects,  on  account  of  the 
impediments  which  they  had  encountered  in  their 
efforts  to  collect  in  the  State  courts  their  confiscated 
debts,  were  referred  to  a  mixed  commission  of  five 
persons,  which  met  at  Philadelphia  in  May,  1797. 
The  proceedings  of  this  body  were  inharmonious, 
and  its  sittings  were  suspended  on  July  31,  1798, 
by  the  withdrawal  of  the  two  American  members. 
Differences  of  opinion  on  questions  of  law  were  to 
be  expected,  but  the  discussions  at  the  board  also 
developed  personal  feeling.  This  appears  to  have 
been  largely  due  to  the  action  of  Mr.  Macdonald, 
one  of  the  British  commissioners,  a  gentleman  who 
no  doubt  deserved  all  the  commendations  bestowed 
upon  him  at  the  time  of  his  appointment  for  recti- 
tude and  good -will,  but  who  seems  unfortunately 
to  have  possessed  a  sense  of  duty  unmitigated  by  a 
sense  of  proportion.  Wishing  to  be  entirely  candid 
with  his  associates,  he  made  it  a  rule  freely  to  ac- 
quaint them  with  all  his  opinions;  and  he  adopted 
the  practice  of  presenting  to  the  board,  when  it  was 

203 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

not  otherwise  occupied,  memoranda  expressive  of 
his  views.  The  final  rupture  was  caused  by  his  sub- 
mitting a  resolution  which  declared  that  from  the 
beginning  of  the  Revolution  down  to  the  treaty  of 
peace  the  United  States,  whatever  may  have  been 
their  relation  to  other  powers,  stood  to  Great  Brit- 
ain in  an  attitude  of  rebellion.  As  it  has  always 
been  the  doctrine  of  the  United  States  that  the 
treaty  of  peace  did  not  grant  their  independence, 
but  merely  recognized  it  as  a  condition  existing 
from  July  4,  1776,  the  date  of  its  declaration,  the 
American  commissioners  regarded  the  resolution  as 
gratuitously  offensive  and  withdrew.  The  claims 
which  the  commission  failed  to  adjust  were  settled 
by  a  treaty  concluded  January  8,  1802,  under  which 
the  British  government  accepted  the  sum  of  ;^6oo,- 
000  in  satisfaction  of  its  demands. 

But  the  most  important,  as  well  as  the  most  in- 
teresting, of  the  arbitral  tribunals  under  the  Jay 
treaty,  was  that  which  sat  at  London  for  the  pur- 
pose of  disposing  of  American  claims  against  Great 
Britain  on  account  of  captures  made  under  the 
orders  in  council,  and  of  British  claims  against  the 
United  States  on  account  of  the  latter's  failure  com- 
pletely to  enforce  its  neutrality.  The  membership 
of  this  board  was  worthy  of  the  great  questions  sub- 
mitted to  its  determination.  The  American  com- 
missioners were  Christopher  Gore,  who,  although 
popularly  known  as  the  legal  preceptor  of  Daniel 

204 


INTERNATIONAL   ARBITRATION 

Webster,  achieved  an  eminence  of  his  own;  and 
William  Pinkney,  of  Maryland,  who,  besides  win- 
ning distinction  in  diplomacy  and  statesmanship, 
was  the  acknowledged  leader  of  the  American  bar 
of  his  time.  The  British  commissioners  were  Sir 
John  Nicholl,  an  eminent  civilian,  who  was  after- 
wards succeeded  by  Maurice  Swabey;  and  John 
Anstey.  The  fifth  commissioner  was  Colonel  John 
Trumbull,  of  Connecticut,  who  had  accompanied 
Jay  to  England  when  he  negotiated  the  treaty.  The 
mode  by  which  Trumbull  was  chosen  is  worthy  of 
mention.  The  treaty  provided  that  in  case  the 
four  commissioners,  two  of  whom  were  to  be  ap- 
pointed by  each  government,  could  not  agree  upon 
the  fifth,  he  should  be  chosen  by  lot.  In  execution 
of  this  stipulation,  the  commissioners  on  each  side 
presented  to  the  others  a  list  of  four  persons;  but, 
as  neither  side  would  yield,  it  became  necessary  to 
resort  to  the  casting  of  lots.  The  next  step,  accord- 
ing to  common  practice,  would  have  been  for  each 
side  to  place  in  the  urn  a  name  of  its  own  indepen- 
dent selection,  with  the  chances  in  favor  of  his  being 
a  partisan.  But  at  London  each  side  selected  its 
name  from  the  list  of  four  made  out  by  the  other 
with  a  view  to  a  mutual  agreement,  and  the  result 
was  that  a  well-disposed  man  became  the  fifth 
commissioner. 

The  board  had  not  been  long  in  session  when  a 
serious  controversy  arose  as  to  its  power  to  deter- 

205 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

mine  its  own  jurisdiction  in  respect  of  the  several 
claims  presented  for  its  decision.  The  division  of 
opinion  was  so  pronounced  that  for  a  time  the  Brit- 
ish commissioners  absented  themselves  from  the 
meetings,  but  the  difficulty  was  eventually  sub- 
mitted to  Lord  Chancellor  Loughborough,  who 
ended  it  by  declaring  "that  the  doubt  respecting 
the  authority  of  the  commissioners  to  settle  their 
own  jurisdiction  was  absurd,  and  that  they  must 
necessarily  decide  upon  cases  being  within  or  with- 
out their  competency." 

Important  questions  of  law  came  before  the  com- 
missioners in  relation  to  contraband,  the  rights  of 
neutrals,  and  the  finality  of  the  decisions  of  prize 
courts.  These  were  all  discussed  with  marked 
ability,  especially  by  Pinkney.  His  opinions  as  a 
member  of  the  board  Wheaton  justly  pronounced 
to  be  "  finished  models  of  judicial  eloquence,  uniting 
powerful  and  comprehensive  argtiment  with  a  copi- 
ous, pure,  and  energetic  diction";  and  they  are  al- 
most all  we  possess  in  a  complete  and  authentic 
form  of  the  legal  reasoning  of  the  great  master  by 
whom  they  were  delivered.  The  sessions  of  the 
board  were  brought  to  a  close  on  February  24,  1804, 
all  the  business  before  it  having  been  finished. 
There  was,  however,  an  interruption  in  its  proceed- 
ings from  July  30,  1799,  to  February  15,  1802,  pend- 
ing the  diplomatic  adjustment  of  the  difficulty  caused 
by  the  breaking  up  of  the  commission  at  Philadelphia. 

206 


WILLIAM    PIXKN'EV 


INTERNATIONAL   ARBITRATION 

By  reason  of  the  fact  that  the  proceedings  of  the 
London  commission  have  only  lately  been  published, 
its  labors  have  not  received  from  writers  the  atten- 
tion which  they  deserve.  It  was  estimated  that, 
through  the  operation  of  the  stipulation  under  which 
the  commissioners  sat,  American  claimants  recov- 
ered from  the  British  government  the  enormous  sum 
of  $11,650,000.  "The  whole  of  this  sum,"  says 
Trumbull,  "was  promptly  and  punctually  paid  to 
each  claimant,  or  his  assignee;  for,  after  a  careful 
and  accurate  examination  of  the  merits  of  every 
case  of  complaint,  the  awards  of  the  board  were 
made  in  favor  of  each  individual,  in  the  form  of  an 
order  to  pay,  and  payable  at  the  treasury  of  Great 
Britain;  nor  do  I  recollect  even  to  have  heard  a 
single  complaint,  of  the  delay  of  an  hour,  in  any 
instance  of  an  award  presented  for  payment."  The 
aggregate  of  the  awards  against  the  United  States 
appears  to  have  been  $143,428.14;  but  although  this 
amount  was  relatively  small,  its  payment  estab- 
lished the  principle  that  a  government  is  liable  in 
damages  for  neglect  to  perform  its  neutral  duties, 
and  thus  laid  the  foundation  of  the  award  made  in 
1872  at  Geneva. 

Since  the  close  of  the  arbitral  proceedings  under 
the  Jay  treaty,  arbitration  has,  except  in  the  case 
of  the  extraordinary  train  of  events  that  led  up  to 
the  war  of  181 2,  been  almost  habitually  employed 
by  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  for  the  set- 

207 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

tlement  of  controversies  that  could  not  be  adjusted 
by  negotiation.  Like  the  Jay  treaty,  the  treaty 
of  Ghent,  of  December  24,  1814,  which  restored 
peace  between  the  two  countries,  provided  for  three 
arbitrations.  The  first  related  to  the  ownership  of 
certain  islands  in  Passamaquoddy  Bay  and  the  Bay 
of  Fundy;  the  second,  to  the  ascertainment  of  the 
boundary  of  the  United  States  from  the  source  of 
the  river  St.  Croix  to  the  river  St.  Lawrence;  the 
third,  to  the  determination  of  the  boundary  along 
the  middle  of  the  Great  Lakes  and  of  their  water 
communications  to  the  most  northwestern  point  of 
the  Lake  of  the  Woods.  In  1818,  a  difference  as  to 
the  performance  by  Great  Britain  of  her  obligation 
under  the  treaty  of  Ghent,  not  to  carry  away  from 
United  States  territory  then  in  her  possession  "  any 
slaves  or  other  private  property,"  was  referred  to 
the  Emperor  of  Russia.  He  rendered  a  decision  in 
favor  of  the  United  States,  and  in  1822  a  mixed 
commission  was  erected  in  order  to  fix  the  amount 
to  be  paid.  In  1827  a  dispute  as  to  the  northeast- 
em  boundary  was  referred  to  the  King  of  the  Nether- 
lands ;  but  as  his  award  was  recommendatory  rather 
than  decisive,  both  governments  agreed  to  waive  it, 
and  the  question  was  settled  by  the  Webster-Ash- 
burton  treaty.  In  1853  a  convention  was  entered 
into  for  the  settlement  by  means  of  a  mixed  com- 
mission of  all  outstanding  claims.  The  commission 
sat  in  London,  and  disposed  of  many  important 

208 


INTERNATIONAL   ARBITRATION 

controversies,  including  the  celebrated  case  of  the 
Creole,  which  so  nearly  caused  a  rupture  of  relations 
in  1842.  For  the  peculiarly  satisfactory  results  of 
the  board's  labors,  credit  was  perhaps  chiefly  due 
to  the  umpire,  Joshua  Bates,  an  American  by  birth, 
but  then  the  head  of  the  house  of  the  Barings,  who 
exhibited  in  his  decisions  the  same  broad  intelli- 
gence and  sound  judgment  as  had  characterized  his 
exceptionally  successful  career  in  business.  By  the 
reciprocity  treaty  of  1854,  by  which  the  troubles  as 
to  the  northeastern  fisheries  were  temporarily  al- 
layed, arbitration  was  employed  for  the  purpose  of 
determining  what  fisheries  were  exclusively  reserved 
to  the  inhabitants  of  the  two  countries  under  the 
agreement.  In  1863  another  arbitral  board  was 
erected  for  the  purpose  of  deciding  upon  the  claims 
of  the  Hudson's  Bay  Company  and  the  Puget's 
Sound  Agricultural  Company  against  the  United 
States  for  damages  to  their  property  and  rights  in 
connection  with  the  treaty  of  1846,  by  which  the 
limits  between  the  United  States  and  the  British 
possessions  west  of  the  Rocky  Mountains  were  es- 
tablished. 

This  board  was  still  in  session  when  the  relations 
between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  were 
seriously  disturbed  by  the  controversies  growing  out 
of  the  civil  war,  the  northeastern  fisheries,  and  the 
disputed  San  Juan  water  boundary.  These  differ- 
ences were  all  composed  by  the  great  treaty  signed 
14  209 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

at  Washington  on  May  8,  187 1,  on  the  part  of  the 
United  States  by  Hamilton  Fish,  Robert  C.  Schenck, 
Samuel  Nelson,  Ebenezer  Rockwood  Hoar,  and 
George  H.  Williams;  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain, 
by  the  Earl  de  Grey  and  Ripon,  Sir  Stafford  H. 
Northcote,  Sir  Edward  Thornton,  Sir  John  A.  Mac- 
donald,  and  Mountague  Bernard,  This  treaty  pro- 
vided for  four  distinct  arbitrations,  the  largest  num- 
ber ever  established  under  a  single  convention,  and, 
by  reason  of  this  fact  as  well  as  of  the  magnitude  of 
the  questions  submitted,  was  undoubtedly  the  great- 
est treaty  of  arbitration  that  the  world  had  ever 
seen. 

Of  the  four  arbitrations  for  which  it  provided,  the 
first  in  order  and  in  importance  was  that  at  Geneva. 
On  the  part  of  the  United  States,  the  arbitrator 
was  Charles  Francis  Adams;  on  the  part  of  Great 
Britain,  Sir  Alexander  Cockbum.  There  were  three 
other  arbitrators,  Count  Frederic  Sclopis,  a  dis- 
tinguished jurist;  Jacques  Staempfli,  afterwards 
President  of  Switzerland;  and  the  Viscount  D'lta- 
juba,  an  eminent  diplomatist,  respectively  desig- 
nated by  the  King  of  Italy,  the  President  of  the 
Swiss  Confederation,  and  the  Emperor  of  Brazil. 
The  American  agent  was  J.  C.  Bancroft  Davis; 
the  British  agent.  Lord  Tenderden.  Caleb  Gushing, 
William  M.  Evarts,  and  Morrison  R.  Waite  appeared 
as  counsel  for  the  United  States.  Sir  Roundell 
Palmer,   afterwards   Lord   Selborne,    appeared   for 

210 


INTERNATIONAL   ARBITRATION 

Great  Britain,  assisted  by  Mountague  Bernard  and 
Mr.  Cohen. 

The  demands  presented  by  the  United  States  to 
the  tribunal,  arising  out  of  the  acts  of  Confederate 
cruisers  of  British  origin,  and  generically  known  as 
the  Alabama  claims,  embraced  (i)  direct  losses 
growing  out  of  the  destructions  of  vessels  and  their 
cargoes  by  such  cruisers,  (2)  the  national  expendi- 
tures in  pursuit  of  the  cruisers,  (3)  the  loss  for  the 
transfer  of  the  American  commercial  marine  to  the 
British  flag,  (4)  the  enhanced  payments  of  insur- 
ance, and  (5)  the  prolongation  of  the  war  and  the 
addition  of  a  large  sum  to  its  cost.  As  to  classes  3, 
4,  and  5,  Great  Britain  denied  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  tribunal;  but  without  deciding  this  question, 
the  tribunal  disposed  of  these  three  classes  by  ex- 
pressing an  opinion  that  they  did  not,  upon  the 
principles  of  international  law,  constitute  a  good 
foundation  for  an  award  of  compensation,  and  that 
they  should  be  excluded  from  consideration,  even 
if  there  were  no  difference  between  the  two  govern- 
ments as  to  the  board's  competency.  In  regard  to 
the  second  class  of  claims,  the  tribunal  held  that 
they  were  not  properly  distinguishable  from  the 
general  expenses  of  the  war  carried  on  by  the  United 
States;  and  further,  by  a  majority  of  three  to  two, 
that  no  compensation  should  be  awarded  to  the 
United  States  on  that  head.  On  claims  of  the  first 
class,  the  tribunal  awarded  the  sum  of  $15,500,000. 

211 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

Its  first  session  was  held  December  15,  1871 ;  its  last, 
September  14,  1872. 

The  dispute  as  to  the  San  Juan  water  boundary 
was  submitted  to  the  German  Emperor,  who  ren- 
dered, on  October  21,  1872,  an  award  in  favor 
of  the  United  States.  Claims  of  British  subjects 
against  the  United  States,  and  of  citizens  of  the 
United  States  against  Great  Britain  (other  than  the 
Alabama  claims),  arising  out  of  injuries  to  persons 
or  property  during  the  civil  war  in  the  United 
States,  from  April  17,  1861,  to  April  9,  1865,  were 
referred  to  a  mixed  commission,  which  sat  in  the 
United  States.  The  fourth  arbitration  under  the 
treaty  of  Washington,  to  determine  the  compensa- 
tion, if  any,  due  to  Great  Britain  for  privileges  ac- 
corded by  the  treaty  to  the  United  States  in  the 
northeastern  fisheries,  was  conducted  by  a  com- 
mission of  three  persons — a  citizen  of  the  United 
States,  a  British  subject,  and  a  Belgian — which  met 
at  Halifax,  June  15,  1877,  and  on  the  23d  of  the 
following  November  awarded  to  Great  Britain  (the 
American  commissioner  dissenting)  the  sum  of  $5,- 
500,000. 

Questions  of  great  moment,  as  affecting  the  free 
use  of  the  seas,  were  involved  in  the  fur-seal  arbi- 
tration, which  was  held  in  Paris  imder  the  treaty  of 
February  29,  1892;  and  eminent  men  were  chosen 
to  discuss  and  decide  them.  On  the  part  of  the 
United  States,  the  arbitrators  were  John  M.  Harlan, 

212 


INTERNATIONAL   ARBITRATION 

of  the  Supreme  Court,  and  John  T.  Morgan,  of  the 
Senate ;  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain,  Lord  Hannen, 
of  the  High  Court  of  Appeal,  and  Sir  John  Thomp- 
son, Minister  of  Justice  and  Attorney  -  General  of 
Canada.  The  neutral  arbitrators  were  the  Baron 
Alphonse  de  Courcel,  a  senator  and  ambassador  of 
France;  the  Marquis  Emilio  Visconti  Venosta,  a 
senator  of  Italy,  who  had  held  the  post  of  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs;  and  Gregers  Gram,  a  Minister  of 
State  of  Sweden,  The  American  agent  was  John 
W.  Foster;  the  British  agent.  Sir  Charles  H.  Tupper, 
As  counsel  for  the  United  States,  there  appeared 
Edward  J.  Phelps,  James  C.  Carter,  Henry  W. 
Blodgett,  and  Frederic  R.  Coudert;  for  Great  Brit- 
ain, Sir  Charles  Russell,  Sir  Richard  Webster,  and 
Christopher  Robinson.  The  award  which,  so  far  as 
questions  of  jurisdiction  were  concerned,  was  un- 
favorable to  the  United  States,  is  conceded  to  have 
been  based  upon  existing  rules  of  international  law, 
the  tribunal  deeming  its  duties  to  be  judicial  rather 
than  legislative.  The  commission,  however,  under 
powers  expressly  conferred  upon  it,  prescribed  regu- 
lations for  the  protection  of  the  fur-seals  by  joint 
action.  The  claims  of  British  subjects  for  the  pre- 
vious seizure  of  their  vessels  by  American  cruisers 
in  Bering  Sea  were  afterwards  adjusted  by  a  mixed 
commission. 

The  proceeding  of  1903,  by  which  the  Alaskan 
boundary  dispute  was  settled,  can  scarcely  be  classed 

213 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

as  an  arbitration,  since  the  tribunal,  which  contained 
an  equal  number  of  the  citizens  or  subjects  of  each 
contracting  party,  was  unable  to  render  a  decision 
unless  an  appointee  of  one  government  should  give 
his  decision  in  favor  of  the  other.  This  proved  in 
the  particular  instance  to  be  possible,  Lord  Alver- 
stone  (formerly  Sir  Richard  Webster),  Chief -Justice 
of  England,  one  of  the  British  members,  having 
given  the  highest  proof  of  the  independence  and 
impartiality  of  the  British  bench  by  joining  in  a 
decision  favorable  to  the  United  States. 

Down  to  1898,  when  the  controversy  as  to  Cuba 
was  at  length  settled  by  the  sword,  all  differences  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  Spain,  which  could  not 
be  adjusted  by  diplomacy,  were,  beginning  with  the 
mixed  commission  under  the  Pinckney-Godoy  treaty 
of  1795,  settled  by  arbitration.  The  most  important 
of  the  arbitral  tribunals  between  the  two  countries 
was  that  which  was  established  under  the  diplo- 
matic agreement  of  February  11-12,  1871,  touch- 
ing claims  growing  out  of  the  insurrection  in  Cuba. 
There  were  two  other  arbitrations  between  the  two 
countries,  held  respectively  in  1870  and  1880. 

As  between  the  United  States  and  France,  many 
important  questions,  including  large  pecuniary 
claims,  have  been  settled  by  direct  negotiation. 
But  from  November,  1880,  to  March,  1884,  a  mixed 
commission,  sitting  in  Washington,  disposed  of  the 
claims  of  citizens  of  France  against  the  United  States 

214 


INTERNATIONAL   ARBITRATION 

for  injuries  to  their  persons  and  property  during  the 
American  civil  war,  and  of  the  claims  of  citizens  of 
the  United  States  against  France  for  injuries  during 
the  war  between  that  country  and  Germany. 

On  various  occasions,  as  under  the  treaties  of 
1839  and  1868,  arbitrations  have  been  held  between 
the  United  States  and  Mexico.  The  claims  sub- 
mitted imder  the  treaty  of  1868  were  remarkable, 
both  in  nimiber  and  in  amount,  those  presented  by 
the  United  States  aggregating  one  thousand  and 
seventeen,  and  those  by  Mexico  nine  hundred  and 
ninety-eight,  while  the  total  amount  claimed  on 
one  side  and  the  other  exceeded  half  a  bilUon  dol- 
lars. The  total  amount  allowed  was,  however, 
about  $4,250,000.  Two  of  the  awards  against  Mex- 
ico, which  embraced  nearly  or  quite  a  third  of  the 
total  amount  awarded  against  her,  were  alleged  to 
have  been  procured  by  fraudulent  testimony.  The 
government  of  the  United  States  investigated  this 
allegation,  and  eventually  returned  to  Mexico  all  the 
money  that  had  been  paid  by  her  on  the  awards  in 
question,  even  paying  out  of  its  own  treasury  such 
part  as  had  already  been  distributed  among  the 
claimants. 

Arbitrations  have  also  been  held  by  the  United 
States  with  Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  Denmark,  Ecua- 
dor, Hayti,  Nicaragua,  Paraguay,  Peru,  Portugal,  Sal- 
vador, Santo  Domingo,  Siam,  and  Venezuela.  The 
total  number  of  the  arbitrations  of  the  United  States 

21S 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

down  to  1900  was  fifty-seven,  twenty  of  which  were 
with  Great  Britain,  while  the  President  of  the 
United  States  had  acted  as  arbitrator  between  other 
nations  in  five  cases,  and  ministers  of  the  United 
States,  or  persons  designated  by  the  United  States, 
had  acted  as  arbitrator  or  umpire  in  seven  cases. 
The  number  of  the  arbitrations  of  the  United  States 
during  that  period  was  equalled  only  by  those  of 
Great  Britain,  the  total  of  which  appears  to  have 
been  the  same. 

In  adopting  arbitration  as  a  means  of  settling  its 
disputes,  the  government  of  the  United  States  has 
no  doubt  been  influenced  by  the  manifestation  in 
various  forms  of  public  sentiment  in  favor  of  that 
method.  As  early  as  February,  1832,  the  senate 
of  Massachusetts,  by  a  vote  of  19  to  5,  resolved  that 
"  some  mode  should  be  established  for  the  amicable 
and  final  adjustment  of  all  international  disputes 
instead  of  resort  to  war";  and  in  1837  a  like  resolu- 
tion was  passed  by  the  house  of  representatives 
unanimously.  Similar  declarations  were  adopted  by 
the  legislatures  of  other  States.  In  1874  a  resolution 
in  favor  of  general  arbitration  was  passed  by  the 
House  of  Representatives  of  the  United  States. 

On  November  29,  1881,  Mr.  Blaine,  as  Secretary 
of  State,  extended,  in  the  name  of  the  President,  an 
invitation  to  all  the  independent  countries  of  North 
and  South  America  to  participate  in  a  general  con- 
gress to  be  held  in  Washington  on  November  24^ 

216 


INTERNATIONAL   ARBITRATION 

1882,  "for  the  purpose  of  considering  and  discussing 
methods  of  preventing  war  between  the  nations  of 
America."  Action  upon  this  proposal  was  postponed 
chiefly  because  of  the  continuance  of  the  Chile-Peru- 
vian war,  but  the  project  was  never  entirely  relin- 
quished, and  on  May  28,  1888,  the  President  gave 
his  approval  to  the  act  under  which  was  convoked 
the  International  American  Conference  of  1889- 
1890.  Of  this  conference  one  of  the  results  was  the 
celebrated  plan  of  arbitration  adopted  April  18, 
1890.  By  this  plan  it  was  declared  that  arbitration, 
as  a  means  of  settling  disputes  between  American 
republics,  was  adopted  "  as  a  principle  of  American 
international  law";  that  arbitration  should  be 
obligatory  in  all  controversies  concerning  diplo- 
matic and  consular  privileges,  boundaries,  terri- 
tories, indemnities,  the  right  of  navigation,  and  the 
validity,  construction,  and  enforcement  of  treaties; 
and  that  it  should  be  equally  obligatory  in  all  other 
cases,  whatever  might  be  their  origin,  nature,  or  ob- 
ject, with  the  sole  exception  of  those  which,  in  the 
judgment  of  one  of  the  nations  involved  in  the  con- 
troversy, might  imperil  its  independence;  but  that, 
even  in  this  case,  while  arbitration  for  that  nation 
should  be  optional,  it  should  be  "obligatory  upon 
the  adversary  power."  As  yet  this  plan  represents 
but  an  aspiration,  since  it  failed  to  receive  the  ap- 
proval of  the  governments  whose  representatives 
adopted  it. 

217 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

On  February  14,  1890,  the  Senate  of  the  United 
States,  and  on  the  3d  of  the  following  April  the  House 
of  Representatives,  adopted  a  concurrent  resolu- 
tion by  which  the  President  was  requested  to  in- 
vite, from  time  to  time  as  fit  occasions  might  arise, 
negotiations  with  any  government  with  which  the 
United  States  maintained  diplomatic  relations,  "to 
the  end  that  any  differences  or  disputes  arising  be- 
tween the  two  governments  which  cannot  be  ad- 
justed by  diplomatic  agency  may  be  referred  to  ar- 
bitration, and  be  peaceably  adjusted  by  such  means." 
On  July  16,  1893,  the  British  House  of  Commons 
formally  declared  its  cordial  sympathy  with  the  pur- 
pose of  this  resolution,  and  expressed  the  hope  that 
her  Majesty's  government  would  "lend  their  ready 
co-operation  to  the  government  of  the  United 
States"  upon  the  basis  indicated. 

Nothing  tangible  had  been  accomplished  in  that 
direction  when  the  controversy  over  the  Venezuelan 
boundary  disclosed  the  importance  of  arbitration 
as  a  possible  means  of  avoiding  a  conflict  between 
the  two  countries.  Under  these  circumstances, 
Mr.  Olney,  as  Secretary  of  State,  negotiated  with 
Sir  Julian  Pauncefote,  then  British  ambassador  at 
Washington,  concurrently  with  the  negotiation  of  a 
special  treaty  of  arbitration  for  the  settlement  of 
the  Venezuelan  question,  a  general  arbitration  treaty. 
By  this  treaty,  provision  was  made  for  three  classes 
of  tribunals,  two  of  which  were  to  be  boards  of  three 

218 


INTERNATIONAL    ARBITRATION 

or  five  members,  as  the  case  might  be,  while  the 
third  was  to  be,  not  in  strictness  a  tribunal  of  arbi- 
tration, but  a  joint  commission,  in  the  form  lately 
employed  in  the  Alaskan  boundary  dispute,  specifi- 
cally to  deal  with  territorial  claims.  This  treaty 
failed  to  receive  the  approval  of  the  necessary  two- 
thirds  of  the  Senate,  but  only  by  a  few  votes. 

In  the  peace  conference  that  met  at  The  Hague, 
in  1899,  on  the  invitation  of  the  Czar  of  Russia,  the 
United  States  was  one  of  the  participants.  Of  this 
conference,  the  most  notable  achievement  was  the 
convention  for  the  peaceful  adjustment  of  interna- 
tional differences.  This  convention  embraces  stip- 
ulations, first,  as  to  mediation,  and  secondly,  as 
to  arbitration.  In  the  part  relating  to  mediation, 
the  signatory  powers  agree  that,  in  case  of  "grave 
difference  of  opinion  or  conflict,"  they  will,  before 
appealing  to  arms,  have  recourse,  "  as  far  as  circum- 
stances permit,"  to  the  good  offices  of  one  or  more 
friendly  powers,  and  that  such  powers  even  may  of 
their  own  motion  offer  mediation,  without  incur- 
ring the  odium  of  performing  an  unfriendly  act. 
The  functions  of  the  mediator  are,  however,  de- 
clared to  be  purely  conciliatory,  and  his  recommen- 
dations "advisory"  and  not  "obligatory."  As  an 
adjunct  to  the  system  of  mediation  the  convention 
recommends  in  certain  cases  the  appointment  of  an 
international  commission  of  inquiry,  the  mode  of 
whose  appointment,  as  well  as  its  jurisdiction  and 

219 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

procedure,  is  to  be  regulated  by  a  special  convention 
between  the  disputing  states. 

By  the  arbitral  stipulations,  the  object  of  inter- 
national arbitration  is  declared  to  be  "the  settle- 
ment of  disputes  between  nations  by  judges  of  their 
own  choice  and  in  accordance  with  their  reciprocal 
rights";  and  arbitration  is  recognized  as  specially 
applicable  to  questions  of  law,  and  of  the  interpre- 
tation and  execution  of  treaties,  which  cannot  be 
settled  by  diplomacy.  The  resort  to  arbitration  is 
voluntary,  but  the  convention  furnishes  a  plan  by 
which  it  is  intended  to  be  systematized  and  made 
easy.  Of  this  plan  the  basal  feature  is  what  is 
called  the  permanent  court  of  arbitration,  which  is 
constituted  by  the  designation  by  each  of  the  sig- 
natory powers  of  not  more  than  four  persons  "rec- 
ognized as  competent  to  deal  with  questions  of  in- 
ternational law,  and  of  the  highest  personal  integ- 
rity." The  persons  so  designated,  who  are  known 
as  "members  of  the  court,"  constitute  a  list  from 
which  any  of  the  signatory  powers,  in  the  event  of 
a  controversy,  may,  if  they  see  fit  to  do  so,  choose 
a  tribunal  for  the  decision  of  the  particular  case. 

To  the  existence  of  this  convention  there  is,  no 
doubt,  to  be  ascribed  the  recent  remarkable  agree- 
ment between  Great  Britain  and  Russia  for  the  set- 
tlement, by  means  of  a  mixed  court  of  inquiry,  of 
the  Dogger  Bank  incident. 

The  subject  of  general  arbitration  between  Ameri- 

220 


INTERNATIONAL    ARBITRATION 

can  nations,  which  remained  in  abeyance  after  the 
Washington  conference  of  1890,  was  again  taken  up 
by  the  Second  International  Conference  of  Ameri- 
can States,  which  met  at  the  city  of  Mexico  on 
October  22,  1901.  There  appeared  to  be,  as  the 
American  members  of  the  conference  reported,  a 
unanimous  sentiment  in  favor  of  "arbitration  as  a 
principle,"  but  a  great  contrariety  of  opinion  as  to 
the  extent  to  which  the  principle  should  be  carried. 
A  plan  was  finally  adopted  in  the  nature  of  a  com- 
promise. A  protocol  looking  to  adhesion  to  The 
Hague  convention  was  signed  by  all  the  delegations 
except  those  of  Chile  and  Ecuador,  who  are  said, 
however,  afterwards  to  have  accepted  it  in  open 
conference.  A  project  of  a  treaty  of  compulsory 
arbitration  was  also  signed  by  the  delegations  of 
certain  countries,  not  including  the  United  States, 
and  a  treaty  was  also  adopted  covering  the  arbitra- 
tion of  pecuniary  claims. 

When  we  consider  the  future  of  international 
arbitration,  whether  in  America  or  elsewhere,  we 
are  at  once  confronted  with  the  question  as  to  its 
limitations.  Is  it  possible  to  fix  any  precise  bounds, 
beyond  which  this  mode  of  settling  international 
disputes  may  be  said  to  be  impracticable?  If  we 
consult  the  history  of  arbitrations  during  the  past 
hundred  years,  we  are  obliged  to  answer  that  no 
such  lines  can  be  definitely  drawn;  but  this  is  far 
from  affirming  that  the  use  of  force  in  the  conduct 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

of  international  affairs  will  soon  be  abolished.  It 
signifies  merely  that  phrases  such  as  "national 
honor"  and  "national  self-defence,"  which  have 
been  employed  in  describing  supposed  exceptions 
to  the  principle  of  arbitration,  convey  no  definitive 
meaning.  Questions  of  honor  and  of  self-defence 
are,  in  international  as  in  private  relations,  matters 
partly  of  circumstance  and  partly  of  opinion.  When 
the  United  States,  in  1863,  first  proposed  that  the 
differences  that  had  arisen  with  Great  Britain,  as 
to  the  fitting  out  of  the  Alabama  and  other  Con- 
federate cruisers,  should  be  submitted  to  arbitra- 
tion. Earl  Russell  rejected  the  overture  on  the 
ground  that  the  questions  in  controversy  involved 
the  honor  of  her  Majesty's  government,  of  which 
that  government  was  declared  to  be  "the  sole 
guardian,"  Eight  years  later  there  was  concluded 
at  Washington  the  treaty  under  which  the  differ- 
ences between  the  two  governments  were  submitted 
to  the  judgment  of  the  tribunal  that  met  at  Geneva. 
This  remarkable  example  serves  to  illustrate  the 
fact  that  the  scope  and  progress  of  arbitration  will 
depend,  not  so  much  upon  special  devices,  or  upon 
general  declarations  or  descriptive  exceptions,  as 
upon  the  dispositions  of  nations,  dispositions  which, 
although  they  are  subject  to  the  modifying  in- 
fluence of  public  opinion,  spring  primarily  from  the 
national  feelings,  the  national  interests,  and  the 
national  ambitions. 


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GADSDEN  PURCHASE  1853 

LOUISIANA  PURCHASE  FROM  FRANCE  1803 

TEXAS  ANNEXED  IN  7845 

OREGON  TERR  I  TORY,  AMERICAN  TITLE  ESTABLISHED  IN  1846 

CEDED  BY  SPAIN  IN  1819 

TERRITORY  OF  THE  ORIGINAL  THIRTEEN  STATES 

CEDED  BY  MEXICO  1848 


)F  THE   UNITED   STATES 


IX 

THE  TERRITORIAL  EXPANSION  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

As  conventionalized  in  the  annual  messages  of 
Presidents  to  Congress,  the  American  people  are 
distinguished  chiefly  by  their  peaceful  disposition 
and  their  freedom  from  territorial  ambitions.  Never- 
theless, in  spite  of  these  quiet  propensities,  it  has 
fallen  to  their  lot,  since  they  forcibly  achieved  their 
independence,  to  have  had  four  foreign  wars,  three 
general  and  one  limited,  and  the  greatest  civil  war 
in  history,  and  to  have  acquired  a  territorial  do- 
main almost  five  times  as  great  as  the  respectable 
endowment  with  which  they  began  their  national 
career.  In  reality,  to  the  founders  of  the  American 
Republic  the  question  of  territorial  expansion  did 
not  present  itself  as  a  matter  of  speculation,  or  even 
of  choice.  There  was  not  a  single  European  power 
having  possessions  in  America  that  did  not  lay  claim 
to  more  territory  than  it  had  effectively  occupied, 
nor  was  there  a  single  one  whose  claims  were  not 
contested  by  some  other  power;  and  these  contests 
were  interwoven  with  the  monopolistic  struggle 
then  in  progress  for  colonial  commerce  and  naviga- 

223 


AMERICAN   DIPLOMACY 

tion.  The  Spaniards  and  the  Portuguese,  the  Eng- 
lish and  the  French,  the  Swedes  and  the  Dutch,  con- 
tended with  one  another  in  Europe  as  well  as  in 
America  for  empire  on  the  American  continents. 
Their  colonists  knew  no  rule  of  life  but  that  of  con- 
flict; and  they  regarded  the  extension  of  their 
boundaries  as  a  measure  of  self-defence  rather  than 
of  aggression.  We  have  seen  that,  by  the  treaty  of 
alliance  with  France  of  1778,  the  remaining  British 
possession  in  North  America,  if  they  should  be 
wrested  from  the  mother-country,  were  to  be  "con- 
federated with  or  dependent  upon"  the  United 
States;  and  in  harmony  with  this  stipulation,  pro- 
vision was  made  in  the  Articles  of  Confederation 
(Article  xi.)  for  the  full  admission  of  Canada  into 
the  Union,  No  other  colony  was  to  be  so  admitted 
without  the  consent  of  nine  States ;  and  unless  they 
consented,  the  colony,  if  seized,  was  to  remain  in  a 
"dependent"  position.  With  the  independence  of 
the  United  States,  a  new  force  entered  into  the  ter- 
ritorial contests  in  America,  but  it  did  not  stay 
their  course.  On  the  north  of  the  new  republic  lay 
the  possessions  of  Great  Britain;  on  the  west,  the 
possessions  of  France ;  on  the  south,  the  possessions 
of  Spain.  With  all  these  powers  there  were  ques- 
tions of  boundary,  while  the  colonial  restrictions  in 
commerce  and  in  navigation  were  as  so  many  withes 
by  which  the  limbs  of  the  yoimg  giant  were  fettered. 
It  was  in  order  to  obtain  relief  from  such  condi- 

224 


TERRITORIAL   EXPANSION 

tions  that  the  United  States  acquired  Louisiana. 
To  the  inhabitants  of  the  West,  the  Mississippi 
River  was,  as  Madison  once  declared,  the  Hudson, 
the  Delaware,  the  Potomac,  and  all  the  navigable 
rivers  of  the  Atlantic  States  formed  into  one  stream. 
During  the  dark  hours  of  the  American  Revolution, 
the  Continental  Congress  seemed  to  be  ready  to 
yield  to  Spain,  in  return  for  her  alliance,  the  ex- 
clusive right  to  navigate  the  Mississippi;  but  for- 
tunately this  was  not  done.  After  the  re-estab- 
lishment of  peace,  Spain  continued  to  maintain  her 
exclusive  claims.  But  the  opposition  to  them  in 
the  United  States  steadily  grew  stronger  and  louder ; 
and  at  length,  on  October  27,  1795,  encompassed 
by  many  perils  in  her  foreign  relations,  Spain  con- 
ceded to  the  United  States  the  free  navigation  of  the 
Mississippi,  together  with  the  privilege  of  depositing 
merchandise  at  New  Orleans  and  thence  exporting 
it  without  payment  of  duty.  The  incalculable  ad- 
vantage of  this  arrangement  was  daily  growing  more 
manifest  when,  early  in  1801,  rumors  began  to  pre- 
vail that  Spain  had  ceded  both  Louisiana  and  the 
Floridas  to  France.  As  a  neighbor,  Spain,  because 
of  the  internal  weakness  of  her  government  and  the 
consequent  unaggressiveness  of  her  foreign  policy, 
was  not  feared;  but  an  apprehension  had  from  the 
first  been  exhibited  by  the  United  States  as  to  the 
possibility  of  being  hemmed  in  by  colonies  of  Eng- 
land and  France,     If  the  rumored  cession  should 

22s 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

prove  to  be  true,  the  arrangement  with  Spain  with 
regard  to  the  Mississippi  was  threatened  with  ex- 
tinction, Jefferson  was  therefore  hardly  extrava- 
gant when  he  declared  that  the  cession  of  Louisiana 
and  the  Floridas  by  Spain  to  France  would  com- 
pletely reverse  all  the  political  relations  of  the 
United  States,  and  would  render  France,  as  the  pos- 
sessor of  New  Orleans,  "our  natural  and  habitual 
enemy," 

The  treaty  of  cession  was  in  fact  signed  at  San 
Ildefonso,  on  October  i,  1800;  but  it  was  not  pub- 
lished and  even  its  existence  was  officially  denied. 
It  did  not  embrace  the  Floridas,  but  included  the 
whole  of  the  vast  domain  then  known  as  Louisiana, 
The  administration  at  Washington,  though  in  the 
dark  as  to  what  had  actually  been  done,  felt  the 
necessity  of  action.  It  desired  if  possible  to  prevent 
the  transfer  of  the  territory ;  or,  if  this  could  not  be 
accomplished,  to  obtain  from  France  the  Floridas, 
if  they  were  included  in  the  cession,  or  at  least  West 
Florida,  so  as  to  give  the  United  States  a  continu- 
ous stretch  of  territory  on  the  eastern  bank  of  the 
Mississippi,  With  these  objects  in  view,  Jefferson 
appointed  Robert  R.  Livingston  as  minister  to 
France,  Livingston  set  out  on  his  mission  early  in 
October,  1801.  On  his  arrival  in  Paris  he  soon 
became  convinced  that  the  cession  of  Louisiana,  if 
not  of  the  Floridas,  had  been  concluded;  and  he 
hinted  to  Talleyrand,  who  was  then  Minister  of 

226 


TERRITORIAL    EXPANSION 

Foreign  Affairs,  that  Louisiana  might  be  transferred 
to  the  United  States  in  payment  of  debts  due  by 
France  to  American  citizens.  Talleyrand  replied, 
"None  but  spendthrifts  satisfy  their  debts  by  sell- 
ing their  lands,"  and  then,  after  a  pause,  blandly 
added,  "But  it  is  not  ours  to  give."  Livingston 
was  not  deceived  by  this  evasion ;  on  the  contrary, 
he  endeavored  to  obtain,  by  appeal  to  the  First  Con- 
sul himself,  Napoleon,  the  cession,  not  of  the  whole 
but  of  a  part  of  Louisiana,  or  at  any  rate  an  assur- 
ance that  the  transfer  of  the  territory  by  Spain  to 
France  would  not  be  permitted  to  disturb  the  arrange- 
ment as  to  the  use  of  the  Mississippi.  On  February 
II,  1802,  Talleyrand  informed  Livingston  that  he  had 
been  instructed  by  the  First  Consul  to  give  the  most 
positive  assurance  on  this  subject ;  but  it  had  barely 
been  given,  when  a  report  reached  Washington  that 
the  Spanish  intendant  at  New  Orleans  had  sus- 
pended the  right  of  deposit.  It  was  soon  learned 
that  the  suspension  was  not  authorized  by  the  Span- 
ish government,  but  the  act  of  the  intendant  gave 
rise  to  energetic  discussions  in  Congress.  A  reso- 
lution was  adopted  by  the  House  declaring  that  the 
stipulated  rights  of  the  United  States  in  the  Missis- 
sippi would  be  inviolably  maintained,  while  a  reso- 
lution was  offered  in  the  Senate  to  authorize  the 
President  to  take  forcible  possession  of  such  places 
as  might  be  necessary  to  secure  their  full  enjoyment. 
The  state  of  public  feeling  was  such  that  every 

227 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

branch  of  the  government  felt  obliged  to  take 
measures  not  only  to  preserve  existing  rights,  but 
also,  if  possible,  to  enlarge  and  safeguard  them.  With 
this  end  in  view,  James  Monroe  was  joined  with 
Livingston  in  an  extraordinary  commission  to  treat 
with  France,  and  with  Charles  Pinckney  in  a  like 
commission  to  treat,  if  necessary,  with  Spain.  The 
specific  objects  of  the  mission,  as  defined  in  the  in- 
structions given  by  Madison,  as  Secretary  of  State, 
on  March  2,  1803,  were  the  cession  to  the  United 
States  of  the  island  of  New  Orleans  and  the  Floridas. 
Meanwhile,  Livingston  had,  if  possible,  redoubled 
his  exertions.  His  favorite  plan  was  to  obtain  from 
France  the  cession  of  the  island  of  New  Orleans  and 
all  that  part  of  Louisiana  lying  northward  of  the 
Arkansas  River;  and  he  also  urged  the  cession  of 
West  Florida,  if  France  had  obtained  it  from  Spain. 
On  Monday,  April  nth,  he  held  with  Talleyrand  a 
memorable  and  startling  interview.  Livingston  was 
expatiating  upon  the  subject  of  New  Orleans,  when 
Talleyrand  quietly  inquired  whether  the  United 
States  desired  the  "whole  of  Louisiana."  Living- 
ston answered  that  their  wishes  extended  only  to 
New  Orleans  and  the  Floridas,  though  policy  dic- 
tated that  France  should  also  cede  the  country  above 
the  river  Arkansas;  but  Talleyrand  observed  that, 
if  they  gave  New  Orleans,  the  rest  would  be  of  little 
value,  and  asked  what  the  United  States  would 
"give  for  the  whole."     Livingston  suggested  the 

228 


TERRITORIAL    EXPANSION 

sum  of  20,000,000  francs,  provided  the  claims  of 
American  citizens  were  paid.  Talleyrand  declared 
the  offer  too  low,  but  disclaimed  having  spoken  of 
the  matter  by  authority.  In  reality  Napoleon  had, 
on  the  preceding  day,  announced  to  two  of  his 
ministers  his  final  resolution.  The  expedition  to 
Santo  Domingo  had  miserably  failed;  colonial  en- 
terprises appeared  to  be  no  longer  practicable;  war 
with  England  was  at  hand;  and  it  seemed  wiser  to 
sell  colonies  than  go  down  with  them  in  disaster. 
In  this  predicament  Napoleon  decided  to  sell  to 
the  United  States  not  only  New  Orleans  but  the 
whole  of  Louisiana,  and  only  a  few  hours  before  the 
interview  between  Talleyrand  and  Livingston  was 
held,  had  instructed  Barbe  Marbois,  his  Minister  of 
Finance,  to  negotiate  the  sale. 

Monroe  arrived  in  Paris  on  April  12th.  On  the 
next  day  Marbois  informed  Livingston  that  Na- 
poleon had  authorized  him  to  say  that,  if  the  Amer- 
icans would  give  100,000,000  francs  and  pay  their 
own  claims,  they  might  "take  the  whole  country." 
Noting  Livingston's  surprise  at  the  price,  Marbois 
eventually  suggested  that  the  United  States  should 
pay  to  France  the  sum  of  60,000,000  francs  and  as- 
sume the  claims  of  its  own  citizens  to  the  amount 
of  20,000,000  more.  Livingston  declared  that  it 
was  in  vain  to  ask  a  thing  so  greatly  beyond  their 
means,  but  promised  to  consult  with  Monroe,  The 
American   plenipotentiaries   were   thus   confronted 

229 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

with  a  momentous  question  concerning  which  in  its 
full  extent  their  instructions  did  not  authorize  them 
to  treat;  but  properly  interpreting  the  purposes  of 
their  government  and  the  spirit  of  their  country- 
men, they  promptly  and  boldly  assumed  the  re- 
sponsibility. They  accepted  Marbois's  terms,  ex- 
cessive as  they  at  first  seemed,  and  took  the  whole 
province.  Speaking  in  a  prophetic  strain,  Living- 
ston, when  he  had  affixed  his  name  to  the  treaty  of 
cession,  exclaimed:  "We  have  lived  long,  but  this 
is  the  noblest  work  of  our  lives.  .  .  .  To-day  the 
United  States  take  their  place  among  the  powers 
of  the  first  rank.  .  .  .  The  instrument  we  have  signed 
will  cause  no  tears  to  flow.  It  will  prepare  centu- 
ries of  happiness  for  innumerable  generations  of  the 
human  race."  Time  has  verified  Livingston's  pre- 
vision. The  purchase  of  Louisiana  has  contributed 
more  than  any  other  territorial  acquisition  to  make 
the  United  States  what  it  is  to-day. 

Though  the  whole  of  Louisiana  was  ceded,  its 
limits  were  undefined.  The  province  was  retro- 
ceded  by  Spain  to  France  in  1800  "with  the  same 
extent  that  it  now  has  in  the  hands  of  Spain,  and 
that  it  had  when  France  possessed  it,"  and  by  the 
treaty  of  April  30,  1803,  the  territory  was  ceded  to 
the  United  States  "in  the  same  manner,"  but  the 
boundaries  had  never  been  precisely  determined. 
Livingston  and  Monroe  assured  their  government 
that  the  cession  extended  to  the  river  Perdido,  and 

230 


ROBERT    R.    LIVIXGSTOX 


TERRITORIAL    EXPANSION 

therefore  embraced  West  Florida.  This  claim  was 
not  sanctioned  by  France,  but  Congress,  acting 
upon  Livingston  and  Monroe's  assurance,  author- 
ized the  President  in  his  discretion  to  erect  "the 
bay  and  river  Mobile"  and  the  adjacent  terri- 
tory into  a  customs  district.  Spain  strongly  pro- 
tested, and  the  execution  of  the  measure  was  held 
in  suspense.  In  the  summer  of  1810,  however, 
a  revolution  took  place  in  West  Florida,  Baton 
Rouge  was  seized ;  the  independence  of  the  province 
was  declared;  and  an  application  was  made  for  its 
admission  into  the  Union.  The  President  repulsed 
this  application,  but  occupied  the  territory,  as  far  as 
the  river  Pearl,  as  part  of  the  Louisiana  purchase. 
The  country  lying  between  that  stream  and  the 
Perdido  was  permitted  still  to  remain  in  the  pos- 
session of  Spain, 

On  January  3,  181 1,  President  Madison,  incited  by 
the  political  situation  in  America  as  well  as  in  Europe, 
sent  to  Congress  a  secret  message,  in  which  he  recom- 
mended that  the  Executive  be  authorized  to  take 
temporary  possession  of  any  part  of  the  Floridas,  in 
certain  contingencies.  As  to  West  Florida,  Congress 
had  already  clothed  the  Executive  with  ample  pow- 
ers; but  as  East  Florida  unquestionably  still  be- 
longed to  Spain,  Congress  authorized  the  President 
to  occupy  all  or  any  part  of  the  country,  either  un- 
der arrangements  with  the  local  authorities  or  in 
case  a  foreign  government  should  attempt  to  seize 

231 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

it.  Under  this  act,  East  Florida  was  taken  pos- 
session of  all  the  way  from  Fernandina  to  St.  Au- 
gustine; but  the  manner  in  which  it  was  done  was 
disapproved  by  the  government  at  Washington,  and 
in  May,  1813,  the  country  was  finally  evacuated  by 
the  American  forces.  During  the  war  of  181 2,  West 
Florida  was  the  scene  of  hostilities  between  the 
British  and  the  American  forces,  and  in  181 7  and 
18 1 8  it  was  the  theatre  of  the  famous  Seminole  war. 
Meanwhile  the  government  of  the  United  States  was 
endeavoring  to  obtain  from  Spain  the  relinquish- 
ment of  her  provinces.  The  negotiations,  which 
were  conducted  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  by 
John  Quincy  Adams,  were  brought  to  a  close  by  the 
treaty  of  February  22,  18 19,  by  which  Spain  ceded 
to  the  United  States  not  only  the  Floridas,  but  also 
all  the  Spanish  titles  north  of  the  forty -second  par- 
allel of  north  latitude  from  the  source  of  the  Ar- 
kansas River  to  the  Pacific  Ocean.  In  return,  the 
United  States  agreed  to  pay  the  claims  of  its  citizens 
against  Spain  to  an  amount  not  exceeding  $5,000,- 
000,  and  to  indemnify  the  Spanish  inhabitants  of 
the  Floridas  for  injuries  suffered  at  the  hands  of 
American  forces,  besides  granting  to  Spanish  com- 
merce in  the  ceded  territories,  for  the  term  of  twelve 
years,  exceptional  privileges. 

While  the  United  States  retained  under  the  treaty 
of  18 1 9  all  the  territory  to  the  eastward  that  it 
claimed  as  part  of  Louisiana,  it  relinquished  by  the 

232 


TERRITORIAL    EXPANSION 

same  treaty  its  claim  to  the  imperial  domain  called 
Texas,  a  province  long  in  dispute  between  France 
and  Spain,  and  after  1803  between  Spain  and  the 
United  States.  Only  a  brief  time,  however,  elapsed 
when  efforts  began  to  be  made  to  recover  Texas, 
either  in  whole  or  in  part.  Two  such  attempts  were 
made  during  the  Presidency  of  John  Quincy  Adams, 
in  1825  and  1827.  The  effort  was  renewed  by  Presi- 
dent Jackson  in  1829,  and  again  in  1833.  In  August, 
1835,  the  American  minister  in  Mexico  was  directed 
to  persevere  in  the  task,  and  also  to  offer  half  a 
million  dollars  for  the  bay  of  San  Francisco  and  cer- 
tain adjacent  territory  as  a  resort  for  American 
vessels  in  the  Pacific.  On  March  2,  1836,  the  peo- 
ple of  Texas,  through  a  convention  of  delegates,  de- 
clared their  independence.  In  the  following  year 
President  Van  Buren  repelled  an  overture  for  an- 
nexation. The  independence  of  Texas  was,  how- 
ever, acknowledged  not  only  by  the  United  States, 
but  also  by  France  and  Great  Britain;  and  treaties 
were  made  with  Texas  by  all  those  powers.  On 
April  12,  1844,  a  treaty  of  annexation  was  concluded 
at  Washington.  This  treaty  having  failed  in  the 
Senate,  Congress,  by  a  joint  resolution  approved 
March  i,  1845,  took  action  looking  to  the  admission 
of  Texas  into  the  Union  as  a  State.  The  terms  of- 
fered in  the  resolution  were  accepted  by  Texas,  and 
by  a  joint  resolution  of  Congress,  approved  Decem- 
ber 29,   1845,  the  admission  was  formally  accom- 

233 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

pushed.  No  acquisition  of  territory  by  the  United 
States  has  been  the  subject  of  so  much  honest  but 
partisan  misconception  as  that  of  the  annexation  of 
Texas.  By  a  school  of  writers  whose  views  have 
had  great  currency,  the  annexation  has  been  de- 
nounced as  the  result  of  a  plot  of  the  slave-power 
to  extend  its  dominions.  But,  calmly  surveying  the 
course  of  American  expansion,  we  are  forced  to  con- 
clude that  no  illusion  could  be  more  complete.  It 
would  be  more  nearly  correct  to  say  that,  but  for 
the  controversy  concerning  slavery,  there  would 
have  been  no  appreciable  opposition  in  the  United 
States  to  the  acquisition  of  Texas.  Such  local  an- 
tagonism as  might  have  existed  to  the  disturbance 
of  the  balance  of  power  in  the  Union  would  have 
been  overwhelmed  by  the  general  demand  for  an 
extension  of  boundaries  so  natural  and,  except  for 
the  slavery  question,  in  every  respect  so  expedient. 
Six  months  after  the  annexation  of  Texas,  the 
long  dispute  as  to  the  Oregon  territory  was  brought 
to  a  close.  This  territory  was  bounded,  according 
to  the  claim  of  the  United  States,  by  the  426.  par- 
allel of  north  latitude  on  the  south,  by  the  line  of 
54°  40'  on  the  north,  and  by  the  Rocky  or  Stony 
Mountains  on  the  east.  It  embraced,  roughly  speak- 
ing, an  area  of  600,000  square  miles.  The  claim  of 
the  United  States  was  foimded  upon  the  discovery 
by  Captain  Robert  Gray,  of  the  American  ship 
Columbia,  in  1792,  of  the  River  of  the  West,  which 

234 


TERRITORIAL    EXPANSION 

he  named  from  his  ship  the  Colimibia  River ;  the  ex- 
ploration of  the  main  branch  of  that  river  by  Lewis 
and  Clark;  the  establishment  of  the  fur-trading 
settlement  of  Astoria,  by  John  Jacob  Astor,  in  1811, 
and  its  restoration  to  the  United  States  under  the 
treaty  of  Ghent;  and  finally,  the  acquisition  in  18 19 
of  all  the  territorial  rights  of  Spain  on  the  Pacific 
above  forty-second  degree  of  north  latitude.  By  the 
Democratic  national  platform  of  1844  the  title  of  the 
United  States  to  the  whole  of  Oregon  was  declared 
to  be  "  clear  and  unquestionable."  This  declaration 
was  popularly  interpreted  to  mean  "  fifty-four  forty 
or  fight";  but  on  June  15,  1846,  under  the  shadow 
of  the  Mexican  war,  the  dispute  was  terminated  by 
a  nearly  equal  division  of  the  territory  along  the 
forty-ninth  parallel  of  north  latitude. 

This  title  had  barely  been  assured,  when,  as  the 
result  of  the  war  with  Mexico,  the  United  States, 
by  the  treaty  signed  on  its  behalf  by  Nicholas  P. 
Trist,  in  defiance  of  instructions,  at  Guadalupe- 
Hidalgo,  on  February  2,  1848,  came  into  possession 
of  California  and  New  Mexico.  In  consideration 
of  these  cessions,  the  United  States  paid  to  Mexico 
$15,000,000,  and  assumed  the  payment  of  claims 
of  American  citizens  against  Mexico  to  an  amount 
not  exceeding  $3,250,000,  The  acquisitions  thus 
made  were  enlarged  by  the  convention  of  December 
30,  1853,  by  which  Mexico,  for  the  sum  of  $10,000,- 
000,  released  the  United  States  from  liability  on 

23s 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

account  of  certain  stipulations  of  the  treaty  of  1848 
and  ceded  the  Mesilla  Valley.  This  cession,  which 
is  often  called  the  Gadsden  purchase,  was  strongly 
desired  by  the  United  States,  not  only  for  the  pur- 
pose of  establishing  a  safe  frontier  against  the  Ind- 
ians, but  also  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  a  feasi- 
ble route  for  a  railway  near  the  Gila  River. 

By  the  treaty  signed  at  Washington  on  March 
30,  1867,  the  Emperor  of  Russia,  in  consideration 
of  the  sum  of  $7,200,000,  conveyed  to  the  United 
States  all  his  "territory  and  dominion"  in  America. 
Many  strange  conjectures  have  been  made  as  to  the 
motives  of  this  transaction.  It  has  been  suggested 
that  it  was  merely  a  cover  for  the  reimbursement  to 
Russia  of  the  expenses  of  her  "  friendly  naval  dem- 
onstration" during  the  American  civil  war.  This 
explanation  may  be  placed  in  the  category  of  the 
grotesque,  Robert  J.  Walker  has  been  given  as 
authority  for  the  statement  that  the  Emperor 
Nicholas  was  ready  to  give  Alaska  to  the  United 
States  during  the  Crimean  war,  if  the  United  States 
would,  in  spite  of  the  treaty  of  1846,  reassert  its 
claim  to  the  whole  of  Oregon.  In  reality,  the  ter- 
ritory was  of  comparatively  small  value  to  Russia, 
who  had  for  years  leased  an  important  part  of  the 
coast  to  the  Hudson's  Bay  Company.  In  the  hands 
of  the  United  States  its  potential  value  was  obvious- 
ly greater.  Its  acquisition  was,  besides,  gratifying 
to  the  spirit  of  continental  dominion,  which  has  al- 

236 


TERRITORIAL    EXPANSION 

ways  been  so  strongly  manifested  by  the  people  of 
the  United  States. 

The  acquisition  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  under 
the  joint  resolution  of  Congress  of  July  7,  1898, 
marked  the  natural  consummation  of  the  special  re- 
lations that  had  long  subsisted  between  the  United 
States  and  that  island  group.  As  early  as  1853 
the  United  States,  while  William  L.  Marcy  was  Sec- 
retary of  State,  sought  to  annex  the  islands.  A 
treaty  of  annexation  was  negotiated,  but,  as  its 
form  was  unacceptable  to  the  United  States,  it  was 
put  aside  for  a  treaty  of  reciprocity.  This  treaty 
failed  to  receive  the  approval  of  the  Senate,  but  the 
agitation  for  annexation  or  reciprocity  continued; 
and  at  length,  on  January  30,  1875,  a  reciprocity 
treaty  was  concluded  by  which  the  islands  were 
virtually  placed  under  an  American  protectorate. 
This  treaty  was  renewed  in  1887,  the  United  States 
then  acquiring  the  right  to  establish  a  naval  station 
in  the  harbor  of  Pearl  River.  On  February  14, 
1893,  a  treaty  of  annexation  was  signed  at  Wash- 
ington, but  on  the  change  of  administration  it  was 
withdrawn  from  the  Senate.  Another  treaty  of 
annexation,  signed  on  June  16,  1897,  was  still  be- 
fore the  Senate  when  the  joint  resolution  was  passed 
by  which  the  acquisition  was  definitively  accom- 
plished. 

Alaska  and  Hawaii  were  far  distant  from  the 
United  States,  but  the  greater  part  of  Alaska  was  on 

237 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

the  continent  of  North  America,  and  the  Hawaiian 
Islands  had  so  long  been  the  subject  of  special  pro- 
tection as  to  have  come  to  be  considered  within 
the  sphere  of  American  influence.  The  war  with 
Spain  opened  a  new  vista.  Even  the  remotest  of 
the  Spanish  possessions  in  the  West  Indies  fell 
within  the  conception  of  America,  but  the  Spanish 
possessions  in  the  Far  East  lay  beyond  the  accus- 
tomed range  of  American  political  thought.  For 
some  weeks  after  the  destruction  of  the  Spanish 
fleet  at  Manila,  the  views  of  the  United  States  seem- 
ed scarcely  to  extend  beyond  the  possible  acquisi- 
tion of  a  naval  station  in  the  Philippines  for  strategic 
purposes.  The  desire  for  a  naval  station,  however, 
soon  grew  into  the  desire  for  an  island — perhaps  the 
island  of  Luzon.  When  news  came  of  the  capture 
of  Manila  by  the  American  forces,  with  some  Ameri- 
can casualties,  the  desire  for  the  whole  group  re- 
ceived a  marked  impulse.  In  his  instructions  to 
the  American  peace  commissioners  at  Paris,  Presi- 
dent McKinley  said  that  the  United  States  would 
not  be  content  with  "  less  than  "  the  island  of  Luzon. 
More  than  two  months  elapsed  before  instructions 
were  given  to  take  the  whole  group ;  and  even  then, 
as  the  records  show,  the  American  commissioners 
were  divided  on  the  question.  For  my  own  part, 
I  venture  to  express  the  opinion  that  the  problem 
was  simplified  by  taking  all  the  islands.  Though 
the  group  is  vast  in  extent,  it  is   physically  con- 

238 


TERRITORIAL    EXPANSION 

tinuous,  and,  if  a  considerable  part  of  it  had  been  re- 
tained by  Spain,  the  dangers  attendant  upon  native 
revolt  and  discontent  would  have  been  incalculably 
increased.  The  acquisition  of  Puerto  Rico  and 
other  Spanish  islands  in  the  West  Indies  provoked 
no  division  of  opinion. 

There  is  no  incident  in  the  history  of  the  United 
States  that  better  prepares  us  to  understand  the 
acquisition  of  the  Philippines  than  the  course  of  the 
government  towards  the  Samoan  Islands.  As  early 
as  1853,  if  not  earlier,  the  United  States  was  repre- 
sented at  Apia  by  a  commercial  agent;  but  the 
islands  and  their  affairs  attracted  little  attention 
till  1872,  when  the  great  chief  of  the  bay  of  Pago- 
Pago  (pronounced  Pango-Pango),  in  the  island  of 
Tutuila,  desirous  of  obtaining  the  protection  of  the 
United  States,  granted  to  the  government  the  ex- 
clusive privilege  of  establishing  a  naval  station  in 
that  harbor.  A  special  agent,  named  Steinberger, 
was  then  despatched  to  Samoa,  and,  after  making  a 
report,  he  was  sent  back  to  convey  to  the  chiefs  a 
letter  from  President  Grant  and  some  presents. 
Subsequently  he  set  up,  on  his  own  responsibility, 
a  government  in  the  islands  and  administered  it. 
But  as  ruler  of  Samoa  he  fell  into  difficulties,  and, 
with  the  concurrence  of  the  American  consul,  was 
deported  on  a  British  man-of-war.  On  January  16, 
1878,  a  treaty  between  the  United  States  and  Samoa 
was  concluded  at  Washington,  by  which  the  privi- 

239 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

leges  of  the  United  States  in  the  harbor  of  Pago- 
Pago  were  confirmed,  and  by  which  it  was  provided 
that,  if  differences  shall  arise  between  the  Samoan 
government  and  any  other  government  in  amity  with 
the  United  States,  the  latter  would  "employ  its 
good  offices  for  the  purpose  of  adjusting  those  dif- 
ferences upon  a  satisfactory  and  solid  foundation." 
It  was  under  this  clause  that  the  conference,  which 
was  held  in  Washington  in  June  and  July,  1887, 
between  Mr.  Bayard,  as  Secretary  of  State,  and  the 
British  and  German  ministers,  on  Samoan  affairs, 
was  brought  about.  The  conference  failed  to  pro- 
duce an  agreement.  Germany  intervened  in  the 
islands,  and  became  involved  in  hostilities  with  a 
part  of  the  natives.  Steps  were  taken  to  protect 
American  interests,  and  the  relations  between  the 
United  States  and  Germany  had  become  decidedly 
strained  when,  on  the  invitation  of  Prince  Bismarck, 
the  sessions  of  the  conference  were  resumed  at  Ber- 
lin. They  resulted  in  the  treaty  of  June  14,  1889, 
by  which  the  islands  were  placed  under  the  joint 
protection  and  administration  of  the  three  powers. 
The  cumbersome  system  of  tripartite  government 
thus  established  signally  failed ;  and  at  length,  by  a 
treaty  between  the  three  powers,  concluded  on  De- 
cember 2,  1899,  Tutuila  and  the  adjacent  islands, 
east  of  longitude  171°  west  of  Greenwich,  passed 
under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States,  while 
Upolu  and  Savaii,  and  other  islands  west  of  that 

240 


TERRITORIAL    EXPANSION 

meridian,  were  left  to  Germany.  The  significance 
of  the  Samoan  incident  lies,  however,  not  in  the 
mere  division  of  territory,  but  in  the  disposition 
shown  by  the  United  States,  long  before  the  acqui- 
sition of  the  Philippines,  to  have  a  voice  in  deter- 
mining the  fate  of  a  remote  island  group  in  which 
American  commercial  interests  were  so  slight  as  to 
be  scarcely  appreciable. 

By  the  convention  with  the  Republic  of  Panama, 
November  i8,  1903,  the  United  States  acquired  in 
perpetuity  the  use,  occupation,  and  control  of  a 
zone  ten  miles  wide  on  the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  and 
certain  adjacent  islands,  for  the  purposes  of  an  in- 
teroceanic  canal.  Within  these  lands  and  the  ad- 
jacent waters  the  United  States  possesses  "all  the 
rights,  power,  and  authority"  which  it  would  have 
if  it  were  the  sovereign  of  the  territory  within  which 
the  lands  and  waters  lie.  It  may  be  observed  that 
an  unsuccessful  effort  was  made  in  1856  to  obtain 
from  New  Granada  the  cession  of  five  islands  in  the 
bay  of  Panama,  with  a  view  to  protect  the  isthmian 
route. 

Besides  the  annexations  already  described,  the 
United  States  has  acquired  or  assumed  jurisdiction 
over  many  islands  in  various  parts  of  the  world. 
In  1850,  the  cession  was  obtained  from  Great  Brit- 
ain of  Horse-Shoe  Reef,  in  Lake  Erie,  for  the  pur- 
poses of  a  light-house.  In  1867,  Brooks  or  Midway 
Islands,  lying  iioo  miles  west  of  Honolulu,  were 
'«  241 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

formally  occupied  by  the  commander  of  the  U.  S.  S. 
Lackawanna.  In  like  manner  the  atoll  called  Wake 
Island,  lying  in  latitude  19°  17'  50"  north  and 
longitude  166°  31'  east,  was  taken  possession  of  in 
1899  by  the  commander  of  the  U.  S.  S,  Bennington. 
But  the  greatest  extension  of  jurisdiction  over  de- 
tached islands  or  groups  of  islands  has  taken  place 
under  the  Guano  Islands  Act  of  August  18,  1856. 
By  this  act,  where  an  American  citizen  discovers  a 
deposit  of  guano  on  an  island,  rock,  or  key,  not 
within  the  jurisdiction  of  any  other  government, 
and  takes  peaceable  possession  and  gives  a  certain 
bond,  the  President  may,  at  his  discretion,  treat  the 
territory  as  "appertaining  to  the  United  States"; 
but  the  government  is  not  obliged  to  retain  pos- 
session after  the  guano  shall  have  been  removed. 
Under  this  statute  more  than  eighty  islands,  lying 
in  various  parts  of  the  Atlantic  and  the  Pacific,  have 
been  brought  within  American  jurisdiction. 

The  actual  acquisitions  of  territory  by  the  United 
States  by  no  means  indicate  the  scope  of  its  diplo- 
matic activities  in  that  direction.  Efforts  have 
been  made  to  annex  territory  which  has  not  event- 
ually been  obtained.  As  late  as  1870  the  annexation 
of  Canada,  to  which  the  Articles  of  Confederation 
looked,  was  the  subject  of  informal  discussions  be- 
tween British  and  American  diplomatists.  In  De- 
cember, 1822,  the  government  of  Salvador,  acting 
under  a  decree  of  its  Congress,  despatched  three 

242 


TERRITORIAL    EXPANSION 

commissioners  to  Washington  to  offer  the  sover- 
eignty of  the  country  to  the  United  States,  but  be- 
fore their  arrival  the  situation  had  changed  and  the 
proposal  was  abandoned.  Ever  since  the  founda- 
tion of  the  American  Republic,  the  annexation  of 
Cuba  has  formed  a  topic  of  discussion  and  of  diplo- 
matic activity.  John  Quincy  Adams  in  1823  de- 
clared that  Cuba,  if  forcibly  disjoined  from  Spain, 
and  incapable  of  self-support,  could  gravitate  only 
towards  the  North  American  Union;  and  Jefferson 
confessed  that  he  had  "ever  looked  on  Cuba  as  the 
most  interesting  addition  which  could  ever  be  made 
to  our  system  of  States."  In  1848  an  offer  was 
made  to  Spain  to  purchase  the  island  for  $100,000,- 
000,  but  it  was  simimarily  repulsed.  During  the 
civil  war  in  the  United  States,  the  discussion  of 
the  Cuban  question,  which  had  actively  continued 
during  the  administrations  of  Pierce  and  Buchanan, 
was  suspended;  but  it  was  revived  by  the  breaking 
out  of  the  Ten  Years'  War  in  Cuba,  in  1868.  In  the 
next  year  a  vigorous  effort  was  made  to  secure  the 
separation  of  Cuba  from  Spain  either  by  annexation 
to  the  United  States  or  by  the  grant  of  independence 
under  the  guarantee  of  the  United  States.  This 
was  the  last  definite  proposal  made  to  Spain  for 
annexation,  and,  when  the  United  States  eventually 
intervened,  it  was  for  the  purpose  of  establishing 
Cuban  independence.  In  the  peace  negotiations 
at  Paris,  the  Spanish  commissioners  proposed  to 

243 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

cede  the  island  to  the  United  States.  The  pro- 
posal was  declined;  and  the  manner  in  which  the 
resolution  of  intervention  was  kept,  by  the  estab- 
lishment of  an  independent  government  under  safe- 
guards which  cannot  hamper  the  exercise  of  the 
island's  sovereignty  for  any  legitimate  purpose, 
forms  one  of  the  most  honorable  chapters  in  diplo- 
matic history. 

In  1848  an  offer  of  the  sovereignty  of  Yucatan 
was  made  to  the  United  States,  but  the  occasion 
for  its  consideration  soon  passed  away. 

In  negotiations  with  the  Dominican  Republic,  in 
1854,  for  a  commercial  treaty,  an  effort  was  made 
to  obtain  for  the  United  States  a  coaling  station  in 
Samana  Bay.  An  examination  of  the  bay  had 
been  made  by  Captain  George  B.  McClellan,  whose 
report  may  be  found  among  the  Congressional  docu- 
ments. The  effort  to  obtain  the  desired  privilege 
was  renewed  in  1855,  but  without  success.  In  1866, 
Mr.  F.  W.  Seward,  Assistant  Secretary  of  State, 
was  sent  to  Santo  Domingo  for  the  purpose  of  se- 
curing a  cession  or  lease  of  the  peninsula  of  Samana 
as  a  naval  station.  His  mission  was  not  successful, 
but  its  object  was  not  abandoned,  and  his  powers 
were  transferred  to  the  commercial  agent  at  Santo 
Domingo  City.  In  1868  the  President  of  the  Do- 
minican Republic  requested  the  United  States  im- 
mediately to  take  the  country  under  its  protection 
and  occupy  Samana  Bay  and  other  strategic  points 

244 


TERRITORIAL    EXPANSION 

as  a  preliminary  to  annexation.  In  his  annual  mes- 
sage of  December  9,  1868,  President  Johnson,  Mr. 
Seward  still  being  Secretary  of  State,  advocated  the 
acquisition  of  "  the  several  adjacent  continental  and 
insular  communities  as  speedily  as  it  may  be  done 
peacefully,  lawfully,  and  without  any  violation  of 
national  justice,  faith,  or  honor,"  and  declared  that, 
while  foreign  possession  or  control  of  them  had 
"  hindered  the  growth  and  impaired  the  influence  of 
the  United  States,"  "  chronic  revolution  and  anarchy 
would  be  equally  injurious."  A  joint  resolution 
was  introduced  in  the  House  of  Representatives  for 
the  annexation  of  the  Dominican  Republic.  An 
agent  from  Santo  Domingo  was  then  in  Washington 
awaiting  action.  The  project  was  warmly  espoused 
by  President  Grant,  and  on  November  29,  1869, 
two  treaties  were  concluded,  one  for  the  annexation 
of  the  Dominican  Republic  and  the  other  for  the 
lease  of  Samana  Bay.  Both  instruments  were  com- 
municated to  the  Senate  on  January  10,  1870. 
They  failed  to  receive  that  body's  approval.  In  his 
last  annual  message  to  Congress,  in  1876,  President 
Grant  recurred  to  the  subject,  reaffirming  his  belief 
in  the  wisdom  of  the  policy  that  he  had  proposed. 
In  1867,  George  Bancroft  was  instructed,  while 
proceeding  as  minister  to  Berlin,  to  call  at  Madrid 
and  sound  the  Spanish  government  as  to  the  cession 
of  the  islands  of  Culebra  and  Culebrita,  in  the  Span- 
ish West  Indies,  to  the  United  States  as  a  naval  sta^ 

245 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

tion.  The  results  of  his  inquiries  were  so  discourag- 
ing that  the  subject  was  peremptorily  dropped ;  but 
the  islands  have  come  into  the  possession  of  the 
United  States  under  the  treaty  of  peace  with  Spain 
of  1898. 

In  his  efforts  to  obtain  the  cession  of  islands  in 
the  West  Indies,  Mr.  Seward  did  not  overlook  the 
Danish  possessions  in  that  quarter.  His  informal 
negotiations  probably  began  as  early  as  January, 
1865.  The  Danish  government  discouraged  his  ad- 
vances, but  they  were  renewed  in  an  official  form 
in  July,  1866.  A  convention  for  the  cession  of  St. 
Thomas  and  St.  John  for  $7,500,000,  leaving  Santa 
Cruz  to  Denmark,  was  signed  at  Copenhagen  on 
October  24,  1867.  As  stipulated  in  the  treaty,  a 
vote  was  taken  in  the  islands ;  it  was  almost  unani- 
mously in  favor  of  annexation  to  the  United  States. 
This  circumstance  greatly  increased  the  embarrass- 
ment of  the  Danish  government  when  the  United 
States  Senate  failed  to  approve  the  treaty.  On 
January  24,  1902,  a  convention  was  signed  at  Wash- 
ington for  the  cession  to  the  United  States  of  the 
islands  of  St.  Thomas,  St.  John,  and  Santa  Cruz, 
with  the  adjacent  islands  and  rocks,  all  for  the  sum 
of  $5,000,000.  It  was  approved  by  the  Senate  on 
February  17,  1902,  It  was  approved  by  the  lower 
house  of  the  Danish  Rigsdag;  but  on  October  21, 
1902,  it  failed  in  the  upper  house,  by  an  even  di- 
vision. 

246 


TERRITORIAL    EXPANSION 

The  Mole  St.  Nicolas,  in  Hayti,  was  leased  by  the 
United  States  during  the  civil  war  as  a  naval  station. 
In  1 89 1,  however,  the  Haytian  government  declined 
to  let  the  harbor  again  for  a  similar  purpose. 


X 

INFLUENCE   AND   TENDENCIES 

Nothing  could  have  been  further  from  the 
thoughts  of  the  wise  statesmen  who  guided  the 
United  States  through  the  struggle  for  independence 
and  laid  the  foundations  of  the  government's  foreign 
policy  than  the  institution  of  a  philosophical  prop- 
agandism  for  the  dissemination  of  political  princi- 
ples of  a  certain  type  in  foreign  lands.  Although 
the  Declaration  of  Independence  loudly  proclaimed 
the  theory  of  the  natural  rights  of  man,  they  gave  to 
this  theory,  in  its  application  to  their  own  concerns, 
a  qualified  interpretation,  and,  as  practical  men, 
forbore  to  push  it  at  once  to  all  its  logical  conse- 
quences. On  the  continent  of  Europe,  the  apostles 
of  reform,  directing  their  shafts  against  absolutism 
and  class  privileges,  spoke  in  terms  of  philosophical 
idealism,  while  the  patriots  of  America,  though  they 
did  not  eschew  philosophy,  debated  concrete  ques- 
tions of  constitutional  law  and  commonplace  prob- 
lems of  taxation.  In  Europe,  the  revolution  meant 
first  of  all  a  destructive  upheaval ;  in  America,  where 
the  ground  was  clear,  it  meant  a  constructive  de- 

248 


INFLUENCE    AND    TENDENCIES 

velopment.  And  yet,  in  spite  of  this  difference, 
the  American  Revolution  operated  as  a  powerful 
stimulus  to  political  agitation  in  Europe.  There 
was  in  the  very  existence  of  American  Indepen- 
dence, permeated  as  it  was  with  democratic  repub- 
licanism, a  force  that  exerted  a  world-wide  influence 
in  behalf  of  political  liberty.  Of  this  fact  Euro- 
pean statesmen  betrayed  their  appreciation  when 
they  deprecated  the  course  of  the  King  of  France  in 
subordinating  what  appeared  to  them  to  be  a  per- 
manent general  interest  to  the  gratification  of  a 
feeling  of  enmity  towards  Great  Britain.  Spanish 
diplomatists  were  not  alone  in  expressing  this  senti- 
ment. The  Emperor  Joseph  II.  of  Austria,  in  a  letter 
to  his  minister  in  the  Netherlands,  in  1787,  remarked 
that  "France,  by  the  assistance  which  she  afforded 
to  the  Americans,  gave  birth  to  reflections  on  free- 
dom." That  the  assistance  thus  given  hastened  her 
own  revolution,  there  can  be  no  doubt.  Nor  did  the 
visible  effect  of  the  example  of  the  United  States 
end  here.  It  has  been  manifest  in  every  European 
struggle  for  more  liberal  forms  of  government  dur- 
ing the  past  hundred  years  —  in  Spain,  in  Italy,  in 
Germany,  and  In  Hungary.  It  penetrated  even  to 
Russia,  where  there  was  found  among  the  papers  of 
one  of  the  leaders  who  planned  a  revolution  for  1826 
a  constitution  for  that  country  on  the  model  of  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States.  And  it  may  also 
be  traced  in  the  lives  of  those  who  have  striven  to 

249 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

advance,  sometimes  under  adverse  and  discourag- 
ing conditions,  the  cause  of  self-government  on  the 
American  continents. 

While  the  United  States  refrained  from  aggressive 
political  propagandism,  the  spirit  of  liberty  that  re- 
sulted from  its  independence  was  necessarily  reflect- 
ed in  its  diplomacy.  It  is  true  that  the  attitude  of 
the  government  on  certain  special  questions  was  for 
a  long  while  affected  by  the  survival  in  the  United 
States  of  the  institution  of  African  slavery.  It  was 
for  this  reason  that  the  recognition  of  Hayti,  Santo 
Domingo,  and  Liberia  as  independent  states  did  not 
take  place  till  the  administration  of  Abraham  Lin- 
coln, although  such  recognition  had  long  before  been 
accorded  by  European  powers.  But  the  attitude 
of  the  United  States  towards  those  countries  was 
exceptional,  and  was  governed  by  forces  which 
neither  diverted  nor  sought  to  divert  the  govern- 
ment from  the  general  support  of  the  principles  on 
which  it  was  founded. 

The  influence  of  the  United  States  in  behalf  of 
political  liberty  was  clearly  exhibited  in  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  principle,  to  which  we  have  here- 
tofore adverted,  that  the  true  test  of  a  government's 
right  to  exist,  and  to  be  recognized  by  other  govern- 
ments, is  the  fact  of  its  existence  as  the  exponent  of 
the  popular  will.  This  rule,  when  it  was  announced, 
appeared  to  be  little  short  of  revolutionary,  since  it 
was  in  effect  a  corollary  of  the  affinnation  made  in 

250 


INFLUENCE    AND    TENDENCIES 

the  Declaration  of  Independence,  that  governments 
derive  their  just  powers  from  the  consent  of  the 
governed,  and  that,  whenever  any  form  of  govern- 
ment becomes  destructive  of  the  ends  for  which 
governments  are  instituted,  it  is  the  right  of  the 
people  to  alter  or  abolish  it  and  to  institute  a  new 
government,  laying  its  foundation  on  such  principles 
and  organizing  its  affairs  in  such  form  as  to  them  shall 
seem  most  likely  to  effect  their  safety  and  happiness. 
Nor  was  the  free  spirit  of  American  diplomacy  less 
manifest  in  its  opposition  to  the  system  of  commercial 
monopoly;  in  its  espousal  of  the  principles  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine ;  or  in  its  advocacy  of  the  freedom 
of  the  seas,  of  the  rule  that  free  ships  make  free  goods, 
and  of  the  exemption  of  private  property  at  sea  from 
capture.  The  weight  of  its  influence  was  also  con- 
stantly lent  in  favor  of  the  maintenance  of  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  countries  of  the  Far  East.  In  the 
treaty  with  China  of  June  i8,  1858,  made  at  a  time 
when  the  Chinese  government  appeared  to  be  pecul- 
iarly friendless,  we  find  the  remarkable  stipulation 
that  "  if  any  other  nation  should  act  unjustly  or  op- 
pressively" towards  that  country,  the  United  States 
would  **  exert  its  good  offices,  on  being  informed  of 
the  case,  to  bring  about  an  amicable  arrangement 
of  the  question,  thus  showing  their  friendly  feelings," 
But,  besides  exerting  an  influence  in  favor  of  liberty 
and  independence,  American  diplomacy  was  also  em- 
ployed in  the  advancement  of  the  principle  of  legality, 

251 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

American  statesmen  sought  to  regulate  the  relations 
of  nations  by  law,  not  only  as  a  measiire  for  the  pro- 
tection of  the  weak  against  the  aggressions  of  the 
strong,  but  also  as  the  only  means  of  assuring  the 
peace  of  the  world.  The  conception  of  legality  in 
international  relations  lay  at  the  foundation  of  the 
system  of  neutrality,  which  was  established  during 
the  administration  of  Washington.  It  also  formed 
the  basis  of  the  practice  of  arbitration,  which  was  so 
auspiciously  begun  at  the  same  time.  Half  a  century 
later  it  received  an  accession  of  strength  in  the  de- 
velopment of  the  process  of  extradition.  It  is  true 
that  in  the  development  of  this  process  in  modem 
times  the  credit  of  the  initiative  belongs  to  France ; 
but,  beginning  with  the  Webster- Ashburton  treaty 
of  August  9,  1842,  the  United  States,  at  an  important 
stage  in  the  history  of  the  system,  actively  contrib- 
uted to  its  growth  by  the  conclusion  of  numerous 
conventions.  The  twenty-seventh  article  of  the  Jay 
treaty  provided  for  the  surrender  of  fugitives  charged 
with  murder  or  forgery ;  but  it  proved  to  be  for  the 
most  part  ineffective,  and  expired  by  limitation  in 
1808.  The  Webster- Ashburton  treaty  provided  for 
the  extradition  of  fugitives  for  any  of  seven  offences, 
and  proved  to  be  efficacious.  Similar  treaties  with 
other  cotintries  were  soon  afterwards  made,  ten  being 
concluded  while  William  L.  Marcy  was  Secretary  of 
State,  during  the  administration  of  Pierce.  Since 
that  time  our  extradition  arrangements  have  grown 

252 


INFLUENCE    AND   TENDENCIES 

both  in  number  and  in  comprehensiveness.  We 
cannot  afford,  however,  to  rest  on  our  laurels.  In 
recent  times  other  nations,  and  especially  Great 
Britain  since  1870,  observing  the  propensity  of  crim- 
inals to  utilize  improved  facilities  of  travel,  have 
by  legislation  as  well  as  by  negotiation  vastly  in- 
creased the  reach  and  efficiency  of  the  system.  It 
will  therefore  be  necessary,  if  we  would  fulfil  the 
promise  of  our  past  and  retain  a  place  in  the  front 
rank,  steadily  to  multiply  our  treaties  and  enlarge 
their  scope.  No  innovation  in  the  practice  of  nations 
has  ever  more  completely  discredited  the  woful  pre- 
dictions of  its  adversaries  than  that  of  surrender- 
ing fugitives  from  justice.  The  Webster-Ashburton 
treaty  was  loudly  denoimced  as  a  mere  trap  for  the 
recovery  of  political  offenders.  Other  treaties  en- 
countered similar  opposition.  In  no  instance  have 
these  direful  forebodings  been  justified  by  the  event. 
American  diplomacy  has  also  been  characterized 
by  practicality.  It  has  sought  to  attain  definite  ob- 
jects by  practical  methods.  Even  in  its  idealism, 
as  in  the  advocacy  of  the  exemption  of  private  prop- 
erty at  sea  from  capture,  it  has  shown  a  practical 
side.  The  same  disposition  has  been  exhibited  in  the 
American  consular  service.  Consuls  have  been  de- 
scribed by  publicists  as  agents  of  commerce ;  but  for 
a  long  while  their  functions  were  passive  rather  than 
active,  and  to  some  extent  were  ornamental.  The 
government  of  the  United  States  conceived  the  idea 

253 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

of  employing  its  consuls  not  only  for  the  protection 
of  commerce,  but  also  for  its  extension.  In  1880, 
while  Mr.  Evarts  was  Secretary  of  State,  there  was 
begun  the  monthly  publication  of  consular  reports, 
which  has  been  continued  with  useful  results  up  to 
the  present  time.  The  example  thus  set  has  been 
followed  in  other  countries,  so  that  we  find  to-day 
among  the  publications  of  the  British,  French,  and 
German  governments  consular  reports  on  the  com- 
merce and  industries  of  foreign  countries.  In  1897, 
on  the  recommendation  of  Mr.  Frederic  Emory,  then 
chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Foreign  Commerce  of  the 
Department  of  State,  the  usefulness  of  the  American 
series  was  greatly  enhanced  by  the  establishment  of 
the  system  of  publishing  daily  advance  sheets  of  the 
monthly  issues.  It  is  obvious  that  this  develop- 
ment constituted  a  highly  important  step  towards 
making  the  consular  service  of  practical  value  to  the 
business  interests  of  the  country, 

American  diplomacy  has  also  exerted  a  potent  in- 
fluence upon  the  adoption  of  simple  and  direct 
methods  in  the  conduct  of  negotiations.  Observant 
of  the  proprieties  and  courtesies  of  intercourse,  but 
having,  as  John  Adams  once  declared,  "no  notion  of 
cheating  anybody,"  American  diplomatists  have  re- 
lied rather  upon  the  strength  of  their  cause,  frankly 
and  clearly  argued,  than  upon  a  subtle  diplomacy,  for 
the  attainment  of  their  ends.  Nor  did  the  frame- 
work of  government  adopted  in  the  United  States 

254 


INFLUENCE    AND    TENDENCIES 

admit  of  the  practice  of  secrecy  and  reserve,  such 
as  characterized  the  diplomacy  of  monarchs  whose 
tenure  was  for  life  and  who  were  unvexed  by  popular 
electorates  and  representative  assemblies.  Hence, 
as  it  was  in  the  beginning,  so  American  diplomacy 
has  in  the  main  continued  to  be,  a  simple,  direct,  and 
open  diplomacy,  the  example  of  which  has  had  much 
to  do  with  shaping  the  development  of  modem 
methods.  Nor  should  we  forbear  to  remark  that 
while  it  has,  by  reason  of  the  directness  with  which 
it  expresses  its  sentiments,  sometimes  been  disre- 
spectfully dubbed  "shirt-sleeves"  diplomacy, it  may 
confidently  invite  a  comparison  as  to  the  propriety 
of  its  speech  and  conduct  with  the  diplomacy  of  other 
nations. 

In  at  least  one  instance,  however,  the  attempt  at 
simplicity  was  carried  further  than  in  the  end  proved 
to  be  practicable.  Washington,  while  President, 
once  observed  that,  although  he  was  not  accustomed 
to  impede  the  dispatch  of  business  "  by  a  ceremonious 
attention  to  idle  forms,"  it  would  not  be  prudent  for 
a  young  state  to  dispense  altogether  with  rules  of 
procedure  which  had  "originated  from  the  wisdom 
of  statesmen"  and  were  "sanctioned  by  the  com- 
mon consent  of  nations."  But  Jefferson,  late  in  his 
first  administration,  sought  to  abolish  all  social 
forms  and  precedence.  The  occasion  of  this  action 
was  the  claim  of  Mrs.  Merry,  the  wife  of  the  British 
minister,  of  the  right  to  be  taken  in  to  dinner  by  the 

255 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

President.  In  order  to  avoid  this  claim,  Jefferson 
adopted  what  he  called  the  rule  of  pell-mell,  the 
meaning  of  which  was  that  no  particular  place  was  to 
be  assigned  to  anybody,  but  that  each  was  to  take 
what  was  at  hand;  and  he  sought  to  enforce  this 
measure  not  only  at  his  own  entertainments,  but 
also  on  all  public  occasions,  such  as  inaugurations. 
This  innovation  was  hotly  resented  by  certain  mem- 
bers of  the  diplomatic  corps,  and  gave  rise  to  con- 
troversies which,  by  reason  of  their  spicy  and  enter- 
taining quality,  have  enjoyed  a  prominence  out  of 
proportion  to  their  historical  importance.  Experi- 
ence soon  demonstrated  that  social  equality  was  not 
always  best  assured  by  committing  the  determina- 
tion of  questions  of  etiquette  to  individual  inclina- 
tion and  enterprise,  which  perchance  might  seek  in 
confusion  an  undue  exaltation.  No  one  could  have 
more  fully  exemplified  simplicity  in  character  and  in 
bearing  than  did  President  Madison;  but  on  enter- 
taining the  new  British  minister,  F.  J.  Jackson,  in 
1809,  he  settled  the  question  of  procedure  by  es- 
corting Mrs.  Jackson  to  dinner,  while  Jackson  took 
in  Mrs.  Madison.  Nothing  could  better  illustrate 
Madison's  indifference  to  forms  than  his  official  re- 
ception of  Jackson  on  the  latter's  presentation.  The 
affair  was  conducted  in  the  same  manner  as  a  private 
meeting  between  gentlemen.  After  Jackson  was  in- 
troduced, Madison  asked  him  to  have  a  chair,  and, 
says   Jackson,    while   they   were   talking,    a   negro 

256 


INFLUENCE  AND  TENDENCIES 

brought  them  "some  glasses  of  punch  and  a  seed- 
cake." 

The  effect  of  democratic  tendencies  on  American 
diplomacy  is  seen  in  the  course  of  the  government  of 
the  United  States  with  regard  to  diplomatic  uniform. 
As  early  as  1817  American  ministers  had  a  prescribed 
dress  which  was  fixed  by  the  mission  at  Ghent.  This 
dress  consisted  of  a  blue  coat,  lined  with  white  silk; 
a  straight  cape,  embroidered  with  gold,  and  single- 
breasted  ;  buttons  plain,  or,  if  they  could  be  had,  with 
the  artillerist's  eagle  stamped  upon  them;  cuffs  em- 
broidered in  the  same  manner  as  the  cape;  white 
cashmere  breeches;  gold  knee-buckles;  white  silk 
stockings,  and  gold  or  gilt  shoe-buckles;  a  three- 
cornered  chapeau  bras,  not  so  large  as  that  used  by 
the  French  nor  so  small  as  that  used  by  the  English ; 
a  black  cockade  with  an  eagle  attached,  and  a  sword. 
On  gala-days  and  other  occasions  of  extraordinary 
ceremony  the  American  ministers  were  allowed  to 
wear  more  embroidery,  as  well  as  a  white  ostrich- 
feather,  not  standing  erect,  but  sewed  around  the 
brim,  in  their  hats.  A  description  of  the  costume, 
together  with  a  plate,  was  given  to  the  minister  as  a 
part  of  his  instructions.  At  the  beginning  of  the 
administration  of  President  Jackson  the  prescribed 
uniform  was  changed  so  that  it  consisted  of  a  black 
coat,  with  a  gold  star  on  each  side  of  the  collar  near 
its  termination ;  underclothes  of  black,  blue,  or  white, 
at  the  option  of  the  wearer ;  a  three-cornered  chapeau 
17  257 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

bras ;  a  black  cockade  and  eagle ;  and  a  steel-mounted 
sword  with  a  white  scabbard.  This  dress,  which  was 
supposed  to  correspond  with  the  simplicity  of  Amer- 
ican institutions,  was  recommended  but  not  pre- 
scribed. These  instructions  were,  however,  done 
away  with  by  a  circular  issued  by  William  L.  Marcy, 
as  Secretary  of  State,  on  June  i,  1853,  by  which 
American  ministers  were  desired,  as  far  as  practica- 
ble without  impairing  their  usefulness,  to  appear  at 
court  "in  the  simple  dress  of  an  American  citizen." 
If  this  could  not  be  done  without  detriment  to  the 
public  interest,  the  nearest  approach  to  it,  com- 
patible with  the  requisite  performance  of  duties, 
was  earnestly  recommended.  "  The  simplicity  of  our 
usages  and  the  tone  of  feeling  among  our  people  is," 
said  Marcy,  "much  more  in  accordance  with  the 
example  of  our  first  and  most  distinguished  rep- 
resentative at  a  royal  court  than  the  practice  which 
has  since  prevailed.  It  is  to  be  regretted  that  there 
was  ever  any  departure  in  this  respect  from  the 
example  of  Dr.  Franklin."  Wharton,  in  his  Inter- 
national Law  Digest,  states  that  the  dress  worn  by 
Franklin  "  was  Quaker  full  dress,  being  court  dress 
in  the  time  of  Charles  II.";  it  was,  at  any  rate,  com- 
paratively simple.  The  experiences  of  the  American 
ministers  in  carrying  out  Marcy's  instructions  were 
varied.  The  greatest  difficulty  was  encountered  by 
Buchanan,  at  London,  where  his  proposal  to  ap- 
pear at  court  without  some  mark  indicative  of  his 

258 


INFLUENCE    AND    TENDENCIES 

rank  was  the  subject  of  peremptory  objection.  He 
finally  compromised  upon  appearing  in  the  dress 
which  he  wore  at  the  receptions  of  the  President  of 
the  United  States,  with  the  addition  of  a  very  plain 
black-handled  and  black-hilted  dress  sword.  With 
this  addition,  he  declared  that  he  never  felt  prouder 
as  a  citizen  of  his  country  than  when  he  stood  amid 
the  brilliant  circle  of  foreign  ministers  and  other 
court  dignitaries  "  in  the  simple  dress  of  an  American 
citizen."  At  Paris,  Henry  S.  Sanford,  who  was  then 
acting  as  charge  d'affaires  ad  interim  of  the  United 
States,  was  permitted  to  appear  at  the  Tuileries  in 
citizen's  dress.  When,  however,  the  new  minister, 
John  Y.  Mason,  arrived,  he  decided,  after  consul- 
tation with  the  French  officials,  to  adopt  a  uniform, 
and  had  a  costume  devised  which  was  described 
by  Sanford  as  "a  coat  embroidered  with  gilt  tinsel, 
a  sword  and  cocked  hat,  the  invention  of  a  Dutch 
tailor  in  Paris,  borrowed  chiefly  from  the  livery  of  a 
subordinate  attacM  of  legation  of  one  of  the  petty 
powers  of  the  Continent."  Sanford,  conceiving  Ma- 
son's conduct  to  involve  an  oblique  censure  of  his  own 
course,  resigned  his  position  as  secretary  in  disgust. 
At  The  Hague,  August  Belmont  was  permitted  to 
appear  in  citizen's  dress,  although  it  was  stated  that 
his  appearance  in  uniform  "  would  have  been  better 
liked."  At  Lisbon,  John  L.  O 'Sullivan  appeared  at 
court  in  "an  ordinary  evening  suit,"  consisting  of  a 
blue  coat  and  black  trousers,  with  "a  simple  Amer- 

259 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

ican  button"  indicating  his  representative  capacity. 
At  Berlin  it  was  declared  that  the  King  "would  not 
consider  an  appearance  before  him  without  costume 
respectful";  and  the  American  minister  thereupon 
provided  himself  with  a  court  dress  which  he  de- 
scribed as  "very  plain  and  simple."  At  Stockholm, 
the  King  expressed  his  willingness  to  receive  the  rep- 
resentative of  the  United  States  in  an  audience  for 
business  in  any  dress  his  government  might  prescribe, 
but  added,  "  In  the  society  of  my  family  and  on  occa- 
sions of  court  no  one  can  be  received  but  in  court  dress, 
in  conformity  with  established  custom. ' '  The  minis- 
ter therefore  appeared  at  court  in  the  costume  which 
he  had  previously  worn.  By  a  joint  resolution,  ap- 
proved March  27, 1 867 ,  Congress  prohibited  persons  in 
the  diplomatic  service  of  the  United  States  "from 
wearing  any  uniform  or  official  costume  not  previous- 
ly authorized  by  Congress. ' '  By  Section  34  of  the  act 
of  July  28,  1866,  however,  officers  who  have  served 
in  the  civil  war  as  volunteers  in  the  armies  of  the 
United  States  are  authorized  to  bear  their  official 
title,  and  upon  occasions  of  ceremony  to  wear  the 
uniform  of  the  highest  grade  they  have  held,  by 
brevet  or  other  commissions,  in  the  volunteer  service. 
In  spite  of  these  statutes,  diplomatic  officers  of  the 
United  States,  while  not  adopting  what  might  be 
called  a  uniform,  have  often  worn,  as  Buchanan  did 
in  London,  some  article  of  apparel  suggestive  of 
their  official  station  and  rank. 

260 


INFLUENCE    AND    TENDENCIES 

The  subject  of  diplomatic  dress  has  been  intro- 
duced, not  because  it  was  in  itself  of  great  moment, 
but  because  it  illustrates  the  development  of  that 
democratic  spirit,  often  described  in  contemporary- 
writings  as  "American  feeling,"  which  was  perhaps 
most  ebullient  in  the  middle  of  the  last  century.  Since 
that  time  great  changes  have  taken  place,  and  with 
the  increased  complexity  of  social  activities,  the 
extraordinary  growth  of  private  fortunes,  and  the 
wonderful  advance  of  the  nation  as  a  whole  in 
wealth  and  power,  simplicity  has  become  less  and 
less  a  distinctive  trait  of  the  life  of  the  Republic, 
either  at  home  or  abroad.  On  the  other  hand, 
there  has  grown  up  a  visible  tendency  towards  con- 
formity to  customs  elsewhere  established,  and  the 
progress  of  this  tendency  has  been  accelerated  by 
the  natural  drift  of  a  great  and  self-conscious  peo- 
ple towards  participation  in  what  are  called  world- 
affairs. 

The  first  joint  international  treaty,  with  reference 
to  a  question  not  distinctively  American,  to  which 
the  government  of  the  United  States  became  a  party, 
was  the  convention  concluded  on  October  22,  1864, 
jointly  with  Great  Britain,  France,  and  the  Nether- 
lands, in  relation  to  the  payment  by  Japan  of  the 
Shimonoseki  indemnity.  Three  years  later  a  joint 
convention  was  concluded  between  the  same  powers 
and  Japan  for  the  establishment  of  tariff  duties  in 
the  latter  country.     By  reason  of  a  common  interest, 

261 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

the  United  States  was  thus  led  in  the  Far  East  to 
depart  from  its  usual  policy  of  making  only  separate 
or  independent  agreements  with  other  nations.  No 
similar  departure  had  then  been  made  in  China,  but 
the  policy  of  concerted  action  with  other  powers  had 
already  been  entered  upon  in  that  country  as  well 
as  in  Japan — a  policy  which  has  eventuated  in  the 
allied  march  to  Peking  in  1900  and  in  the  conclusion 
of  the  convention  of  September  7,  1901,  between  the 
allies  and  China.  This  convention,  which  embraces 
questions  of  politics  as  well  as  of  commerce,  is  the 
most  comprehensive  joint  arrangement  to  which  the 
United  States  has  ever  become  a  signatory.  The 
United  States  has,  however,  as  a  member  of  the 
great  family  of  nations,  become  a  party  to  other 
joint  international  agreements,  such  as  the  Geneva 
convention  for  the  amelioration  of  the  condition 
of  the  wounded  in  the  field;  the  convention  for 
the  protection  of  submarine  cables  outside  territorial 
waters ;  the  Madrid  convention  with  reference  to  the 
protege  system  in  Morocco;  the  international  union 
for  the  protection  of  industrial  property;  the  inter- 
national postal  union ;  and  the  treaties  concluded  at 
The  Hague  with  reference  to  the  laws  and  customs  of 
war  on  land,  the  adaptation  to  maritime  warfare  of 
the  principles  of  the  Geneva  convention,  and  the 
pacific  adjustment  of  international  disputes. 

Intimacy  of  association,  though  it  does  not  destroy 
the  spirit  of  emulation,  tends  to  produce  uniformity 

262 


INFLUENCE    AND    TENDENCIES 

in  manners  and  customs.  Of  the  operation  of  this 
rule,  a  striking  example  may  be  seen  in  the  act  of 
Congress  by  which  provision  was  made  for  the  ap- 
pointment of  ambassadors.  Prior  to  the  passage  of 
this  act  it  had  been  assumed  to  be  undesirable  to  in- 
troduce into  the  American  diplomatic  service  a  grade 
of  officials  deriving  extraordinary  ceremonial  privi- 
leges from  the  fact  that  they  were  supposed  in  a 
peculiar  sense  to  represent  the  "person"  of  the 
"sovereign."  William  L.  Marcy,  when  Secretary  of 
State,  naturally  declined  to  recommend  the  creation  of 
such  a  class.  Secretary  of  State  Frelinghuysen,  view- 
ing the  matter  in  a  practical  light,  thought  it  would 
be  unjust  to  American  ministers  to  increase  their 
rank  without  raising  their  salaries,  and  that  Congress 
could  not  with  propriety  be  asked  to  make  them  "  an 
allowance  commensurate  with  the  necessary  mode 
of  life  of  an  ambassador."  Mr.  Bayard,  who  was 
afterwards  to  become  the  first  American  ambassador, 
declared,  when  Secretary  of  State,  that  "  the  benefits 
attending  a  higher  grade  of  ceremonial  treatment" 
had  not  "been  deemed  to  outweigh  the  inconven- 
iences which,  in  our  simple  social  democracy,  might 
attend  the  reception  in  this  country  of  an  extraor- 
dinarily foreign  privileged  class."  Nevertheless,  in 
1893,  the  higher  grade  was  introduced.  For  this 
measure  it  will  scarcely  be  claimed  that  there  was 
any  necessity.  In  the  days  before  American  am- 
bassadors existed,  a  visitor  to  London  sought  to  learn 

263 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

who  was  the  most  important  "ambassador"  at  the 
court  of  St.  James.  A  European  member  of  the 
diplomatic  corps,  to  whom  the  inquiry  was  address- 
ed, promptly  responded,  "The  American  minister." 
From  time  to  time,  however,  American  representa- 
tives abroad,  wishing  to  enjoy  the  ceremonial  privi- 
leges of  the  ambassadorial  rank,  recommended  its 
creation;  and  eventually  their  recommendation  was 
adopted.  But  it  was  done  without  any  increase  of 
compensation,  so  that  to-day  none  but  a  man  of 
fortune  can  afford  to  be  an  American  ambassador. 
When  we  scan  the  list  of  those  who  have  thus  far 
held  the  position,  it  is  not  difficult  to  believe  that  the 
Republic  has  as  yet  suffered  no  detriment  by  reason 
of  this  moral  limitation  upon  the  choice  of  its  agents ; 
but  the  creation  of  conditions  under  which  persons 
of  moderate  means  are  excluded  from  the  highest 
public  employments,  except  at  a  sacrifice  which  they 
can  ill  afford  to  make  or  cannot  make  at  all,  is  not 
in  harmony  with  what  have  been  conceived  to  be 
American  ideals. 

To  this  incongruity  it  is  within  the  power  of  Con- 
gress at  any  time  to  apply  a  corrective;  but  there 
is  yet  another  innovation  the  remedy  for  which 
lies  with  the  executive  branch  of  the  government. 
Among  the  extraordinary  privileges  commonly  said 
to  belong  to  the  ambassador,  by  reason  of  his  rep- 
resenting the  "person"  of  the  "sovereign,"  is  that 
of  personal  audience  on  matters  of  business  with 

264 


INFLUENCE    AND   TENDENCIES 

the  head,  of  the  state.  In  Europe,  with  the  substitu- 
tion of  constitutional  governments  for  absolute  mon- 
archies, this  privilege  has  become  merely  nominal, 
but  in  Washington  it  has  been  revived  in  something 
like  its  pristine  rigor,  direct  intercourse  with  the 
President,  without  regard  to  the  Secretary  of  State, 
being  constantly  demanded  and  practised.  In  the 
days  when  the  highest  rank  was  that  of  envoy  ex- 
traordinary and  minister  plenipotentiary,  the  privi- 
lege of  transacting  diplomatic  business  directly  with 
the  President  was  rarely  accorded  to  a  foreign  min- 
ister, not  only  because  the  time  of  the  President  was 
supposed  to  be  already  sufficiently  occupied,  but  also 
because  the  White  House  is  not  an  office  of  record, 
the  custodian  of  the  diplomatic  archives  being  the 
Secretary  of  State,  who  is  the  legal  organ  and  ad- 
viser of  the  President  in  foreign  affairs,  and  who,  by 
reason  of  his  preoccupation  with  the  business  of  his 
own  department,  is  supposed  to  possess  that  mas- 
tery of  its  details  which  is  so  essential  to  the  care  of 
public  as  well  as  of  private  interests.  The  Presi- 
dent, with  his  multifarious  duties  and  responsibili- 
ties, is  certainly  entitled  to  all  the  freedom  of  dis- 
cretion which  the  rulers  of  other  countries  enjoy 
with  regard  to  the  direct  management  of  diplomatic 
business. 

But  without  regard  to  methods,  which  from  time 
to  time  may  change,  there  is  no  doubt  that  the 
importance  of  the  United  States  as  a  factor,  not  in 

265 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

the  "concert  of  Europe,"  but  in  that  wider  concert 
which  embraces  all  civilized  powers,  Eastern  as  well 
as  Western,  is  destined  to  grow.  In  187 1  a  confer- 
ence at  Washington,  presided  over  by  the  Secretary 
of  State,  resulted  in  the  conclusion  of  a  permanent 
truce  between  Spain  and  the  allied  republics  on  the 
west  coast  of  South  America,  thus  formally  ending 
an  unfortunate  conflict  in  the  Western  Hemisphere. 
In  1905  the  whole  world  rings  with  praise  of  the 
President  of  the  United  States,  who,  quick  to  seize 
the  critical  moment,  successfully  interposed  for  the 
termination  of  the  titanic  struggle  between  Russia 
and  Japan  in  the  Far  East.  In  his  triumph  there  was 
no  doubt  a  large  personal  element.  But  it  is  also 
true  that  from  his  fortunate  station  he  was  able  to 
speak  on  this  occasion  with  an  impartial  and  au- 
thoritative benevolence  which  no  other  ruler  could 
invoke.  The  results  afford  a  convincing  proof  of  the 
nation's  power ;  and  not  merely  of  its  power,  but  also 
of  the  exercise  of  that  highest  influence  which  pro- 
ceeds not  so  much  from  material  forces  as  from  the 
pursuit  of  those  elevated  policies  that  have  identified 
American  diplomacy  with  the  cause  of  freedom  and 
justice. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


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Adams,  John  Quincy,  Memoirs,  Comprising  Portions  of  His 
Diary  from  lygs  to  1848.  12  volumes,  Philadelphia, 
1874-1877. 

Allen,  Gardner  W.,  Our  Navy  and  the  Barbary  Corsairs. 
Boston  and  New  York,  1904. 

American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science, 
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Commercial.  Philadelphia,  1899.  The  United  States 
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Bacourt,  Adolphe  de.  Souvenirs  d'un  Diplomate :  Lettres 
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Bancroft,  Frederic,  Life  of  William  H.  Seward.  2  vol- 
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Bancroft,  George,  History  of  the  Formation  of  the  Constitu- 
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Barbe  Marbois,  Francois,  Marquis  de.  The  History  of 
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Essay  on  the  Constitution  and  Government  of  the  United 
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Bemis,  George,  American  Neutrality :  its  Honorable  Past, 
its  Expedient  Future.     Boston,  1866. 

Bernard,  Mountague,  A  Historical  Account  of  the  Neutral- 
ity of  Great  Britain  during  the  American  Civil  War. 
London,  1870. 

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AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

Channing  and  Hart,  Guide  to  the  Study  of  American 
History.     Boston,  1897. 

Compilation  of  Reports  of  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations, 
United  States  Senate,  lySg-igoi.  Senate  Executive 
Documents,  231,  56th  Congress,  2d  Session,  pts.  i 
to  8. 

CusHiNG,  Caleb,  The  Treaty  of  Washington :  its  Negotia- 
tion, Execution,  and  the  Discussions  relating  thereto. 
New  York,  1873. 

DoNiOL,  Henri,  Histoire  de  la  Participation  de  la  France  it 
I'Etablissement  des  Etats- Unis  d'Am^rique.  Correspond- 
ance  Diplomatique  et  Documents.  5  volumes,  Paris, 
1886-1892. 

Foster,  John  Watson,  A  Century  of  American  Diplomacy, 

iyy6-i8y6.     Boston,  1900. 
American  Diplomacy  in  the  Orient.     Boston,  1903, 

Hart,  Albert  Bushnell,  Hand-book  of  the  History,  Diplo- 
macy, and  Government  of  the  United  States.  Cambridge, 
1901. 

The  Foundations  of  American  Foreign  Policy.     New 

York,  1 90 1. 

Henderson,  John  B.,  Jr.,  American  Diplomatic  Questions. 
New  York,  1901. 

Latane,  John  Holladay,  The  Diplomatic  Relations  of  the 
United  States  and  Spanish  America.     Baltimore,  1900. 

Lyman,  Theodore,  The  Diplomacy  of  the  United  States, 
being  an  Account  of  the  Foreign  Relations  of  the  Country, 
from  the  first  Treaty  with  France  in  1778.  2d  edition, 
2  volumes,  Boston,  1828. 

Mahan,  Alfred  Thayer,  The  Problem  of  Asia  and  its 
Effect  on  International  Policies.     Boston,  1900. 

Moore,  John  Bassett,  History  and  Digest  of  the  Interna- 
tional Arbitrations  to  which  the  United  States  has  been  a 
268 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Party,  together  with  Appendices  Containing  the  Treaties 
Relating  to  Such  Arbitrations,  and  Historical  and  Legal 
Notes  on  Other  International  Arbitrations  Ancient  and 
Modern,  and  on  the  Domestic  Commissions  of  the 
United  States  for  the  Adjustment  of  International  Claims. 
6  volumes,  Washington,  1898. 

Moore,  John  Bassett,  A  Treatise  on  Extradition  and  In- 
terstate Rendition.     2  volumes,  Boston,  1891. 

A  Digest  of  International  Law.    In  press. 

Petin,  Hector,  Les  Etats-Unis  et  la  Doctrine  de  Monroe. 
Paris,  1 90 1. 

Reddaway,  William  Fiddian,  The  Monroe  Doctrine.  Cam- 
bridge, England,  1898. 

Rhodes,  James  Ford,  History  of  the  United  States  from  the 
Compromise  of  18^0.  5  volumes.  New  York,  1893- 
1901. 

Richardson,  James  D.,  compiler,  A  Compilation  of  the 
Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  lySg-iSgj.  10 
volumes,  Washington,  1896-1899. 

Roosevelt,  Theodore,  The  Winning  of  the  West,  I76g- 
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Rush,  Richard,  Memoranda  of  a  Residence  at  the  Court  of 
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Schouler,  James,  History  of  the  United  States  of  America 
under  the  Constitution.  Revised  edition,  6  volumes. 
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Schuyler,  Eugene,  American  Diplomacy  and  the  Further- 
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Trescot,  William  Henry,  The  Diplomacy  of  the  Revolu- 
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Trescot,  William  Henry,  The  Diplomatic  History  of  the 
Administrations  of  Washington  and  Adams,  lySg-iSoi. 
Boston,  1857. 

Tucker,  George  Fox,  The  Monroe  Doctrine:  a  Concise 
History  of  its  Origin  and  Growth.     Boston,  1885. 

Wharton,  Francis,  A  Digest  of  the  International  Law  of 
the  United  States.     3  volumes,  Washington,  1887. 

Wh EATON,  Henry,  History  of  the  Law  of  Nations  in  Europe 
and  America  from,  the  Earliest  Times  to  1842.  New 
York,  1845. 

WiNsoR,  Justin,  The  Mississippi  Basin:  the  Struggle  in 
America  between  England  and  France,  idgy-iyd^. 
Boston,  1895. 

The  Westward  Movement :  the  Colonies  and  the  Re- 
public West  of  the  Alleghanies,  iy6j-iyg8.  Boston, 
1897. 

Woolsey,  Theodore  Salisbury,  America's  Foreign  Policy : 
Essays  and  Addresses.     New  York,  1898. 

The  collected  works  of  American  statesmen,  and  es- 
pecially those  of  Washington,  John  Adams,  Jefferson, 
Franklin,  Hamilton,  Madison,  Monroe,  Gallatin,  Webster, 
Calhoun,  Seward,  Summer. 


INDEX 


Aberdeen,  Lord,  proposal  as 
to  Venezuelan  boundary,i52, 

153- 

Adams,  Charles  Francis,  minis- 
ter to  England,  185;  arbi- 
trator at  Geneva,  210. 

Adams,  Henry,  History  of  the 
United  States,  267. 

Adams,  John,  voyages  to 
Europe,  16;  negotiations  in 
the  Netherlands,  24, 27 ;  peace 
commissioner,  27-29,  ^t,;  de- 
mands as  to  fisheries,  28, 
29,  88-90;  attitude  towards 
France,    29,   30;     advocates 

Eayment  of  debts,  29;  up- 
olds  policy  of  non-inter- 
vention, 132,  133;  minister 
to  England,  34;  commission- 
ed to  treat  with  Barbary 
powers,  64;  seeks  to  negoti- 
ate with  France,  57-59;  dec- 
laration as  to  honest  dealing, 

254- 
Adams,  John  Quincy,  outlines 
Monroe  Doctrine,  148-152; 
position  as  to  Cuba,  243;  ac- 
quisition of  Floridas,  232;  at- 
tempts to  acquire  Texas, 
233;  on  policy  of  reciprocity, 
107;  opposes  commercial  re- 
strictions, 113,  114,  118; 
maintains  claims  as  to  the 
fisheries,  91;  supports  policy 
of  non-intervention,  135;  op- 
poses   claim    of    visit    and 


search,  76,  77;  advocates  ex- 
emption of  private  property 
at    sea    from    capture,    61; 
memoirs,  267. 
Aix-la-Chapelle,    Congress    of, 

144- 
Alabama,      the.      Confederate 
cruiser,  story  of  escape,  50, 

52- 

Alabama  claims,  arbitration, 
209-212;  pa5niient,  49-51. 

Alaska,  cession,  98,  236;  fur- 
seal  question,  98;  boundary, 
213,  219. 

Alexander  I.  of  Russia,  ukase 
of  1821,  98,  150. 

Algiers,  regency  of,  64,  65; 
treaty  of  1795,  68;  capture 
of  American  vessels,  66,  67; 
war     with    United     States, 

71- 

Aliens,  removal  of  disabilities 
of,  Zi. 

Allen,  Gardner  W.,  history  of 
Barbary  corsairs,  267. 

Allegiance,  indelible,  73,  171, 
178,  186,  190,  191.  See  Ex- 
patriation. 

Allianga,  the  American  steam- 
er, fired  on,  80,  81. 

Alliance  with  France,  12, 13, 14, 
224. 

Alverstone,   Lord,   decision  on 

'   Alaskan  boundary,  214. 

Amazon  River,  free  navigation, 
83. 


271 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 


Ambassadors,  appointment  of, 
263. 

American  diplomacy,  begin- 
nings, I,  5, 9, 14; "  Committee 
of  Secret  Correspondence,"  5 ; 
"department  of  foreign  af- 
fairs," 5  n. ;  "Secretary  of 
Foreign  Affairs,"  5  n. ;  plan  of 
treaty  with  France,  6;  first 
diplomatic  communication, 
ID,  11;  hardships  of  early  rep- 
resentatives, 14-17;  treaty  of 
1782,  29;  foundation  of  sys- 
tem of  neutrality,  49 ;  struggle 
for  neutral  rights,  53;  policy 
of  non-intervention,  131; 
principle  of  religious  liberty, 
133-135;  influence  and  ten- 
dencies, 248;  opposition  to 
monopoly,  251;  principle  of 
legality,  251;  practicality, 
253;  simplicity  and  candor, 
254-261;  tendency  towards 
conformity,  261 ;  co-operation 
for  common  ends,  261,  262; 
creation  of  ambassadorial 
office,  263;  growth  of  influ- 
ence, 265,  266;  mediation  be- 
tween Russia  and  Japan,  266. 

American  Revolution,  signifi- 
cance, 2,  3,  7,  248,  249;  atti- 
tude of  European  powers,  7, 
17-19. 

American  statesmen,  practical- 
ity, 37,  44. 

Amiens,  Peace  of,  59^ 

Annexation.  See  Expansion, 
Territorial. 

Anstey,  John,  arbitrator  under 
Jay  treaty,  205. 

Aranda,  Count  d',  Spanish  am- 
bassador at  Madrid,  18. 

Arbitration,  international.  See 
International  arbitration. 

Arbitrators,  mode  of  choosing, 
205. 

Argentine  Confederation,  ex- 
ploration of  rivers,  85. 

Armed  neutrality,  55. 


Articles  of  Confederation,  224. 

Ashburton,  Lord,  negotiations 
with  Webster,  74. 

Astor,  John  Jacob,  settlement 
at  Astoria,  235. 

Atherton,  Sir  W.,  opinion  as  to 
the  Alabama,  52. 

Aulick,  Commodore,  empower- 
ed to  negotiate  with  Japan, 
127. 

Austria,  attitude  towards  Amer- 
ican Revolution,  19;  mission 
of  William  Lee,  14,  15;  case 
of  Martin  Koszta,   195-199. 

Award,  waiver  of,  208. 

Bacourt,  Adolphe  de,  me- 
moirs, 267. 

Bainbridge,  Commodore,  war 
with  Algiers,  71. 

Bancroft,  Frederic,  Life  of 
Seward,  267. 

Bancroft,  George,  minister  to 
England,  1 74 ;  special  mission 
to  Spain,  245;  conclusion  of 
naturalization  treaties,  188; 
History  of  Formation  of  Con- 
stitution, 267. 

Banks,  N.  P.,  report  on  ex- 
patriation, 186. 

Barbary  powers,  depredations 
of  corsairs,  64-72,  267;  aboli- 
tion of  tribute,  7 1 ;  declara- 
tions as  to  religious  liberty, 

Barb6  Marbois,  the  Louisiana 
cession,  229,  267. 

Bates,  Joshua,  arbitrator  under 
treaty  of  1853,  209. 

Bathurst,  Lord,  position  as  to 
the  fisheries,  91. 

Bayard,  T.  F.,  fisheries  treaty, 
96;  proposal  of  co-operation 
for  protection  of  fur-seals, 
99;  Samoan  conference,  240; 
first  American  ambassador, 
153.  263. 

Bays,  meaning  of,  in  conven- 
tion of  1818,  93,  95,  96. 


272 


INDEX 


Beaumarchais,  9. 

Belligerent  rights,  efforts  to 
limit,  34. 

Belmont,  August,  minister  to 
the  Netherlands,  259. 

Bemis,  George,  on  American 
neutrality,  267. 

Bering  Sea  controversy,  97- 
104;  cession  of  Alaska,  98; 
seizure  of  Canadian  sealers, 
99 ;  suggestion  of  Mr.  Phelps, 
99;  contentions  of  Mr. 
Blaine,  100;  treaty  of  arbi- 
tration, 100,  212;  award, 
loi,  212,  213;  damages,  104. 

Berlin  decree,  57,  60. 

Bermuda  Islands,  renunciation 
of  France,  13. 

Bernard,  Mountague,  on  neu- 
trality, 267;  member  of  joint 
high  commission  of  1871,210; 
assistant  British  counsel  at 
Geneva,  211. 

Biddle,  Commodore,  visit  to 
Japan,  126. 

Bismarck,  friendly  attitude  on 
natvu^alization  question,  188; 
Samoan  policy,  240,  241. 

Black,  J.  S.,  on  expatriation, 
179. 

Blame,  James  G.,  Bering  Sea 
contentions,  100;  invitations 
for  Pan-American  Congress, 
216, 217. 

Blanco,  General,  succeeds  Gen- 
eral Weylerin  Cuba,  141. 

Blockades,  law  as  to,  53,  60,  61. 

Blodgett,  Henry  W.,  counsel  in 
Bering  Sea  arbitration,  213. 

Bolivia  concedes  free  navi- 
gation of  Amazon  and  La 
Plata,  83,  84. 

Brazil, independence,  112;  navi- 
gation of  Amazon  and  Para- 
guay, 83,  85. 
Brewer,  Mr.  Justice,  president 
of  Venezuelan  boundary  com- 
mission, 156. 
Brillon,     Madame,    introduces 


Lord  Cholmondeley  to  Frank- 
lin, 25. 

British  West  Indies,  trade  with, 
106,  109-111,  113. 

Brooks  or  Midway  Islands,  ac- 
quisition of,  241. 

Bryant,  William  CuUen,  de- 
scription of  Genet,  48. 

Buchanan,  James,  proposals  for 
annexation  of  Cuba,  243;  ad- 
vanced position  as  to  expatri- 
ation, 174;  controversy  as  to 
diplomatic  dress,  258,  260. 

Buenos  Ayres,  State  of,  re- 
actionary policy,  84. 

Burgoyne,  effect  of  surrender 
at  Saratoga,  9. 

Burlingame,  Anson,  career  in 
China,  124. 

Cables,  submarine,  convention 
for  protection,  262. 

Calhoun,  John  C,  views  on 
Canning  -  Rush  correspond- 
ence,  148. 

Canada,  acquired  by  Great 
Britain,  7;  question  as  to 
annexation  by  United  States, 
27,  28,  224,  242. 

Canal.     See  Interoceanic  canal. 

Canning,  George,  attitude  tow- 
ards Holy  Alliance,  146; 
proposals  to  Rush,  146,  147. 

Canton,  trade  with,  119,  121, 
122. 

Cape  Breton,  island  of,  7. 

Caramanly,  Jusuf,  Bashaw  of 
Tripoli,  character  and  policy, 
68,69. 

Carmichael,  William,  service  in 
France,  19,  20;  mission  to 
Spain,  14. 

Carter,  James  C,  cotmsel  before 
Bering  Sea  tribunal,  213. 

Cass,  Lewis,  declaration  as  to 
religious  liberty,  135;  in- 
structions as  to  expatriation, 
182,  183. 

Castlereagh,  Lord,  attitude  tow- 


18 


273 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 


ards  Holy  Alliance,  146;  com- 
mercial proposals,  113. 

Catherine  II.  of  Russia,  dis- 
missal of  Genet,  38;  declara- 
tion of  neutral  rights,  54,  55. 

Chamberlain,  Joseph,  fisheries 
treaty,  96. 

China,  trade  with,  119,  122; 
treaty  of  1844  with  United 
States,  123,  124;  American 
policy,  123-125;  Burlingame 
mission,  124;  co-operation  of 
powers,  262;  support  of  in- 
dependence, 251. 

Cholmondeley,  Lord,  interme- 
diary between  Franklin  and 
Shelbume,  25. 

Citizenship.  5e^  Expatriation ; 
also.  Allegiance,  indelible. 

Clay,  Henry,  exemption  of  pri- 
vate property  at  sea,  61; 
navigation  of  rivers  and 
canals,  82,  83;  answer  to 
Kossuth's  appeal,  138. 

Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  82. 

Cleveland,  Grover,  retaliatory 
proposal  as  to  fisheries,  p7; 
order  for  release  of  Canadian 
sealers,  99;  invocation  of 
Monroe  Doctrine  in  Vene- 
zuelan boundary  dispute, 
152-157;  suggestion  of  inter- 
vention in  Cuba,  140. 

Cockburn,  Sir  Alexander,  arbi- 
trator at  Geneva,  210. 

Cohen,  Arthur,  assistant  coun- 
sel at  Geneva,  211. 

Colonial  monopoly,  contest 
with,  2,  3,  12,  105,  112,  113, 
223,  224. 

Colonization,  meaning  of  term, 

151- 
Columbia,     arbitrations    with, 

215-   . 
Columbia  River,  discovery  of, 

119,  120,  234. 
Commerce,  pursuit  of,  63,  65; 

restrictions  upon,   105-130; 

policy  of  reciprocityjio6, 107; 


most  -  favored  -  nation  prin- 
ciple, 12. 

Commercial  intercourse  with 
Canada,  27,  31,  32. 

Commercial  restrictions,  con- 
test with,  105-130. 

"  Committee  of  Secret  Corre- 
spondence," 5,  24. 

"  Committee  of  Foreign  Af- 
fairs," 5  n. 

Confederation,  inefficiency,  34, 

35- 

Confederate  cruisers,  49,  50. 

Congress,  Continental.  See 
Continental  Congress. 

Congress,  United  States,  reso- 
lution of  1890  in  favor  of  in- 
ternational arbitration,  218. 

Conscience,  liberty  of,  33. 

Consular  service,  American, 
usefulness  in  extension  of 
commerce,  253,  254. 

Contraband,  law  of,  53,  54,  61, 
62;  provisions,  54;  decree  of 
French  convention,  55,  56; 
British  orders  in  council,  56. 

Continental  Congress,  manage- 
ment of  foreign  affairs,  5; 
plan  of  treaties,  6;  drawing 
of  bills  on  Jay,  18. 

Continuous  voyages,  doctrine 
of,  60. 

Corea,  opening  to  trade,  130. 

Correspondence,  Committee  of 
Secret.  See  "Committee  of 
Secret   Correspondence." 

Costa  Rica,  arbitrations  with, 

215- 
Costello  and  Warren,  case  of, 

184. 
Courcel,    Baron    Alphonse   de, 

Bering  Sea  arbitrator,  213. 
Creole,  the,  case  of,  209. 
Cuba,  views  of  Jefferson,  162; 

attempts  at  annexation,  243, 

244;    intervention    in,    139- 

142. 
Culebra  and  Culebrita,  attempt 

to  annex,  245. 


274 


INDEX 


Gushing,  Caleb,  envoy  to  China, 
122;  views  on  expatriation, 
176;  counsel  at  Geneva,  210, 
268. 

Dana,  Francis,  mission  to 
Russia,  15,  19. 

Danish  West  Indies,  attempts 
to  annex,  246. 

Dauphin,  the,  an  American 
ship,  seized  by  Algerine 
cruiser,  66. 

Davis,  J.  C.  B.,  American  agent 
at  Geneva,  210. 

Deane,  Silas,  secret  agent  to 
France,  5,  6;  surrender  as 
a  rebel  demanded,  15;  com- 
missioner to  France,  8. 

Debts,  confiscated,  engagement 
to  pay,  28,  29,  34. 

Decatur,  Commodore,  dealings 
with  Barbary  powers,  70,  71. 

Declaration  of  Independence, 
2,  6,  168,  248,  250,  251. 

Declaration  of  intention.  See 
Naturalization . 

Declaration  of  Paris,  61. 

Denmark,  claim  to  monopolize 
fisheries,  87  ;  abolition  of 
sound  dues,  81,  82;  question 
of  ceding  West  India  posses- 
sions, 246;  arbitrations,  215. 

"  Department  of  foreign  af- 
fairs," 5  n. 

Dickinson,  John,  member  of 
"  Committee  of  Secret  Corre- 
spondence," 6. 

Diplomacy,  American.  See 
American  diplomacy. 

Diplomacy,  element  of  chance, 
25;    questionable    practices. 

Diplomatic  dress,  controver- 
sies concerning,  257-261. 

Diplomatic  life,  15. 

Directory,  French,  refusal  to 
receive  Pinckney,  57-59. 

Discriminating  duties,  abolition 
of,  12,  117-119. 


Divine  right,  jsrinciple  of,  4. 

Dogger  Bank  incident,  220. 

Dominican  republic.  See  Santo 
Domingo. 

Doniol,  French  and  American 
relations,  268. 

Dress,  diplomatic.  See  Diplo- 
matic dress. 

"Due  diligence,"  test  of  neu- 
tral duty,  50. 

Dumas,  C.  W.  F.,  his  services 
to  the  United  States,  21-25. 

Dupuy  de  Lome,  Senor,  Span- 
ish minister,  his  withdrawal. 

Duties,  discriminating.  See 
Discriminating  duties. 

Eaton,  General  William, 
capture  of  Deme,  70. 

Ecuador,  arbitrations  with,  215. 

Elgin,  Lord,  reciprocity  and 
fisheries  treaty,  93,  94. 

Elliot,  Hugh,  Britisn  minister 
at  Berlin,  theft  of  Arthur 
Lee's  papers,  19-23. 

Embargoes,  61. 

Emory,  Frederic,  development 
of  consular  reports,  254. 

Empress  of  China,  American 
ship,  arrival  at  Canton,  1784, 
119. 

England.     See  Great  Britain. 

Etiquette,  diplomatic,  contro- 
versies as  to,  255,  2^7. 

European  powers,  attitude  of, 
towards  American  Revolu- 
tion, 1 7-1 p. 

Eustis,  William,  captured  on 
the  Trent,  74. 

Evarts,  William  M.,  counsel  at 
Geneva ,  210;  establishment 
of  consular  reports,  254. 

Everett,  A.  H.,  empowered  to 
negotiate  with  Japan,  126. 

Everett,  Edward,  views  on  ex- 
patriation, 175. 

Expansion,  territorial,  of  the 
United  States,  13,  223-247; 


275 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 


Alaska,  236;  Brooks  or  Mid- 
way Islands,  241;  California 
and  New  Mexico,  235;  Flor- 
idas,  232;  Guano  Islands, 
242 ;  Hawaii,  237 ;  Horse-Shoe 
Reef,  241;  Louisiana,  225- 
231;  Mesilla  Valley,  236;  Ore- 
gon, 234;  Panaraa  Canal 
Strip,  241;  Philippines  and 
Porto  Rico,  238,  239;  Texas, 
231,  232;  Tutuila,  239,  240; 
Wake  Island,  242 ;  Unsuccess- 
ful attempts,  242-247;  Can- 
ada, 242;  Cuba,  243,  244; 
Culebra  and  Culebrita,  245, 
246 ;  Danish  West  Indies,  246 ; 
Mole  St.  Nicolas,  247;  Salva- 
dor, 242;  Santo  Domingo, 
244,  245;  Yucatan,  244. 

Expatriation,  doctrine  of,  168; 
meaning  of,  169,  191,  192, 
194;  attitude  of  courts,  171; 
of  Secretaries  of  State,  172; 
Buchanan's  innovation,  174, 
175,  181,  182;  views  of  Web- 
ster, Everett,  and  Marcy, 
175;  Cushing's  opinion,  176; 
case  of  Christian  Ernst,  179- 
182;  Black's  opinion,  179, 
193;  Seward's  action,  183; 
case  of  Warren  and  Costello, 
184;  agitation  for  legislation, 
185;  act  of  July,  27,  1868, 
186-188;  treaties,  188,  189; 
subsequent  action,  192-194. 

Extradition,   practice   of,   252. 

Far  East,  trade  with,  119. 
Ferdinand  VII.   of  Spain,  res- 
toration by  France,   146. 
"Fifty -four   forty    or   fight," 

235- 

Fillmore,  Millard,  reception  of 
Kossuth,  138. 

Fish,  Hamilton,  treaty  of  May 
8,  1 87 1,  210;  opposes  inter- 
vention in  Cuba,  140;  advo- 
cates immunity  of  private 
property  at  sea,  61. 


Fisheries,  northeastern,  27,  28, 
30;  treaty  of  1782-83,  88- 
90;  negotiations  at  Ghent, 
90;  seizures  of  vessels,  91; 
"rights"  and  "liberties,"  89- 
93;  convention  of  181 8,  92, 
93;  legislation  and  disputes, 
93;  reciprocity  treaty  of 
1854,  93,  94;  treaty  of  1871, 
94;  Halifax  commission,  94, 
95;  modus  vivendi  of  1885, 
95;  headland  theory,  93,  95; 
meaning  of  "bays,"  93,  95, 
96;  act  of  March  3,  1887,  96; 
Bayard-Chamberlain  treaty, 
96,  99;  modus  vivendi,  97. 

Fisheries  questions,   87-104. 

Florida,  the,  Confederate  cniis- 

^^i  SO- 
Floridas,  acquisition,  163,  225- 

232. 

Foreign  affairs,  committee  for, 
5  n. ;  department  of,  5  «.; 
secretary  of,  5  n. 

Foster,  John  W.,  agent  in 
Bering  Sea  arbitration,  213; 
works  on  American  diplo- 
macy, 268. 

Fox,  Charles  James,  26. 

France,  secret  mission  of  Deane, 
5,  6;  proposed  treaty,  6,  7; 
olaligations  to,  7;  attitude 
towards  American  Revolu- 
tion, 7,  9;  treaties  of  com- 
merce and  alliance,  12-14, 
33,  132,  136;  proposal  of  new 
alliance,  43,  133;  question 
as  to  effect  of  alliance,  42- 
44;  violations  of  neutrality, 
39-42,  56,  59-61;  recall 
of  Genet,  Morris,  and  Mon- 
roe, 47-49,  57;  refusal  to 
receive  Pinckney,  57;  X.  Y. 
Z.  negotiations,  57-59;  rupt- 
ure of  relations,  59;  reacqui- 
sition  of  Louisiana,  225;  op- 
position to  claim  of  visit  and 
search,  76 ;  invasion  of  Spain, 
145;    position   on    expatria- 


276 


INDEX 


tion,  190;  arbitrations,  214, 
215. 

Franklin,  Benjamin,  member 
of  "Committee  of  Secret 
Correspondence,"  6;  solicits 
aid  of  C.  W.  F.  Dumas,  24; 
commissioner  to  France,  8; 
voyage  to  France,  15;  cor- 
respondence with  Shelbume, 
25,  26;  proposals  for  peace, 
27;  opposition  to  claims  of 
loyalists,  28;  position  as  to 
confiscated  debts,  28;  atti- 
tude towards  France,  29-^1; 
commissioned  to  treat  with 
Barbary  powers,  65;  negoti- 
ator of  treaties,  33 ;  advocates 
immvmity  of  private  prop- 
erty at  sea,  61;  dress,  258. 

Frederick   the    Great,    21. 

Freedom,  principle  of,  2,  6. 

Free  port  acts,  113. 

"  Free  ships  free  goods,"  54. 

Frelinghuysen,  F.  T.,  views 
as  to  ambassadorial  rank, 
263. 

French  consuls,  assiimption  of 
admiralty  powers,  44,  45. 

French  Revolution,  attitude  of 
United  States,  35,  36,  143; 
course  of  Gouverneur  Morris, 

37.  38.       .        . 
Fur-seal  arbitration.     See  Ber- 
ing Sea  controversy. 

Gallatin,  Albert,  effort  to 
abolish  commercial  restric- 
tions, 113,  116. 

GenSt,  Edmond  C,  French 
minister  to  United  States, 
38-41,  43.  44;  recall,  44, 
48. 

Geneva  arbitration,  207,  210, 
211. 

Geneva  convention,  262. 

George  III.  advised  to  rec- 
ognize American  indepen- 
dence, 25. 

Germany,  acceptance  of  Mon- 


roe Doctrine,  158,  164; 
Samoan  policy,  240; 

Gerry,  Elbridge,  envoy  to 
France,  57-59. 

Ghent,  treaty  of,  stipulation 
against  slave-trade,  78;  ar- 
bitrations, 208. 

Gibraltar,  Strait  of,  navigation, 
64.  65,  71,  72. 

Glynn,  Commander,  visit  to 
Japan,  126. 

Gore,  Christopher,  arbitrator 
under  Jay  treaty,  204. 

Government,  acts  of,  4. 

Gram,  Gregers,  Bering  Sea 
arbitrator,  213. 

Grant,  U.  S.,  attitude  towards 
Cuba,  140;  attempts  to  annex 
Santo  Domingo,  245. 

Gray,  Captain  Robert,  discov- 
ery of  Columbia  River,  234. 

Great  Britain,  acquisition  of 
Canada  and  the  Island  of 
Cape  Breton,  7 ;  maritime 
supremacy,  1 5 ;  ubiquitous 
agencies  for  obtaining  infor- 
mation, 19;  war  against  the 
Netherlands,  17;  rule  of  war 
of  1756,  59;  peace  of  1782, 
29;  treaties  with,  33;  reten- 
tion of  northern  posts,  34; 
Jay  treaty,  56;  violations  of 
neutral  rights,  56,  59-61; 
trade  with  the  Mediterra- 
nean, 65 ;  trade  excluded  from 
Hanover,  60;  efforts  to  sup- 
press slave-trade,  76;  treaty 
with  China,  122;  attitude 
towards  Holy  Alliance,  145; 
acceptance  of  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, 157,  159;  law  of  alle- 
giance, 178,  179,  184;  natu- 
ralization treaty  with  United 
States,  188,  189;  system  of 
extradition,  252. 

Greeks,  struggle  for  indepen- 
dence, 136. 

Grenville,  Lord,  negotiations 
with  Jay,  no,  202. 


277 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 


Grey  and  Ripon,  Earl  de,  mem- 
ber of  joint  high  commis- 
sion of  187 1,  210. 

Grotius,  principle  of  equality 
of  nations,  131;  classification 
of  contraband,  54. 

Guadalupe-Hidalgo,  treaty  of, 

^  235- 

Guano  Islands,  242. 

Hague  conference,  arbitration 
and  mediation,  219;  con- 
ventions, 262. 

Halifax  commission,  212. 

Hall,  W.  E.,  on  American  neu- 
trality, 46. 

Hamilton,  Alexander,  position 
as  to  Genet's  reception,  39, 
40;  neutrality  circular,  46. 

Hannen,  Lord,  Bering  Sea 
arbitrator,  213. 

Hanover,  law  as  to  allegiance, 
179,  182 ;  exclusion  of  British 
trade,  60. 

Harding,  Sir  John  Dorney, 
escape  of  the  Alabama,  52. 

Harlan,  John  M.,  Bering  Sea 
arbitrator,  212. 

Harris,  Townsend,  consul-gen- 
eral and  rninister  to  Japan, 
129. 

Harrison,  Benjamin,  on  "  Com- 
mittee of  Secret  Correspond- 
ence," 6. 

Hart,  A.  B.,  on  American 
foreign  policy,  268. 

Hay,  John,  canal  treaty,  82; 
memorandum  on  Monroe 
Doctrine,  158;  circular  of  July 
3,  1900,  as  to  China,  125. 

Hayti,  recognition  of,  250;  ar- 
bitrations with,  215;  Mole  St. 
Nicolas,  247. 

Headland  theory,  93,  95. 

Hoar,  E.  R.,  on  joint  high 
commission  of  1871,  210. 

Holy  Alliance,  144-146. 

Hongkong  acquired  by  Eng- 
land, 122. 


Horse-Shoe  Reef,  acquisition, 
241. 

House  of  Commons,  censure  of 
Shelburne,  29;  resolution  on 
arbitration,  218. 

Hudson's  Bay  Company,  arbi- 
tration of  claims,  209. 

Hungary,  struggle  for  inde- 
pendence, 136. 

Impressment,  61,  ^2-75,  173. 

Independence  of  United  States, 
I,  2,  6,  13,  14,  36. 

Indirect  claims,  211. 

Industrial  property  union,  262. 

Ingraham,  Captain,  demand  for 
release  of  Martin  Koszta,  196. 

International  American  Confer- 
ence, First,  217;  Second,  221. 

International  arbitration,  200- 
232;  meaning  of  "arbitra- 
tion," 200,  220;  arbitrations 
with  Great  Britain,  201-213; 
neutral  rights  and  duties, 
204-207 ;  power  to  determine 
jurisdiction,  205,  206;  treaty 
of  Ghent,  208;  Geneva  tri- 
bunal, 210;  Halifax  commis- 
sion, 212;  fur-seal  arbitra- 
tion, 212,  213;  Alaskan  boun- 
dary commission,  213,  219; 
arbitrations  with  Spain,  214; 
France,  214;  Mexico,  215; 
Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  Den- 
mark, Ecuador,  Hayti, 
Nicaragua,  Paraguay,  Peru, 
Portugal,  Salvador,  Santo 
Domingo,  Siam,  Venezuela, 
21^;  summary,  216;  public 
opinion,  216;  Pan-American 
conference,  216,  217;  resolu- 
tion of  Congress  of  1890,  218; 
resolution  of  House  of  Com- 
mons of  1893,  218;  Olney- 
Pauncefote  treaty,  218; 
Hague  conference,  219-221; 
Second  International  Amer- 
ican Conference,  220,  221; 
limitations,  221,  222. 


278 


INDEX 


International  law,  principle  of 
equality  of  nations,  131. 

Interoceanic  canal,  neutraliza- 
tion, 82. 

Intervention,  policy,  13,  131; 
advocated  by  Kossuth,  136; 
Cuba,  139-142. 

Itajuba,  Viscount,  arbitrator  at 
Geneva,  210. 

Italy,  position  on  expatriation, 
190. 

Izard,  Ralph,  mission  to  Tus- 
cany, 14,  19. 

Jackson,  Andrew,  115,  116; 
appointment  of  Edmund 
Roberts,  120;  attempts  to 
acquire  Texas,  233. 

Jackson,  P.  J.,  British  minister, 
256. 

Japan,  opening  to  trade,  126- 
130;  Shimonoseki  indemnity, 
261;  tariff  duties,  261;  peace 
of  Portsmouth,  266. 

Java,  visited  by  Edmiind  Rob- 
erts, 121. 

Jay,  John,  member  of  "Com- 
mittee on  Secret  Correspond- 
ence," 6;  mission  to  Spain, 
14,  16,  18;  peace  commission- 
er, 27-29;  attitude  towards 
France,  29,  30;  treaty  of 
1794,  56,  202;  treaties  signed 

by.  33- 

Jay  treaty,  French  resent- 
ment, 56,  57;  amendments 
by  Senate,  iii,  112;  arbitra- 
tions, 202-207. 

Jeffers,  Lieutenant,  case  of  the 
Water  Witch,  85,  86. 

Jefferson,  Thomas,  declines  mis- 
sion to  France,  8;  attitude 
towards  Barbary  powers,  65, 
67-70;  position  as  to  Genet, 
40,44;  exposition  of  neutral 
duties,  45;  doctrine  of  rec- 
ognition, 143;  policy  of  non- 
intervention, 133;  position  as 
to  Cuba  and  Mexico,  162, 243 ; 


as  to  Louisiana  and  Floridas, 
226;  impressment,  73,  74;  ex- 
patriation, 172;  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, 148;  signer  of  treaties, 
33;  etiquette,  255. 
Joint  high  commission  of  1871, 

2IO. 

Joseph  II.  of  Austria  on 
American  independence,  249. 

Kent,  James,  on  expatriation, 
171,  172,  184. 

Knox,  General,  views  as  to  re- 
ception of  Genet,  39. 

Kossuth,  Louis,  visit  to  United 
States,  136-139. 

Koszta,  Martin,  seizure  at 
Smyrna,   194. 

Laurens,   Henry,  mission  to 

the     Netherlands,     15,     16; 

capture    and   imprisonment, 

16;  peace  signer,  27,  29. 
Laybach,  Congress  of,  144. 
Lee,  Arthur,  mission  to  Prussia, 

15;    theft    of   his   papers   at 

Berlin,  19-23. 
Lee.William,  mission  to  Vienna, 

14, 15,  19;  plan  of  treaty  with 

the  Netherlands,  17. 
Lewis  and  Clark,  expedition  of, 

Liberia,  recognition  of,  250. 

Livingston,  R.  R.,  Secretary  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  5  n.;  Louisi- 
ana purchase,  226-230. 

Loughborough,  Lord  Chancel- 
lor, opinion  on  treaty  ques- 
tion, 206. 

Louis  XVI.  of  France,  coun- 
selled by  Gouveneur  Morris, 
38;  treaties,  40. 

Louisiana  purchase,   225-231. 

Loyalists'  claims  for  compensa- 
tion, 27,  28,  88. 

Macdonald,  Sir  John  A., 
member  of  joint  high  com- 
mission of  1 87 1,  210. 


279 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 


Macdonald,  Thomas,  arbitrator 
under  Jay  treaty,  203. 

McClellan,  Captain  George  B., 
report  on  Samana  Bay,  244. 

McFarland,  Mr.,  captured  on 
the  Trent,  74. 

McKinley,  William,  demands 
restoration  of  order  in  Cuba, 
141;  advocates  immunity  of 
private  property  at  sea,  61; 
statement  concerning  expa- 
triation,  191. 

Madison,  James,  war  message 
of  1812,  74,  173;  importance 
of  the  Mississippi,  225;  in- 
structions as  to  New  Orleans 
and  the  Floridas,  228;  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  148;  sim- 
plicity of  manners,  256,  257. 

Mahan,  Captain,  on  Asiatic 
problem,   268. 

Maine,  the,  destruction  at 
Havana,  141,  142. 

Manila,  visited  by  Edmund 
Roberts,  121;  captured  by 
American  forces,  238. 

Mann,  A.  Dudley,  agent  to 
Hungary,   136. 

Marcy,  William  L.,  treaty  as 
to  reciprocity  and  fisheries, 
93;  extradition  treaties,  252; 
case  of  Martin  Koszta,  194; 
attempt  to  annex  Hawaii, 
237;  views  on  expatriation, 
175;  advocates  immunity  of 
private  property  at  sea,  61; 
circular  as  to  diplomatic 
dress,  258;  declines  to  recom- 
mend appointment  of  am- 
bassadors, 263. 

Mare  clausum,  doctrine  of,  10 1, 
102. 

Maria,  the,  American  schooner 
captured  by  Algerine  cruiser, 
66. 

Marshall,  John,  envoy  to  France, 
57-59;  views  as  to  effect  of 
naturalization,  173;  principle 
of  equality  of  nations,  132. 


Mason,  James  M.,  capture  on 
the  Trent,  74. 

Mason,  John  Y.,  diplomatic 
dress,  259. 

Massachusetts,  legislative  res- 
olution in  favor  of  arbitra- 
tion, 216. 

Mediation,  distinguished  from 
arbitration,  200,  201;  Hague 
convention,  219. 

Mediterranean,  early  trade,  64, 

65- 
Mercury,  the,  captured  by  the 

British,   16. 
Merry,    Mr.,    British   minister, 

255- 

Mexico,  views  of  Jefferson,  162 ; 
war,   235;  arbitrations,   215. 

Mexico,  Gulf  of,  islands  in,  13. 

Midway  Islands.  See  Brooks 
or  Midway  Islands. 

Milan  decree,  57,  60. 

"Millions  for  defence,  but  not 
a  cent  for  tribute,"  59. 

Mississippi  River,  navigation 
of,  18,  90,  225,  227. 

Mole  St.  Nicolas,  attempt  to 
annex,  247. 

Monopolies,  commercial  and 
colonial,  2-4,  105,  112,  113. 

Monroe  Doctrine,  7;  Holy  Al- 
liance, 144;  European  con- 
gresses, 144,  145;  Canning- 
Rush  correspondence,  146; 
Monroe's  message  of  1823, 
149-152,  161-163;  Polk's 
message  of  1845,  ^S^>  ^S^; 
Venezuelan  boundary,  152- 
157;  exposition  by  President 
Roosevelt,  157;  acceptance 
by  Germany,  158;  pecuniary 
claims,  159-161,  165-167; 
Hague  declaration,  164;  case 
of  Santo  Domingo,    164. 

Monroe,  James,  minister  to 
France,  49,  57;  negotiations 
with  England,  113;  Loui- 
siana purchase,  228-230; 
policy  of  non-intervention, 


280 


INDEX 


135;  Monroe  Doctrine,  148- 

152. 

Morgan,  John  T.,  Bering  Sea 
arbitrator,  213. 

Morocco,  early  relations  with, 
64,  66;  system  of  protection, 
262. 

Morris,  Gouvemeur,  agent  to 
London,  109,  1 1 o ;  minister  to 
France,  37,  38,  47,  49. 

Morris,  Robert,  member  of 
"  Committee  of  Secret  Cor- 
respondence," 6. 

Most  -  favored  -  nation  clause, 
12. 

Muscat,  treaty  with,  1833, 121. 

Naples,  popular  movement  in, 

^45- 

Napoleon,  cession  of  Louisiana, 
227,  229;  Berlin  and  Milan 
decrees,  57,  60. 

National  Convention  of  France, 
provision  decree,  55. 

Nationality.    See  Expatriation. 

Natural  rights,  theory  of,  4, 
168,  248. 

Naturalization,  effect  of,  170, 
173,  174,  191,  192;  treaties, 
188,  189;  declaration  of  in- 
tention,  194,   195. 

Navigation  Acts,  32,  107. 

Navy,  early  need  of,  67. 

Nelson,  Samuel,  member  of 
joint  high  commission  of 
1871,  210. 

Netherlands,  mission  of  Laur- 
ens, 15,  16;  treaties,  14,  17, 
33;  war  with  England,  17; 
award  of  King  on  North- 
eastern boundary,  208. 

Neutral  rights,  struggle  for, 
53,  202,  204-207;  blockade, 
53.  54;  contraband,  54;  arm- 
ed neutrality,  54,  55;  viola- 
tions by  France,  55,  57,  59- 
61;  by  Great  Britain,  56,  59- 
61;  rule  of  war  of  1756,  59; 
"continuous    voyages,"    60; 


Berlin  and  Milan  decrees,  60; 
orders  in  council,  60;  im- 
munity of  private  property 
at  sea,  61,  62;  freedom  of 
navigation,  63;  "free  ships 
free  goods,"  54. 

Neutrality,  system  of,  33,  35; 
proclamation,  39-42,  44; 
duties,  45,  46,  204-207; 
legislation,  49;  Alabama 
claims,  49,  50;  due  diligence, 
50;  Bemis's  and  Bernard's 
works,  267.  See  also  Armed 
neutrality;  Neutral  rights. 

Neutralization  of  ways  of  com- 
munication, 82. 

New  Orleans,  right  of  deposit, 
227. 

Nicaragua  arbitrations,    215. 

Nicholl,  Sir  John,  arbitration 
under  Jay  treaty,  205. 

Non-intercourse,  61. 

Non-intervention,     policy     of, 

131-139.  142-144. 

Northcote,  Sir  Stafford,  mem- 
ber of  joint  high  commis- 
sion of  187 1,  210. 

Northeastern  boundary,   208. 

Olney,  Richard,  exposition  of 
Monroe  Doctrine,  153-156; 
general  arbitration  treaty, 
218. 

"Open-door"  policy,  125. 

Orders  in  council, British,  56, 60. 

Oregon,  boundary  settlement, 
234-236. 

O' Sullivan,  John  L.,  minister  to 
Portugal,  259. 

Oswald,  Richard,  peace  nego- 
tiator, 26,  29;  characteristics, 

27. 
Ottoman  Empire,  trade  with, 
119;  expatriation,    191. 

Pacific  Ocean,  meaning  of 
term,  98,   103. 

Page,  Lieutenant,  exploring  ex- 
pedition, 84,  85; 


9S1 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 


Pago-Pago,  Bay  of,  in  Samoa, 
239,  240. 

Palmer,  Sir  Roundell,  opinion 
on  Alabama  case,  52.  See 
also  Sel borne,  Lord. 

Panama,  Repulalic  of,  recogni- 
tion,  144. 

Pan-American  conference.  See 
International  American  Con- 
ference. 

Paraguay,  Republic  of,  case  of 
the  Water  Witch,  85,  86;  ar- 
bitrations, 215. 

Paraguay  River,  navigation  of, 
84-86. 

Parana,  River,  84-86. 

Paris,  Declaration  of.  See  Dec- 
laration of  Paris. 

Passamaquoddy  Bay,  arbitra- 
tion as  to  islands  in,  208. 

Paul    I.   of   Russia,    ukase   of 

'    1799.  97.     . 

Pauncefote,  Sir  Julian,  Olney- 
Pauncefote  treaty,  218;  Hay- 
Pauncefote  treaty,  82. 

Peacock,  U.  S.  S.,  voyage  with 
Edmund  Roberts,  120. 

Perry,  Commodore  M.  C,  treaty 
with  Japan,  127-129. 

Peru,  arbitrations  with,  215. 

Peter  the  Great,  54,  55. 

Petin,  Hector,  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, 269. 

Phelps,  E.  J.,  fur-seal  arbitra- 
tion, 99,  213. 

Philippines,"  open-door"  pol- 
icy, 125. 

Kedmont,  popular  movement 
in,  145- 

Pierce,  Franklin,  desires  an- 
nexation of  Cuba,  243. 

Pinckney,  Charles,  minister  to 
Spain,  228. 

Pinckney,  Charles  Cotesworth, 
minister  to  France,  57-59; 
"millions  for  defence,"  59. 

Pinkney,  William,  arbitrator 
under  Jay  treaty,  205;  nego- 
tiations with  England,   113. 


Piracy,  63,  64,  72,  75;  Barbary 
powers,  64,  65;  attempt  to 
declare  slave-trade  to  be 
piracy,  77;  charge  in  Vir- 
ginius  case,  79,  80. 

Plate  River,  free  navigation,  84. 

Polk,  James  K.,  extends  Mon- 
roe  Doctrine,  151,  152,   164. 

Porcupine  River,  free  naviga- 
tion, 83. 

Portsmouth,  peace  of,  266. 

Portugal,  offer  of  subjugation, 
9;  arbitrations,  215. 

Postal  union,  262. 

Preble,  Commodore,  in  war 
with  Tripoli,  70. 

Prescription,  principle  of,  in 
Venezuelan    boundary    case, 

„  ?56,  157- 

Privateering,  34,  39,  40,  42,  44, 
46. 

Proclamation  of  neutrality,  39- 
42,  44- 

Provisions.     See  Contraband. 

Prussia,  attitude  towards  Amer- 
ican Revolution,  19;  misfort- 
unes of  Arthur  Lee,  15,  20- 
23;  treaty,  61;  exclusion  of 
British  trade  from  Hanover, 
60 ;  invites  co  -  operation 
against  Chinese  pirates,  72; 
law  of  allegiance,  178. 

Puget's  Sound  Agricultural 
Company,  arbitration  of 
claims,  209. 

Quebec  commission  of  1898, 
97- 

Randolph,  Edmund,  views  as 

to  Genet's  reception,  40. 
Rayneval,  visit  to  England,  30. 
Reciprocity,    policy     of,     106, 

107;  with  Hawaii,  237. 
Recognition    of    governments, 

143.  250. 
Red  Cross  ,262.   See  also  Geneva 

convention. 
Religious  liberty,    133-135. 

82 


INDEX 


Reprisal,  frigate,  15,  16. 

Revolution.  5<?^  American  Rev- 
olution; French  Revolution. 

Rights  of  man,  4,  5.  See  also 
Natural  rights. 

Rivers,  free  navigation,  82-85. 

Roberts,  Edmund,  agent  to  Far 
East,  120,  121,  125;  treaty 
with  Siam,  121 ;  with  Muscat, 
121. 

Robinson,  Christopher,  counsel 
in  fur-seal  arbitration,  213. 

Robinson,  W.  E.,  advocates 
doctrine  of  expatriation,  185. 

Rockingham,  Lord,  forms 
British  cabinet,  25,  26. 

Roosevelt,  Theodore,  exposition 
of  Monroe  Doctrine,  157;  ap- 
plication to  Santo  Domingo, 
165;  recognition  of  Panama, 
144;  advocates  immunity  of 
private  property  at  sea,  62; 
good  offices  between  Russia 
and  Japan,  266;  Winning  of 
the  West,  269. 

Rule  of  the  war  of  1756,  59. 

Rush,  Richard,  contest  with 
commercial  restrictions,  113; 
Monroe  Doctrine,  146-148; 
character  as  diplomatist,  147 ; 
memoirs,  268. 

Russborough,  Lord,  at  Berlin, 
22. 

Russell,  Earl,  demand  for  re- 
lease of  Mason  and  Slidell,  74; 
orders  for  detention  of  the 
Alabama,  52,  53. 

Russell,  Sir  Charles,  counsel  in 
fur-seal  arbitration,  213. 

Russia,  attitude  towards  Amer- 
ican Revolution,  19;  mission 
of  Francis  Dana,  15;  aspira- 
tions to  become  a  commer- 
cial power,  55;  arbitration  of 
slave  question,  208;  cession 
of  Alaska,  236;  peace  confer- 
ence at  The  Hague,  219;  posi- 
tion on  expatriation,  191; 
peace  with  Japan,  266. 


St.  Croix   River,  arbitration, 

202,  203. 
St.  Lawrence  River,  free  naviga- 
tion, 83. 
St.    Thomas,    Island    of.      See 

Danish  West  Indies. 
Salisbury,  Lord,  attitude  as  to 

Venezuelan    boundary,    154. 
Salvador,  proposal  of  annexa- 
tion, 242;  arbitrations,   215. 
Samana  Bay,  efforts  to  acquire, 

244. 
Samoa,    policy    towards,    239- 

241 ;    general    act  of  Berlin, 

240;  division  of  islands,  240, 

241. 
Sanford,  Henry  S.,  259. 
San  Jacinto,   the,    capture    of 

the  Trent,  74. 
San    Juan     water     boundary, 

209,   212. 
Santo  Domingo,  recognition  of, 

250;  attempts  to  annex,  244; 

arbitrations,     215  ;     Monroe 

Doctrine,  165. 
Sayre,  Stephen,  companion  of 

Arthur  Lee,  20,  22. 
Schenck,    Robert    C,    member 

of  joint  high  commission  of 

1871,  210. 
Schulenburg,    Cotmt,    Prussian 

minister  of  foreign  affairs,  20. 
Schuyler,     Eugene,     work     on 

American  diplomacy,   268. 
Sclopis,   Count   Frederic,  arbi- 
trator at  Geneva,  210. 
Seals.   See  Fur-seal  arbitration. 
Search,  right  of,  63.     See  also 

Visit  and  search. 
Seas,  freedom  of,  63,  72-81. 
Selbome,     Lord,     counsel     at 

Geneva,  210.  See  also  ^ohner. 

Sir  Roundell. 
Seminole  war,  232. 
Senate,  United  States,  amends 

Jay  treaty,    1 1 1 ;   opposition 

to  visit  and  search,    77,  78; 

debates    fisheries    treaty    in 

open  session,  97. 


283 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 


Seven  Years'  War,  7. 

Seward,  F.  W.,  mission  to  Santo 
Domingo,  244. 

Seward,  W.  H.,  on  release  of 
Mason  and  Slidell,  75;  Mon- 
roe Doctrine,  160,  161,  163. 

Shelbume,  Lord,  friendly  dis- 
position towards  America, 
25-27,  29;  censured  for  peace 
treaty,  29. 

Shenandoah,  Confederate  cruis- 

?^'  50-      .     . 

Shimonoseki    indemnity,     261. 

Shufeldt,  Commodore,  treaty 
with  Corea,  130. 

Siam,  treaty  with,  121;  arbitra- 
tion, 215. 

Slavery,  effect  on  diplomatic 
action,  250;  claims  for  carry- 
ing away  of  slaves,  208;  ef- 
forts to  suppress  slave-trade, 

75-79- 

Slidell,  John,  captured  on  the 
Trent,  74. 

Somers,  fate  of,  70. 

Sound  dues.    See  Denmark. 

Spain,  attitude  towards  Ameri- 
can Revolution ,  17,  18;  navi- 
gation of  the  Mississippi,  18, 
225 ;  efforts  to  obtain  her  alli- 
ance, 14,15;  cession  of  Louisi- 
ana to  France,  225;  relations 
with  Barbary  powers,  65,  66; 
invasion  by  France,  145,  146; 
cases  of  Virginius  and  Alli- 
anga,  79-81;  arbitrations, 
214. 

Spanish  America,  revolt  in, 
112. 

Spanish  peace  conference  of 
1870-71,  266. 

Staempfli,  Jacques,  arbitrator 
at  Geneva,  210. 

Steinberger,  A.  B.,  agent  to 
Samoa,  239. 

Stikine  River,  free  navigation. 

Story,  Joseph,  on  expatriation, 
171,  184. 


Stowell,  Lord,  on  claim  of  visit 
and  search,  76 

Suffolk,  Earl  of,  British  foreign 
secretary,   19. 

Sumner,  Charles,  amendment 
of  expatriation  bill,   187. 

Swaley,  Maurice,  arbitrator  un- 
der Jay  treaty,  205. 

Switzerland,  position  on  ex- 
patriation, 190. 

Talleyrand,  treatment  of 
American  envoys,  57-59; 
Louisiana   cession,    226-230. 

Tenterden,  Lord,  British  agent 
at  Geneva,  210. 

Texas,  annexation,  232,  233. 

Tezkereh,  travel -pass  in  Tur- 
key, 198. 

Thompson,  Sir  John,  Bering 
Sea  arbitrator,  213. 

Thornton,  Sir  Edward,  nego- 
tiator of  treaty  of  Washing- 
ton, 210. 

Tornado,  the,  capture  of  the 
Virginius,  79. 

Treaties,  plan  of  Continental 
Congress,  6,  8,  9;  prior  to 
Constitution,  33;  most  -  fa- 
vored-nation principle,  12; 
change  of  government,  40; 
Algiers,  68,  71;  Bolivia,  83, 
84;  China:  1844,  123;  1858, 
1868,  134,  135,  251;  Corea, 
130;  France:  commerce  and 
alliance  of  1778,  12-14,  35» 
39,  40,  42,  44,  107,  108; 
Germany,  as  to  Samoan  Isl- 
ands, 240;  Great  Britain: 
peace  of  1782-83,  29-31, 
88-90;  Jay  treaty,  56-57. 
no,  III,  202,  252;  of  1802, 
204;  of  Ghent,  78;  of  com- 
merce, 1815,118;  convention 
of  18 18,  92,  93;  Webster- Ash- 
burton,  78,  252,  253;  reciproc- 
ity and  fisheries  of  1854,  83, 
93;  of  Washington,  1871,  83, 
94,  210;  arbitration  as  to  fur 


284 


INDEX 


seals,  loo,  104;  Hawaii,  237; 
Japan,  128,  129,  135;  Mexico, 
235;  Morocco,  66,  262;  Mus- 
cat, 121;  Netherlands,  14; 
Panama,  241;  Paraguay,  86; 
Prussia  61;  Samoa,  239,  240; 
Siam,  121,  13s;  Spain,  232; 
Tripoli,  68,  134;  Tunis,  68; 
Turkey,  119;  protection  of 
submarine  cables,  262;  in- 
dustrial property, ibid.;  postal 
union,  ibid.;  Hague  conven- 
tions, ibid.;  naturalization, 
188,  189. 

Trent,  the,  case  of,  74. 

Trescot,  W.  H.,  works  on 
American  diplomacy,  269, 
270. 

Tripoli,  relations  with,  64,  68- 

70.  134. 

Trist,  Nicholas  P.,  treaty  of 
Guadalupe-Hidalgo,  235. 

Troppau,  congress  of,  144. 

Trumbull,  John,  arbitrator  un- 
der Jay  treaty,  205. 

Tucker,  George  P.,  on  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine,  270. 

Tunis,   relations  with,   64,  68. 

Tupper,  Sir  C.  H.,  agent  in  fur- 
seal  arbitration,  213. 

Turkey,  case  of  Martin  Kosz- 
ta,  195-197;  expatriation, 
191.  See  also  Ottoman  Em- 
pire. 

Tuscany,   14,  19. 

Tutuila,  acquisition  of,  239. 

Tuyl,  Baron,  Russian  minister, 
151- 

Ukases,  Russian,  97,  98. 

United  States,  founds  system 
of  neutrality,  35,  36,  46;  at- 
titude towards  French  Rev- 
olution, 36,  37;  contest  with 
commercial  restrictions,  108; 
early  trade  with  Mediterra- 
nean, 65,  66,  69,  70;  co-opera- 
tion against  piracy,  7  2 ;  resist- 
ance  to  claim  of  visit  and 


search,  75-81;  abolition  of 
Danish  sound  dues,  81. 

Urquiza,  General,  decrees  free 
navigation  of  Parana  and 
Uruguay,  84. 

Uruguay  River,  free  naviga- 
tion of,  84. 

Van  Berckel,  negotiations 
with  William  Lee,  17. 

Van  Buren,  Martin,  rejection 
as  minister  to  England,  115— 
117;  declines  overture  for  an- 
nexation of  Texas,  233. 

Vattel,  principle  of  equality  of 
nations,   131. 

Venezuela,  botuidary  dispute, 
152-157;  Anglo  -  German 
blockade,  157-159;  arbitra- 
tions,  215. 

Vergennes,  French  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  8,  29-31,  38. 

Verona,  congress  of,  145. 

Vestal,   the,   capture  of,    16. 

Vienna,  congress  of,  8^. 

Virginius,  the,  capture  and  re- 
lease, 79,  80. 

Visconti  Venosta,  Marquis 
Emilio,  Bering  Sea  arbitra- 
tor, 213. 

Visit  and  search,  opposition  to 
claim  of,  34,  63,  72-75,  75- 
78,  81. 

Waite,  Morrison  R.,  counsel 

at  Geneva,  210. 
Wake  Island,  acquisition,  242. 
Walker,   Robert  J.,  statement 

as  to  Alaska,  236. 
War,   with  Algiers,   71;   Great 

Britain,     74;     Mexico,     235; 

Seminoles,   232;  Tripoli,   69, 

70 ;  mitigation  of  evils,  33,  34. 
Warren  and  Costello,  case  of, 

184. 
Washington,    George,    attitude 

towards  French  Revolution, 

36,  37,  39;  reception  of  GenSt, 
I      40;    proclamation    of    neu- 

85 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 


trail ty,  40-42 ;  instructions  to 
Gouvemeur  Morris,  109;  Jay 
mission,  56, 202 ;  Farewell  Ad- 
dress, 133,  162. 
Water  Witch,  the,  firing  upon, 

85- 

Weoster,  Daniel,  views  on  im- 
pressment, 74;  expatriation, 
175  ;  Webster  -  Ashburton 
treaty,  252. 

West  Florida.   See  Floridas,  the. 

West  Indies  offered  to  Spain,  g. 

Weyler,  General,  policy  of  con- 
centration, 141. 

Wickes,  Captain,  commander 
of  the  Reprisal,  16. 


Wilkes,  Captain,  seizure  of 
Mason  and  Slidell,  74. 

Williams,  George  H.,  amend- 
ment of  expatriation  bill,  188; 
member  of  joint  high  com- 
mission of  1871,  210. 

X.  Y.  Z.  episode,  57-59. 

Yucatan,  proposal  to  occupy, 

244. 
Yukon  River,  free  navigation, 

83. 

Zegelin,  Herr,  Prussian  diplo- 
matist, 20. 


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